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Abstract
The nineties were a hectic period for many policy makers around the world in respect-of
payment systems reforms. The increased attention to payment system issues was brought
about by the following trends: (i) increased cross-border competition, innovations, and
new communication and information technologies; (ii) the financial and political
integration and changing processes in European Union and Countries in Transition.
The purpose of this thesis is threefold. Firstly, it seeks to define and critically assess the
major payment system developments and problems around the world with a view of
advancing the understanding of the payment system matters. Secondly, it presents
empirical evidence on payment systems similarities, and differences, across countries.
This serves as a basis for recommendations about payment system reforms in Countries
in Transition. Thirdly, it emphasises and investigates the institutional aspects of payment
systems in different groups of countries.
The research finds that payment systems around the world are different, but there are
some universal themes and values that can serve as a basis for countries that are
reforming their payment systems. The particular recommendations for public policy
relate to need for greater: (i) payment system providers and instruments competition; (ii)
payment system and monetary policy co-ordination; (iii) emphasis on financial stability.
xiv
Payment Systems Reforms	 Introduction
1. Introduction
1.1	 Requisite for the research
There is currently an increased focus on the payment system issues which reflect
both political changes and economic development around the world. For the countries
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, rebuilding the payment systems is of
foremost importance for supporting the establishment of the market economies. These
countries are interested in fundamental questions of payment system policy and design.
The European Union countries are also interested in some basic payment system issues
as a result of the efforts being made towards establishing the monetary union. At the
same time, central banks in G-10 countries have continued to emphasise the importance
of controlling and reducing payment and settlement risks in global financial markets
(Greenspan 1996). Furthermore, the development of new electronic banking and
payment products, the introduction of electronic cash, payment mechanisms for the
Internet, and new versions of home banking are all contributing to the growing world-
wide interest in payment system issues.
"A country's payment system is what makes its real and financial markets
work... when commodities are exchanged for cash, cheque, giro, credit card, or debit
card payments — rather than other commodities - trade expands as transaction costs fall
and production specialisation increases" (Humphrey, Pulley, Vesala 1996). An efficient
payment system, in which transferability of claims is effected in full and on time, is a
prerequisite for an efficient macroeconomy ... similarly, disruptions in the payment
system result in disruptions in aggregate economic activity" (Benston and Kaufman
1994). "Payment system is the lifeblood of an economy that carries the essential
messages without which our complex economy would break down, just as the human
body would cease to function if the circulatory system did not get the oxygen to the
right place at the right time" (Rivlin 1998).
• In general, payment systems can preserve or undermine the public trust and
confidence in financial systems and thus are under a close public policy scrutiny with a
view to guarding financial stability.
1
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The stability and efficient working of the banking system is tied to the integrity
of the payment system (Blommestein 1993). An efficient payment system is essential
for efficient functioning of competitive money and capital markets and monetary
control - the prerequisites for the creation of a fully-fledged market-based financial
system. Furthermore, the payment system is one of the first places where financial
stress is manifested, as firms in financial difficulty fail to meet their payment'
obligations (Summers 1994). There are, however, very few theoretical and even fewer
empirical studies which look at payment system issues in Countries in Transition (CIT),
who are trying to restructure their banking and monetary systems.
In the literature on payment system issues, there is no consensus on which
settlement systems yield the best trade-off between risks and costs. In addition, there is
no conclusive evidence on how institutional factors, such as banking structure and the
monetary regime, affect the choice between systems. Related issues concern the
questions of government versus private sector in providing credit or liquidity to
payment system and the conflict/congruence of interests of central bank and
commercial banks. The research agenda for studying efficiency of payment
intermediaries is also in its infancy, with almost all of the studies having analysed a
single organisation, the US Federal Reserve (Berger, Hancock and Marquardt 1996).
Finally, the empirical studies almost exclusively analyse the United States payment
system' and occasionally payment systems in other developed countries, with little or
no reference to less-developed countries. All this makes it difficult to recommend what
should be done and implement clear-cut solutions in Countries in Transition and
Yugoslavia2.
CIT payment systems' reforms have been and are being conducted to support
new banking and monetary systems in their shift towards market oriented systems.
However, the results of the reforms conducted so far are mixed and the reforms are
burdened with conflicts and obstacles. Delays in implementation, frequent design
changes, incompatibility with monetary policy, conflicts of interests, all regarding the
1 Due to good data sets available and the possibility to compare two different settlement systems (CHIPS and
Fedwire) in one country.
2 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was proclaimed a sovereign federal state in 1992 and consists of the
Republic of Serbia and Republic of Montenegro. In the subsequent sections it will be referred to as Yugoslavia.
2
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payment systems, can be partly attributed to lack of consensus in the theory and practice
related to the payment system problems.
The payment system reform in Yugoslavia became a controversial issue, and
was reflected in a struggle among different payment system providers about who should
run it. However, a debate about which payment system is best suited for the Yugoslav
financial system and how to establish it, would seem more appropriate.
In the course of this research the major payment system issues and dilemmas are
looked at with a view to establishing a framework for analysis and possible solutions to
the CIT and Yugoslav payment systems problems.
1.2	 The research design
1.2.1 The approach
This research is focused on payment system reform as a part of monetary and
banking system restructuring in transitional countries. The research is aimed at testing
theoretical assumptions about payment instrument choice, adequate settlement system
and payment intermediaries efficiency in the case of Countries in Transition. It
identifies and measures the independent variables that influence the payment system
and its relationship with banking and monetary systems. The major payment system
issues identified are costs, risks and speed of payments, payment instruments and
providers choice, the use of technology and innovations, monetary policy, banking
system reform and customer satisfaction. In short, the research examines payment
system components that influence the functioning of a modern monetary economy.
A three-step research approach is employed. First, the investigation sets out to
evaluate payment systems in different groups of countries through a cross-countries
analysis. Second, payment systems in CIT are researched with a view to establishing a
background for their improvement, i.e. to suggest a way forward for establishing
efficient and effective payment systems in the given environment. Third, the past and
current performance of the Yugoslav payment system are presented and the payment
system design, and its operation, are placed in a broader context of the Yugoslav
banking system restructuring and effective monetary policy.
3
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The main questions the research seeks answers for are:
• What are the major payment systems' characteristics?
• What were the major problems associated with the payment systems in the past and
present?
• Which clearing and settlement system would be appropriate for a transitional
economy and how to achieve it cost-effectively?	 '
• What role should the government and central bank play?
• What are the implications of payment system design for the banking system and its
performance, the monetary policy and transition of the economy as a whole?
The research hopes to explain the issues, define the problems, and discover
possible solutions for both the CIT and Yugoslav case.
The approach combines both descriptive and explanatory research into a
"problem-solving" approach by means of cross-border comparative analysis, looking at
the performance over time and both theoretical and practical achievements in that field
in an international context. The research is, therefore, conducted to find the limits or
merits of previously proposed generalisations and recommendations for Cif and
Yugoslavia, as far as the particular problems are concerned. The recommendations of
the research are based on comparative analysis and established best-practice in both
developed countries and CIT. Conclusions will be drawn and the generalisations will be
made from the results of various tests and illustrations that use empirical data on CIT,
developing and industrial countries.
1.2.2 Research propositions
The main propositions, regarding CIT payment systems' reform, investigated in
the course of the research are:
Proposition 1: The best practice and experience of both developed and developing
countries should be incorporated in a payment system design and reform.
4
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The .argument is that the lessons from the payment system development in the
transitional countries and proven merits and disadvantages of particular clearing and
settlement systems that are in place in different developed countries can be used as a
base for the payment system development. A difficulty is that the payment system of
every single country is different and there is no consensus on solutions for major
payment system problems.
Proposition 2: Overall banking and monetary system reform in a CIT is necessary and
payment system design is only a part of it.
The assumption is that payment system reform on its own cannot significantly
improve the efficiency of money flows in a monetary economy as the major payment
system's risks and costs are usually banking system borne. For risk and cost reduction
related to payment systems to be effected, a prudent and efficient banking system is
required. Also, as payment system efficiency is measured against its compatibility with
monetary policy, a payment system should be an integral part of a monetary system
reform. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of some short-term gains of an
autonomous payment system reform and the importance of the initiation of reform
processes. Therefore, the emphasis is on the relationship between payment, banking and
monetary systems.
1.3 Results and contribution of the research
The research results go in favour of accepting the propositions for Countries in
Transition. Thus the experiences of other countries can help countries that have started
with the payment systems' reforms or those that need to improve their payment systems
further. Nonetheless, country specifics, especially banking and monetary policy
environments should be taken into account when deciding on appropriate payment
system arrangements. In addition, payment system reform should be co-ordinated with
the monetary policy and banking system. On the other hand, financial system
restructuring and improvements regarding financial discipline, competition, legislation,
5
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technology and skills are the best guarantees for reducing payment system risks and
costs and increasing speed and reliability of payments.
In light of identified deficiencies in the literature and practical aspects of
payment system reform in CIT, the contribution of the research is significant in three
particular areas.
First, the research draws from the existing theories and practice of developed
countries in its investigation of payment systems in transitional countries. The results of
the research can, therefore, be used to show whether some of the proposed
generalisations about payment systems hold in the different economic environment.
These generalisations and recommendations concern payment instrument choice,
adequate settlement systems, payment intermediaries efficiency, and the relationship
between payment system and monetary system in the different environment. It is
anticipated that the research will advance theoretical understanding of payment system
as a part of broad monetary and banking systems. It will also illustrate, and provide
some empirical evidence for, the payment system/monetary policy relationship.
Second, in light of the little research effort involving payment systems in CIT,
the aim of this research is to extend existing ideas and develop new ideas in the
literature on payment system reform by analysing the issues and presenting some
empirical evidence for CIT. These issues concern new payment technologies and
electronic money in CIT, monetary policy implications of payment system reform, and
payment system and banking sector relationship. Results of the study can be used for
further generalisations about payment and financial system functioning in CIT or as
lessons for other countries undertaking the reforms.
Third, the study will present the advantages and disadvantages of various
systems and make recommendations about what should be done in Yugoslavia. In
particular, the recommendations concern the appropriate settlement system, the role of
policy makers and financial institutions in the payment system design and operations,
and they place payment system reform in the context of the overall banking and
monetary system restructuring.
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1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is structured as 9 chapters, the first of which is the "Introduction
chapter". The second chapter "Payment System in Theory and Practice" is an overview
of the theoretical framework for research, research topics, work conducted on the
payment system issues, the unresolved problems, payment systems developments and
trends. Both theoretical and practical achievements in the field are presented and then
critically evaluated. Also, a section on payment systems in Countries in Transition is
presented. The chapter looks at the major payment issues and developments with a view
to establishing a framework for payment system analysis.
The subsequent chapter "The Research Framework" outlines the research
design, methodology, methods and hypotheses with a reference to the contribution and
limitation of the research. The fourth chapter "Payment Systems Cross-Countries
analysis: The Bank of England Group" presents a cross-section analysis of payment
systems in 70 countries. The particular aspects that are investigated are the differences
and similarities across the industrial, developing and transitional countries in respect of
their payment systems. The fifth chapter "Countries in Transition payment systems" is
the analysis of payment systems in transitional countries which aims to present the
systems and to identify their major characteristics, problems and experiences with
payment reforms. The emphasis is put on the payment and monetary systems
relationship. The payment system in Yugoslavia is analysed in the sixth and seventh
chapter. "Yugoslav Payment System: Exploratory and Explanatory Analysis" chapter is
the first step in analysing and presenting results on the Yugoslav payment system. The
objective of the chapter is to explain the issues, define the problems and suggest
possible solutions for the problems. The final analytical chapter "Survey of Yugoslav
banks and financial institutions" tests further the proposed recommendations for the
Yugoslav payment system put forward in the preceding chapter. The purpose of the
survey is twofold. First, it is an additional source of information on the Yugoslav
payment system. Second, it provides insights into the desired state of the affairs and
future functioning in relation to the payment system, as viewed by the Yugoslav
bankers, mangers and payment system experts.
7
Payment Systems Reforms
	 Introduction
The eighth chapter is "Conclusions and Recommendations". It draws from the
summaries and conclusions made in the four analytical chapters and revisits the
payment system problems and debate in order to assess the contribution of the research.
The recommendations made relate to possible solutions to some payment system
problems in Countries in Transition, lessons for other countries undertaking reforms and
suggestions regarding the Yugoslav payment system design. The last chapter is "The
Appendices", where the four appendices containing data, tests results and survey
questions all relating to the analytical chapters are presented. Finally, the last few pages
of the thesis contain a list of the literature cited in the thesis.
8
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2. Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
2.1 .Theoretical framework
2.1.1. Conceptual framework
Payment system can be broadly defined as the means of conducting transactions
in an economy (Bauer and Ferrier 1996). A payment system consists of a set of
instruments, banking procedures and, typically, interbank funds transfer systems that
facilitate the circulation of money (European Monetary Institute - EMI 1996). More
precisely, payment system is a mechanism, or set of mechanisms, which coupled with
rules and procedures, provide an infrastructure for transferring money from one entity
in the economy to another (Greenspan 1996). That infrastructure links together different
banks, giro organisations and other financial institutions, payers and payees with banks,
as well as national bank with commercial banks (Bergendahl and Lindblom 1995). A
simple payment system mechanism, that of exchanging currency for goods, represents
direct real-time payment, which, in light of its straight-forwardness and legal clarity,
sets a standard of efficiency against which other payment systems may be compared
(Greenspan 1996). Most of the other major payment mechanisms involve the transfer of
deposit money or claims, which can be done using paper or electronically. Despite the
technical variations between different paper-based and electronic payment systems for
transferring deposit money, the goal of all these systems is essentially the same - the
monetary claim of the person making a payment is reduced and the claim of the person
receiving the payment is increased (ibid. 1996).
The term payment system has been used fairly widely to cover both clearing and
settlement of payments. Clearing in a payment system involves the transmission of
payment information between the payer and payee and between intermediaries, i.e.
transmission and recording of the instructions to make a payment. Settlement, on the
other hand, is actual transfer of money to a payee's account based on payment
instructions, i.e. the actual transfer of some medium generally acceptable in fulfilment
of the payment instruction. The act of settlement, therefore, discharges obligation in
respect of funds or securities transfer between two or more parties. Settlement that is
9
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irrevocable and unconditional is described as final settlement (Bank for International
Settlements - BIS 1997a).
There is also a distinction between large value transfer systems - LVTS and small
value transfer systems - SVTS. The former transmit large payments, typically over $1
million, (mainly interbank payments) and the latter refer to the remaining payment
methods such as cash, check, automated clearinghouse (ACH) transfer, credit card and
debit card which are typically used to make payments of much lower value (Berger,
Hancock and Marquardt 1996). Although, as a rule, no minimum value is set for the
payments that a LVTS can carry, the average size of payments passed through such a
system are usually large and the system is often referred to as wholesale funds transfer
system.
The concept of payment system float is also important. The balance sheet effects
of differences in timing of debit and credit from payments is referred to as the float
(Blommestein 1993, Summers 1993). The liquidity impact of float complicates the
monetary management of both commercial banks and central bank. If credits are
systematically made before offsetting debits, the banking system will be providing
liquidity to the economy, and vice versa, if debits are systematically made before
offsetting credits, the liquidity will be withdrawn from the economy. In general, an
efficient payment system should synchronise, on average, the timing of credits and
debits arising from payments, thereby having a neutral overall effect on liquidity
(Summers 1993). Related to the concept of float, and often used as a synonym for it, is
the term payment lag (or settlement lag), which can be defined as the time-lag between
the initiation of a payment order and its final settlement. The possible implications of
both the payment system float and lag are particularly relevant to the debate on payment
system risks, costs, settlement system design and finality of settlement.
2.1.2. Payment instruments
Payment instruments basically convey relevant information regarding the
transfer of monetary value from one party in a transaction to the other. According to the
physical form of a payment instruction, payment instruments can be categorised as
paper (e.g. cheques and paper giro payment/credit transfer orders), electronic (e.g.
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electronic payment orders) and payment cards (e.g. credit and debit cards).
Traditionally, the emphasis has been on the distinction between credit-based and debit-
based transfers. With a credit-based instrument (for example a payment order) the
sender gives the instruction directly to his own bank for onward transmission to the
receiver's bank. When a debit-based instrument is used (for example a cheque), the
sender gives the instruction to the receiver himself, and the receiver then passes the
instruction to his bank, which will in turn pass it to the sender's bank (Sheppard 1996).
With regard to the person making a payment, her account can be debited or her
monetary claim can be reduced: before (for example, in case of traveller's cheques and
prepaid cards), at the time (e.g. debit card payments at the point of sale) or after (credit
card payments) the payment instruction itself.
The range of payment instruments available in any particular country reflects
that country's historical and social background, built into the architecture of the
financial system. The selection of payment instrument for a particular transaction,
however, will depend on: a) customer's familiarity with the particular instrument and
the costs and risks involved, b) frequency, urgency, place and value of the payment, and
c) the counterparts' preferences and 'negotiation' power or position.
2.1.3. Payment system risks
Any form of payment involves some risk to one or more of the participants in
the payment. Risks come about primarily because many payments involve implicit or
explicit extension of credit, i.e. there is often a lag between the time that a transaction
takes place and the time that settlement occurs (Berger et al 1996), and because
payment instruments are often handled by multiple parties - any of whom could fail to
perform their function before the funds are completely delivered from the payer to the
payee (Marquardt 1994). In other words, the risks in the payment system arise from
institutional inter-dependency in the payment process that creates different risks among
parties in the payment chain and from timing delays between the transaction and the
final settlement of the associated payment (Bank of Canada 1997a).
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It is, therefore, the payment lag and involvement of multiple parties that
distinguish between the risks borne in the payment process itself and other underlying
risks in the financial system that can be transmitted through the payment system.
According to the Bank for International Settlement', the main risks incurred in
payment systems are credit risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and systemic risk. These
can be defined as follows: credit risk refers to the risk of a transaction not being realised '
at full value (typically related to insolvency by the payor or a payment intermediary); a
liquidity risk is a risk of a settlement not being realised at the desired time but at an
unspecified time in the future; operational risks relate to computers and
telecommunications systems break-downs 2 ; systemic risk designates the risk that serious
solvency and liquidity problems within one or several banks jeopardise the stability of
the entire banking system.
Additional risks (that are not included in the definition) are technology risk,
security risk and legal risk. Technology risk occurs when technological investments do
not produce the anticipated cost savings in economies of scale and scope (Saunders
1994). It is particularly relevant for the debate about payment system design and
efficiency. Security risk refers to illegal access to payment information or funds by a
third party. It can leave a party subject to financial loss or the risk to privacy and results
from fraud or negligence. Legal risk exists when there are uncertainties or gaps in the
legal framework for payments or payment systems that can impose liquidity or credit
risk on participants (Bank of Canada 1997a). The uncertainties or misinterpretations
with regard to laws and private arrangements have implications on legal enforceability
of parties' rights and obligations with regard to the payments.
Scott (1993) regards fraud, mistake and systemic risk to be the three major risks
in the payment system. The first two require improvements in the legal framework but
the major concern is systemic risk - the failure of a bank to settle its net position could
lead to a chain reaction of bank failures (ibid. 1993). Systemic risk is defined differently
by different authors 3 , but regardless of the definition it remains the major concern
'Used also by Rochet and Tirole (1996)
2 This definition of operational risk (BIS 1997a) seems too narrowly focused. The operational risk can also relate to
human error, natural disasters or system design flaws (Bank of Canada 1997a). It, therfore, refers to the reliability
and integrity of the payment system with respect to the processing of payments.
3 For example BIS (1997a), Rochet and Tirole (1996), Bartholomew and Whalen (1995), Mishkin (1995), Saunders
(1994), Blommestein and Lange (1993), Scott (1993).
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especially for the monetary authorities. Central banks have a particular interest in
limiting systemic risk in large-value funds transfer systems as the aggregate value of
transactions and exposures in LVTS are significantly higher than those in retail funds
transfer systems. At the same time, the debate about systemic risk issues is often used to
support or criticise government/central bank's regulation of and intervention in banking
and payment system.
2.1.4. Payment system costs
Payment system costs include the real resource costs of operating the payments
system, the financial costs to payments system participants from holding portfolios that
differ from what otherwise would be optimal if the payment system was friction-less,
and the real and financial costs of delays in funds being transferred to payees (Berger et
al 1996). Total resource costs of making payments typically absorb about 3 percent of
GDP in developed countries (Hancock and Humphrey 1998).
The real resource costs of payment, which consume an estimated 1 percent to
1.5 percent of GDP annually (Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala 1996), include: accounting,
mailing, labour etc., all borne in obtaining and tendering the means of payment by the
payer; costs of providing physical instruments (e.g. notes, coins, checks, credit cards,
slips); costs of collection, processing, physical transportation, electronic
communication, and accounting incurred by intermediaries (including banks,
clearinghouses, central banks and others); costs of depositing, safeguarding, and
accounting by the payee; and costs of identifying and reducing the risks (for example,
costs of evaluating, monitoring and controlling credit and risk positions, and costs of
obtaining and maintaining collateral or external guarantees by the payer).
The financial costs include: costs of holding more liquid portfolios with lower
returns in order to discharge payment obligations, because it is difficult and costly to
convert assets into some form of money and vice versa, when the payee cannot
instantaneously convert money into higher-yielding assets; costs of holding safer than
optimal portfolios, i.e. for the payer to demonstrate his or her creditworthiness to
potential payees or intermediaries to gain acceptance or better payment terms; costs of
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holding more informational transparent porolios to help demonstrate creditworthiness
and liquidity to potential payees, clearinghouses or other intermediaries.
Costs from delays in the funds transfer could be: opportunity cost of time in
waiting for payments to be settled, resulting in funds being employed in lower-return
activities (when the payee eventually gets the funds) or moral hazard, if the payer has
access to the funds beyond the payment date (when he or she is effectively using
someone else's funds); and cost of real resources, spent to reduce the delays and risks
caused by the delays. Settlement delays on various payment instruments may also make
monetary policy more difficult to conduct. Monetary policy operates through the
payment system as funds that are transferred from the central bank must filter their way
quickly and smoothly through entire payment system (Berger et al 1996). Payment
delays or uncertainty about how fast funds will be distributed make it difficult to
determine the effect of open market operations or discount window lending. This can
increase both costs of real resources, that central bank may employ to reduce the
uncertainty, and costs of inadequate timing of policy measures, i.e. lagged and/or
undesired effects when the circumstances might have changed.
2.1.5. Risks v costs framework
Berger, Hancock and Marquardt (1996) suggest an analytical framework which
emphasises the trade-off between risk and costs in the payment system, and how this
trade-off can be affected by technological, financial, and regulatory innovations. The
axes in Figure 2-1 measure the risk and costs borne by the payors and payees as well as
those imposed on others (e.g. systemic risk). The vertical axis measures a weighted sum
of risks of all parties bearing payment risk, where the risk borne by one party may be
represented by a function of the variance and possibly higher moments of distribution of
its losses due to payment activity. The horizontal axis measures the weighted sum of
costs borne by all the parties.
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Cost
The curve FF is social best practice efficient frontier for the payment system in
the sense that risks cannot be reduced further without increasing the costs of payments,
and these costs cannot be reduced further without increasing risks. The convex shape of
the frontier reflects the usual assumption of diminishing marginal returns. The best
practice available depend upon the current technology for processing and settling
payments, the current financial techniques for monitoring and controlling risk, and the
current regulatory environment, all of which may be altered by innovations, thus
shifting the FF curve to its new position F' F'. As the authors put it, the FF frontier can
be looked at as a reversed version of standard production-possibilities frontier that is
expressed in terms of the output of two negative outcomes instead of the trade-off
between goods. In effect, they are measuring the deviations from the standard
assumption of economic models in which the payment system creates only negligible
transaction costs and has little effect on the financial holdings of participants (i.e. risk
and costs are measured relative to an ideal, friction-less payment system in which all
payments are riskless, costless, and instantaneous). The non-frontier points (e.g. point
C) reflect inefficient choices from a social viewpoint in which both risk and costs could
be reduced. The payor and payees that are directly involved in the transaction may in
some cases prefer outcomes that are not on the frontier, where substantial risk and costs
are imposed on others but where their own risks and costs are smaller.
The social indifference curve II represents the highest level of social utility that
can be obtained given the frontier, measured by a weighted sum of the utilities of the
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affected parties. The concave shape of the indifference curve reflects an assumption of
diminishing marginal utility from risk reduction - as risk gets lower and lower those
bearing risk would be willing to pay less and less to remove marginal risk.
Point A where the indifference curve is tangent to the efficient frontier,
represents the best social choice of payment risk and costs. The tangent price line PP
shows the rate at which risks and costs are traded off at the optimum. At point A, the
marginal costs of reducing risk just matches the marginal disutility from risk on a
weighted basis. That is, the marginal rate of transformation between risk and costs
equals the marginal rate of substitution, yielding a Pareto-optimal outcome in which no
party could be made better off in terms of payment risks and costs without another party
being made worse off.
Schoenmaker (1995) emphasises the trade-off between costs and delays
(efficiency), which is another way to look at the current best social practice and how it
can be improved. Folkerts-Landau et al (1993) talk about discipline (i.e. risks) versus
speed (i.e. efficiency) and the tension between them that constrains the design of a
payment system. Although they do not present the explicit analytical models for the
trade-offs, the analogy with the CAPM efficient frontier can be applied to
Schoenmaker's and Folkerts-Landau et al's paradigms.
2.1.6. Gross v Net Settlement
Large-value payments systems, also referred to as wholesale or interbank
payment systems, usually transfer payments of significant size which are often time-
critical. There is general agreement that most payment system participants and
regulatory authorities prefer very low risk systems for handling their largest payments
(Berger et al 1996). They are willing to undertake significant costs to keep their own
risk and systemic risk to negligible levels. There is substantial disagreement, however,
over the best methods for keeping risks very low at the minimum possible cost (Ibid.
1996).
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With regard to how the messages are processed and the finality of payment
orders there are two existing paradigms4:
1) Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) System, that settles banks' net positions (usually) at
the end of the day. Each party's out-payments are netted against its in-payments
before settlement takes place. For example, CHIPS 5 , which is the largest system in
terms of value transmitted in the United States.
2) Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System, with gross processing and settlement --
i.e. on a transaction by transaction basis -- and with the intervention of a settlement
agent (usually central bank). Each payment instruction is passed from the payor's
bank to the settlement agent and is individually settled across the accounts of the
paying and receiving bank at the settlement institution. For example, Fedwire in the
United States or CHAPS 6 in the United Kingdom.
Rochet and Tirole (1996a) distinguish another basic settlement system - Direct
Gross Settlement without counter-party (central bank), i.e., SIC7 in Switzerland. Instead
of the possibility of intra-day overdrafts granted by central bank, SIC employs queue
management 8 , i.e., orders are processed only if there are funds at the payor bank's
account on, for example, the first in first out mode. However, as the authors note, a
gross system without counter-party but with queue optimisation is not unlike a net
system operating several times a day. Furthermore, in light of the credit granting
arrangement (private or by central bank), Summers (1996) argues that, although SIC is
interesting in its own right, it is not directly relevant to the problem. Most authors often
treat SIC as a specific form of RTGS. Whether a system that applies queuing
management resembles more an RTGS or a DNS system depends on access to
information on queued payments by the receiving bank and on the processing
sequence9 . Some of the queuing issues are discussed further in section 2.3.6.
4 See for example Borio et al (1993), Scott (1993), Summers (1993,1994), Schoenmaker (1995), European Monetary
Institute (1996), Berger eta! (1996).
5 Clearing House Interbank Payments System
6 Clearing House Automated Payment System
7 Swiss Interbank Clearing system
8 If a sending bank lacks 'good funds' (reserve balances at central bank) to settle payment message, the message
enters a queue to be processed when sufficient funds have been delivered on incoming payment massages.
9 If a receiving bank has access to the information on payments, it can act on it and make the funds available to its
customers which creates the same type of settlement risk as a DNS system. Furthermore, if the pending payments are
not automatically delivered and can be cancelled, as in SIC, it makes such a system de facto a DNS system.
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It is worth mentioning that, particularly with the development of payment
technology, the distinction between RTGS and DNS concerns the form of settlement, not
the form of transmission and processing. Like RTGS systems, many net settlement
systems transmit and process payment messages in real time on a transaction-by-
transaction basis, but they settle, by definition, on a net basis at discrete intervals (BIS
1997a).
There is no overall consensus over whether RTGS or DNS systems yields the
best trade-off between risk and costs on LVTS. In RTGS the payee has good funds
immediately and does not have to wait until net settlement occurs. Gross systems with
immediate finality can, however, shift the settlement risk to the central bank - if the
finality of payment is guaranteed; cause queuing or gridlock l ° when payor banks do not
have sufficient funds available to complete transaction orders; and/or require costly
collateral or reserves to be held by the participants. With respect to reserve
requirements, the incremental costs of maintaining additional (sterile) bank balances to
fund RTGS payments with cash increases the cost of using this form of settlement
compared to DNS (Summers 1996).
On the other hand, it is often argued, RTGS almost eliminates the systemic risk.
However, the queuing and gridlock may also cause widespread liquidity problems and
systemic risk. If banks do not have sufficient liquidity, no one may be willing or able to
make the first large payment. This, however, could be somewhat mitigated by sending
very large values in several smaller instalments. One possible solution to these
problems is to have the central bank provide additional funds needed for RTGS
settlement operations (Berger et al 1996). US Fedwire, for example, provides reserve
account overdrafts with the guarantee of finality to the receiving institution. In addition,
most central banks have policies regarding the provision of overnight credit through a
discount window or other mechanisms (Summers 1995).
Net settlement is generally regarded as cheaper but riskier (particularly with
regard to systemic risk). DNS system often put much of the settlement risk on the payee,
its bank, or clearinghouse (Berger et al 1996). A particular concern, that may cause
systemic risk, is unwinding, that is, cancellation of all payment orders sent to and
li) Co-ordination failure, regardless of overall liquidity of the system, where banks delay their payment orders until
they themselves receive incoming orders.
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received by a failing institution during the day of trade. However, these risks can be
controlled - as in CHIPS. The participants in DNS systems are allowed to run only
limited and controlled overdrafts, and they increasingly tend to be backed by either
prime collateral or external guarantees (ibid. 1996). Furthermore, as argued by
Schoenmaker (1995), the extra cost of gross settlement exceeds the reduction in
systemic risk which goes in favour of the net settlement system.
The choice between an interbank and a central bank financing depends on costs
and risks. A central bank financing has the advantage that the liquidity risks and credit
risks are taken away from the banking sector (Bergendahl and Lindblom 1995). The
central bank could guarantee settlement, as in the Japanese Zengin system. However,
such a guarantee removes the insolvency test from the system, since banks will more
readily assume credit risks from other banks. A middle road can be pursued e.g.
controls can be set on bank exposures, through imposing limits on bank positions and
required collateral, as in US CHIPS system.
According to Kahn and Roberds (1997) the trade-off between net and real-time
gross settlement can be characterised as a trade-off between two distortions. Net
settlement increases default probability and thereby the cost associated with potential
defaults, while gross settlement increases the costs associated with holding non-interest
bearing reserves (ibid. 1997). Therefore, the current lack of consensus on the issue of
optimality of particular settlement rules might be explained with different weightings
that bank regulators and banks allocate to different payment system costs.
2.1.7. Securities settlement systems
There is a great variety of both equity market structures and securities settlement
systems that exist today in different countries. Some countries practice physical delivery
of securities (e.g. Germany), a few countries have centralised systems of clearing and
settlement (e.g. France) and other countries have a network of multiple settlement and
clearing systems (e.g. the United Kingdom). Some of the securities markets are of the
organised type, e.g. New York Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange and most of the
European stock exchanges (or bourses), where orders are centralised in a single location
and executed there. In other markets, like in London and New York (NASDAQ), there
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are independent market-making activities by intermediaries which are coupled with the
rise in the use of electronic quotation systems. These markets are essentially over-the-
counter (OTC) markets.
There are also various price-setting mechanisms ranging from "the batch" or
periodic call system to the "continuous" market system. Under the former system,
orders coming in over an interval of time are not transacted immediately, but are stored
and transacted together in a multilateral transaction. In this sense, the orders are
transmitted and processed on a 'net basis'. There is, however, evolutionary shift
towards continuous, i.e. gross, clear ing" , whereby a transaction occurs whenever two
traders' orders cross.
Organised clearance and settlement dates back to the Amsterdam stock
exchange 12 clearing system which included netting and margining functions13.
Centralised market places were necessary at the time for the price discovery and
liquidity needed to support initial offerings and for secondary trading, which made
those markets liquid. Advances in technology and communications, as well as in risk
assessment mechanisms, gave a boost to the development of OTC markets and
electronic trading systems. The process reflects the customer demand and, given the
dominant share of the trade volume in the OTC markets, points to a new model for
financial markets and regulation. However, the regulators efforts still concentrate on the
organised markets, treating them as if they were the focal point of financial transactions
(Reid 1993). Earle (1993), therefore, suggests the need to regulate the intermediary, as
the risk lies in the intermediary not the market.
Customers demand settlement services that meet modern international standards,
such as delivery versus payment (DVP), and three-day settlement cycle (Smith 1996).
The former refers to the link between a securities transfer system and a funds transfer
II In the securities markets the term "clearance" may have two meanings. One stands for the process of calculating
the mutual obligations of market participants, usually on a net basis, for the exchange of securities and money (BIS
1997b). It may also signify the process of transferring securities on the settlement date, i.e. to refer to securities
settlement. In this study, and by consistently applying the general distinction made earlier, the term is used only in
the first sense.
12 Established in 1688.
13 In the modern context, the process of margining requires a counterpart to pay a certain amount, before the actual
settlement, to reduce replacement cost exposures resulting from changes in market prices, following the revaluation
of securities that are the subject of unsettled trade. Related to it is the concept of "marking to market", which is the
practice of re-valuing securities using current market prices followed with the requirement of transferring funds or
securities equal to the value of (yet unrealised) loss to the other counterpart. Netting refers to an agreed offsetting of
mutual positions or obligations by trading partners or participants in the system.
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system that ensures that delivery occurs if, and only if, payment occurs, thus mitigating
the settlement risk. At the same time, there is a shift towards 'dematerialised' holding
and transfer of shares, whereby legal ownership of securities is transferred
electronically without a written instrument of transfer 14 . Book-entry system for transfer
and settlement of securities, doesn't necessarily require the latest technology, although
fully computerised systems are becoming a norm. Nonetheless, electronic holding and
transfer of shares are still inaccessible and/or cost-ineffective for 'small' shareholders
and infrequent traders15.
The same groups of risks and costs that are immanent to other payment systems
can emerge in the process of securities clearing and settlement. In the case of securities
settlement, credit risk can manifest itself as replacement cost risk (resulting in the cost
of replacing, at current market prices, the original transaction because a counterpart
failed to perform), principal risk (if there is no delivery after the payment and vice
versa), and cash deposit risk (resulting from holding the funds with an intermediary for
the purpose of settlement). In addition to a 'counterpart' liquidity risk, there is an issue
of overall market liquidity and flexibility that allow for the smoother trade activity and
tailor-made solutions. A system of independent market making and electronic quotation
has some advantages over organised (centralised) exchanges in that it allows the
intermediaries to trade for their own account and engage in market-making activities.
This, on the other hand, can result in bigger exposure of the participants to the risks
borne by intermediaries, but can be controlled for by licensing procedures and capital
requirements. Operational risk can also be bigger in the case of organised markets
whereby the higher number of participants can suffer from the organisational or
technical inefficiencies of the exchange.
As with other payment systems, there is a threat of systemic risk and a) the risks
can be shifted to the settlement agent if it guarantees settlement or extends credit, or to
other participants and other systems, b) the risks can be limited by use of collateral,
margins, caps etc., and c) there could be problems of gridlock, unwinding, delays,
'daylight' exposures etc. These depend on whether gross or net settlement is in use and
14 For example, London's CREST settlement system (launched in 1997) provides for that.
15 'Paper-form' shares usually settle only after 6 to 10 days. There are some positive developments though. For
example, as from mid-1999 the CREST system will reduce the membership fee to £10, thus making it more
accessible to small shareholders.
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which settlement agent is chosen 16, default procedures and provisions (e.g. loss-sharing
agreement etc.), regulations, and technical and intellectual expertise of the
intermediaries and exchanges. Additional risk, that is unique to the process of securities
trade activity, is custody risk. This is the risk of loss of securities held in custody
occasioned by the insolvency, negligence or fraudulent action of the custodian" or of a
sub-custodian (BIS 1997b). This issue is particularly relevant for the cross-border -
securities clearing and settlement.
Securities settlement systems are important parts of wholesale payment systems,
especially in countries with more developed capital markets, as the securities clearing,
open market operations and pledge of collateral for payment purposes are the essential
components of monetary policy operations and financial institutions' liquidity
management in those countries. The efforts towards reducing clearing cycle and
settlement risk for transactions with securities, and freeing the liquidity that may be
trapped in (or is needed for) a capital market — i.e. delivery versus payment
consideration, can partially explain the increasing establishment of national RTGS
systems.
Arguably, given the state of development of securities clearing systems and
market infrastructure, there may be a trade-off between reducing systemic risk and
increasing operational risk, if securities clearing and settlement cycle is reduced to t+0
days. Fast clearing requires good operational risk control and provisions (and advanced
technological and institutional framework) to mitigate the potential costs of operational
mistakes or failure. Furthermore, DVP and shorter clearing cycle can increase the need
for liquidity and require additional legal and credit-risk provisions.
2.2. Cross-border payment and foreign exchange settlement systems
2.2.1. Introduction
Financial liberalisation, expanded cross-border capital flows and major advances
in trading technology have led to dramatic changes and growth in foreign exchange
16 For example interbank payment system or established bank as a settlement agent or central bank.
22
Payment Systems Reforms	 Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
trading in the last twenty years. While banks have upgraded their operational capacity to
settle these trades over time, current settlement practices generally expose each trading
bank to the risk that it could pay over the funds it owes on a trade, but not receive the
funds it is due to receive from the counterpart. Given the estimated US$ 1.25 trillion 18 of
foreign exchange trades arranged daily, the resulting large exposures raise significant
concerns for individual banks and the international financial system as a whole (BIS
1996a). Settlement risk in this market involves not only 'daylight' credit risks but also
potentially significant overnight credit risk. Settlement risk in foreign exchange markets
can potentially disrupt the payment systems of many countries (Berger et al 1996). The
interbank foreign exchange market has been one of the most difficult areas to improve
settlement practices (Greenspan 1996). The complexity of settlement practices in the
foreign exchange market, involving many different banks, currencies payment systems,
and countries is at the root of the difficulty of reducing credit, liquidity, and systemic
risk (ibid. 1996).
Cross-border payments involve a variety of legal and regulatory arrangements
and communication channels. Traditionally, banks have relied on "correspondent
banking" relationship. Non-resident banks do not generally participate directly in
domestic interbank funds transfer systems and do not normally hold accounts with the
local central bank (EMI 1996). Therefore, payments in a particular currency tend to be
executed via banks located in the country of issue. Cross-border payments through
corespondents are executed by means of reciprocal accounts 19 to which standard credit
lines may be attached. The correspondent banking system remains widely in use
throughout the world, although, in an age of electronic messaging it is rapidly becoming
a costly anachronism which simply adds to the costs of each payment transfer and is
one of the major obstacles to implementing effective cross-border electronic payment
networks (Crede 1995).
According to EMI (1996), some banks have also resorted to the "in-house
solution", that is, they have established a presence in different countries through
17 Custodian is an entity, often a bank, that safekeeps and administers securities for customers and that may provide
various other services, including clearance and settlement, income collection, tax reclamation, corporate actions cash
management, foreign exchange and security (stock) lending and reporting.
18 In 1999, the market participants informaly talk about approximately $3 trillion forex transactions a day.
19 The accounts are referred to as "nostro" and "loro" accounts. An account held on behalf of a foreign bank is
described as loro account, while the foreign bank would regard this account as its nostro account.
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branches or subsidiaries, becoming a member of the relevant domestic clearing and
settlement systems in the countries concerned. Others have applied the so-called "club
solution", which is an agreement or set of agreements between a group of individual
institutions, one or more in each country, which provide one another with indirect
access to the domestic payment system20 . Another approach would be the "sectoral
system" which consists of arrangements between groups of institutions of the same kind '
or with common objectives. These groups consist of several institutions co-operating in
one country, with a view to linking up with groups of institutions in other countries
(ibid. 1996)21.
The creation of cross-border linkages can be taken a step further by creating
interfaces directly between the Automated Clearing Houses of several countries 22 . The
approach, although still underdeveloped, departs the most from the concept of
traditional corespondent banking. Another approach in this direction is "virtual" cross-
border banking which, by operating in real-time and using proprietary harmonised
standards, transfers funds directly and in seconds between the customers' accounts at
member branches (for example the 1B0S 23). MOS and similar systems (e.g. Financial
Network Association) utilise more up-to-date technological solutions for implementing
electronic payments, thus improving outdated correspondent banking practice of routing
payments, which is both expensive and time inefficient.
2.2.2. Large-value cross-border payments
It is useful, however, to make a distinction between cross-border interbank and
retail payment systems. The cross-border interbank funds transfers are of greater value
and may cause potentially big disruptions, i.e. bring about significant risks and costs for
the participants. In the case of large-value payments, the market operators' main interest
is to reduce the banks' exposure to settlement risk through the establishment of special
bilateral or multilateral arrangements and through the development of cross-border and
2() E.g. DISCUS system, designed and operated by Commerzbank, Credito Itallano, NatWest and Societe Generale.
21 A typical example is TIPA system, created to service a network of co-operative banks. Further example is
EUROGIRO, a cross-border payment service which is available to private and business organisations of the
Post/Giro organisations of sixteen European countries.
22 For example, such linkages exist between BZS in Germany and BACS in the UK and BGC in the Netherlands.
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multi-currency netting schemes. Banks are becoming increasingly dependent on
automated interfaces with these networks to handle and pass on incoming payment
instructions.
The best known global interbank communication system is undoubtedly Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) 24, which can be also
used within a single country, as in France. It handles the exchange of nearly 3 million
financial messages on average per business day over its proprietary network. However,
the SWIFT payment order does not, by itself or under SWIFT rules, create an irrevocable
obligation on the part of the sending bank which may result in the receiving bank
bearing the risks of executing the instructions. Financial institutions have to rely on
correspondent banking relationships to arrange clearing and/or settlement. This may
create problems for non-member users in terms of float or lag. If, for example, a
payment initiator's bank sends a message to its correspondent bank requesting it to
debit a "loro" account and transfer the amount to the fund receiver's bank, it may create
a strong incentive for the correspondent bank to choose a slow payment procedure in
order to benefit from the float (Bergendahl and Lindblom 1995). Possible solutions to
some of these problems are: a) for a sending bank, to send the message directly to the
receiver's bank, which will contact the corespondent bank and see that the payment is
settled as soon as possible (ibid. 1995) and b) an already developing practice whereby
the incoming orders are forwarded to the domestic interbank fund transfer system
without relying on corespondent banking.
A good example of both potential improvements of speed and safety of the
message flow and a departure from traditional corespondent banking relationship in
cross-border payments is the EU's TARGET25 system. It resulted from a need for
payment operations between the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the
banking system to be effected quickly and safely, with a view to facilitating single
monetary policy and an integrated money market for the countries participating in the
European Economic and Monetary Union - EMU (EMI 1996). TARGET is designed as a
23 Inter-bank Online System. The system was originally created by the Royal Bank of Scotland and Banco Santander
in 1991.
24 SWIFT is a private company, established in Belgium in 1973, which is owned by nearly 3000 banks. It transmits
financial messages between 5,200 financial institutions connected to the company's proprietary network which
covers about 140 countries.
25 Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system.
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payment system composed of one RTGS system in each of the countries which
participate in stage three of EMU. The RTGS systems are interconnected to each other
according to common infrastructures and procedures — the so-called "Interlinking
system". Effectively, TARGET has become the ultimate RTGS system for EMU, i.e. it
processes cross-border payments denominated in "Euro" as if they were domestic
payments. Only the National Central Banks, as settlement agents of their national RTGS
systems, will be allowed to make use of, and participate in, the Interlinking procedures,
for their own purpose or on behalf of their customer banks (ibid. 1996, ECB 1998a).
There are, however, some issues and limitations that need to be addressed.
First, TARGET is designed as a wholesale interbank funds transfer system of
EMU countries' banks, and as such it facilitates payment instructions denominated in
Euros only and within the EU borders. If one assumes that all EU countries will
participate in EMU eventually, i.e. that all major European currencies are to be replaced
with the Euro, this still leaves unchanged the practice of the cross-border (outside EU)
payments and the payments denominated in, for example, US dollars, Swiss francs or
Japanese yen. If, for example, a UK company trades with a US counterpart and the trade
is in dollars, the payor's bank still has to have a correspondent banking relationship and
an account in the other currency or there has to be an arrangement between the two
countries for incoming orders to be forwarded to, and processed by, the domestic
interbank fund transfer system. The latter solution, being in line with the improvements
of cross-border payments, may require that individual countries, i.e. RTGS systems,
establish relationships with RTGS systems in the countries outside the EU.
The implication for TARGET, and thus the European Central Bank — ECB, is the
question of whether it will assume the role of central RTGS for the payments outside EU
and in other currencies or will it leave it to each country's central bank or other
institutions to make such arrangements. A further question relates to the countries'
independence in conducting foreign trade and resulting foreign exchange policies. The
answers to the questions of harmonisation, single policies and independence with regard
to the particular decisions will have an effect on EMU monetary policy, both in terms of
the Euro exchange rate and interest rates.
Second, there is a need to establish the provisions of intraday liquidity, operating
hours and pricing policies all of which requires further provisions. Related to this, is the
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policy on the treatment and provision of liquidity for 'out' EMU countries that are the
members of the EU (e.g. UK). Third, the retail cross-border payments are unlikely to be
processed by TARGET which requires further development of other systems and
schemes. And finally, with regard to the network of RTGS systems both at the countries
and EU level, there is an issue of costs for individual banks participating in cross-border
trade and further implications of development of alternative net systems. By definition,
the RTGS systems will process payments only if there are sufficient funds or overdrafts
facilities available on the sending institution's account with its central bank and, it is
conceived, that the national central banks will grant overdraft facilities for 'TARGET'
payments only if they can be fully collateralised.
This raises several issues ranging from the merits and disadvantages of RTGS
systems in general, increased costs of payments, to the freedom of choice of payment
arrangements. If, for example, the users view TARGET as more expensive than existing
payment arrangements, the system may be under-utilised as the users will turn to other
schemes and netting arrangements 26 . This means that users have to be encouraged and
the system may have to be subsidised initially in order for TARGET to establish a
trading volume large enough to minimise marginal cost per use. Furthermore, the
parallel existence of several settlement systems may complicate EU monetary policy27.
2.2.3. Cross-border retail payment systems
Over the years a number of initiatives have been taken by providers of
international funds transfer services to offer their customers services which are more
transparent with regard to processing, time and cost, faster, and cheaper in terms of the
commission charged. The initiatives range from specially designed transfer systems for
a particular segment of the funds transfer market to efforts towards linking national
ACH. In the past small value cross-border payments were mainly conducted in foreign
26 During the 1990s (and earlier) several cross-border payment systems have been established in Europe, which are
not primarily based on correspondent banking relationships. The most important are EUROGIRO - 1991, ECHO —
1995, ECU Clearing and Settlement — 1983, and Euro Clearing System — 1999, which all rely on multilateral netting.
22 The latest private development is Continuous Linked Settlement — CLS, which will start operating in the year
2000, with, initially, about 60 member Fls. The system will effectively function as a RTGS settlement bank, with
simultaneous exchange of separate payment legs of a FX trade. For each currency it handles, CLS Bank will hold
accounts for settlement members. Each member bank's account will be broken down into sub-accounts for each
currency it trades in. CLS Bank will continuously settle transactions through these sub-accounts. At the start and end
of the trading day, each member will pay or receive central banks funds into/from each sub-account.
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currency (notes and coins) and with use of cheques and later traveller's cheques. The
cheque schemes relied on numerous bilateral arrangements for clearing cheques
denominated mainly in the currency of the country in which a bank's customer had the
account. The first major innovation was the introduction of credit card schemes, such
as, Diners, American Express, VISA, MasterCard. At present major financial institutions
and card issuers are developing international multi-currency electronic purse products28,
such as CAFE project, EXPRESS, MONDEX, VISA Cash etc., and technical standards for
their use, such as EM V29 standards for card-reading terminals.
All the cross-border retail payment instruments can be classified30 in three
groups: "pay before", "pay now", and "pay later". The pay before group of instruments
comprise traveller's cheques and electronic prepaid cards. The pay now group consists
of cheques, cash dispenser cards and debit cards. The last group of instruments refers to
credit cards. With regard to the clearing and settlement of the SVTS cross-border
payments, banks use corespondent banking, in house solutions, club solutions, `sectoral'
solutions and 'virtual banking'. As for the card issuers, they settle the payments on a
multilateral net settlement basis at the chosen institution - in the case of Europay, and/or
use corespondent services of domestic clearing and settlement systems via chosen
settlement banks for each of the accepted currencies - in case of VISA and MasterCard.
The main problems that consumers encounter making cross-border payments are
the delays and uncertainty of funds transfer, high costs relative to the value of
payments, double charging, low transparency and lack of information and advice.
Therefore, the major issues that need to be addressed are standardisation of payment
services (with regard to the minimum quality and speed of clearing and settlement),
alternatives available, and transparent pricing. Hopefully, the existence of a) alternative
payment systems, such as EUROGIRO - the network of European giro and postal
institutions (used for transmission of both large value and small value payments in
Europe) and TIPA that relies on national ACHs for clearing and settlement, on one hand,
and b) established correspondent banking that uses SWIFT network and major card
schemes and developments, on the other hand, will result in competition between them
28 The issue is discussed in more detail under the heading "The new payment technologies"
29 Developed jointly by Europay International, MasterCard International and VISA International.
3(1 As defined by Europay International (in EMI 1996).
28
Payment Systems Reforms	 Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
with a view to enhancing the retail cross-border payment service in terms of lower costs
and higher speed and reliability.
Within the EMU region, with use of the single currency, the 'cross-border' retail
payments are anticipated to start functioning as effectively and efficiently as within the
particular developed countries. The advent of the Euro, therefore, brings many potential
benefits and opportunities to the EMU member countries, including — transparent
pricing, price competition, lower charges (no exchange rate or foreign transaction
charges), reduced clearing and settlement time and, thus, risks and exposures, etc. Also,
there is an opportunity for introducing electronic payment instruments, and electronic
money products, on a much wider scale, thus enabling the replacement of coin operated
vending machines, public telephones etc. and an overall reduction of cash in circulation.
2.2.4. Settlement in the international securities market
The international securities market consists of the international bond market for
long term debt instruments (so called "Eurobonds" and foreign bonds) and "Euro-note"
market for short-term securities. By far the largest proportion of the stock of
international bonds is denominated in US dollars (EMI 1996). Most of the international
securities are listed on established stock exchanges, though trading is normally carried
out over-the-counter and conducted by various specialised dealer groups. Most of the
securities in the market are in bearer form and are not fully dematerialised (ibid. 1996),
thereby the majority of the transfers of ownership is by physical delivery of securities.
The major global securities depositories and settlement organisations Cede! and
Euroclear, however, provide for bearer securities to be deposited in an account with
them enabling the transfer of ownership via book entries which should improve the
settlement practice and reduce the risks involved.
Investment in and trade with equities can also have an international dimension,
in which case the participants can use global custodians, local banks or dealers, and
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international securities depository firms3I which facilitate the global portfolio
diversification and resulting settlement procedures.
The users of capital markets issue and trade securities in financial centres with
the lowest regulatory standards and, hence, the lowest costs. Cross-border securities
trading - brought about by freer markets, widely available information and new
communication technologies - is estimated to be from $12 to $15 trillion a year. '
"International securitisation" (e.g. a US firm issuing new bonds and selling them
directly to a Japanese investors) competes with "international financial intermediation".
In addition to relative costs, which appear to be smaller when a middleman is cut out,
the participants in capital markets should also assess the risks involved, i.e. the cost of
gathering information on foreign firms. The emergence of fund raising and public
offerings over the Internet and the threat for established organised markets could be
viewed in the context of a costs versus asymmetric information trade-off.
Another important matter is the use of securities for collateral purposes in the
conduct of monetary policy across EMU. Repurchase Agreements — "repos" will be the
backbone of the new (monetary) order after EMU (Euromoney 1998), i.e. ECB will use
them as its main regulatory tool for open market operations. There are many issues that
need to be resolved. The most important is the eligibility of securities issued in different
EMU countries by different governments and institutions 32 . From a payment system
perspective, the most important is the establishment of a clearing model for the 'cross-
border' (but within EMU) repos and how collateral will be treated and transferred by
central banks. As in the case of cross-border payments in general, this can be done a)
via the corespondent accounts of, and credit lines between, the central banks and b) via
a real-time system, i.e. TARGET33.
31 Although major global depositories organisations, Cedel and Euroclear, which offer trade settlement in over 25
different domestic markets, have a very small share of the cross-border equity settlement business (Giddy, Saunders
and Walter 1996). The organisations' combined annual turnover (mainly in domestic markets) is about $100 trillion.
32 Currently central banks accept only their own collateral and their own list of eligible bonds, but after the monetary
union, the government bonds of the more debt- ridden countries (e.g. Belgium and Italy) will be trading in the same
tier as those of France and Germany (Euromoney 1998).
33 Both models would require, at least in the medium run, `intermediation' of either Cedel or Euroclear as the
depository institutions with networks of national depositories in the respective countries. Both Cedel and Euroclear
plan to introduce the real-time cross-border settlement in the European trading day, for equities and bonds, by the end
of 1999. It is expected that the majority of their customers will only start utilising it, and tentatively at first, from the
year 2000 (Banking Technology 1999). The slow take-up will be mainly due to the need for changes in internal
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2.2.5. Cross-border payments risks
In addition to the risks immanent to the domestic banking and payment systems
there are two groups of risks that cross-border or foreign exchange payment participants
may be exposed to -- namely sovereign risk and foreign exchange risk.
Country or sovereign risk is a more serious credit risk than that faced by a firm, or its
financial intermediary, that operates in a single country. A foreign counterpart may be
unable to repay issued claims even if it would like to, because the government of the
country have prohibited or limited payments due to foreign currency shortages and
political reasons (Saunders 1994). In that case there are no automatic bankruptcy
procedures and provisions that a payee may resort to as in home country.
Foreign exchange risk relates to the net exposure, i.e. the degree to which a bank
is net long (positive) or net short (negative), in a given currency (ibid. 1994). In terms
of the payment processing, firms and banks may hold foreign currency reserves and/or
collateral, which are exposed to the volatility of the exchange rate movements on a
daily (even hourly) basis, and may result in huge losses for the participants. As for the
foreign exchange trade between the banks in a single market, e.g. in London, the risks
may result from the trade convention, i.e. the participants generally rely on the good
will of parties to follow through the oral promises of their traders or to resolve disputes
out of court.
The European Monetary Institute (1996) emphasises foreign exchange
settlement risk, which can be defined as the inability of the second party to deliver
counter-value after an institution has irrevocably paid it out funds in foreign currency.
The inability may be due to operational or liquidity problems, the commencement of
insolvency proceedings or political factors. The example of Bankhaus Herstatt, a
relatively small German bank very active in foreign exchange trading, is often used to
illustrate the risk raised by the asynchronous settlement of foreign exchange
transactions (so-called Herstatt risk). In 1974 the bank was ordered into liquidation by
the German banking supervisory authorities, thereby suspending all payments. The
suspension and related announcement took place after the closing of the interbank funds
reporting procedures (of its users) and central hardware reprogramming, both subordinate to the year 2000 ('Y2K')
and primary Euro IT projects and required changes (ibid. 1999)
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transfer system in Germany so that all Herstatt's Deutche Mark receipts were already
final, but before its US dollar obligation were to be settled on US CHIPS system. As a
consequence a number of the counterparts faced the prospect of losses. It was only with
difficulty that normal interbank payment flows were re-established. Concerns about
foreign exchange settlement risk have also arisen in a variety of later episodes, such as
the liquidation of BCCI (in 1991), the emergency in the former Soviet Union in August
1991, and collapse of Barings in 1995 (BIS 1996a).
What complicates the management of foreign exchange settlement risk is a)
differences between national systems as to when, during their operating cycle, transfers
can be initiated and when they are final and b) variations in the operating hours of
payment systems themselves. Both these restrictions limit the possibility for
simultaneous and final exchanges of currencies through national payment systems. The
degree of overlap in the operating hours is naturally greater within the EU. A bank's
actual exposure in the settlement of any foreign exchange deal can be defined,
therefore, as being equal to the full amount of the currency it has purchased, and lasts
from the time at which its payment instruction for the currency sold can no longer be
cancelled unilaterally until the time at which the currency purchased is received with
finality (BIS 1996a). This implies that a way forward for resolving some of the
problems that arise from a foreign exchange transaction exposure is extension of
working hours of different settlement institutions in different countries, so as to increase
overlap in the operating hours. In addition, there is an obvious need to standardise the
format of the messages exchanged (e.g. use of EDI and EDIFACT standards) and to
create a 'level playing field' for the participants - both in terms of national legislations
and international co-operation.
However, the major risk in foreign exchange dealings remains the duration of
the settlement exposure. It is estimated (BIS 1996a) that the exposure currently lasts for
a minimum of one to three business days, plus any intervening weekends and holidays.
As an illustration of the extent of exposure, some banks routinely settle FX trades worth
well over US$ 1 billion with a single counterpart on a single day (ibid. 1996a). Some of
the suggested solutions to the risks are a) "obligation netting", as opposed to trade-by-
trade settlement, by reducing the amount at risk by lowering the number and size of
payments that would otherwise be needed to settle the underlying transactions, b) one of
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the "payment versus payment" modes for settlement that assures participants that a final
transfer in one currency will occur if, and only if, a final transfer of another currency, or
currencies, takes place, c) improved risk measurement and control techniques applied
regularly and thoroughly by the counterparts, intermediaries and settlement agents.
In the long run, however, the most effective solutions would be shorter
settlement period duration, made possible by improved payment and communication
technologies. The latest private banking initiative - CLS 34 will enable simultaneous and
'good funds' settlement of both legs of a foreign exchange transaction, and the CLS
bank (clearinghouse) will hold accounts at each relevant central bank for that purpose.
There are also some specific issues, with potentially important implications,
resulting from the replacement of the national notes and coins of the EMU member
states with Euro notes and coins in the year 2002. Firstly, there may be a threat posed
by potentially increased counterfeiting of the new currency, resulting from the lack of
familiarity with (intuitive feel for) the new fiat currency by the public across the
region35 . Secondly, the currency replacement may result in potentially significant costs,
both social (production and distribution of the new currency and withdrawals of old
currencies etc.) and private (changes needed relating to the operation of vending
machines, public telephones, some ATM terminals etc.). Therefore, there could be the
case for wider and early introduction of electronic money, which seems to have some
cost-advantages over cash, both in terms of preventing counterfeiting (as suggested by
APACS 1998) and social and private costs of currency replacement (see, for example,
Humphrey 1996). The e-money issues are discussed in more detail in section 2.4.
There are additional risks and real costs brought about by the advent of Euro.
These include new technology investments, accounting and operational system
replacement costs for the retailers and merchants, consumers (payers) resistance to
change, legal and jurisdiction ambiguities. Furthermore, institutional arrangements
and/or technology change of such a scale can undermine trust and confidence, the very
pivots of an efficient payment system36.
34 As defined in footnote 27.
35 Given the reserve currency function of the Euro, the issues may also be relevant outside the EU/EMU borders.
36 Notwithstanding the importance of payment system arrangements, the major potential threats to the financial
stability and success of the Euro are political and economic in nature.
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2.3. Payment System and Public Policy
2.3.1. Introduction
The significance of payment system is, inter alia, in its role in, and impact on,
financial stability (confidence and certainty) and monetary policy implementation. -
Payment system is one of the first places where financial stress is manifested, as firms
in financial difficulty fail to meet their payment obligations (Summers 1994). It can be
argued that the improvements in payment methods and payment innovations have
contributed to more efficient trade and economic specialisation, both at national and
international levels. An indicator of the importance of payment system is the magnitude
of payment system flows in developed countries, where payment system turnover is 20
times (Canada) to 100 times (Japan) greater than the country's annual GDP. Thus, the
potential inefficiencies, costs or improvements that relate to payment systems
functioning are potentially significant for a financial system functioning.
As payment systems are at the heart of the functioning of financial systems,
which in turn fuel the whole economy, it would be easy to over-state its significance.
Few people, however, think about payment system as long as it works. Moreover, it is
only in the last decade that the policy makers and academics have seriously focused on
the issue in its own right. Since there were no major breakdowns or disruptions in the
functioning of payment systems in industrial countries recently, the question is - what
lies behind the increased attention to the matter in recent years?
First, changes in financial systems around the world, together with increased
economic activity and trade, brought about by increased competition, innovations,
`globalisation' and deregulation, have resulted in increased volumes and values of
payments that accompany these economic activities. Table 2-1 illustrates the magnitude
of payment transactions values in developed countries. The sheer size of the average
daily values of the transactions induced both the policy makers (i.e. mostly central
banks) and the researchers to give more attention to the payment system risks, as well as
to look at the ways in which payment costs can be reduced and efficiency increased.
Second, the advent of new communication and computer technologies, and new
payment technologies in particular, have produced new threats and, most importantly,
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1994 data
Annual turnover Ratio of payment Number of days to
Country	 in payment	 system turnover turn over annual
systems	 to annual GDP	 GDP'
$000 billion
Belgium	 10.9	 47.5	 5.25
Canada	 11.6	 20.7	 12
France	 58.3	 43.9	 5.5
Germany	 129.1
	 63	 4
Italy	 20.4	 29.9	 8.35
Japan	 463.4	 100.9	 2.5
Netherlands	 12.4	 37.5	 6.75
Sweden	 6.4	 32.6	 7.75
Switzerland	 24.5	 93.9	 2.75
United Kingdom	 42.9	 41.9	 6
United States	 506.5	 73.6	 3.25
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new opportunities for banking and monetary systems. Finally, at a political level, the
efforts towards establishing European Monetary Union, the rebuilding of the financial
systems of economies in transition, and the quest of central banks in developed
countries for global competitiveness of their respective financial systems, have resulted
in more efforts towards payment systems analysis.
Table 2-1 Payment flows and GDP in "G10" countries
Source: Bank for International Settlements (from Sheppard, 1996)
l Assuming approximately 250 days (working days only) on average a year.
These trends re-emphasise the importance of some public policy questions with
regard to payment system, such as:
• Are payment services a 'public good', i.e. what are the advantages and disadvantages
of both public and private provision of the services? Related is the question of
'market solutions' versus 'regulatory solutions'.
• What is the relationship between payment systems and monetary policy? What is the
proper role of monetary authorities in payment systems?
• What are the ways of reducing risk and costs in large value transaction systems?
How does the settlement system design bear on the shape of, and competition in,
banking industry and what are the consequences for banks' liquidity management?
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• What is the evidence of systemic risk in the interbank market and what is the impact
of the rise in global transactions on this risk? Related are the questions of the need
for international co-ordination by supervisors and the provision of liquidity for
settling international transactions37.
• What is the potential impact of new retail payment technologies on monetary and
-
other public policies?
The public policy strategy, therefore, has to address the questions of desirable
properties of a payment system and to balance the trade-offs between different public
policies' objectives and, indeed, various groups of stakeholders involved in or affected
by a payment system design. The Bank of Canada (1997b) explicitly states three broad
policy objectives regarding payment system - efficiency, safety and consumer interests.
In the UK the payment system issues are treated under two distinctive, yet closely
related, organisational and functional activities of the Bank of England - financial
stability (also the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority, as from June 1998)
and monetary policy 38 . The US Federal Reserve (Greenspan 1998, Moscow 1998)
acknowledge that, in the medium term, the role of the Fed is: a) in providing nation-
wide, accessible to all, payment services (such as check clearing and ACH businesses)
and encouragement and help in the use of electronic payment technologies, and b) as a
setter and rule-maker instead of the operational presence in other payment activities (to
foster a competitive environment).
More to the actual policy objectives, Ferguson (1998) states that the Fed needs
to ensure that the payment system: 1) supports economic growth by ensuring open
access, 2) manage risk well, 3) is resilient in the face of crisis, and 4) continues to
evolve to keep pace with the needs of an evolving economy. The European Central
Bank (EMI 1996, Hartman 1998, Issing 1998) see the role of the payment system
(TARGET) in facilitating the conduct of an efficient single monetary policy within the
monetary union by enabling quick and efficient transmission of monetary policy
measures and signals, allowing the arbitrage and competition to the same end.
37 The relating questions were also raised at the 34th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in May 1998.
38 Thus the FSA is mainly responsible for the supervision of the individual financial institutions, and the Bank of
England is responsible for "the overall stability of the financial system as a whole" (see e.g.
www.bankofengland.co.uk /geninfo2.htm).
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As no two financial systems or central banks are identical, the public policies
and strategies differ around the world. There, are however some common features with
regard to the payment systems and public policy relationship which are analysed next.
2.3.2. Payment system as a 'public good'
In light of the current practice around the world, whereby the payment systems
are under monetary and regulatory authorities' control, a question arises: is payment
system, or some of its parts, a "public good"? A simple answer is no. Because it can be
rivalrous, excludable and subject to congestion, and given the state of modern payment
system technologies that can easily discriminate between the users, payment system is
not a pure public good. There are, however, some features of payment system that seem
to make market outcomes inefficient, i.e. which make the case for a market failure
hypothesis39.
It can be argued that payment system, as a form of co-operative network, is
prone to creating service monopolies, whereby there can exist exclusions, barriers to
entry, predatory pricing or price discrimination of the services etc. This is especially
true if financial systems are concentrated and/or payment systems are owned by large
private institutions that can exercise economies of scale and scope and otherwise
exclude competition. This issue is most relevant in the network organisation offering
infrastructure clearing services and processing services for payments (Bank of Canada
1997b). It has been the case in the majority of countries that governments (central
banks) assumed the ownership and/or operation of central settlement institutions as
response to the 'natural monopoly' of payment system, the industry with dominant scale
effects. In some industrial countries (for example, US, UK and Canada) there is,
however, a shift (gradual return) towards government regulation and/or oversight of the
system as a whole - as opposed to a direct operational involvement.
It can also be argued that payment systems produce both positive and negative
externalities. Positive externalities exist when, for example, participants in a credit card
network or a settlement system benefit from a new member, both in terms of spreading
39 For an elaborate discussion on what is and what is not a public good and on market failure see Lipsey and Christal
(1995, p.418-424).
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network operating costs and expansion of the network of members they can deal with.
Negative externalities exist when network members do not bear appropriate costs,
thereby increasing the overall social costs of payment systems. Negative externalities
are present, for example, in the case of inadequate risk monitoring in a private system
and consequent risk spill-over to the payment system (e.g. collapse of Barings in 1995),
i.e. if there is a threat of systemic risk.
Related to systemic risk concerns, one may argue that another component of
'market failure' - asymmetric information - can exists in a payment system which is
entirely privately owned. This can be manifested both as:
a) a principal-agent problem, reflected in inadequate monitoring of payment system's
management behaviour and risk control that can produce negative externalities, and
b) a missing market problem, particularly relevant for transitional countries, which are
trying to adjust their financial systems to market economy requirements (for
example, non-existing risk insurance markets, underdeveloped interbank and
liquidity markets etc.).
Therefore, because of potential social costs that are not taken into account by the
bearers of private costs in payment systems, payment systems can be provisionally
dubbed as a 'public good', in that it may require some form of public intervention as
opposed to a totally free-market solution. Furthermore, in CTT there may be arguably a
stronger case for public intervention in payment systems because of the need to achieve
other social goals, such as restructuring of the banking and monetary systems in a short
period of time.
Benston and Kaufman (1994) from their review of evidence40
 concluded that a
payment system is not a 'public good' and that fragility of banking and payment
systems should not be a public concern, other than actions for preventing actions,
including those by government, that either directly or indirectly increase the risk profile
of banks or the potential losses from banks' (and payment systems') failures to other
banks or taxpayers. Their research and conclusions, however, make a case for
settlement in 'good funds' (central bank's money) and supervision of payment services
providers.
411 For a summary of reserach in the field see Benston and Kaufman (1994). For a discussion on banking system
regulation see (Dow 1996)
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McAndrews (1997b) argues that it is useful to analyse a payment system as a
network good, for which the value that a person gets from the product increases as more
people consume it and the technique a firm chooses to produce the product will depend
on techniques chosen by other firms. A network good is, therefore, characterised by
economies of scale, complementary technologies (both within a system and between the
systems)41 , possibilities of under-utilisation and high average costs per user (if there is
not a critical number of users), price fixing (as an extreme type of co-operation) and of
early leaders establishing dominance or monopoly. There is also a possibility that an
already installed technological base (i.e. their users/owners who have invested in it) can
prevent or delay new, better, solutions or improvements to the system, in which case the
outcome is clearly inefficient from a social point of view (e.g. magnetic v chip cards).
Weinberg (1997) takes a view that networks are fundamental to the role played
by intermediary institutions in payment systems and that clearing and settlement are
inherently network services. Therefore, the payment system also 'suffers' from network
specific externalities. In his theoretical model (ibid. 1997), Weinberg focuses on
positive externalities and concludes that public intervention can never improve upon the
economic performance of a private network unless there are barriers that prevent groups
of economic agents from pursuing the alternatives of their choices.
Therefore, the role of public policy would be to understand and try to prevent
such barriers from occurring by regulation and pricing practices and "antitrust scrutiny"
of firms by large market share. The model, however, does not prove that all economic
decision-makers are always free to make alternative arrangements in a network.
Moreover, as the model assumes that the externalities can be only enjoyed if one joins
the network (network specific - internal externalities that may be external to the
individual participants), it does not address the negative externalities, i.e. potential spill-
over of risks.
Inefficiency of a clearinghouse due to the principal-agent problems should also
be considered. Bauer and Ferrier (1996), illustrate the point by stating that since there is
no market for corporate control to "discipline" managers at the US Federal Reserve
processing sites, monitoring costs will be higher at the Federal Reserve than at publicly
41 For example, use of standard equipment for credit cards by merchants and use of the same equipment/network for
credit cards ('off-line' service) and debit cards ('on-line' service), respectively.
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traded corporations. Furthermore, the FED lacks the value traded shares and interest
rates 42 as monitoring devices.
On the other hand, the success of a new payment network may require a second-
best economic solution, such as allowing a large degree of control by one firm,
significant co-operation among rivals, or government mandate to set technical standards
in order to guarantee widespread access to yield large benefits for consumers (Mayer
1996). For example, nation-wide banks with access to many local payments
clearinghouses may be able to compete mere effectively for payments intermediation
business and find more efficient ways to clear and settle interregional payments
(Hughes et al 1996). The increase in size and geographical spread of large banking
organisations can improve the risk expected return trade-off faced by these
organisations by reducing deposit volatility and by allowing for greater diversification
of asset risks for a given rate of return.
In conclusion, given the current organisational structure and design of payment
systems, i.e. the involvement of monetary authorities, it is the 'superiority of the market
solution in payment system' hypothesis that is continuously tested. As the evidence is
inconclusive, payment systems remain guilty until proven innocent.
2.3.4. Payment system and monetary policy
"Only a central bank, with its unlimited power to create money, can with a high
probability thwart a chain reaction of defaults before it becomes destructive.., hence, a
central bank will of necessity be drawn into becoming lender of last resort" (Greenspan
1998). Given the nature of final payment settlement in an economy (that is in central
bank's funds), if the central bank guarantees intraday liquidity for payments it may
assume the role of the 'lender of first resort' thus creating a moral hazard problem. In
light of the rapid growth in volumes and values of payment transactions and their
increased real and potential impact on risks and costs of financial transactions (and not
just within national borders), the systemic risk versus moral hazard trade-off became a
part of central banks' day-to-day input choice in their monetary management.
42 That is, it doesn't borrow funds to purchase buildings etc.
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Related to this issue is a central bank's involvement in the settlement process,
i.e. the choice between the types of settlement and liquidity provision systems for large
value transactions. Goodhart (1988) has argued that central banks evolved in part out of
the need for an independent provider of payment services. A system choice, as
discussed under the heading "gross v net settlement", influences the value, type and
costs of liquidity needed for settlement purposes. In addition, liquidity provision
arrangements further determine the risks and possibility of 'spillover' of intraday credits
for payments to overnight credits.
Thus, a choice of a RTGS system for final settlements raises policy questions
about: 'daylight overdrafts' and pricing of the credit (also a potential need for the
development of intraday money markets and hourly/minutely pricing); guarantee of
finality of payments by central bank or queuing arrangements if there is no such
guarantee; operational efficiency/smooth transactions versus moral hazard; need to
redefine/shorten time horizon of monetary policy operating objectives and, finally, costs
of liquidity for settling every transactions in good funds (and therefore utilisation of
such a system if there is an alternative DNS system available, e.g. TARGET versus
correspondent banking). A choice of a DNS system puts public policy emphasis on risk
reduction and related issues, such as: bilateral and multilateral credit limits within the
system, i.e. caps on exposures, risk/loss sharing arrangements among the participants,
other prudential requirements for payment intermediaries, and supervision and early
intervention. A significant step towards risk reduction in DNS systems, especially for
cross-border transactions, was increased awareness of inherent risk in DNS systems by
commercial and central banks and consequent adoption of standards for net settlements
- as formulated by "Lamfalussy Standards"43.
Apart from systemic risk and liquidity provision concerns, a strong link between
payment systems and monetary policy is the influence of payment systems on available
and optimal choice among monetary policy instruments. For example, open market
operations, which are increasingly becoming the dominant instruments of monetary
43 Minimum standards for interbank netting schemes that require convergence of net settlement systems in developed
countries towards netting arrangements with: a) well-founded legal basis, b) clear understanding of risks affected by
the netting process, c) clear defined procedures for credit risk and liquidity management which specify
responsibilities of participants and limit maximum level of credit exposures by each participant, d) ability of ensuring
timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability of the participant with the largest single net-debit
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operations world-wide (Borio 1997, Johnson 1998), require efficient and fast payment
systems that can convey changes in prices/interest rates for allocation purposes. Well-
developed financial markets, as a prerequisite for efficiency of these indirect monetary
instruments, are shaped by the speed, risks and costs of payment systems. For example,
open market operations require payment systems that ensure the transfer of securities
through book entries and the rapid settlement of funds through accounts at the central
bank (Fry et al 1998).
A further tie between monetary policy and payment system is the
payment/settlement float. Depending on the type (credit or debit float) and the central
bank's ability to influence/measure that float, monetary policy can be seriously
undermined if payment lags are beyond the central bank's control. The direction, i.e.
extension/retraction of credit, and size and variability of the float influence the level and
volatility of banks' reserves and hence the demand for money. As the existing
technology can easily and cheaply minimise the size of float formed by payment and
accounting lags, elimination of the remaining variability of float is a matter of
institutional arrangements. As banks may like float as a form of free credit, the
monetary policy and institutional arrangements must ensure that central bank does not
credit banks' aczomts before related debits and that banks do not delay crediting
customers' accounts after receiving related payments.
In addition, substitution of paper based payment instruments by electronic
payment instruments for retail payments increases the speed of transactions and
settlement and, therefore, reduces the payment float made with, for example, cheques
and credit card payments. Hence, the public policy involvement can be extended to
retail payments to encourage electronic payments with a view to increasing monetary
control and overall efficiency of the financial system.
The impact of float is particularly relevant to high inflation countries, such as
CIT. In a high inflation environment, payment system inefficiencies and resulting float
dramatically increase the opportunity cost of holding money. The increased velocity of
money and inability to predict and measure the demand for money and the effects of
money supply in those circumstances put everyday monetary operations at risk of being
position to settle, e) transparent, open and fair access, and 0 back-up facilities capable of completing daily processing
to ensure operational reliability of the technical system (BIS 1990).
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ineffective or counterproductive. Furthermore, the losses resulting from the combined
effects of inflation and payment lags can seriously damage trust in payment and
banking systems and/or result in deposit withdrawals, increased currency substitution
and black market operations.
In summary, payment systems transmission mechanism, i.e. its speed (lags,
float, delays), costs, risks and transparency, has important monetary policy implications
with regard to the ability of monetary authorities to measure and control the money
stock. In the case of interest rates as a monetary policy tool, payment system must
convey changes in interest rates for allocation purposes. In the case of the money base
as a monetary policy tool, payment systems must reduce, and/or enable control of,
payment float for effective money stock control. Arguably, in light of the financial and
payment systems innovations and new payment technologies, and thus potential
changes in, and/or volatility of demand for money, interest rate setting by central banks
may be superior to the money base as the main monetary policy tool".
Finally, the monetary policy/payment system relationship can be observed
through an analysis of the demand for and supply of bank reserves. Banks hold reserves
to meet withdrawals of deposits and make payments. Central banks have imposed
reserve requirements (as a percentage of bank deposits) on banks primarily as a 'buffer'
for changes in liquidity conditions, including unforeseen withdrawals. The reserve
requirements, however, serve three additional functions: first, liquidity management - as
they contribute to offsetting the supply of liquidity generated through autonomous
factors; second, monetary control - because they can be used as a means of controlling
monetary aggregates; and, finally, income or tax function - as they are a source of
revenue for the central bank (Borio 1997). Generally, required reserves balances have
evolved so that they can be used for payments. Another significant trend is the
reduction in reserve requirements over the last decade in all countries (Borio 1997, Fry
et al 1998).
In the absence of binding reserve requirements, holdings of central bank deposit
liabilities are governed by the clearing function they serve (Lacker 1997). In virtually
all (industrial) countries, banks target small settlement balances whose amounts appear
44 Thus, changes in payment technology may affect changes in monetary policy which in turn may change the
payment settlement system design (because of the need for fast and efficient payment system).
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to be highly insensitive to movements in the overnight rate (Borio 1997). The amounts
held are largely dictated by the technical and institutional characteristics of payment and
settlement arrangements, including the central bank's attitude to the provision of end-
of-day marginal financing (ibid. 1997). Furthermore, in line with the trend towards
market oriented monetary policy (indirect instruments) the significance of required
reserves for controlling monetary aggregates and as a source of income have generally
declined.
In light of the trends, it can be argued that settlement arrangements, central
bank's involvement in the provision of liquidity for payments and the efficiency of
interbank money markets affected by payment systems are the three most significant
factors for analysing the demand for bank reserves and hence policy implementation. In
a RTGS system, as opposed to a DNS system, there is a need for intraday settlement
balances, i.e. intraday credit. To prevent the intraday credit from 'spilling over' to
overnight credit, the liquidity management facilities - central bank intraday credit or
queuing mechanisms - need to provide sufficient liquidity and otherwise discourage
banks from turning to the central bank for 'overnight' liquidity.
On the supply side, the increased reliance on market operations, i.e. interest rates
as an opexational target, have contributed to more active liquidity management, that in
turn requires an efficient and reliable payment system. More to the point, the provision
of intraday liquidity entails the choice of the optimal mechanism through which the
credit is provided (e.g. overdraft facilities as in US or intraday repos as in UK). Related
to the issue is the potential impact of these mechanisms on the use of collateral for
interday credit for payments and reduced availability of the pool of collateral for
overnight credit and/or emergency purposes (thus reducing protection in case of
systemic risk).
In short, regardless of the stage of development of financial markets and
payment systems, i.e. available monetary instruments, large value payment systems are
the transmission mechanism of day-to-day monetary operations. As such they determine
speed, precision, costs and predictability, and hence efficiency, of monetary
interventions. Related is the issue of the ability to measure, and the usefulness of,
monetary targets. It is affected by rapid changes in payment systems that influence
demand and supply of money.
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Demand for money, as influenced by payment systems, depends on: a) demand
for settlement reserves - depending on the type of settlement system, provision of
liquidity by the central bank, the development of financial markets, liquidity
management by commercial banks and treatment and level of obligatory and excess
reserves, and b) type, size and variability of payment float and lags - through its
influence on velocity of money and cost of inflation. Together, they are reflected in
transaction, precautionary and speculative motives of demand for money for payment
purposes. These motives are, in respective order, determined by: 1) type of settlement
system and stage of development of interbank money market - that influences the
degree of synchronisation of payments, 2) payment system costs, reliability and
frictions - that indicate the level of uncertainty, and 3) opportunities and threats brought
about by developing payment technologies - that enable quick transfer of money and
conversion between monetary assets.
The supply of money, on the other hand, is affected by: a) payment system
efficiency, i.e. how fast and predictable are the distribution of money and monetary
operations through payment system channels, b) availability of, and optimal choice
among, monetary instruments determined by the stage of development of financial
markets and payment systems and c) ability to control/prevent spillover of intraday to
overnight borrowings for payment purposes (particularly relevant in a RTGS system).
Therefore, the stage of development and efficiency of payment systems and
central bank's ability to determine the effects that changes in payment systems can have
on monetary management reflect on the effects, efficiency and transparency of
monetary policy and the ability to measure its effects. The most significant changes in
payment systems that may affect monetary policy management are the emergence of
electronic money45 and the increased introduction of real-time gross settlement systems
around the world.
2.3.5. Payment system design and operations
Central banks naturally assume two payment related services - cash services and
final settlement of interbank payments in central bank money. In addition they may
45 As discussed under the heading "The New Payment Technologies".
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assume provision of liquidity for payments to support the smooth functioning of
economic activities. The roles, however, may not be 'inherently' central bank's duties.
Nevertheless, the research regarding private versus central bank money (seniorage cost
v private money real and opportunity costs) and private versus central bank settlement
is yet to provide convincing evidence about the issues.
For small value/retail payments a proper role of a central bank is not so obvious.
The US Federal Reserve, for example, provides check and ACH services. The
involvement in the retail payment services has been justified by concern as to whether
private sector providers would adequately meet the needs of all depository institutions,
especially small institutions and those in remote locations (Ferguson 1998, Rivlin
1998). Therefore, the need for the Fed's involvement can be explained either by
inadequate market competition (and/or underdeveloped markets) or public policy that
gives priority to serving all institutions in all regions, thus supporting local economies.
On the other hand, a central bank's involvement, however well intended, may pose
significant barriers to private firms' entry and/or impede competition or progress as
payment services evolve. The stakes for banks in retail payment services are high. It has
been estimated that payment business represents as much as one-third of industry
revenues, expenses and profits in the United States (Ferguson 1998).
There are some fundamental advantages and disadvantages that central banks
may have as a competitor. Advantages stem from central bank's immunity to
insolvency or default and institutional and/or financial powers. Disadvantages, on the
other hand, are in different risk taking profiles and the flexibility to be selective with
regard to customers and the pricing of the services (ibid. 1998). In view of the potential
impediments to progress and the high stakes for banks, central banks in developed
counties have increasingly started to adopt a market based approach to payment system
policies. The emphasis has been on fostering competition, regulatory improvements and
removing obsolete regulation as well as the strategy for a withdrawal from direct
involvement in payment system operations with a shift towards supervision and
surveillance. Nevertheless, central banks still remain major owners of their countries'
large-value payment systems (see Table 2-2.). Furthermore, there is a trend towards
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central banks' ownership of the countries settlement systems, as the new RTGS systems
in central banks' ownership 46 are squeezing out DNS systems.
Table 2-2 Central Bank Ownership of Payment Systems in the Bank of England Group1'2
Type Industrial Transitional Developing
RTGS
Sole 56 86 100
Joint 6 14 0
None 38 0 0
DNS
Sole 6 44 47
Joint 44 44 37
None 50 12 16
Source: Bank of England Survey of 70 central banks (Fry et al 1998)
1)Bank of England Group comprises 70 countries that responded to Bank of England Survey on Payment
Systems, conducted in February 1998. There are 21 industrial countries, 13 transitional and 36 developing
countries.
2)Percent of countries in each group
There are, however, other stakeholders involved in payment system design and
operation. These include: the banking supervisors (if different from central bank), the
government, the commercial banks and other financial institutions (both domestic and
foreign), organised financial markets and clearinghouses, customers (domestic and
foreign) and system's suppliers and operators. In order to establish an efficient payment
system, they need to co-operate in one way or another and, critically, to 'buy-in' the
design choices and system as a whole (Keppler 1998). The type of co-operation and
policy approach, however, will depend on the individual county's circumstances, i.e.
stage of development of payment and overall financial systems, and whether a new
payment system is being built or an existing one improved.
In general, in recent years, industrial countries tended to rely on a more informal
and/or market based approach. Development of payment systems in those countries
followed, in the business strategy terminology, a 'bottom-up' approach, whereby the
system improvements were a consequence of natural evolution and maturity of financial
systems, and were financial industry driven. Less-developed countries, on the other
hand, usually opt for a 'top-down' approach, whereby the system changes and/or other
institutional and regulatory changes were initiated mainly by central banks with a view
46 Belgium and UK are the rare examples of countries in which RIGS system is not in the central bank's ownership.
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to promoting efficiency and reducing risks. Thus, these countries are trying to 'leap-
frog' into a state of effective and efficient payment systems that can help sustain or
promote the development of financial systems. Notwithstanding these developments,
Fry et al (1998) found in their survey of "The Bank of England Group" of 70 countries
that the central banks generally had strong preferences for evolutionary rather than
,
revolutionary development of their countries' payment systems.
The basic issues and choices that policy makers should be concerned with when
designing or improving payment systems are payment system user needs, risk control,
payment instruments, legal requirements, system requirements, system's ownership and
contro147, and cost recovery and pricing of the services (Montes-Negret and Keppler
1995). In particular, the choices are about type of settlement system (e.g. RTGS or DNS)
and payment processing system (e.g. individual or batch), type of instruments offered
(e.g. paper or electronic or both), operation and ownership of the system (e.g. central
bank's, private or joint). The major obstacles in that process of payment system
development, as illustrated by the survey of the Bank of England Group of countries
(Fry et al 1998), are: a) legal framework - for developed countries, b) immaturity of the
banking system and poor legal framework - for countries in transition, and c) poor
technical infrastructure, legal framework and maturity of the banking system,
respectively - for developing countries.
For countries that intend to introduce major new systems (these include some
industrial countries) or are developing a modern payment system for the first time there
are some policy recommendations based on payment systems implementation
experience of The World Bank (Listfield and Montes-Negret (1994), Montes-Negret
and Keppler (1995), Humphrey, Keppler and Montes-Negret (1997) and Keppler
(1998)). In short they relate to the recommendations that the participants must 'own' the
systems' changes and that payment systems should operate profitably (full-cost
recovery) and pay for themselves in several years. Some of the studies seem to suggest
that there is no difference in issues for developed and developing countries, but for
different level of sophistication of problem-solvers. One may note that an additional
difference between developed and developing countries lies in the level of available
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resources. Furthermore, also relevant for EMU TARGET or any new RTGS system, full-
cost recovery may result in under-utilisation of the systems, especially if there are some
alternative systems available.
However, a thorough macro and micro economic cost-benefit study and
situation analysis are not always the starting points in payment system design, as more
operational (tactical) approaches for payment system improvements and/or trouble-
shooting overtakes a 'strategic' approach to system development. These will depend on
the state of development of existing payment system(s), business environment and
needs, who leads and participates in system design and implementation and a country's
institutional, legal and technological infrastructure.
Once a new payment system is in place, policy makers face somewhat different
problems, including:
• the choice of type of both oversight over system and further involvement in the
system operations by the monetary authorities;
• encouragement of competition and private solutions; and
• influence of increased global financial integration and competition on domestic
payment and monetary systems.
2.3.6. Payment system reforms and trends
The past ten years was a hectic period for many policy makers around the world
in respect of payment system reforms. Regardless of the causes and motives for the
particular reforms, there are some common trends that can be identified from the variety
of actions. The first trend is the strengthening of so-called wholesale payment systems
in light of the increased risk-awareness of the payment systems' participants. One
general approach has been to 'secure' existing payment system arrangements based on
net settlement and the other involved the introduction of real-time gross settlement
systems, coupled with the efforts towards encouraging private sector use of the systems
(BIS 1997a, Emmons 1997).
47 However, in many developing or transitional countries central banks may be the 'only act in town' (Keppler 1998)
and, therefore, have no choice but to take the lead in system changes, as 'market solution' may take too long for the
policy makers' liking.
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Together with these efforts came second and third common themes in payment
system reforms. One, more apparent in industrial countries, is the establishment of
delivery-versus-payment (DVP) mode for securities settlement and a shortening of
settlement periods. The other is an initiative for payment-versus-payment (PVP)
settlement of foreign-exchange payment transactions. Thus, the policy makers in
industrial countries are concerned with the more advanced payment system issues, such
as payment system risks and costs that arise from securities settlement and foreign
exchange operations.
The measures to secure net settlement systems typically include real-time
monitoring of counter-parties within the system, net debit caps, collateralisation, and
additional open-ended financial guarantees (i.e. loss-sharing arrangements) in case all
other safeguards prove inadequate (Emmons 1997). Bilateral correspondent-banking
relationship for FOREX transactions, as another form of deferred net settlement, was
also improved to include payment and financial obligation netting, accompanied with
necessary legal provisions, thus reducing intraday exposures. Furthermore, the central
banks' co-operation facilitated through Bank for International Settlements' forums,
have resulted in greater insistence on adoption of the Lamfalussy Standards within
national DNS systems.
The largest private DNS system in the US and the world CHIPS, which includes
over 100 members, deals with on average about one million transfers worth above six
trillion dollars (just below the value of US annual GDP) each week (data for 1996).
Another significant national DNS is Canadian LVTS, the only large value net settlement
system in developed countries without an RTGS competitor. Another private DNS
system in Europe is the ECU Clearing and Settlement System, which, as from 1999,
evolved into a multilateral private DNS alternative to TARGET — called Euro Clearing
System (ECS). Although all industrial countries, except Sweden and Switzerland, have
operational DNS systems for large value payments, the emphasis has been on the
introduction and/or promotion of RTGS systems. Thus, Japan intends to abolish the DNS
mode within its BOJ-NET by the end of the year 2000 (Shimoda 1998), since 1996 UK
CHAPS is no longer a DNS system and Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal and Spain are also developing RTGS systems. In the European Union this trend
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has been additionally supported by the efforts towards monetary union and creation of
TARGET - the system of interlinking of national RTGS systems.
Nevertheless, all gross settlement systems are not the same and differ in respect
of liquidity provision or operational mechanism. Moreover, some so-called real-time
systems actually do not operate in this mode. The systems can be divided broadly into
two groups - systems without a central bank intraday credit facility and systems with the
facility (BIS 1997a). The examples of the former group are SIC (Switzerland) and BOJ-
NET (Japan). In SIC, transfer orders are temporarily held in the centrally located queue
if covering funds are not sufficient and processed on first in - first out basis, subject to
assigned priorities upon the availability of funds (BIS 1997a, Heller 1998). In B0J-NET
uncovered transfers orders are rejected and returned to the sender (BIS 1997a, Shimoda
1998).
In the countries where central banks provide intraday liquidity, the credit is
extended through intraday overdraft facilities or, as in U.K. and France, through
intraday sale and repurchase transactions with the central bank. In European industrial
countries, the overdrafts or credits must be fully collateralised in all systems. U.S.
Fedwire, on the other hand, charges fees for, and imposes net debit caps on, the
overdrafts. Table 2-3 gives an overview of the arrangements in G-10 countries.
Table 2-3 Financial and aueuinciarranciements in G-10 countries
System with: Centrally located queue No centrally located
queue
Central bank intraday credit
No central bank intraday credit
ELLIPS (Belgium)
TBF (France)
EIL-ZV (Germany)
BI-REL (Italy)
TOP (Netherlands)
RIX (Sweden)
SIC (Switzerland)
CHAPS (UK)
FEDWIRE (USA)
BOJ-NET (Japan)
No RTGS system : Canada
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1997a)
The use of RTGS is also growing outside the Group of Ten and European Union
(BIS 1997a). For example, RTGS systems are already in operation in the Czech
Republic, Hong Kong, Korea and Thailand and the systems will be introduced in
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Australia, China, New Zealand and Saudi Arabia (ibid. 1997a). Its legal and technical
simplicity make an RTGS system attractive even for countries with less developed
financial systems. However, the major driving force behind RTGS systems in those
countries is arguably the involvement of central banks as initiators and facilitators of the
reforms. A centralised RTGS system with its monetary control properties would be a
logical reward for a central bank's efforts. The adoption of the state-of-the-art gross
systems may also be driven by some exogenous factors stemming from the deployment
of foreign advisors, equipment providers and system development experts. Furthermore,
there may be a justifiable desire of some of these countries to integrate more into
regional trade and financial flows. The examples include the Eastern European
countries/European Union link and the South African region. Furthermore, RTGS
system may give confidence to foreign Fl that their payments will not be delayed or go
astray, and support their bigger involvement. Therefore, a payment system choice can
be a part of a public policy strategy aimed at attracting foreign investments and/or
financial institutions, thus encouraging competition, investments or discipline in the
financial system.
2.4. The new payment technologies
2.4.1. Introduction
Payment system expenses are estimated to be between 2 percent to 3 percent of
GDP in the United States (Humphrey et al 1996). The figures are similar in other
developed countries, although European Union countries, due to greater use of
electronic payment instruments, seem to have somewhat less costly payment systems
(EMI 1996). This cost can be markedly reduced when paper-based payment systems are
replaced by electronic payments, since the social costs of electronic payment may be
only one-third to one-half that of a paper based transaction (Humphrey et al 1996). New
payment technologies, particularly newer electronic methods of consumer payments
that may replace older paper-based methods, can potentially speed up settlement to
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lessen risk and reduce the real resource and financial costs of making payments (Berger
et al 1996).
Despite what appears to be significant potential benefit in adopting
technological innovations, there are typically extraordinarily long lags between the
introduction of new payment methods and their widespread use (ibid. 1996). For
example, it was often predicted in the 1960s and 1970s that most SVTS consumer
payments would be electronic long before now (Flannery 1996b, Mayer 1996 and
Osterberg and Thompson 1998). Humphrey et al (1996) find that payees' familiarity
with using a payment instrument and its acceptability are significant factors that
influence payment instrument choice. The speed of adoption of new technologies may
also depend on the distribution of risk and cost benefits of the new payment methods
(Humphrey and Berger 1990, Berger et al 1996). For example, consumers may be
reluctant to give up the benefits of the float by switching to electronic methods of
payment. Another important factor may be the distribution of benefits among payment
services producers and the dynamics of the competitive process, where economies of
scale and scope play a significant role.
Much of the 1970s-era hype about electronic funds transfer has become routine
for banks and corporations (in the developed countries)48 . But the consumers continued
to employ traditional, paper-based transactions media, largely because they are not
required to bear the full costs of their payment media choices (Flannery 1996b). There
is, however, the uniform and unmistakable, though gradual, movement towards greater
use of electronic payment methods both cross-countries and over time (Humphrey et al
1996).
In addition to already established credit card, debit card and electronic giro
payments the new electronic payment instruments, namely those based on smart card
technology and products that utilise computer networks, are responsible for the new
'payment system revolution'. However, given the profession's mixed success in
predicting the impact of technology on the payment system in 1970, today's analogous
forecasts (of the impact of the new payment instruments and technology) might be
taken with a grain of salt (Flannery 1996b).
48 The most prominent electronic LVTS is undoubtedly S.W.I.F.T., which is used for both domestic (inter and intra
bank) and cross-border payments and messages exchange.
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2.4.2. Electronic money defined
The term electronic money is often used loosely to refer to a wide variety of
retail payment mechanisms such as prepaid cards, cash cards, electronic purse, smart
cards, digital cash, e-cash, cyber-money, software products that use Internet network
etc. The Bank for International Settlements - BIS (1996b), defines e-money as stored-
value or prepaid products in which a record of the funds or value available to a
consumer is stored on an electronic device in the consumer's possession. The electronic
value is purchased by the consumer (e.g. by transferring funds from its bank account)
and is reduced whenever the consumer uses the device to make payment.
E-money products are intended to be used as general, multipurpose means of
payment and are, therefore a closer substitute to cash than many existing single purpose
prepaid cards (e.g. phone cards). They are also different from traditional electronic
payment instruments (i.e. debit and credit cards) in the sense that e-money products
don't require on-line authorisation before, or debiting of consumer's bank account after,
each transaction. The term is used for both prepaid cards, i.e. electronic purses, and
prepaid software products that use computer networks such as Internet and various
Intranets, i.e. digital cash. Frontier application is smart-card technology, where chip-in-
card technology substantially expands the memory capacity of prepaid vehicles.
E-money differs from "access products", which are products that allow
consumers to use electronic means of communication to access otherwise conventional
payment services, e.g. use of a PC and Internet to make a credit card payment or to
transmit instructions to make funds transfers between bank accounts (BIS, 1996b). It is
only in conjunction with stored smart cards that specialised software installed on a
standard computer can be referred to as digital cash. Another, already developing,
possibility is to transfer funds from a bank account to a PC, from which, from that
moment onwards, a payment can be made in the same manner as by using a smart card.
At the moment, it seems that there are three distinguished ways in which future
electronic SVTS payment schemes will be developing. First, the use of smart card - off-
line - payments as a close substitute for cash payments, for example the Mondex49
49 Mondex electronic cash is carried on a smartcard, which is credit card-sized with an embedded microprocessor,
capable of making transactions and storing balances. Customers charge their card with encrypted cash from an ATM,
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scheme in the UK. Second, a scheme that utilises both smart cards and personal
computers (together with a computer network e.g. Internet) for making payments, i.e.
combines access products and specific computer software with e-money cards. For
example Unisource and Milicent systems 5° both launched in 1997. And third, the use of
access products to make on-line electronic payment instructions and orders, e.g. by
using a computer, interactive TV or a public terminal (such as ATM) rather than visiting
a bank branch, using a standard telephone or going out for shopping. The term
"electronic banking" is often used to refer to different products and procedures that
operate under the hub of the latter two schemes.
Another way in which the SVTS payments are likely to develop is, of course,
improvement in both the existing payment mechanisms of debit and credit cards - by
means of using built-in-chip technology, and access products. This will probably
increase the speed and efficiency of on-line authorisation and clearing, and probably
reduce the costs of the payments, but, on the other hand, it is unlikely to change the
underlying settlement procedures in the medium term.
The success and implications of all these schemes will depend on a number of
factors, which are looked at in more detail in the subsequent sections.
2.4.3. Issues raised by the development of e-money and electronic banking
Here is a non-exhaustive list of the most important issues, with a brief
evaluation of each.
Clearance and settlement. E-money, i.e. smart card technology and/or specific
software, makes it possible for payment transactions to settle instantly. In that sense it is
a close substitute for cash as it represents direct, off-line, immediate (real-time),
delivery-against-payment payment between the buyers and sellers in an economy. The
from a public telephone, from their own smartcard-enabled telephone or a PC. The Mondex card is inserted in a
terminal to make a purchase. The amount of the transaction is transferred to the retailer's smartcard in the terminal,
and the balance is later transmitted to the bank - manually, by presenting a card or electronically (by switching to on-
line communication with the bank).
51) Payments via Unisource are made by inserting a Mondex card into a computer which utilises instant settlement
feature of smart card technology and enables a simple 'pay-as-you-go' service. Similarly, the Milicent system uses a
distributed brokers approach, versus a centralised clearing-house approach, to speed verification and minimise costs
enabling efficient and cheap 'pay-per-click' mechanism. Vendors contract with brokers to sell scrip to users. After
the user purchases the scrip from a broker via some standard payment method (e.g. credit card) all transactions are
transparent.
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so-called 'off-line' schemes have, therefore, an advantage over credit and debit card
payment mechanisms (as they currently exist), because they doesn't require 'on-line'
authorisation of the payment nor ex-post debiting of an account, which makes it cheap
even for smallest payments. The schemes are designed to facilitate retail payments and
have a relatively low limit on the maximum value that can be held. It limits the potential
,
'damage' that they can do.
Acceptance. The future of e-money is likely to depend on its cost advantages
over other payment methods, revenues from fees and the investment of outstanding
balances for issuers, and considerations of security and privacy for users (BIS 1996b).
To succeed, an electronic purse system will need to offer enough features of value to its
three constituencies - consumers, merchants, and issuers - to induce them to bear the
cost (Wenninger and Laster 1995). As for the institutions (issuers), "although hard data
are scarce, the cost advantage to, for example, debit cards is alleged to be in the range of
50 percent" (Saul 1994). Banks seem to be enthusiastic about the new products and are
actively involved in their development. Some banks are rushing into electronic banking,
perhaps because they see cyberspace as a place where their customers will do their work
for them. An ATM transaction typically costs one-tenth of what a live-teller transaction
does (Martin 1995)51.
Merchants are perceived to be winners too, because off-line prepaid cards are
expected to reduce the costs of clearing of transactions, handling cash, and reducing
fraud (Santamero and Seater 1996). As for the electronic banking, i.e. the use of access
products to make on-line electronic payment instructions and orders, it opens a whole
new world of opportunities for sellers. The trade over the Internet, that utilises smart
cards and/or specialised hardware and software, i.e. electronic commerce, is up and
running. Interactive TV, that enables on-line ordering and payment instructions, is
another example.
The third group, consumers, seem to be enthusiastic too. Smart Card Enterprises
found, in their 1993 survey, that 88 percent of the consumers are willing to use some
51 Illustrative is the quote from a magazine: "Why the rush? Banks are feeling backed into a corner. Nonbank
competitors with stocks and mutual funds are eating into deposits, and expensive branch networks are bleeding
operating budgets. To compete with Merrill Lynch, Fidelity Investments and others, banks have to offer more
products and superior service -- while reducing overhead. How, you ask? By getting customers to do a lot of banking's
backshop work on automated teller machines and their own PCs and telephones." "Net Worth" by Edward Martin,
North Carolina Magazine - November 1995,
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form of the new technology (Saul 1994). The economic rationale for this enthusiasm is
a bit unclear (Santamero and Seater 1996). Each application is different, and they have
to be evaluated by potential users in terms of transfer fees, acceptability, deferential
float, different implied yields on balances held in each form etc. (ibid. 1996). It seems,
therefore, that universal receptivity to alternative monies "may be more a good
marketing ploy than good economics" (ibid. 1996, p.943). Consumer acceptance of any
new technology, however, will be key to its success.
Security52. Security risks to electronic money systems could arise in the
consumer or merchant domains and in the financial institutions domain, as well as in the
network domain (BIS 1996c). The Task Force of Security of Electronic Money
established by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 53 of the G-10 central
bank, found that one critical safeguard in the card-based systems is the degree of
tamper-resistance54 of the microchip embedded in the card or other device. It is their
finding that this feature provides a significant advantage for card-based systems over
software-based systems in terms of technical security, but also adds significantly to
their production costs. Cryptography 55 is the other safeguard for card-based systems and
the primary safeguard for software-based systems.
But, as the Task Force states, it is the potential unavailability of transaction
information 56 for security monitoring purposes, rather than the safe transferability of
electronic value, that poses greater challenges to security. The Task Force concludes,
that electronic money systems can be designed with an adequate level of security
(relative to other forms of retail payment) and that in choosing an option for security
purposes, developers face trade-offs in the areas of cost, functionality, speed and
reliability (ibid. 1996c). Given the robustness of the technical security features, a
greater risk may arise during the manufacturing, distribution or issuing process, e.g.
stealing of the cards during these processes etc.
Access products. Well functioning smart card and electronic home banking
schemes require, apart from publicly available terminals (such as ATMs, public
52 For more detail on the security issues see BIS (1996c and 1998).
53 Which acts as an forum organised by Bank for International Settlements
54 The capacity of devices to resist physical attack up to a certain point.
55 Cryptography stands for the application of mathematical theory to develop techniques and algorithms that can be
applied to data to ensure goals such as confidentiality, data integrity and authentication.
56 The issue is discussed further under the part that looks at the issues of concern for central bank.
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telephones etc.), some electronic device in the home. There has been uncertainty as to
whether the most promising device is the telephone, interactive TV, or personal
computer (Bogolin 1995). The first two have the advantage of universal presence and
familiarity. Telephone banking is already well established, though with limited
functions. The PC is a device better suited for banking functions (Horvitz 1996), but
there is a problem of household penetration. However, the PC can emerge as a true
consumer item57. The major cable-television companies, are all experimenting with the
remote delivery of financial services over either cable television or telephone lines. In
order to achieve that wider bandwidth, both TV and telephone companies need to get
more fiber-optic cable into the ground, a huge and hugely expensive undertaking, but
one which will be accomplished over the next 10 years (Sheshunoff 1996).
From a customer's point of view, however, all those technologies are compatible
(and will eventually be only just a means for payments processing, i.e. commodities)
and what she faces is the decision whether she really needs electronic banking,
weighing up the advantages and the costs. For the providers, however, there are huge
incentives to win the competition as the potential benefits are large. In the United
States, for example, consumers are now paying about $5 billion per year to mail checks
(Humphrey et al 1996). Horvitz (1996) illustrates the benefits, stating that if Microsoft
(who has the ambition to take over the control over electronic banking) were able to
extract ten cents from every such payment, it would earn profits of $1.5 billion per year.
The fixed costs are high, however, and with low volume of usage, average costs (that
the consumers who chose to participate will end up paying) are too high for most
consumers and payees (ibid. 1996).
2.4.4. Public policy implications
There are number of issues of potential concern to monetary authorities raised
by the development of e-money. Of particular relevance are the implications on the
oversight function, seigniorage, monetary policy and financial risks borne by issuers of
e-money. From a policy point of view, the main interest in the e-money schemes lies in
57 "Microsoft Corp. chairman Bill Gates recently tagged PC household penetration at 35%, and predicted it would
reach 50% within two years. This is pretty optimistic, but in line with other benchmarks." (Sheshunoff 1996)
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who issues the prepaid value, how it is used as a means of payment and the impact on
central banks' balance sheet (BIS, 1996b).
There are different types of service providers involved in the operation of an e-
money scheme58 . As far as a central bank is concerned, the issuers are the most
important providers, since e-money is a balance-sheet liability of these institutions (ibid.
1996b). It is of particular importance who issues the money, i.e. can a central bank
exercise control over them. These could be banks, non-bank financial institutions and
non-financial institutions. It seems that in the European Union in general and its
member countries in particular, the only group allowed to issue multipurpose prepaid
cards will be credit institutions (EMI 1996, ECB 1998b). In the United States, it appears
that under current state and federal laws, entities other than depository institutions may
issue e-money (BIS 1996a). The decision about who can issue e-money involves a
trade-off between the risks and implications on competition. However, if e-money is to
replace cash 59
 there has to be a certain provision regarding the guarantee of claims the
products carry, i.e. to insure that, for example, the funds backing the issue of electronic
money be held the asset of sufficiently high quality, liquidity to meet claims and be
subject to a risk-adjusted requirements.
The particular risks that seem to worry tax and monetary officials, are the
possibilities of money laundering across borders and the issuance of multicurrency
cards. The latter makes it more difficult for central banks to measure accurately the
stock of e-money denominated in the home currency. Another concern for public
authorities is how to obtain detailed and precise information about the products or
schemes being promoted in their country by foreign vendors. As for the security and
money laundering issues, if they are perceived to be of sufficient concern, there might
be a desire to regulate not just who issues e-money but also the types of products that
can be offered.
Related to this is the question of the extent to which transactions are recorded. If
details of a transaction can be registered in a central database, which could then be
monitored, then there is a great deal of control over payment process and individual
transactions. If not, as with smart cards that are closer substitutes for cash (e.g. Mondex
5R Typically, these are: the issuers of the e-money value, the network operators, the vendors of specialised hardware
and software and the clearers of e-money transactions.
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cards), the oversight function of central banks for payment systems is diminished. In
addition, the lack of an audit trail and the possibility of money laundering worries tax
and police authorities60.
But the concerns, especially from the monetary authorities' perspective, seem to
be somewhat misplaced. As long as there is control over issuers of e-money and good
technical and security standards for the payment instruments, that is the cards and
software, the supervision of e-money transactions is going to be even easier than the
supervision of cash transactions, including foreign exchange transactions. The real
question is that of the purpose of monitoring, that is, is the oversight function of central
banks used for monetary and perhaps audit control or has it the additional feature of
data and information gathering for whatever additional purpose. The issue of privacy
aside, it is not for a central bank to undertake such an ambitious task anyway. However,
the issues of consumer protection, disclosure and assignment of participants liability,
and privacy, as major public policy considerations, are still important and should be
addressed by regulators and law-makers (McAndrews 1997a).
Another consideration might be whether the failure of one participant was likely
to threaten the viability of the whole scheme or whether the failure of one scheme could
threaten the viability of other schemes or the reputation of electronic payment systems
more generally (BIS 1996b). The systemic risk born exclusively by e-money schemes,
however, is likely to be limited because: a) given the retail nature, the amounts are
likely to be small and b) the issue of systemic risk for e-money schemes is not unlike
the issue of systemic risk in banking or payment systems as a whole. As long as there
are adequate ex-ante licensing procedures and ex-post policy measures (similar to those
for conventional banking) the e-money schemes can be treated in a similar way as the
other payment mechanisms. The difficulty is in deciding on the nature of the e-money,
i.e. whether it is a substitute for cash or deposits (and other payment instruments) or
both.
Designing an appropriate regulatory framework for e-money involves balancing
different objectives including the stability and financial integrity of the issuers,
protection of consumers and the promotion of competition and innovation (BIS 1996b).
59 Whose nominal value is backed by a state guarantee.
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Excessive new regulations, therefore, may not be appropriate. If, for example, it is
decided that e-money balances are a form of deposit, any existing regulations
concerning deposits are likely to apply61 . Furthermore, it is not certain which schemes,
with what possible implications, are likely to be in use in the future 62 . Central banks,
however, should stay vigilant and monitor closely the developments. On the other hand,
it also has to be ensured that monetary authorities are not a hindrance in the process of
innovative electronic payment mechanisms' development. Mayer (1996, p. 975) states
that "processing checks provides more than half the employment in the Federal Reserve
System (in the United States)" and that "for reasons of self-interest (Fed) has held back
the development of electronic payments and electronic data interchange, putting up
roadblocks where the public interest called for it to bulldoze barricades." However, in
the EU and some CTT (e.g. Czech Republic), there is a clear trend towards over-
regulation of the underdeveloped financial and technological innovations, of unproven
merits and drawbacks (see, for example, ECB 1998b)
2.4.5. E-money and monetary policy
The greatest concern for central banks should be the effect of e-money on the
demand for money and on the formulation of monetary policy. E-money could lead to
shifts in the velocity of money which might temporarily reduce the usefulness of the
monetary aggregates, especially narrower ones, for countries that rely on them as targets
or indicators (BIS 1996b). There would also be some statistical questions to resolve,
namely how the amount of electronic money outstanding should be treated and how
frequently it should be measured (Robson 1996).
The effect of e-money on the implementation of monetary policy will, however,
depend on a) whether e-money will substitute for bank deposits (that are the base for
other non-cash payment instruments) or cash in circulation and b) the speed of adoption.
The effect on demand would result from the substitution of e-money for 'reservable'
deposits or from a substantial reduction in banks' demand for settlement balances (BIS
60 See, for example, "FT Guide to Electronic Money", Financial Times, February 5 1997 and "Security of Electronic
Money" BIS, August 1996.
61 Although some electronic money products have more in common with cash than with deposits.
62 As illustrated by the failure of many e-money schemes, e.g. Digicash more recently.
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1996b). A very substantial substitution can, on the other hand, complicate the setting of
money market interest rates. Given the nature of e-money and its use for so-called
'micro-payments' payments, as a substitute for cash, it is less likely that e-money will
substitute for deposits.
The speed of adoption seems unlikely to be fast in the short and medium term.
Nonetheless, the payment network characteristics, such as critical mass acceptance,
interdependent demand and exponential growth (Osterberg and Thomson 1998), can
apply to the analysis of e-money and its development.
In short, the acceptance of e-money and possible substantial substitution of e-
money for cash (and/or deposits) will depend on: a) its costs and risks, as well as its
cost-effectiveness compared to the other payment instruments, b) incentives, marketing
efforts and 'critical-mass' acceptance, c) development of electronic commerce and d)
substitution of 'paper-based' administration and communications with `e-files'
economy.
What the central bank has direct control over is referred to as high-powered
money, the cash base, or the monetary base (Lipsey and Chrystal 1995). This consists of
currency held by the public and the banks and of deposits held by the banks with the
central bank (ibid. 1995). It is the former that may change/shrink due to the e-money
development. Although it may concern a central bank, since cash is the largest
component of central banks liabilities, the improvement of payment mechanisms and
the substitution of cash (if those instruments become widely accepted), ceteris paribus,
would probably reduce the transactions balances altogether. It is to the benefit of
customers and businesses to hold less non-interest bearing instruments.
The substitution of e-money for cash, per se, doesn't increase a cash drain to the
public63 . It could, however, have reverse, and thus, from banking system perspective,
positive effects. The actual reduction of cash balances due to the influence of e-money
would be a result of, for example, a faster and more convenient link with individual
bank accounts for occasional e-cash 'withdrawals' through portable or easily accessible
63 A cash drain to the public reduces the expansion of deposit money that can be supported by the banking system
(Lipsey and Chrystal 1995). It is the effect of public holdings of its money in a fairly stable proportion between cash
and deposits. This means that when the banking system creates new deposit money the public withdraws cash from
the banks to maintain the ratio (ibid. 1995).
62
Payment Systems Reforms 	 Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
devices, such as mobile phones, personal computers or public telephones and
terminals64.
The desired cash holdings ratio of the public, the banks desired reserve ratio,
and hence demand for money as a whole, are likely to continue to be influenced by
more fundamental variables, i.e. those of national income and wealth, inflation and
interest rates. The second and third components of the demand for money, i.e.
precautionary and speculative motives, shouldn't be influenced a great deal by the
development e-money itself. It is the reduction in uncertainty, born by the payment
system itself, of money inflows and outflows that may change those more fundamental
variables (motives for the demand for money). If the evolution of electronic payment
mechanism contributes to the efficiency of the payment system, by improving clearing
and settlement procedures, and, therefore, reduces the transaction balances it is
something that monetary authorities should encourage and help. An overview of the
issues is given in table 2-4.
Table 2-4 Electronic money influence on demand for mone y and cash balances
Influence consequence/consideration
Reduce demand
Black market payments, tax evasion
-
Motives
Transactions
Speculative
Precautionary
Yes, if substantial substitution
Maybe
Not likely
Functions
Means of Exchange
Store of Value
Unit of Account
Yes
Maybe
Maybe, depending on the regulation
Replace cash, cheques and other SVTS
Convenience v privacy
Fiat money v private money
What might worry some central banks, especially if the substitution is
substantial, is the loss of "seigniorage" 65 . If the adoption of e-money was extensive
enough, the loss of seigniorage could become a concern to central banks, which might
in consequence become more dependent on other sources of revenue (BIS 1996b). This,
however, shouldn't worry an economy as a whole, although some governments
(particularly those with large budget deficits) may argue the opposite. Firstly, regarding
64 Thus, the 'off-line' feature of e-money purses could be combined with 'on-line' connection with one's bank
account for e-cash withdrawals.
65 In the modern context, "the term applies to the revenue that accrues from the power to print bank notes, which have
very low production costs relative to their face value, and from the fact that many central banks force banks to place
non-interest-bearing deposits at the central bank (which finances the holding of interest-bearing securities)" (ibid.,
p.675, 1995).
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the government revenue, it is up to general fiscal and tax policy to cater for it66.
Secondly, there is no reason why a central bank cannot issue e-cash instead of paper
cash, once or if e-money substitutes for cash.
The fundamentals remain the same, the money supply is determined by demand
for money, regardless of the physical form of money. The reserve requirements, credits
for liquidity, regulatory role, and the function of banker to the government and the
banks are likely to remain within central bank's jurisdiction for a long time to come. If
we don't question the role of the banking system and its credit function on one hand,
and central banks' fundamental functions on the other hand, the function and volume of
deposit money is unlikely to change (only because of the introduction of e-money) and
electronic units can safely replace pieces of paper. To compensate, to a certain extent,
for the loss of seigniorage, central banks can charge fees for giving a licence for issuers
or start issuing e-cash themselves°. The reserve requirements could then be in the form
of e-money just as in cash. The substitution process is not likely to be very fast and one
should not feel sorry for central banks, as they will find a way to readjust to the new
situation.
The improvement of existing credit and especially debit card schemes, by
replacing magnetic stripes with computer chips, and the improvement of access
products by increasing security and speed of transactions, may, however, have more
significant effects on monetary systems in the long run. The logic is that if it is easy and
widely acceptable to make payments directly from ones bank account, via improved
plastic cards, this might change/reduce desired cash holdings altogether. If it is cheap
and secure to make even the smallest payments, effective and efficient on-line
authorisation can reduce/ replace the role of cash and therefore central bank's role of the
cash supplier. This, however, doesn't take into account the issues of privacy, customs,
familiarity, initial costs and investments which are proving to be hard to overcome.
The obstacles are, therefore, more of the social and ethical than technical nature.
The first obstacles (security and costs for providers issues aside) are the technical
sophistication of the users, availability and costs of the products. It has been estimated
that in the developed countries only about 20 percent of the households had both a PC
66 It is only fair that government revenues are transparent to the public.
67 As central banks did in the past, when they took over control, from private banks, over issuing currency.
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and a modem (Horvitz 1996, World Bank Atlas 1998, Judd 1998). Furthermore, for
example, in the United States in 1996, "a quarter of the nation's households are
`unbanked', and the fraction is rising" (Mayer 1996). People may also be reluctant to
grant financial giants a licence to supervise their finances and have even more insight
into their affairs.
The features of cash of a reliable and familiar, off-line, real-time, delivery-
versus-payment, payment medium is something that all other electronic payment
mechanisms, including e-money, must posses if they have the ambition to replace it.
2.5.The research in payment systems
2.5.1. Introduction
As payment systems are integral part of banking and financial systems, the topic
has been a part of many a study that analysed the functioning of monetary systems.
Payment issues are significantly linked with portfolio allocation issues, particularly the
demand for various forms of money. There is some research linking asset conversion
costs and payments transactions costs with portfolio allocation and the demand for
money. Baumol (1952) introduced the inventory model of the demand for money in
which he outlined the trade-off between transaction money and interest earning assets,
i.e. the opportunity costs of holding more liquid non-interest-bearing funds and the
transaction costs of having to convert other assets into money more frequently. He also
suggested transaction money to be treated as an inventory, i.e. that the level of
inventory of transaction money be optimised according to stock level optimisation rules.
Tobin (1956) integrated the interest elasticity of transaction money for a given volume
with Baumol's income elasticity in what is often referred to as Baumol-Tobin inventory
model. Miller and Orr (1966) presented "a model of the demand for money by firms" in
which they incorporated the variance of net cash flows, the transaction costs of
converting assets and interest rates to determine the lower and upper limit, as well as the
"return point", of transaction money that a firm should hold. Akerlof (1980) makes a
distinction between short-run and long-run demand for transaction money. He argues
that the timing of payments is important in determining which factors influence the
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demand for money, i.e. besides the changes of interest rates and income there is a third
element influencing the demand for money -- the variability of payment structure,
which is more influential in the short run.
From a modern macroeconomic point of view a more holistic approach (that
incorporates these and other theories) to the demand for money is accepted. The
demand for money is determined by the three different motives for holding money: the
transactions, precautionary, and speculative motives (see Lipsey and Chrystal 1995). In
general, if there were no payment system frictions and no costs of converting other
assets into or out of money, the transaction demand for money may approach zero. It is,
therefore, the payment system frictions and costs that require further research as far as
the portfolio and monetary implications of payment system functioning are concerned.
In addition, the analysis of the demand for money and motives for holding
money can be expanded to include the analysis of particular functions that money
serves in a particular country. Therefore, relating it to the payment system, it can be
looked at the unit of account, store of value and means of exchange functions of money
when evaluating relative use and importance of cash in an economy.
There are other areas of research in banking and finance in which insights into
payment issues are realised. The early models of payment instrument choice, for
example, focus on the costs, convenience, and other characteristics of the various
payment media. These models are mainly concerned with mispricing of the payment
instruments and the trade off between private and social costs of payment instrument
choice. For example, Johnson (1968) looks at the extent to which transaction prices may
not accurately reflect resource usage on some types of SVTS payments. However,
portfolio allocation and monetary research have often given little attention to changes in
payment systems, and similarly, research on payment instrument choice has typically
neglected the portfolio and monetary implications (Berger et al 1996). It was only much
later that payment system and its relationship with banking and monetary systems
became a research topic in its own right.
Apart from standard portfolio and demand for money considerations, there are
other payment system problems that are worth the research effort and require focusing
on more specific payment system issues. These include: types and importance of risks
and costs of payment system, the choice of clearing and settlement system that
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minimises those risks and costs, customer choice and payment instrument use, adoption
of new payment technologies, efficiency of payment intermediaries, cross-border and
foreign exchange payments problems, role of government and private agents in running
and/or supervising the functioning of the system etc.
2.5.2. Payment system research literature review
This section focuses on major empirical and theoretical research studies that
have been conducted on payment system problems, which have been addressed in the
previous sections. The research work can be roughly grouped into four major areas with
regard to the subject of research.
The first major area of research is payment instrument choice and use and its
implications for monetary policy. Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala - HPV (1996) try to
explain payment instrument choice and investigate factors beyond standard demand
theory influences. Therefore, beside the influence of relative prices and income, they
also look at banking system concentration, habit, violent crime rate, payment
instruments availability differences and changing patterns of payments over time. They
analyse the payment system of fourteen developed countries using payment data over
1987-1993, constructed by the BIS. They estimated the five-equation mode168 in log-
linear form. Separate equations for each of the five payment instruments (cheque, paper
giro, electronic giro, credit card and debit card) were estimated using ordinary least
squares. HPV estimate two systems of demand equations for five payment methods. One
set of estimates employs dummy variables for each country and the other excludes
dummies and prices.
They find striking cross-country differences with regard to various payment
instruments use that can be explained by common consumer reaction to exogenously
given GDP, the stock of POS and ATMs and lagged usage of other means of payment.
They also find a positive statistical relationship between the availability and usage of
new payment instruments, a shift towards usage of electronic payment instruments and
68 For each of the five instruments, and each instruments' annual transactions per person being a function of: the
instruments price;, real per capita GDP; number of POS terminals per person; number of ATM terminals per person;
use of the payment instrument in the previous year; real value of cash held per person; and two 'institutional'
variables — the number of violent crimes and the asset concentration ratio of the largest five banks in each country.
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the significance of institutional factors for which rate of violent crime and banks' asset
concentration are used as proxies.
As a result of the wide variety of patterns and customs in world payment
systems, most empirical studies have been limited to investigating changes over time
within one country (Avery 1996). There is no evidence as to whether countries can be
viewed as similar entities existing at different stages of development, or as idiosyncratic
entities with payment systems that differ because of basic cultural factors. Avery (1996)
urges caution about drawing too great an inference from HPV, especially in making
assumptions about the future development of payment systems in less-developed
countries. He is also sceptical about the significance of the results, of high adjusted R
squares of changes in usage of over .98, as in change equation (over time) much of the
'action' appears to come from lagged values of the other payment use variables and in
the level equations (cross section) the action comes from the fixed effects. Apart form
the technical details the critique is addressed to the importance of finding truly
exogenous factors which dictate differences in payment systems over time or cross-
country.
One can build on Avery's critique of HPV (1996) and note that the part of the
HPV study that explains the instruments use by customers reaction/demand at different
stages of development does not take into account the system structure, i.e. the issues of
competition and banking system maturity, regulatory framework, technical
infrastructure and other 'true' institutional aspects of payment system. Similarly, are the
crime rate and asset concentration good proxies for the most significant institutional
variables? It seems that, for example, the level of development of a country's legal,
banking and technical infrastructures more adequately represent the institutional
framework for payments. Furthermore, the findings for the 14 countries may not be
generalised and expanded to analyse other developed and developing countries and their
payment systems. This is not only because HPV do not provide the evidence that the
differences are indeed influenced by the different stages of development, but because
the scope of the analysis is confined to the most-developed countries, with similar
characteristics/levels of development.
BPV have expanded the framework of the analysis to consider cross-country
variations and institutional aspects of payment instrument use, choice and their changes
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over time. In addition, the Avery's remark to be wary about using any empirical models
before we have a better understanding of the truly exogenous factors that determine the
differences can be self-serving. If there are no attempts at constructing empirical models
to test propositions one can never be sure whether the theoretical explanations are good
enough to be used for constructing such a model. HPV (1996) is a significant attempt to
explain payment instrument use. It contributes to the insights given by Humphrey and
Berger (1990) concerning the pricing of payment instruments problem, Daniels and
Murphy (1994) about conversion costs and demand for debit cards, Vesela (1993) on
availability and usage of new payment instruments, Humphrey and Berger (1990) and
Robinson and Flatraaker (1995) on costs and advantages of electronic payment, and
Boeschtoen (1992) on use of cash.
The second group of research work focuses on issues of controlling risk on
LVTS, type of settlement system, and the role of private arrangements, government and
central bank in payment systems design and operation. Rochet and Tirole (1996a)
provide a model of interbank lending and systemic risk that addresses the sharing of
risks and monitoring between market participants and the government. They argue that
existing substantial interbank lending implies banks do a considerable amount of
monitoring of each other and that the peer monitoring associated with interbank lending
can make banks safer and reduce the need for regulation. However, they suggest
interbank lending might fail to discipline systemic risk and that only central banks can
provide liquidity in the event of a systemic crisis. Calomiris and Kahn (1996) use
historical data from Suffolk System (that operated in New England from the 1820s to
1850s) to illustrate that banks' own networks, without the central bank, can fairly
successfully clear payments and control risks. The results of these two studies, however,
do not necessarily suggest that private clearing mechanisms can handle systemic risk
well. Flannery (1996a) presents a model of private clearing in which he makes the case
for central banks to provide liquidity through the discount window in cases of crisis.
The 'remedy' is criticised by Kaufman (1996) who views the discount window as an
obsolete safety instrument in the developed countries that can only give rise to moral
hazard problems. He is in favour of completely privately operated payment systems.
There is also no agreement on which settlement system minimises both the
payment system risks and costs, i.e. which system provides an optimal balance of speed,
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accuracy, costs and risks. Central bankers (see for example Greenspan 1996, and EMI
1996) would like to see a movement towards real-time gross settlement systems at
central banks on all types of payments. The research evidence is, however, mixed and
goes more in favour of deferred net settlement. Schoenmaker (1995) finds that the
estimated extra cost of gross settlement may exceed the estimated reduction in
settlement and systemic risk using the data on CHIPS and Fedwire for the period 1990 to
1994. He also finds that the cost of improving the risk management of netting schemes
is moderate. There are, however, some limitations to the study, namely the data
limitations and the assumption of risk-neutrality both acknowledged by the author.
Kahn and Roberds (1998) present a general equilibrium model of a payment
system that operates real-time gross settlement, in which the liquidity constraints
imposed by the system result in settlement delays. They also argue that general policy
responses to the problems of central bank's risk exposure 69— full collateralisation of
overdrafts and/or charging interest on 'daylight' credits — are both flawed along some
dimensions. They reach a tentative conclusion that a policy of partial collateralisation of
intraday credit, when coupled with compatible monetary policy, both eases the effect of
liquidity constraints and reduces the intraday exposure of central banks.
Vital (1994) describes quite a different settlement system, that of the Swiss
Interbank Clearing system - SIC, which apparently works very well in Switzerland.
Rochet and Tirole (1996b) provide an analytical framework for analysing the control of
risk using the characteristics of CHIPS, Fedwire and SIC. They suggest creating a
system with some of the best components of both RTGS and DNS systems. Their
suggestion that a RTGS can be privately organised and run (without a central bank)
contradicts the acknowledged advantage of a central bank in providing liquidity and
guarantees to such a system - the very advantages of a RTGS system over a DNS system.
Hancock and Wilcox (1996) and Khan and Roberds (1997) provide additional empirical
and theoretical insights, respectively, into the risk reduction and limits and merits of
different settlement systems. The evidence, however, is not conclusive.
The third area of research interest is the efficiency of payment system
intermediaries, i.e. the problems of efficiency and costs of payment system providers,
69 If intraday liquidity or guarantee for payments is granted by central bank for elevating the credit constraint
imposed by a 'pure' RTGS system.
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economies of scale and scope, technological changes etc. For the payment system to be
on or near the risk-cost frontier, the costs of payments processing and settlement
incurred by intermediaries must be at or near the minimum for the risk taken (Berger et
al 1996). To meet this condition, payments intermediaries must be reasonably scale
efficient, scope efficient, and X-efficient70. Bauer and Hancock (1993) measure the
scale efficiency and X-efficiency of US Federal Reserve check processing and found the
average X-inefficiency of the Fed offices to be about 25 percent to 30 percent of costs.
Berger, Hunter, and Timme (1993) found similar efficiency results for US commercial
banks as a whole. Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1996) give insights into controlling
deposit volatility and diversification of asset risk by looking at banks that branch across
state lines in the United States. Linking it to payment system operations they suggest
that transaction deposits give banks an informational advantage over other types of
lenders because they provide information that is useful in credit analysis and loan
monitoring. Their findings are in line with work of Humphrey and Berger (1990) who
argue in favour of nation-wide branch banking as it may increase the efficiency of the
payments system by reducing the volume of interbank payments that need to be made. 71
Bauer and Ferrier (1996) provide a thorough analysis of the payments cost
performance of the Federal Reserve in 1990-1994. The study is significant because of
both its internal validity (with respect to the methodology applied) and contribution to
the literature on the production of payment services (with respect to the empirical
results and insights). Using frontier cost functions for each of the three payment
services (cheques, automated clearinghouse services - ACH and Fedwire services) they
measure their marginal costs, economies of scale, cost efficiencies, and rates of
technological change. The efficiency is measured relative to a "best-practice" cost curve
and the cost frontier is estimated using a stochastic, parametric model. They find wide
differences in performance across processing sites, that scale economies have been
exhausted for almost all check-processing sites and that ACH processing sites have
statistically significant scale economies. They also find substantial technological
progress over time for ACH and Fedwire transactions.
74) For an excellent review on studies on financial institution efficiency see Berger and Humphrey (1997). For
conceptual, methodological and practical issues in defining and measuring efficiency see Berger and Mester (1997)
71 The arguments are useful for analysing who should run the payment system operations in Yugoslavia.
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Finally, there are studies that look at new payment technologies and new
instruments, their adoption and implications for the financial sector and monetary
policy. Empirical studies by Bauer and Hancock (1993), Bauer and Hancock (1995) and
Bauer and Ferrier (1996) found that significant cost savings can be achieved from scale
efficiency in the production of electronic based payment systems. Humphrey and
Berger (1990) argue that float benefits may be important in keeping customer and
business payors in the United States from switching from older paper-based payment
methods to newer electronic methods. Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala (1996) find that
payees' familiarity with using a payment instrument and its acceptability are significant
factors that influence payment instrument choice. Santamero and Seater (1996) build a
mathematical model to investigate consumer willingness to substitute electronic money
for paper-based money. Their pioneering model, however, is concerned only with, what
Kane (1996) would call, pocket money.
Boeschoten and Hebbink (1996) investigate the effect of electronic money on
cash substitution and central bank seigniorage in the G-10 countries. As the authors
admit, the analysis is 'static' and is based on the arbitrary assumptions of electronic
money for cash substitution72. Furthermore, the authors resort to questionable
generalisations about cash payments over the whole group of countries from some
estimates on use and importance of cash in particular economies. Nonetheless, the study
re-examined the use and importance of cash and e-money potential and can be extended
by future research to include individual countries' specifics, type and magnitude of cash
payments and motives for holding, and features of, e-money. Although there is a lot of
effort to explain and explore the issues raised by the improvements in payment
technology and technological innovations, the research literature on new payment
technologies and instruments, especially electronic money, is yet to be formed. The
research is, at the moment, mainly concentrated within, and associated with, the central
banks' research departments.
72 Other payment instruments were not included into analysis. Also, there are the issues of 'critical mass', network
good and exponential growth, incentives, cross-demand etc.
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2.5.3. Future research topics
In view of the deficiencies identified in the existing literature, evolving payment
systems and payment system problems and practical requirements of banking and
monetary systems, there are several directions for future research. 73 First, there is no
consensus on whether RTGS or DNS settlement systems yield the best trade-off between
risks and costs. In addition, how do institutional factors, such as banking structure and
the monetary regime, bear on the choice between the systems? Related are the questions
of government versus private sector in providing credit or liquidity to payment systems
and conflict/congruence of interests of central banks and commercial banks. Second,
related to payment instrument choice and monetary policy, there are the issues of
whether `mispricing' of payment services creates significant `misallocations' of
resources, and how innovations in the payment system affect money demand. Also,
there is the 'problem' of slow adoption of new payment technologies. Third, the
research agenda for studying efficiency of payment intermediaries is also in its infancy,
with almost all of the studies having analysed a single organisation, the Federal Reserve
(Berger et al 1996). Fourth, the legal and regulatory structures are also important and
not investigated enough. Similarly, the existing research should be expanded to take
into account the complicated institutionai and policy environment within which major
payment system decisions take place. Fifth, one of the most difficult areas in which to
improve settlement practices has been the interbank foreign exchange market
(Greenspan 1996). Sixth, there are the problems associated with long securities
settlement cycle, liquidity and collateral issues of use of securities for (inter)national
payments and how to minimise custody risks. Seventh, new payment technologies and
innovations open a wide range of questions, of which the most important concern
monetary policy implications and banking sector strategies for the future. Finally, the
empirical studies focused almost exclusively the US payment system (due to good data
sets available) and occasionally payment systems in other developed countries, with
little reference to less-developed countries.
73 See also Greenspan 1996, Summers 1996, Berger et al 1996, OECD 1997, BIS 1996a,b,c,d and 1997a. and the
Banking Structure Conference Notes - available at the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank web site www.frbchi.org .
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2.6. Payment systems in Countries in Transition: the literature review and
debate
2.6.1. Introduction
Creation of a fully-fledged market-based financial system is an integral and
important part of the transition strategy (Blommestein 1993). An efficient payment
system, with a well functioning clearing and settlements system, is essential for
attaining this objective - especially to enable efficient functioning of competitive money
and capital markets and monetary control. The banking system is integral to the
payment process (Summers 1994) and, therefore, the stability and efficient working of
the banking system is itself tied to the integrity of the payment system (Blommestein
1993). Inefficient payment system increases the transaction costs of private agents and
hampers the development of liquid money markets, therefore reducing the efficiency of
the overall economy. The purpose of this section is to point out the key problems and
general policy issues in the reform of the payment system in CIT, as well as to show the
specifics of the payment system issues in the particular economic environments.
2.6.2. Payment system reform: monetary policy and control
Effective market based implementation of monetary policy is a medium-term
goal of financial sector restructuring in Central and Eastern European countries (Khan
and Sunderarajan 1991). Payment system arrangements are of great importance for the
conduct of monetary management (Borio and Van den Bergh 1993). Consequently,
payment system reform contributes to a strengthening of monetary control (Summers
1993, Folkerts-Landau, Garber and Lane 1993).
The payment system reform in CIT was conducted mainly to strengthen
monetary control and newly formed banking systems. With an efficient payment system
this can be achieved in several ways 74. First, by facilitating active liquidity management
by banks, the improvement will reduce the need for banks to hold large and variable
excess reserves. Active liquidity management also reduces the risk that tighter monetary
policy will make individual banks illiquid so that subsequently the central bank will be
forced to loosen monetary policy through refinance facilities. Second, a well-
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functioning system to handle large-value transfers among banks makes short-term
interest rates a more reliable signal for monetary control purposes. And finally, the
payment system reform should reduce the size and variability of net payment float. The
value of net payment float has an influence on the amount and distribution of reserves
available to the banking system for the purposes of making loans. Central banks must
be able to measure and forecast changes in the value of net float in order to forecast the
level of excess reserve liabilities.
An additional way of strengthening central banks monetary management, as
argued by Blommestein (1993), is the requirement that settlement of payment
obligations should be through the transfer of banks' deposits at the central bank, i.e.
implicitly with RTGS (as opposed to settlement between commercial banks through a
network of mutual accounts, i.e. with DNS), in order to prevent uncontrolled increases
in money and credit. Although appealing from central banks' perspective, this argument
doesn't take into account the costs and efficiency considerations. There is some
evidence that the estimated extra costs of RTGS exceed the estimated reduction in
settlement and systemic risk (e.g. Schoenmaker 1995), and that self-regulated payment
systems perform as efficiently as those regulated by government (e.g. Calomiris and
Kahn 1996). However, it is worth mentioning that the evidence is for the developed
countries and that the major issue for the payment system reform in CU is that of
restoring financial discipline and trust in banks. Thus, it is often argued that, in order to
achieve this in the initial stages the central bank must play a crucial role75.
If banks cannot readily transfer funds among themselves it is difficult for them
to engage in active liquidity management, for they lack the means of investing funds for
short periods or obtaining funds at short notice (Folkerts-Landay et al, 1993). An
unexpected excess of payments over receipts may lead a bank to become illiquid,
possibly generating a banking crisis. In the absence of a sufficiently deep money
market, tightening monetary policy will either risk making one or more banks illiquid or
lead to and offsetting expansion of the monetary base through refinance facilities.
Among the four widely recognised elements of the safety net under the banking
and payment system - i.e. open market operations, deposit insurance, finality on
74 See Blommestein (1993), Summers (1993) and Folkerts-Landau, Garber and Lane (1993)
75 The merits of the two different settlement systems for CIT are discussed in section 2.6.4.
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interbank clearing and settlement and discount window - it is the last one that is
perceived as the most effective in economies without sophisticated and broad financial
markets, such as in CIT (Flannery 1996a and Kaufman 1991,1996, BIS 1998). It is
argued, that the more information that is available only to the central bank, the more is
the discount window the appropriate tool to allocate emergency liquidity directly,
quickly, and efficiently. It is also argued (Goodfriend and King 1988 and Kaufman
1991), that in financial and technologically advanced countries, the discount window is
likely to misallocate credit. Payment system (LVTS) has a task to transfer the credit in a
fast and effective manner. However, the effectiveness of the tool makes it more
dangerous in the hands of irresponsible and/or politically easily influenced monetary
authorities. The Yugoslav experience, described in section 2.7 may be used as an
illustration of how things may go wrong.
Government/central bank play a role in developing and regulating the payment
system. They have a clear supervisory role because the stability of the financial system
depends, in part, on the integrity of the payment system. It is, therefore, central bank's
function to ensure that private participants employ proper measures to protect
themselves against payment system risks (Summers 1993), and to provide funds to
financial institutions that are illiquid but solvent in order to prevent liquidity crisis
(Folkerts-Landau et al 1993). This implies assessing banks' fitness to participate in the
payment system operations and the 'lender of last resort' function. The latter is the basis
of provision of 'day-light overdrafts' and the guarantee of finality of payments by the
central bank to permit payments to be processed without the need for every payment
system participant to assess the creditworthiness of every other participant.
This, however may cause moral hazard problems, as banks may assume that
they will be bailed out by the central bank, and transfer the risk from the banks to the
central bank, thus removing banks' incentive to monitor one another and to act on the
information they obtain. So, there is a trade-off between systemic risk prevention and
moral hazard which should be weighted by the central bank when making a policy
decision about the appropriate division of risk among the individual banks in the
payment system and itself. A central bank's role in the payment system supervision and
operation, although important and necessary, should not restrict potential competition
and the possibility of turning over payment system operations to the private sector.
76
Payment Systems Reforms	 Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
Although it is easy to hedge one's bets, by saying that the active role of central
banks in C1T should be weighted against the long-term implications on banking system
competition and moral hazard, it sends confusing messages to the policy makers in
those countries. The ability of 'fine tuning' 76 and economic policy consensus needs to
be developed in these countries. Furthermore, calls for quick and effective reforms put
pressure on the policy makers to produce clear-cut measures. A possible solution to this
'problem' could be clear determination of the stages of the reform by the government,
and what role and for how long should each of the participants play77 . A clearly defined
programme of reform by government and monetary authorities will help in mobilising
potentially confronted participants around the same goal and also set benchmarks by
which the role of the government and central bank as well as the progress can be
assessed. One may note that this gives the regulators and policy makers a key role in the
start of the reform which may be difficult to overthrow later on, but the authorities will
continue to assume that role anyway and it is helpful to commit them by having to
explain and allocate different functions to different participants in the banking and
payment system reform.
2.6.3. Management of payment system risks
The debate about the payment system risks in C1T distils down to the finality of
settlement and how to achieve it, trading-off systemic risk and moral hazard. A final
payment is an irrevocable and unconditional transfer which discharges the obligation to
make the payment (Summers 1993), that is, once a payment message is sent, it is certain
that the payee will receive good funds that cannot be reversed, even if the payor
subsequently becomes insolvent (Folkerts-Landay et al 1993). Because it eliminates the
risk faced by payees, finality is generally a desirable characteristic of payment systems,
even more so in C1T, who strive to rebuild financial discipline and trust in banking
system. In these countries there has been a preference for cash payment as a response to
inefficient clearing and settlement systems and a lack of trust in financial
76 The term refers to precision and sophistication of policy provision rather than frequency of intervention.
77 If, for instance, the aim of the first stage of the reform is the development of well-functioning money markets, it
could be established that say, for a year, the central bank fully guarantees the finality of interbank transfers through
the payment system (catering for moral hazard through supervision and licensing procedures).
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intermediaries78 . The transaction using currency, which represents direct real-time
payments between buyers and sellers in an economy, also permit the legal obligations
that give rise to the payments to be discharged very rapidly once the payment process
has begun (Greenspan 1996). In this respect, "the process of payment and settlement by
currency sets a standard of efficiency against which other payment mechanisms may be
compared" (ibid. 1996, p.690).
Finality of settlement, however, comes at a price, since the risk associated with
default cannot be eliminated but rather shifted either to the central bank (in case of
RTGS system) or the members of the clearinghouse (in DNS system). If there is no
guarantee of finality, as in the Swiss SIC, finality can be achieved at the cost of delays
in carrying out payments, e.g. waiting until the payor has good funds available to
process a payment message. A settlement system that does not extend credit may
virtually eliminate risk associated with the payment on that system, but the payors may
shift risk elsewhere by borrowing to gain the liquidity needed to make payments on the
system, or by shifting transactions to other payments mechanisms where credit is more
easily available (Berger et al 1996).
However, if there is only one settlement system and an underdeveloped and
inefficient money market - as it is the case in C1T - and with no guarantee from the
central bank, then, one may infer, there is no shift of risk and the risk can be eliminated
completely, but at the cost of delays or gridlock. Although, following this logic, it
would seem that there could be a perfect substitution between risks and costs, the
systemic risk cannot be totally eliminated. For instance, in a RTGS system with no
central bank intervention banks will lend for the liquidity from other creditors. If there
is a lack of liquidity in a banking system (say there are no sufficiently available deposits
and/or there is a restrictive monetary policy or some exogenous shock) creditors will be
less able to lend. This will perpetuate illiquidity and some institutions will become
totally illiquid (an increase in bad debts is also likely to follow) and this may cause
further withdrawals of transaction deposits from those institutions and/or conducting the
transactions in cash. If the illiquidity of sufficient number of institutions is perceived to
be serious by the depositors, this may cause a run on banks where even solvent
intermediaries could fail soon.
78 See, for instance, Scott 1993; Topinski and Struzynski 1995 and Nesic 1996
78
Payment Systems Reforms	 Payment Systems in Theory and Practice
The described scenario may seem a long process, with lot of hypothetical steps
that need to follow each other, but, especially during a financial crisis or with high
uncertainty (as in many of CIT) it is very possible. For example, in Yugoslav banks
since 1992, with frozen foreign currency deposits and a lack of trust in banks, the only
form of deposits have been current accounts. This makes transaction money even more
potent at causing disturbance. Therefore, although indirectly, payment systems can
provoke, i.e. contribute to, systemic risk even in a RTGS - even more so if the central
bank is dedicated to maintaining price stability.
Similarly, if central bank does assume the risk, i.e. guarantees the finality of
payments, this may lead to moral hazard problems. This in turn will increase risk-taking
and ineffective investments and consequently losses. The final result may be a series of
financial institutions bankruptcies, which, due to a reduced amount of financial
intermediation undertaken by banks 79, leads to a decline in investment and aggregate
economic activity. Another possibility, although with the same ultimate consequences
(decline in investment and aggregate economic activity), is, as illustrated by the
Yugoslav case in 1993, that the central bank grants overnight liquidity at the expense of
loosening monetary control, which consequently results in hyperinflation.8°
This speculation illustrates two points. First, the theoretical model suggested by
Berger et al (1996, p. 699-702), although good at pointing out that cost and risks are
immanent to payment systems and illustrating the impact of payment innovations,
doesn't completely explain the issue of efficiency of a payment system or method. If
risk cannot be totally eliminated it is costly, adding up to the costs already incurred by
eliminating other risks. Therefore, risk has its cost. In that sense, risk/costs trade-off
analysis should be accompanied, or replaced, with cost/efficiency trade-off and
discipline (i.e. risks) v speed (i.e. efficiency) analysis, outlined by Schoenmaker (1995)
and Folkerts-Landau et al (1993) respectively. The latter two paradigms are of more
help to policy makers in CIT, especially when weighing advantages and disadvantages
of different settlement systems. This is because: a) the choice between two negative
outcomes may be in favour of the one that has no immediate consequences, e.g.
choosing a less costly system because of the budget constraints, neglecting the risks,
79 The most important, and often the only, financial intermediaries in those countries,
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and b) both the cost/efficiency trade-off and discipline v speed analysis are more
transparent for analysing benefits and drawbacks of the investment decisions regarding
the payment system.
Second, it is tentative to conclude that the soundness of a payment system
depends more on the soundness of the banking and economic system, financial
-
discipline and prudence of its participants, and the level of trust and confidence in
payment intermediaries, than on the type of central bank intervention or involvement in
payment system operations (i.e. type and design of settlement system). In other words,
no matter how good a central bank and its payment system policy is, it cannot make up
for inefficient banking and financial systems (although, central bank's performance is
reflected, among other things, in the performance and efficiency of financial sector). It
is illustrated by the experience of developed countries where both RTGS and DNS
systems seem to function well. The hypothesis is, therefore, that it is important for the
post-communist countries to start restructuring the whole of their banking systems,
whose inefficient payment system is only one (though important) problem 81 . The
hypothesis and the relating issues are analysed in chapters 4 to 7.
2.6.4. What payment system is suitable for CIT?
Notwithstanding the importance of overall financial system reforms, the choice
of clearing and settlement system is very important, as it determines: the role of the
central bank; who bears the risks of payment; how losses are shared in case of failure;
how fast, expensive, or safe the system is; and what are the implication for monetary
policy and the liquidity of banks.
It seems that there is an agreement among the authors on which kind of
settlement system for large-value payment CITs should initially implement.
Blommestein (1993) explicitly recommends that all large-value transfers settle on the
books of the central bank as opposed to settlement between commercial banks through a
network of mutual accounts, to prevent uncontrolled increases in money and credit. He,
therefore, views monetary control as a prime objective of the reform. In light of the
8(1 However, it might be worth making a digression by stressing that the greatest moral hazard problems were borne
out by the "soft budget constraints" and bailing out of the "too big to fail" socialist giants in the past.
81 Other being: non-performing loans, banks' inadequate capital base, poor management practice and lack of financial
discipline, perverse incentives and 'soft' budget constraints, low per capita income and propensity to saving etc.
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costs of establishing a settlement system, Scott (1993) argues that those countries
should only have one of the systems in the medium term, and that gross system, with
immediate finality would seem necessary for the development of the interbank money
market and the efficient conduct of monetary policy. He leaves the possibility that the
gross system can be privately owned and operated. Summers (1993, p.181) states that
the large-value transfer system should be operated by the Central Bank (of Russia) and
that it should be a gross settlement system and operate in real-time. There is also
unanimous agreement that the system should provide same-day settlement with finality
for payments. All this should encourage the development of money markets and
contribute to the central bank' ability to perform its monetary control function.
The analysis of the merits of different settlement systems should take into
account the complicated institutional and policy environments within which major
payment system decisions take place (Summers 1996). Schoenmaker (1995), therefore,
after finding that the extra costs of RTGS exceed the estimated reductions in settlement
and systemic risk, leaves the possibility that the potential benefits from a more
permissive and less distorting regulatory system could outweigh the extra cost of RTGS.
So if, for example, the central bank wishes to reduce its role and/or strengthen market
discipline it may opt for a safer and more expensive payment system (i.e. RTGS) to
reduce banking regulation and supervision (ibid. 1995, p. 27).
Therefore, though it may look contradictory, the more monetary authorities'
have control over, and initial involvement in, establishing and operating (safe and
robust) payment system, the less overall banking regulation and supervision (and ex
post intervention) will be required. RTGS is also a pre-requisite for the use of a delivery
against payment mechanism, which should strengthen financial discipline and
confidence in payment intermediaries and contribute to the development of capital
markets. In favour of RTGS systems in CIT also goes the preference of the EU countries
for such a system, both prior to, and for its implementation under, the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU). For Central and Eastern European countries it is important to
build compatible systems which are easy to link to the ultimate EMU network of
national RTGS systems.
A gross settlement system under central bank in its own right, however, does not
imply technical efficiency, speed of payment messages processing and same-day
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settlement. The `real-time' operation requires high technical standards especially for the
clearinghouse. This requires substantial set-up costs.
New electronic transfer systems should be robust and technically efficient to
help in restoring two vital payment system requirements: trust and discipline. The long-
term implications of a payment system design decision on potential retardation of
private markets, competition and moral hazard are also important. As DNS systems
seems to have certain advantages with regard to those considerations, and seemingly
lower cost, it should not be a priori discarded as inadequate for CIT.
2.7. Payment system in Yugoslavia
2.7.1. Background issues
Following the break-up of the mono-bank system in the former Yugoslavia in
the 1960s some core payment functions were given not to the commercial banks or to
the central bank but to the newly formed Social Accounting Service better known as
SDK82. Apart from having a monopoly on payments, the SDK also carried tax and
budgetary controls, financial inspection and financial information dissemination. Inter-
company transactions were, until recently, handled by SDK through "giro-accounts"83
without passing through the banks, with SDK collecting fees from both companies and
banks. The National Bank of Yugoslavia - NBY received on a daily basis the
information on the gross value of bank positions. Inter-bank trading was conducted
'over-night' and the positions were reported the following morning.
The main criticism of SDK — the clearinghouse related to its independence from
the National Bank and its capability to create so called 'quasi-deposits', beyond the
control of NBY, thus undermining monetary policy management. In early 1996, SDK
became an integral part of the National Bank, formally retaining only its financial and
tax control functions, and the banks opened new accounts at the National Bank for that
purpose. However, banks still need to readjust their human and technical recourses to
82 "Sluzba Drustvenog Knjigovodstva" (SDK) in Serbian/Croatian/Macedonian/Slovenian. Although they changed
the name and organisational structure, the name is still in use as a paradigm for the institution and its functions.
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the new function. In view of that, it is provided that, what was known as SDK, performs
payment operations during the transition (i.e. acts as a clearinghouse) thus utilising its
good human resources and technical facilities. The year 2000 was announced as the
deadline for the transformation.
There have been, however, claims that the transformation of the payment system
from SDK to banks came too late and that at this stage it is counter-productive. It is
argued that the transformation will slow down the progress towards a completely
electronic funds transfer system that is, therefore, viewed as the final objective of the
payment system restructuring. As this requires high technical standards for all the
participants in the payment system (particularly banks) and a legal framework for
electronic payments, the argument is that the clearinghouse is more likely to achieve
them. The counter-argument that the participants in the payment system are increasingly
becoming adequately equipped for completely electronic system of payment can be, to
some extent, accepted. Nonetheless, the lack of a legal framework and more importantly
financial discipline and operational skills is something that cannot be overcome over
night.
On the other hand, the transformation of the payment system to banks does not
hold back the improvement of technical facilities (of the various parties in the payment
system) and the possibility of creating an electronic clearinghouse and further electronic
netting. As for the latter, what was known as SDK can still play a crucial role. The key
questions, however, are that of the efficiency, costs and risks of the payment system,
i.e., how to utilise and improve the existing resources without increasing the payment
system costs and risks.
2.7.2. Efficiency of the payment system intermediaries
Before the tighter monetary policy measures in 1994, Yugoslav banks did not
have liquidity problems. All they had to do was to put political pressure (through their.
owners - large state-owned enterprises) on the National Bank of Yugoslavia for more
funds, which were usually granted for the reason of preserving social stability and/or
83 The giro-accounts are the transaction accounts held at SDK, and are, therefore, close substitute for current accounts
at the banks. With giro accounts the balance must be either zero or positive, i.e. there are no overdraft or credit
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preventing systemic risk. In effect, the central bank provided open-ended overdraft
facilities for banks. This was one of the main reasons for one of the largest inflations in
world economic history".
Effective monetary control is essential for achieving the price level stability that
is in turn essential for efficient economic activity. As experienced by the Yugoslav
economy, during the hyperinflation period (see picture 2-1), there was neither effective
monetary control nor economic growth (there was also a huge decline in GDP 85). With
tighter monetary control and very low liquidity of the banks, in the last few years, the
efficient payment system is required to reduce uncertainty in the timing of settlements,
so that banks do not need to turn to the central bank for funds to deal with daily
fluctuations in their payments and receipts.
Picture 2-1 A five-hundred billion Yugoslav Dinars banknote, issued in December 1993
A well-functioning clearing and settlement system is essential for efficient and
competitive banking systems and capital markets and the creation of effective monetary
controL The inefficient executions of payment instructions adversely affects the
efficiency of the overall economy because it increases the demand for transaction
money, which bears little or no interest. In addition, the lack of an efficient system of
interbank payments hampers the development of liquid money markets. Transition from
extension facilities. Given the organisation of the system they were preferred to current accounts at the banks.
84 In December 1993, the (officially published) monthly inflation rate in Yugoslavia was about 300 million percent
(see appendix 3-1).
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a payment system based on cash transactions to one involving the establishment and
transfer of bank liabilities requires a high degree of trust in banks, that is, a precondition
for large-scale movement away from cash is confidence in the banking system (Scott,
1993). However, many banks in CIT have serious bad asset problems which puts their
depositors at risk if they become insolvent.
Indeed, the Yugoslav experience from 1992 to 1996 shows depositors were the
first to suffer during the periods of illiquidity or tighter monetary control. Extreme
cases, however, occurred in 1993 during the period of the hyperinflation, when a salary
or any other receipts, if not withdrawn the same day, and exchanged for a hard currency
(in a black market), were virtually worthless the next day 86 . As a consequence, most of
the payment transactions were conducted in cash and outside the official payment
system as it was banks practice to delay payments. The situation didn't improve much
in 1995, 1996 and 1997, despite the lower inflation rate and more stable
macroeconomic conditions 87 . This brings the debate back to trust and reliability issues
and calls for clearly established rights and responsibilities of the various parties in the
payment system. The Yugoslav payment system problems are revisited in Chapters 6
and 7.
85 Economic sanctions and isolation, and instability (war) in the region are regarded as two factors that contributed to
the fall in GDP in Yugoslavia during that period.
86 This phenomenon is known as hysterics of currency substitution, which also resulted in the 'hysteresis' in the price
levels adjustment).
87 Nesic (1996), states the contrast of 1.6 billion dinars worth of payments that are processed on average every day by
the clearing system and only 114 million dinars on average a day that are in the banks 'giro' accounts. On the other
hand, this illustration doesn't take into account that if the payment system reform allows and encourages the
transformation of the payment system so that the banks are the main providers of the service, this gap would narrow.
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3. The Research Framework
3.1. Research design and approach
3.1.1.	 Background to the research
Greenspan (1996) emphasises the need for greater research efforts involving
payment systems. He points out that the new ideas should reflect broad monetary,
banking and infrastructure aspects of payment systems. Insights into innovations,
efficiency and risks are, therefore, dependent on understanding complex institutions and
processes. In view of the institutional environment and infrastructure, Blommestein
(1993), Scott (1993), Summers (1994) and Schoenmalcer (1995) put the case for the
greater involvement of monetary authorities in payment system design in transitional
countries, and the establishment of safe and robust clearing and settlement systems.
Summers (1996) argues that the analysis of the difference between payment system
goals of central banks and commercial banks, as well as the question of how banking
structure and monetary regime impact on the choice of settlement system, could be
expanded to take into account the complicated institutional and policy environment
within which major payment system decisions take place.
This research is, therefore, focused on payment system reform as a part of
monetary and banking systems restructuring and institutional aspects of payment system
functioning. It is aimed at testing some general assumptions about payment system in
general. In the case of CIT and Yugoslavia, in particular, it identifies and scrutinises the
critical aspects of payment system operations. The major aspects of the analysis are:
payment systems costs, risks and speed of payments; use and importance of cash;
payment instruments and providers choice; use of technology and innovations;
monetary policy; banking system reform; and customer satisfaction. In summary, the
research will look at payment system components that influence the efficiency of a
modern monetary economy.
The theoretical background to the research is a combination of BIS statistical
methodology (e.g. BIS 1996d), in terms of the type of descriptive and explanatory
statistics applied, and the works of Humphrey et al. (1996), Rochet and Tirole (1996)
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and Bauer and Ferrier (1996) in establishing and testing the major variables. The
research model draws from different theoretical and practical methods and
methodologies for describing and analysing payment systems. The research is designed
to apply recognised analytical techniques in a new context, with a view to testing some
theoretical propositions and making recommendations about payment system problems
in the particular environment. Given the complexity of overall payment system design
and the number of issues that need to be considered, it may be justified to use a
compilation of different methods, in conducting this applied research.
3.1.2.	 Research focus and major variables
The research focuses on Countries in Transition and FR Yugoslavia, i.e. their
payment, banking and monetary systems - with the reference from, and comparative
analysis of, both industrial and developing countries. The period under investigation is
the nineties. The research is expected to define and explain the problems as well as to
present possible solutions for them.
The variables are test-specific and differ depending on the group of countries
being researched. Further explanatory notes are given for each analytical chapter
separately. In general, the major dependant variables' are:
• Use and importance of cash,
• Payment instruments use and choice,
• Type and performance of wholesale clearing and settlement systems,
• Payment systems overall efficiency, i.e. the costs, risks, speed and float.
It is argued that these were influenced by the regulatory and institutional
framework, payment system technology and overall technical infrastructure, interest
and inflation rates, monetary policy measures, clearing functioning and efficiency,
banking sector facilities and quality of staff.
I It should be noted that because of analytical purposes and exploratory nature of the bulk of the research the
dependent, independent and endogenous/exogenous variables are very broadly defined here and are, therefore, not
defined from a statistical point of view.
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In particular, the following are defined as independent variables:
• General level of wealth and development of a country (GDP and/or GNP);
• Institutional framework, including banking system maturity and structure;
• Legislation and legal system efficiency;
• Applied payment system technologies and procedures and overall technical
infrastructure;
• Monetary policy, inflation rates, interest rates, required reserves; and
• Competition among payment system providers.
3.1.3.	 Research approach
A three-step research approach is employed (see figure 3-1).
• The research starts with a cross-section analysis of payment systems in a group of
70 countries, the so-called "The Bank of England Group". The investigation sets out
to identify and present the major explanatory variables establishing whether
payment systems are significantly different in industrial, developing and transitional
countries.
• The payment systems and overall financial environment of CIT are investigated to
find their characteristics. Also, some generalisations and recommendations are put
forward, both as lessons for other countries and suggestions for the systems'
improvements.
• The past and current performance of the Yugoslav payment system is analysed with
a view to establishing a background for its improvement, i.e. to suggest a way
forward for establishing an efficient and effective payment system in the given
environment. The findings are also incorporated in the final conclusions on payment
systems in CIT.
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Figure 3-1 The analytical framework
The main questions the research seeks to find answers to are:
• What are the differences between payment systems in CIT and other countries?
What are the characteristics of CIT payment systems?
• What are the major problems in different payment systems? Are there universal
solutions?
• What role should government and central bank play?
• What are the implications of payment system design for the banking system, its
performance, monetary policy and the transition of the economy as a whole?
• Was the Yugoslav payment system efficient2
 in the past? What were the major
problems associated with the payment system in the past and present?
• What clearing and settlement system is best suitable for the Yugoslav economy and
how to achieve it cost-effectively?
In short, the research hopes to contribute to explaining the issues, defining the
problems and to discovering possible solutions to the CIT and Yugoslav case.
Descriptive and explanatory research are combined into a "problem-solving"
research by means of cross-border comparative analysis, examining the performance
over time and both theoretical and practical achievements in that field in an
international context. The research also seeks to find the limits to, or merits of,
previously proposed generalisations and recommendations for CIT and Yugoslavia, as
2 In terms of costs, risks, speed, reliability and influence on other aspects of the monetary economy.
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far as particular problems are concerned. In this sense, the research is deductive. It
draws conclusions from the comparative analysis and best-established practice in both
developed countries and CIT. Nonetheless, in light of the other research methodologies,
as discussed in the subsequent sections, the research is also of an inductive nature. The
conclusions are drawn and the generalisations are made from the results of various tests
and illustrations that use empirical data on the particular transitional countries and
Yugoslavia.
3.2. Research model and methodology
Given the scope and complexity of the problem, isolated methods of data
collection and analysis would seem too narrowly focused or somewhat biased.
Triangulation, i.e. the use of different research approaches, methods and techniques, is
used to overcome the potential bias of a single-method approach. The major methods
that are applied in the course of the research, with the given approach in mind, are:
a) explanatory statistics that uses comparison, correlation and regression tests for
analysing the major variables across countries,
b) exploratory data analysis - based on descriptive statistics on payment and banking
system performance in CIT and Yugoslavia,
c) field research - by conducting surveys and interviews of the CIT central bankers
and Yugoslav banks senior management's and other 'stake-holders' 3 opinions on
the matters,
Secondary analysis was conducted to critically evaluate some of the normative
economics and established practice both in the East and West.
The major categories of investigation are:
1. Institutional framework.
2. Use and importance of cash for payments.
3. Retail payment systems, including use and importance of payment instruments.
4. Wholesale payment systems, their performance and reforms.
5. Overall payment system's risks, costs and place in a monetary economy.
3 Namely experts and managers from the National Bank and clearinghouse - ZOP, and two bourses.
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The institutional framework, as a qualitative variable, is quantified on an ordinary
scale. Use and importance of cash is measured by cash in circulation, cash to narrow
money ratio and cash to gross domestic product ratio. Retail payment systems are
analysed in terms of payment instruments choice, use and importance. Wholesale
payment systems are evaluated in terms of costs, risks, speed and monetary policy
considerations. There are, however, some specifics regarding each of the three research
sites in respect of the research models and methodologies. They are presented next. The
research model is also shown in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2 The Research model
Definition of problems, explanations, generalisations &
recommendations
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3.2.1. The Bank of England Group of countries
The analysis of the Bank of England Group of 70 countries is based on the data
set formed from the survey responses of the countries' central banks. The survey was
conducted by the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England in
February 1998.
In the case of The Bank of England Group data analysis the approach is to:
• Identify and present major payment system explanatory variables;
• Compare payment system categories between the industrial, developing and
transitional countries.
The methods used for the comparative analysis are: Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) and Kruskal-Wallis tests — for comparison across the groups and t-statistics
and Mann-Whitney — for comparison between the groups. The tests results wei
checked by regression analysis and the introduction of two country-dummy variables
Further multiple regression and correlation analysis are used for explorative and
explanatory purposes with regard to the major payment system variables. The tests were
selected for their clarity, their explanatory properties, and for illustrative and
interpretation purposes. A cross-section analysis of the countries' payment systems
using data for a single year (1997) was regarded as an optimal choice given the nature
of information provided by the survey4. The major aspects of the analysis are
institutional framework, cash holdings, required reserves and clearing cycles. These
categories were chosen for their analytical attributes and transparency in describing the
differences in payment systems across the countries.
The three aspects of the institutional framework analysed are: banking system
maturity; legal framework; technical infrastructure. Each of the factors was assessed as
"satisfactory", "transitional" or "poor" for every country by the countries' central
banks, and subsequently quantified on an ordinary scale. As data on total cash
transactions for any country are extremely rare, cash holdings are measured by three
4 That is, only cash holdings data are available and can be used for time-series analysis. However, the frequency and
consistency of the data, i.e. the missing cases, vary across the groups and the variables, especially for less developed
countries for the period prior to 1995. There are also many gaps in the time-series and inconsistencies in data
presentation methodologies.
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indirect measures that indicate the use and importance of cash in an economy. These
are: a) cash in circulation in USD, at purchasing power parity rate, per capita, b) cash in
circulation to narrow money ratio and c) cash in circulation to gross domestic product.
The length of the clearing cycle, measured in days, is used as an indicator of payment
processing efficiency. Required reserves, as an instrument of monetary policy, are
investigated in relation to their payment purpose properties. In particular, the level of
reserves, whether interest is paid on them or not, and if they can be used for payments,
is analysed.
3.2.2.	 Countries in Transition
Four aspects of the CIT payment systems are investigated. Firstly, the
institutional framework is presented. The CIT banking and legal systems development
and technical infrastructures are assessed. Some descriptive statistics and illustrations
are shown. Second, the CIT retail payment systems, including cash holdings and non-
cash payment instruments, are illustrated. The analysis is mainly of a qualitative nature.
Third, a select group of eleven transitional countries' payment systems and reforms are
assessed, by means of case study approach. Finally, the payment systems of these
eleven countries are analysed against the monetary frameworks for each of the
countries, on a case by case basis.
The objectives are to:
• Identify the major characteristics of and trends in the payment systems in CIT.
• Find the major payment system problems of CIT.
• Suggest possible solutions to the problems.
• Place the payment systems reforms in a broader context of monetary economies and
macroeconomic policies.
3.2.3.	 Yugoslavia
The first step in analysing the Yugoslav payment system is an exploratory data
analysis, i.e. looking at the available descriptive statistics and other information, in
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order to: present the characteristics of the system and evaluate proposed design changes;
and identify what needs to be investigated further. This is followed by explanatory
analysis. The final step is to incorporate the results of the survey into the analysis in
order to strengthen or dispute the findings made by previous analytical techniques.
Before each test of the assumptions and propositions, a further explanatory note will be
-
given.
The purpose of the survey is to shed more light on the issues investigated in the
research, namely to test-prove some of the quantitative variables and the analytical
results based on them. In view of limited official data availability and depth the survey
may contribute to a better explanation of the Yugoslav payment system and its
functioning. The population is banks' presidents/directors. The views of Yugoslav
banks' managers are of particular interest as the banks are both the users and providers
of the payment system services and are directly involved in the process of payment
system reform. Descriptive statistics and hypotheses testing by means of t-statistics tests
are used. The data collection methods used are mail questionnaires and interviews. The
results may contribute to explaining the implications of the payment system's past,
present and future design on the banking and monetary system as a whole.
3.3. Data collection
In light of the general perception of limited availability and reliability of
relevant data on the CIT, several data collection methods and perspectives 5 are used to
examine the relevant aspects of the payment system. The following approaches to data
collection are applied:
a) Use of the official documentary sources and data bases: for cross-border data these
are Bank for International Settlements, World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) etc.; for Yugoslavia
these are provided by the National Bank of Yugoslavia, SDKJZOP - the
clearinghouse, and Yugoslav Statistical Office6.
5 So-called triangulation approach.
6 "Savezni zavod za statistiku - SZS" in Serbian
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b) Mail questionnaires, followed up by sample interviews - in person and telephone;
Two surveys that were conducted include a survey of central banks of transitional
countries and a survey of all Yugoslav banks and relevant financial institutions. In
addition, the Bank of England Group survey data set is used.
c) Use of other relevant sources, including the bankers associations and major
investment banks.
3.3.1.	 The Bank of England Group analysis
For the cross-countries comparative analysis, the following data sources are
used. Data on the use of cash7 in 1997, is provided by the International Financial
Statistics (IFS 1998) and the World Bank Atlas 1998. International Financial Statistics
also provide data on levels of required reserves. Data on clearing cycles, institutional
factors, type of settlement system, use of required reserves for payments and interest on
excess reserves, as well as various payment instruments volumes and values was
collected by the BOE survey of 70 countries' central banks. The information is also
checked against some central banks' reports or publications, made available upon
request or at the various Internet homepages 8 of the institutions.
3.3.2.	 Countries in Transition analysis
The cash holdings data is taken from the IFS (August 1998) and the World Bank
Atlas (1998). The institutional framework data, regarding the levels of banking system,
legal framework and technological infrastructure development, is gathered from the
major international financial institutions. EBRD provides data on the banking system
and legal framework developments, classified on an ordinary scale and based on the
field research carried out by the institution. The World Bank provides data on number
of telephone mainlines, use of electricity per capita, number of personal computers per
capita and percentage of paved roads in a country. They are all used for creating an
indicator, quantified on a ordinary scale, of a technological framework development for
7 It includes data on cash in circulation, GDP, purchasing power parity rate, monetary aggregates and population.
8 For a link to central banks' homepages visit www.bis.org/central  banks/
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each transitional country9. Information about reforms, payment, banking and monetary
systems is provided by the CIT central banks. This was gathered by the survey of CIT
central banks and checked in the World Bank, EBRD and other institutions'
publications.
Information gathered from the central banks was mainly in the form of specially
prepared reports on the countries payment systems in response to the survey. As many
central banks were unable to complete the questionnaires on their countries payment
systems due to the lack of available data or the short periods for which the systems had
operated, they were happy to prepare/send special reports or answer specific questions
on the payment systems instead.
3.3.3. Analysis of the Yugoslav payment system
Data for the exploratory analysis was provided by the national clearinghouse
(ZOP), National Bank of Yugoslavia, The Bankers' Association and the Yugoslav
Statistical Office. Other data and information were gathered by the survey of all
Yugoslav banks and the representatives of the central bank, the clearinghouse and the
two bourses.
3.4. Research hypotheses and proposals
Several hypotheses and research questions are investigated in each of the three
parts of the research. The main hypotheses and proposals that are tested in the course of
the research are:
1. Countries in Transition, that are undertaking payment system reforms or adjusting
their payment systems to support their market economies, should incorporate in
their payment system design the best practice and experience of both developed
countries and particularly CIT that have already gone through this process.
The null hypothesis is formulated and tested as:
9 A further explanation of the classification is given in the analytical chapter and in the relating appendix.
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Payment system in each country is unique and the payment system design and/or
reform should be unique too.
The argument is that the lessons from the payment system development in the
CIT, and the proven merits and disadvantages of particular clearing and settlement
systems that are in place in different industrial countries, can be used as a basis for the
payment system development in countries undertaking the reforms. The difficulty,
however, is in choosing among a great variety of different payment systems and
particular solutions for payment system problems.
2. In CIT, overall banking and monetary system reform is necessary, and payment
system design is only one part of it. A payment system reform should be in line with
the overall monetary system reform and banking system restructuring strategy.
The null hypothesis is:
Payment system reform in CIT could, and should be, undertaken regardless of
the banking system restructuring. It will improve, in its own right, the overall
efficiency of the banking system and help the monetary policy.
The assumption is that payment system reform on its own cannot significantly
improve the efficiency of the monetary economy as the functioning of the financial
system and its relationship with the real economy are crucial for the system
restructuring. Therefore, it is the overall institutional setting that determines the
payment system's costs, risks and efficiency. In particular, the Cif are faced with the
problems of ownership structure, loan repayments (bad debts) and lack of legal clarity,
bankruptcy laws and accounting standards regarding payments.
If there are no real changes in the banking system, if payment system design is
poorly co-ordinated with monetary policy, and if there is no efficient legal system, not
even the implementation of state-of-the-art technology and organisational structure and
well-thought of legal solutions will result in fast, cheap and risk-less payments. The
problem is emphasised by the limited resources and/or choice among priorities that the
policy-makers are dealing with. Nonetheless, payment system restructuring is
97
Payment Systems Reforms	 The Research Framework
necessary, and it may contribute to the facilitation of other financial system
restructuring objectives.
The main questions this research is attempting to answer are:
• What are the similarities and differences in payment systems around the world?
• What are the characteristics of payment systems in CIT?
• What are the main problems regarding the CIT payment system reforms?
• What are the possible solutions to the problems?
• Are the generalisations about the payment systems in different countries
appropriate? and
• Are there universal solutions to the payment system problems?
The working hypotheses, as formulated for hypotheses testing by various
statistical tests, are presented in each analytical chapter.
3.5. Contribution
Although payment system efficiency has been a part of many studies on banking
and monetary systems functioning, it is only recently that it has been investigated in
more detail and researched as a topic in its own right. As Berger, Hancock and
Marquardt (1996, pp. 725) suggest: "It is an exciting time in the history of this research
- a time when the key issues are being identified, a limited number of hypotheses are
being put forth, and a few tentative conclusions are being drawn". There is also a need
for more research efforts involving payment systems as a part of broad monetary and
banking systems (Greenspan 1996). As a country's payment system costs are estimated
to be about two to three percent of GDP per annum (Humphrey et al 1996), theoretical
insights into improving the efficiency of payment systems could have significant
practical use. In light of identified deficiencies in the literature and practical aspects of
payment system reform in CIT, the research is aimed at contributing to three particular
areas.
Firstly, building on previous studies, this research might contribute to
investigating institutional, monetary and banking aspects of payment system
functioning. Although focused on CIT and Yugoslavia, the research draws from
existing theories and practice of developed countries. The results of the research can,
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therefore, be used to show whether some of the proposed generalisations about payment
instrument choice, adequate settlement system, payment intermediaries efficiency, and
relationship between payment system and monetary system hold in the case of CIT. In
this sense, the research will make a theoretical contribution to understanding payment
systems as part of broad monetary and banking systems.
Secondly, there has been little research effort involving payment systems in
CIT. Although there have been some studies 1 ° that examine aspects of payment system
reforms in a particular country, they are limited in depth and devoid of empirical
illustrations. Other studies in the field ll have approached the problem from a normative
economics point of view without using empirical research, largely as a consequence of
the lack of available data. The aim of this research is to go further in investigating the
problems and presenting some empirical evidence and illustrations. It is concerned with
extending existing ideas and developing new ideas about:
• monetary policy and banking system implications of payment system reform,
• choice between settlement systems and payment system arrangements,
• new payment technologies and electronic money in Cif,
• empirical results of the study can also be used for further generalisations about
payment and financial system functioning in CIT and as lessons for other countries
undertaking the reforms.
Finally, from the perspective of the Yugoslav financial system, the contribution
is in clarifying the points raised in the debate about the payment system and showing a
way forward and/or possible solutions to the problem. It is the first study of the type
regarding Yugoslavia and as such its task is to scrutinise some of the proposed claims,
policies and actions undertaken. In particular, the recommendations concern:
• The choice of the appropriate settlement arrangements;
• Role of different participants in payment system (including government, central
bank, commercial banks and the clearinghouse); and
• The place of the payment system reform in the overall banking and monetary system
restructuring.
I ° For example, Topinski and Struzynski 1995.
II For example, Blommestein 1993, Scott 1993, Folksters-Landau et al. 1993, Summers 1994.
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The particular contribution of the first analytical chapter 12 is:
a) Confirmation and explanation of seemingly contradicting assumptions about
relatively high cash holdings in higher income and lower inflation countries and
higher use and importance of cash in lower income / higher inflation countries.
b) Empirical analysis of payment systems in less developed countries.
c) Comparison and analysis of payment systems across different country groups.
d) Introduction of the institutional framework variables into empirical analysis on
payment systems.
The second analytical chapter, Payment Systems in Countries in Transition,
provides:
a) Empirical evidence on payment systems functioning in CIT.
b) Possible solutions for the payment system problems in the analysed CIT.
c) Transparent illustration of payment system and monetary and banking systems
relationship in general.
The third and fourth analytical chapters (chapters 6 and 7), that analyse the
payment system in Yugoslavia, scrutinise:
a) The perception about the payment system performance in the past.
b) Proposed payment system solutions for the future.
The overall results of the research may thus be used for illustration of
functioning of payment system in monetary economy and the relation of payment
system with banking, financial and economic systems.
3.6. Limitations of the research
There are also some constraints on the research. Lack of time-series data for
some major variables, not enough detailed data, and unreliable and contradicting
information sources - all regarding CIT and Yugoslavia - are the major constraints.
Therefore, the research methodology and methods are, to a certain extent, dictated by
data availability. For example, payment system efficiency is tested in an unorthodox
manner, using a survey methodology rather than efficient frontier measures of cost or
profit or 'alternative-profit' efficiency.
12 Chapter 4 'Payment Systems Cross-Countries Analysis: The Bank of England Group".
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There is also a problem of normative versus positive economics, i.e. some of the
theoretical propositions and recommendations of payment system design in CIT can be
critically evaluated only after they are implemented and run for some time. Lack of
historical precedents, and an empirical basis, for testing some of the theoretical
propositions mean that this and some further research will have to some extent base
recommendations on normative economics, i.e. the prevailing perception of the reality
and how the things should work at the time of the research.
However, conclusions and suggestions can be proposed on data and information
that are available. Furthermore, the payment system problems have serious practical
implications on all aspects of financial system operations in any country let alone a
country in a state of transition towards an efficient market economy. Therefore, the
problems should not be an obstacle but a challenge for a researcher.
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4. Payment Systems Cross-Countries Analysis - The Bank of England Group
4.1 . Introduction
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of payment systems across the
world for the year 1997. The analysis is based on the survey responses of "The Bank of
England Group" -- The BOE group -- of 70 countries. The BOE group comprises 21
industrial countries, 13 Countries in Transition - CIT, and 36 developing countries (see
Table 4-1.). The survey was conducted by the Bank of England's Centre for Central
Banking Studies, in February 1998. The analysis presented in this chapter follows up on
the Centre's project' of comparing payment systems around the world.
The four broad categories used for analysis and presented in the subsequent
sections are: 1) use of cash, 2) clearing cycle, 3) required reserves and 4) institutional
framework. These categories were chosen for their properties of capturing and
explaining differences between payment systems in different countries.
The aims of this part of the research are:
a) To establish explanatory variables for payment systems functioning in order to
present the payment systems' characteristics; and
b) To compare payment systems across the three country groups to identify similarities
and differences between them.
Table 4-1 The Bank of England Group of Countries
Source: Fry et al (1998)
'Fry et al (1998)
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For the purpose of this study, the original data set collected by the survey was
adjusted accordingly. Thus, the ordinal scales for some qualitative variables were
established and some gaps, especially regarding data for CIT, were filled 2 . In addition,
other data sources, such as International Financial Statistics and World Bank Atlas,
were used.
The methodology is based on exploratory and explanatory analysis of the data
sets collected by the survey. The methods used for the comparative analysis are:
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test - across groups, and t-
tests and Mann-Whitney test - between groups. The tests results were checked by
regression analysis, where two country dummies were introduced 3 . The methodology is
also explained in Chapter 3. A cross-section analysis for a single year was dictated by
the data availability and the type of comparative analysis. In general, the year 1997 was
chosen for the purpose of capturing the up-to-date payment systems developments. As
some variables appear to follow a non-normal distribution (see table 9-13, appendix 1),
both parametric and non-parametric methods were used for the tests. There are,
however, no significant differences in the results from the two groups of tests. Detailed
summaries of the tests are presented in the appendix 1, tables 9-1 to 9-13.
4.2. Use of cash
The extent of use of cash for payments (i.e. its proportion in overall volumes and
values of payments) can be used as an indicator of a stage of a country's payment
systems development and/or efficiency. Three indirect measures can be used to evaluate
the importance of cash holdings for payments. These are cash holdings per person, i.e.
currency in circulation, ratio of currency in circulation to 'Ml' and ratio of currency in
circulation to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). All three measures are considered in the
analysis as they all provide additional information individually with regard to use of
cash across the BOE group.
2 The original data-sets, based on the Bank of England's survey responses, were marginally adjusted as some gaps for
missing cases for various variables for transitional countries were filled. The data source for the adjustments are the
central banks' annual reports for the year 1997.
3 `Ddummy' = 1 for developing countries and 0 otherwise, and `citdummy' = 1 for CIT and 0 otherwise.
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The first measure is supposed to capture 'the wealth effect', that is to be in line
with the theoretical predictions of higher currency in circulation (CC) with higher GDP
and lower CC with higher inflation and higher interest rates. Therefore, the measure
may be an indicator of the store of value function of money. The second measure is an
indicator of importance of cash compared to deposits 4, which are used for non-cash
retail payments. The third measure caters for inflation and shows the relative
importance of cash in circulation related to a country's 'wealth'. The latter two
measures are supposed to capture the importance of cash as a medium of exchange 5 for
the BOE group countries. The summary of results for the measures across groups is
shown in table 4-5 in the summary section. The test results are also presented in the
appendix 1.
4.2.1. Cash Holdings Per Person in USD
Cash holdings per person, defined as cash in circulation in USD at purchasing
power parity rate - (ppp 1997) per inhabitant, seem to vary across countries and among
the three groups. To avoid possible test ambiguities regarding the distribution of the
variable, both parametric and non-parametric groups of tests were used. There are,
however, no contradicting results in respect of the methods used. Whether the cash
holdings are significantly influenced by GDP per capita (in USD at ppp 1997), i.e. if
there is the 'wealth effect', is also tested. The analysis did not take into consideration
the "currency substitution" phenomena, which characterises Central Asia, Turkey,
Russia, Bulgaria, Mexico and countries with high income from tourism, such as Greece
and Spain. Unfortunately, the data on "reserve currency" in circulation in those
countries was not readily available6 . It is assumed that this measure may not adequately
capture the importance and use of cash (as a medium of exchange) in less developed
countries, even though the cash holdings are expressed both per capita and at the
purchasing power parity rate.
"By definition: Cash in Circulation + Transaction Deposits = Narrow Money (denoted as MI)
5 Central banks' fiat money is by law the unit of account in a particular economy. However, the local currency and its
unit of account function, can be de facto substituted by a foreign currency, especially in a high inflation country.
6 Foreign currency in circulation can reach up to 100 percent (anecdotal evidence for Turkey) of the local currency
which could change some of the findings regarding this measure.
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Differences across the three groups of countries
There are statistically significant differences across the three groups of
countries in respect of cash holdings (cash in circulation) per person. A person in an
industrial country 'holds' on average more cash than a person in developing country,
who in turn has more cash than a person in a transitional country. The difference in cash
holdings between CIT and developing countries is not statistically significant. ANOVA
and K-W were also used to test whether three institutional factors -- banking system
maturity, legal framework and technology -- significantly influence the cash holdings.
Banking system maturity and 'technological level' seem important factors i.e. there are
differences in countries with "poor", "developing" or "satisfactory" banking system
maturity and technology in relation to the cash holdings (see appendix 1)7.
Regression and correlation analysis
Figure 4-1 shows the cash holdings per person in relation to GDPppp per capita.
Cash holdings are positively related to GDPppp per capita, i.e. income/wealth (r =
0.64). The three 'outliers' are Malta, with GDP/per capita of about $10,000 and the cash
holdings of about $3,000, Spain, with GDP/per capita of below $15,000 and the cash
holdings of about $1,500, and Finland, with GDP/per capita of about $20,000 and the
cash holdings below $500. Malta and Spain have high cash holdings per capita and
Finland and UK have low cash holdings per capita relative to the levels of GDP per
capita. Possible explanation for high cash holdings in Malta and Spain are the presence
and significance of offshore banking (surge of capital) and monetisation of foreign
currency income from tourism, respectively. The explanation for the relatively low cash
holdings in UK and Finland may be the high use of cash alternative payment
instruments, such as debit cards, as found by Humphrey et al. (1996) and illustrated by
BIS (1998).
7 Because of the unbalanced sample design (unequal number of units in the groups and missing cases for some
variables) two factor analysis was not possible other than by regression analysis.
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In line with macroeconomics theory, additional explanatory variables identified
and used in tests are:
1) "Velocity of money", defined as ratio of nominal GDP to nominal cash balance
(base money), — negatively related. Therefore, the real money balance, CCpppPC,
increases when the velocity (the 'work' that money does) decreases.
2) "Real interest rates", defined as deposit interest rates at annual level adjusted for the
annual inflation rates, which is negatively related.
Together with GDPppp per capita the variables explain about 80% of the
variation in relative cash holdings (R 2 =0.805). GDPppp per capita and the velocity's 1-
coefficients are statistically very significant. All other variables on their own or in
combinations do not increase explanatory power of the regressions.
Figure 4-1 Cash in circulation per person in USD (purchasing power parity rate 1997)
The peak at $10,000 GDPppp per capita represents Malta.
8 The econometrics tests confirm that the multiple regression can be used for the explanatory purposes as there seems
to be no indication of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation or lack of fit with regard to model
specification (see appendix 1).
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4.2.2.	 Cash in circulation to narrow money ratio
It is tested for significant differences across the three groups of countries with
regard to the level of currency in circulation relative to narrow money monetary
aggregate9 (CC/M1). Descriptive statistics (table 4-5) show that developing countries
have a slightly higher level of currency in circulation relative to MI than CIT, which in
turn have much higher level of the ratio than industrial countries. The ratios are 40%,
39% and 22%, respectively.
Differences across the three country groups
There are statistically significant differences across the three groups of
countries in respect to the level of cash in circulation to narrow money aggregate).
Only technology seems to be an influential institutional factor in respect to the level of
the ratio, i.e. countries with the different levels of payment systems' technical
infrastructure (as assessed by the central banks) have different levels of CC to Ml.
Thus, countries with 'poor' level of technical infrastructure tend to have larger
proportion of cash in circulation to narrow money as compared to countries with
'satisfactory' payment system technology and/or banking system maturity. Possible
explanations centre around payment instruments availability and efficiency of fund
transfers for retail payment instruments, both dependent on the available payment
system technology.
Regression analysis
GDP in USDppp per capita, cash in circulation in USDppp per capita, "technical
infrastructure" and "length of clearing cycle (in days)" explains 70% of the variations of
the ratio" (see table 9-4). The level of cash holdings to narrow money decreases with
higher GDP but increases with higher relative cash in circulation, i.e. with the increased
9 Based on the BIS (1998) classification and central banks' responses. The monetary aggregate has been denoted as
Ml, although the annotation may be different in different countries, for example in UK — M2 and Sweden — M3.
III The variable seems to have normal distribution. Nevertheless, the results were checked by non-parametric tests.
The results are in agreement with the 'parametric' tests.
II Inlcusion of number and value of other payment instruments increases the explanatory power of regression but
reduces the sample size to about one half of the observations, thus excluding lower income countries with
underdeveloped statistics on payment instruments. This regression is, therefore, excluded from the analysis.
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importance of store of value function of money. Length of clearing cycle has a direct
influence on reliance on cash in conducting economic transactions, i.e. the longer the
clearing the higher the CC/M1 ratio. Therefore, the faster the clearing the less need for
the immediate settlement feature of cash, hence the higher the proportion of deposits
(used for cash alternative payment instruments) in narrow money. The level of
technological development is inversely related to proportion of cash in narrow money.
Thus, the more advanced the technology, the more payment instruments available, more
reliable (certain) the process of clearing, and the more convenient the process of
payment with payment instruments other than cash.
The measure (CC/M1) seems significant in capturing differences across the three
groups in respect to the relative importance of cash in the respective economies. It
indicates whether a payment system is 'cash-based' or not, i.e. 'the phase' of a payment
system development. Thus, in countries with the lower ratio the level and importance of
transaction deposits with financial institutions (which are the base for non-cash payment
instruments such as cheques or debit cards) is higher.
4.2.3. Cash in Circulation to GDP
The null hypothesis is that there are no significant differences across the three
groups of countries (industrial, CIT, developing) regarding the currency in circulation
(in local currency) to GDP (in local currency) ratio. The averages are 5%, 6.7% and
7.1%, respectively. It is also tested to establish if there are significant differences across
countries with different levels ("poor", "developing" and "satisfactory") of banking
system maturity, legal framework and technology in respect of a level of Currency in
Circulation to GDP.
The measure (CC/GDP) is also identified as a 'link' between the opposing
findings of the two other cash holdings measures 12, as illustrated by the correlation
matrix (table 4-2).
12 SCCpppPC and Cash in Circulation to Ml.  The former measure is higher in higher income and lower inflation
countries and the latter measure is higher in lower income (and higher inflation) countries.
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Table 4-2 Cash measures correlations
CCPPPPC CCGDP
CC/M1	 Pearson Correlation .153 .630**
Sig. (2-tailed) .282 .000
CCPPPPC Pearson Correlation .561**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Differences across the three groups
Both parametric and non-parametric tests show that there are no significant
differences between industrial, transitional and developing countries in respect of
currency in circulation to GDP ratio. The null hypothesis is, therefore, rejected. The
dummy variables in the regression analysis are insignificant both individually and in
explaining the total variation of the dependant variable. Legal framework adequacy
influences the ratio. Even though the tests show that there are no significant differences
between the three groups of countries in respect of the level of the ratio, there are
significant differences across countries with different levels of GDP (economic
wealth/development) in respect of the CC/GDP ratio (as illustrated by the regression
analysis). 13
Regression analysis
The proportion of currency in circulation to GDP is negatively related to the
relative level of GDP - GDPppp per capita, level/class of legal framework and level of
deposit interest rates. There is also a positive and significant relationship with a relative
level of currency in circulation (CCppp per capita). These four variables explain about
80% of the variation in CC/GDP (R2 = 0.798). Thus, the higher the GDP and the level
of legal system development the lower the ratio. This can be explained by, for example,
the higher level of economic and trade development in countries with higher income
countries that requires cash-alternative payment instruments that are, in turn, well
13 The differences in findings can be explained by the limitations of the classification of the countries into three
distinct groups (as discussed in section 4.7) and/or small (gradual) change of the ratio with a change in a country's
wealth (level of GDP).
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guarded by law. Interest rates provide incentives for the use of other payment
instruments, based on interest-bearing transaction deposits. The level of relative bash
holdings ($CCpppPC) is positively related to relative importance/use of cash
(CC/GDP). Other variables seem to contain no additional information on the dependant
variable for the BOE group.
It can be also argued that the effectiveness and extensiveness of the legal system
influences certainty and trust in the system, i.e. the use of cash-alternative payment
instruments. Thus, the better the legal system, the less use of cash, hence the greater
reliance on other payment instruments as there is less fear of credit risk (better
protection of the parties involved in a transaction). This assumption seems to be
confirmed by the findings of the regression analysis.
In summary, the CC to GDP ratio may be used as a measure of cash holdings
that caters for inflation and differences in wealth across countries. The ratio is positively
related to relative cash holdings ($CCppp per capita), and negatively related to the
relative level of GDP (GDPppp per capita). Interest rates and legal framework adequacy
inversely influence the ratio which can be explained by the opportunity costs and credit
risk protection, respectively. The ratio is highest in the developing group of countries
and lowest in the industrial group of countries.
4.3. Clearing Cycle
Length of clearing cycle is used as a proxy measure of both large-value payment
systems' efficiency and speed of the payment systems' transactions. The following
hypotheses are tested. The null hypothesis 1 is that there are no significant differences
in length of clearing cycles across the three groups. The null hypothesis 2 is that
banking system maturity and technology are not significantly different across groups,
with regard to clearing cycle. Null hypothesis 3 is that use of RTGS system cannot
explain differences in clearing cycles. The summary of descriptive statistics is shown in
Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3 Clearinci cycles in The BOE Grou
category Industrial Transitional Developing BCE group
Average length of clearing cycles
in days
1 3.8 4.3 3.2
Standard deviation in days 0.9 4 4.5 3.9
Range in days 0 -3 1.5 - 4 0 - 23.5 0 - 23.5
1st Quartile - 3rd Quartile 0.3- 1.5 1.8 - 3.6 2- 6.5 1 -3.5
Use of RTGS systems - percent of
the countries
86 46 25 46
Differences in clearing cycles
Both parametric and non-parametric tests show that there are significant
differences in clearing cycles in developing, transitional and industrial countries
(see appendix 1). This is also confirmed by the regression analysis, where two country-
dummies - one for developing and one for transitional countries - both have significant
13-coefficients. The null hypothesis 1 is, therefore, rejected. The differences between
transitional and developing countries alone are not significant and both these groups of
countries have, on average, longer clearing cycles than industrial countries. The average
clearing cycles for industrial, transitional and developing countries are 1, 3.8 and 4.3
days respectively.
There are also significant differences across the three groups of countries in
respect to their use of RTGS systems. Countries that use RTGS systems have
significantly shorter clearing cycles. However, the countries with a RTGS system tend
to have a DNS system as well. Therefore, use of RTGS can be viewed as an extension
of payment systems efficiency and risk control, rather than an explanatory variable in its
own right. Banking system maturity and technology are also found to determine
differences in clearing cycles. Thus, countries with satisfactory banking system maturity
and/or technology have, on average, shorter clearing cycles than countries with
developing or poor state of these 'factors' (see appendix 1). Hypotheses Ho 2 and Ho 3
are, therefore, rejected.
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Regression analysis
The relationship between clearing cycle and GDPppp per capita is log-linear
(see figure 4-2). Log GDP (in USD at ppp 1997, per capita) - loggdp - is the single most
important explanatory variable in the regression equations. There is a negative
correlation between the logs of the two variables of r=0.61 (see also appendix 1). For
every one percent increase in GDPpppPC the length of the clearing cycle is expected to
be reduced by approximately a half percent. Inflation (Consumer Price Index — CPI) is
another significant explanatory variable. The best regression equation, which includes
loggdp and logCPI, explains about 43% of the total variations in clearing cycles.
Other variables tend to reduce sample size (number of observations), as there are
data/cases missing for less developed countries. GDP, inflation and total volume of
payments, for example, explain over 97% of the variations, but in a sample of about one
third of the countries (mostly higher income countries where clearing, GDP and
inflation cases are matched with data for total volume of payments). Banking system
maturity, technology, legal framework, existence of RTGS system and country
dummies do not add to the explanatory power of the multiple regression analysis.
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Further explanations and limitations
The most important limitations for drawing final conclusions about clearing
cycles from the results based on the regression analysis, relate to the measurement of
the clearing cycle in the survey. Given the sample structure and data collection
difficulties, the clearing cycles are measured in days rather than hours which may not be
appropriate for countries that use advanced clearing and settlement systems. The
limitation, however, did not blur the differences across the payment systems in the three
groups of countries.
Inflation as an explanatory variable was included to test the assumption that long
clearing cycles may benefit financial institutions (free liquidity from float) and/or
central banks (seigniorage income) in countries with higher inflation. The variable,
however, has an inverse influence. As the variable is very much determined by extreme
values (for countries with CPI > 1100 percent), the reverse influence (the higher the
inflation the faster the clearing), may be due to the relatively fast clearing (1 to 2.5
days) in high inflation countries in the sample. Another possible explanation is that the
clearing institutions in countries with higher inflation feel the pressure of payment
services users for faster clearing.
Use of electronic credit orders (inversely), total volume of transactions
(inversely in developed countries — because of competition and electronics, positively in
transitional and developing countries — due to increased work especially for paper
orders), and total value of transactions (the same as total volume) would seem to add to
explanatory power (and are significant) but reduce the sample to as low as 1/3 of the
observations14.
4.4. Required Reserves
As discussed in Chapter 2, required reserves have been used as both monetary
policy instruments and payment system liquidity buffers in many countries. In general,
the higher the required reserves, the more liquidity for payments which is available to
financial institutions (provided that the reserves can be used for payments). The cost of
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keeping required reserves, on the other hand, depends on whether interest (as well as its
level) is paid on them. These required reserves arrangements are also important for
assessing the costs of a RTGS type of settlement system15.
The null hypothesis is that there are no significant differences across the groups
with regard to the reserve requirements. The groups, however, do not seem to be
homogeneous in respect of the reserve requirements. The descriptive statistics are
shown in table 4-4. The results are also presented in the appendix 1.
Table 4-4 Required reserves in The BOE Group - in percent
category Industrial Transitional Developing BOE group
Required reserves - percent of the
countries that use the instrument
59 100 92 82
Average value of the reserves 3.7 9.1 9.6 7.6
Standard deviation 4.7 1.8 7.8 6.9
Median 2 9 8 7
Range 0-15
 6-12 0-35 0-35
Interest on reserves - paid in the
percentage of the countries
29 40 19 25
Reserves used for payments
percentage of the countries
67 70 53 60
Differences across groups,
The tests reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences between the
levels of required reserves for the three country groups. Therefore, there are
significant differences across the three groups and between the individual groups in
respect of the level of required reserves. Developing countries have, on average, the
highest level of required reserves. The difference in percentage of required reserves
between developing and transitional countries is not significant.
Reserves tend to be used for payments in all three groups of countries. Interest
on reserves is paid in about 25% of the `130E countries'. There are no statistically
14 As some less developed countries have no (available) statistical records on payment transactions volumes and
values. The regression equation is, therefore, discarded from the analysis.
15 As argued by Fry et al. (1998) and Khan and Roberds (1998).
114
Payment Systems Reforms 	 The Bank of England Group
significant differences across the three groups regarding the numbers of countries that
pay interest on reserves or the number of countries that allow the reserves to be used for
payment purposes.
Banking system maturity seems an important factor that influences the levels of
reserve ratios. Countries with more mature banking systems have lower required reserve
ratios. As monetary authorities in countries with more developed banking systems rely
on monetary policy instruments other than required reserves, this diminishes both the
importance and level of the required reserves in these countries. This also shifts the
burden of liquidity planning more to financial institutions rather than the central bank.
For this to work, however, an efficient interbank money market should exist to enable
financial institutions to draw liquidity for payments.
4.5.	 Institutional factors
Three categories that are used as proxies for the payment systems' institutional
infrastructure development are: banking system maturity; legal system adequacy;
technical infrastructure. Each of the factors was assessed as "poor", "developing" or
"satisfactory" by the countries' central banks. There are significant differences across
the three country groups in respect of banking system maturity and technical
infrastructure. In general, industrial countries have more mature banking systems and
more developed technical infrastructure. Also, their legal systems seem more advanced
and in line with more efficient payment systems.
The three factors seem to be important explanatory variables for different
payment systems' characteristics and for capturing differences across countries and
among the three country groups. The descriptive statistics is shown in table 4-5.
Detailed test results are presented in the appendix 1.
4.5.1.	 Banking system maturity
Banking system maturity, in this context, can be viewed as being the banking
best practice established through trial and errors, competition and satisfying customer
needs (including business ethics), rather than technical advances or adequate legislation.
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There are statistically significant differences across the three country groups
regarding the banking system maturity, according to the central banks' evaluation of
their countries respective systems. Industrial countries have reached a satisfactory stage
of banking system development while in other two groups of countries banking systems
can be classified as developing. Transitional countries, because of the nature or
financial intermediation under communism, have the least mature banking systems.
Banking system maturity seems an important factor that influences: the length
of clearing cycle and reserve ratios (inversely related) and cash in circulation
(same direction) in a country. These findings can be explained by a) development of
banking system skills and technology driven by competition and co-operation among
banks to satisfy customers needs, b) available monetary policy instruments and adopted
practice that resulted from banking system development, and c) banking system
maturity and country's income and wealth positive correlation.
In general, banking systems with a longer tradition and/or faster development
have more efficient money markets, require less liquidity, have established efficient
banking supervision and are driven by the customer needs and competition which are a"
reflected in the factor's influence on the respective categories.
4.5.2.	 Legal system adequacy
Legal system adequacy was assessed by each country's central bank according
to the extent to which it is an obstacle to efficient payment systems. In that context, it
was de facto the assessment of a system related to the optimal legal system in a country
in terms of supporting an efficient payment system. There are no statistically
significant differences across the three country groups regarding their legal systems
adequacy. On the other hand, the factor seems to have influence on the relative use and
importance of cash, as measured by Currency in Circulation to GDP ratio.
Possible explanations for the mentioned influence may be that the clearer the
rules and more protected the creditors/payers in a payment system the less need to rely
on cash as an immediate, real-time settlement instrument. The interpretation of the
results as a whole, however, should be more in line with the fact that there is room for
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improvements in all of the legal systems, rather than to say that there are no differences
in the legal systems development and efficiency across the three country groups.
4.5.3.	 Technical infrastructure
There are statistically significant differences across the three country
groups in respect of the development of payment systems' technical infrastructure, as
assessed by the central banks. Technical infrastructure development has an inverse
influence on the length of a clearing cycle, cash in circulation and cash in circulation to
Ml ratio. Therefore, the more advanced the technology the faster the clearing cycle, the
more payment instruments available, the more reliable (certain) the process of clearing
and the more convenient the process of payment with payment instruments other than
cash.
The strong influence of the technical solutions on payment system as a whole
should come as no surprise, especially as the payment systems are sometimes equated
with the payment technology. Of course, one should be wary in recommending the
introduction of the most advanced technology in all cases, as the choice of the
appropriate technical solutions is a matter of costs, resources, priorities and not least the
banking, organisational, legal and telecommunications infrastructures needed to support
the payment system technology.
4.6. Summary of the results
The results of the analysis (see also table 4-5) can be summarised as follows:
• The level of cash holdings, as measured by Cash in Circulation in USD at
purchasing power rate (1997) is significantly different across the three country groups.
The measure seems to capture the 'wealth effect' and store of value function of money
and is in line with theoretical predictions of a positive relationship between a country's
wealth and cash holdings. Thus, an individual in an industrial country holds on average
double the value of cash than an individual in a developing country. The values of cash
holdings are the lowest in transitional countries. Relative cash holdings are inversely
influenced by velocity of money and interest rates and inflation, i.e. real interest rates.
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• Currency in circulation to narrow money monetary aggregate - M1 ratio is
significantly different between industrial, transitional and developing countries. The
measure may be used as an indicator for the stage of development of payment system,
i.e. the relative importance and use of cash for the BOE countries group. The ratio
decreases with higher GDPppp per capita and better technical framework. The ratio
increases with longer clearing and higher relative level of cash in circulation. In
developing and transitional countries the ratio is about 40 percent on average as
compared to 22 percent in industrial countries.
• Cash in circulation relative to nominal GDP is not significantly different across the
three country groups. It may, however, be used as a measure of cash holdings that
'caters' for inflation and differences in wealth across countries. The ratio is positively
related to relative cash holdings ($CCppp per capita), and negatively related to the
relative level of GDP (GDPppp per capita). Interest rates and legal framework adequacy
inversely influence the ratio which can be explained by the opportunity costs and credit
risk protection, respectively. The ratio is highest in the developing group of countries
and lowest in the industrial group of countries. The measure reconciles different
findings captured by other two 'use of cash' measures.
• Length of clearing cycle in days is significantly different across the BOE country
groups. It is negatively related to GDPppp per capita and inflation. Use of RTGS and
electronic payments, total volume and value of transactions and banking system
maturity can also be used as explanatory variables. Industrial countries have the fastest
clearing, which, on average, does not exceed one day. Transitional countries clear
payments somewhat faster than developing countries.
• Required reserve ratios are significantly different in industrial, transitional and
developing countries. There are no differences across the three country groups with
regard to proportion of countries in each group where monetary authorities: a) allow use
of the reserves for payment purposes and b) pay interest on reserves. Reserve ratios are
significantly lower in countries with more mature banking systems.
• Institutional factors — banking system maturity, legal system adequacy and technical
infrastructure are different across countries and the three country groups. These factors
are also important explanatory variables for differences in cash holdings and clearing
cycles.
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Table 4-5 BOE Group - summary of the results data for 1997)*
significant
Category Industrial Transitional Developing BOE group differences1
GDP per capita - USD ppp
average 19794 4639 6792 10293 Yes
standard deviation 3763 3250 5923 7997
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
average 126.50% 291% 203530% 101850% Yes
standard deviation 23pp 240pp 973196pp 688186pp
median 117.50% 203% 188% 133%
Deposit Interest Rate
average 4.12% 11.68% 13.69% 10.15% Yes
standard deviation 2.19pp 7.65pp 14.54pp 11.50pp
Velocity of Base Money
average 26.43 21.73 25.1 25.00 No
standard deviation 18.93 15.15 16.22 16.94
Clearing Cycle - in days
average 1 3.8 4.3 3.2 Yes
standard deviation 0.9 4.0 4.5 3.9
Required Reserves
average 3.70% 9.10% 9.60% 7.60% Yes
standard deviation 4.7pp 1.8pp 7.8pp 6.9pp
Cash Per Capita - USD ppp
average 1000 287 475 644 Yes
standard deviation 523 207 642 601
Cash to M1 - percent
average 22 39 40 33 Yes
standard deviation 12.5pp 15.5pp 14pp 16.0pp
Cash to GDP - percent
average 5 6.7 7.1 6.2 No
standard deviation 2.3pp 4.7pp 7PP 5.1pp
Banking System Maturity/
average 2.95 1.83 2.24 2.4 Yes
standard deviation 0.23 0.40 0.72 0.68
Adequate Legal Framework2
average 2.5 2.1 2 2.2 No
standard deviation 0.7 0.7 0.86 0.8
Technical Infrastructure
average 2.9 2.3 2.1 2.4 Yes
standard deviation 0.3 0.63 0.86 0.77
Use of RTGS system - percent
yes 86 46 25 45 Yes
no 14 54 75 55
Use of plastic cards - retail
percent of the countries 100 60 40 60 Yes
Use of electronic - wholesale
percent of the countries 100 80 40 65 Yes
*Data Sources: Bank of England Payment Systems Survey of 70 countries, International Financial
Statistics (August 1998), World Bank Atlas 1998 and Central banks annual reports for the year 1997.
1)The tests include Analysis of Variance and 2-sample t-tests, Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney non-parametric
tests, and regression analysis. There are no differences in results with regard to the tests applied, except for CPI
variable. As the variable seems to follow a non-normal distribution non-parametric tests were given more weight in
the hypothesis testing. Moreover, when countries with CPI over 1000 percent are excluded from the sample, even
`parametric' tests show significant differences across the country groups in respect of levels of CPI.
2)The central banks' evaluation of their countries' respective systems. The responses were classified on an ordinary
scale, where "poor" = 1, "developing" = 2, and "satisfactory" = 3.
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4.7. Conclusions
The following describe the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis:
-
• The tests show that there are significant differences across industrial,
transitional and developing countries in respect of their payment systems.
Developing countries appear to be a heterogeneous group with regard to the level of
income and other characteristics of development. Industrial and transitional countries
form more homogenous groups in that respect, as the countries within these groups have
major characteristics in common. Hence, possible generalisations and/or
recommendations based on this study may be safer to make or implement for/in, for
example, a country in transition.
• Although the characteristics of the CIT' payment systems look somewhat 'better'
than those of the developing countries, the differences between the transitional and
developing countries are, on the whole, not significant.
• The relative importance of cash seems much higher in developing and
transitional countries than in industrial countries. This may be a consequence of less
developed payment systems, i.e. less mature banking system, less developed legal and
technical infrastructure, slower clearing and lack of alternative payment instruments
available and/or competition among services providers. Immediate, real-time settlement
provided through cash payments can be, therefore, substituted by more convenient
alternatives only if they are cheap, reliable and efficient. The mere existence of the
alternatives is no guarantee. The influence of wealth, interest rates, inflation and
velocity of money, as found by the analysis, are in line with the theoretical predictions.
• The length of a clearing cycle, as a measure of payment processing efficiency, is a
matter of technological, economic and banking systems development. The RTGS
type of system, by definition, clear payments in real — time, i.e. immediately.
• Industrial countries, and those with more mature banking systems in the other
two groups of countries, tend to rely less on required reserves, hence the lower
average ratio, as an instrument of monetary policy. Developing and transitional
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countries with underdeveloped money markets and acute illiqudity problems may still
use the instrument effectively for monetary policy and efficient payments purposes.
• Institutional infrastructure for payment systems is a combination of banking
system maturity, legal framework and technical infrastructure, all of which can, on
their own or in combination, make obstacles for, or help facilitate, an efficient payment
system functioning.
• As for CIT, a tentative conclusion is that they need to improve both wholesale
and retail payment systems. In general, there is a high reliance on cash for retail
payments, paper payments dominate the wholesale systems and the institutional
infrastructure is still underdeveloped. Mainly centralised large value payments
processing in the past have resulted in slightly faster wholesale payment systems'
clearing than in developing countries.
Potential limitations of the analysis may be in:
• Use of the single year data for the cross-countries comparison.
• A smaller number of observations for less developed countries regarding different
payment instruments (volumes and values of payments).
• Definition and measurement of some variables, e.g. clearing cycle.
• Classification of countries in the three groups, as some countries may have more in
common with countries in a group other than 'their own' 16. In general, "developing
countries" seems to be a heterogeneous group of countries at different stage of
banking and payment system development and level of GDP.
16 For instance, in respect of payment system and institutional characteristics, Vietnam and Tanzania can also be
regarded as developing countries and Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Bermuda are not less developed than, for
example, Portugal, Greece or Spain.
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5. Payment Systems in Countries in Transition
5.1. Analytical framework
This chapter presents the major aspects of payment systems operations in
Countries in Transition, and offers a critical evaluation of their present characteristics
and possible future development. The subsequent sections investigate: a) the
institutional framework, b) the use and importance of cash and other payment
instruments, c) the large-value payment systems and d) the monetary and banking
system aspects of the payment systems reforms in CIT.
The aims of the analyses are to:
1. Identify the major characteristics of the payment systems of CIT.
2. Identify the major problems of the payment system reforms.
3. Suggest possible solutions for the problems and adequate payment system designs.
Because of limited data availability and depth for transitional countries, the
analysis resorts to a combination of different research techniques, namely a mix of
qualitative and quantitative analytical methodologies. Depending on the type and
quality of available information, the identified critical aspects of a payment system are
assessed by descriptive statistics, statistical tests, secondary analysis or case studies
approach or a combination of these methods. The main data sources are the countries'
central banks, The World Bank, IMF and EBRD.
The institutional framework analysis is based on descriptive statistics on main
institutional factors provided by the World Bank, EBRD and to a lesser extent the
central banks. The cash holdings analysis uses the International Financial Statistics data
(IMF 1998) and the central banks' responses/evaluation of their countries' respective
systems. The information on other payment instruments, payment system reforms and
monetary policy is mainly provided by the central banks in the form of special reports
or answers in response to the survey. The large-value payment systems of particular
countries are analysed by a case-study approach. The analysis also refers to the results
of the previous analytical chapter. Final conclusions and recommendations for the CIT
payment systems are postponed until the analysis of the Yugoslav payment system is
presented.
122
The Payment Systems Reforms 	 Countries in Transition
5.2.	 Institutional framework
5.2.1.	 The economic environment
At the beginning of the analysis it should be clarified which countries can be
classified as transitional. In general, all former socialist/communist countries, that have
discarded that form of socio-political organisational structure, and which are embracing
a capitalist economic system qualify as members of "The Countries in Transition" —
CIT group. As there are some prerequisites for a fully-fledged capitalist system that take
time to fulfil, these countries are in a specific process of transition. However, not all of
these countries have started the transition from the same position, nor have they passed
the same distance. Moreover, for some countries it is not clear whether they are heading
to the same destinationl.
Without going into philosophical or political debate about what makes a country
a transitional one, it will be accepted that all Eastern European and former Soviet Union
countries that were a part of so-called "eastern block", as well as the former Yugoslav
republics, are CIT. This is also in line with the literature on transitional economies and
the World Bank classification (1998b). In line with the Bank of England (Fry et al.
1998) classification, China, Vietnam and Tanzania are also treated as transitional
economies. Table 5-1 shows that the great majority of transitional countries are either
(Eastern) European or Central Asian (former Soviet Union) countries and that they are
mostly middle income countries.
Table 5-1 CIT - Regions and Income
Country group Africa East Asia Central Asia Europe Total
Low income 1 2 4 2 9
Middle lower 4 11 15
Middle upper 6 6
Upper income
Total 1 2 8 19 30
Data Source: IBRD/The World Bank (1998c)
Note: Economies are divided among income groups, according to 1996 GNP per capita in USD,
calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Income groups are low income, $785 or less; lower-
middle income, $78643,115; upper-middle income, $3,116-$9,635; and high-income, $9,636 or more.
For example, in case of China it is arguable that the objective of the reforms is to form a capitalist economic and
political system.
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As these countries have followed certain patterns in their developments,
whereby the emphasis was on: collective rather than individual ownership and
responsibility; material production rather than services; and centralised planning rather
than private initiative, there are also some similarities in their financial and banking
systems developments. Thus, other aspects of the institutional infrastructure, such as
legal framework, overall technology and emphasis on inter-companies payment
transactions seem to be similar.
CIT form a huge economic region in terms of the territory, population (even
excluding China) and production. Table 5-2 (on the next page) shows the relative sizes
and strengths of the economies and the group as a whole.
The relative economic strength of the group, however, as measured by average
GNP per capita and income group indicators and the proportion of the world's total
production, is not in line with the 'size' of the economies. The transitional countries are
mostly lower-middle income economies, with a GNP per capita at purchasing power
parity rate of, on average, $3,3502, and are "less indebted". Their overall production is
about seven percent of the world's total. Nonetheless, the size of the market, especially
when measured at purchasing power parity rate, makes the CIT group an attractive area
for business and research.
Based on the World Bank (1998a, 1998b) and EBRD (1997, 1998) reports, it
can be concluded that the economic and financial sector reforms in CIT were not
implemented with the same vigour and determination in all countries. The explanations
lie in various social and political considerations as well as the balance of power between
'new' and 'old' political and economic forces. In general terms, the overall financial
reforms in CIT so far, where conducted, have resulted in increased competition and
transparency of the rules, improvements in technology and necessary banking and
financial skills, and government income as a result of privatisation of the state owned
financial institutions. On the minus side, however, there were numerous lay-offs that
resulted in increased unemployment rates in some countries, and instances, e.g. in
Russia, of the negative influence of movements of capital, that was also driven by
global capital markets dynamics and was possible because of the new openness and
integration in the world markets.
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Table 5-2 CIT basic statistics
Population	 GNP per capita in Income group -
Country	 million	 USD- purchasing	 World Bank
power parity rate	 Atlas Method
Europe
Indebtedness
Albania	 3.28	 1,398 2 1
Belarus
	
10.3	 4,380 2 1
Bosnia	 4.38 1 3
Bulgaria
	
8.35	 4,280 2 3
Croatia	 4.77	 4,290 3 1
Czech R.
	
10.32
	 10,870 3 1
Estonia	 1.47	 4,660 2 1
Hungary
	
10.19
	 6,730 3 2
Latvia	 2.49	 3,650 2 1
Lithuania
	
3.71	 4,390 2 1
Macedonia
	
1.98	 2,147 2 2
Moldova	 4.33	 1,440 1 1
Poland	 38.62	 6,000 3 1
Romania	 22.61	 4,580 2 1
Russia	 147.74	 4,190 2 1
Slovak R.	 5.34	 7,460 3 1
Slovenia	 1.99	 12,110 3 1
Ukraine	 50.72	 2,230 2 1
FR Yugoslavia	 10.57 2 1
Central Asia
Armenia	 3.77	 2,160 1 1
Azerbaijan	 7.58	 1,490 1 1
Georgia	 5.41	 1,810 2 2
Kazakhstan	 16.47	 3,230 2 1
Kyrgyz R.	 4.58	 1,970 1 1
Tajikistan	 5.93	 900 1 1
Turkmenistan	 4.6	 2,010 2 1
Uzbekistan	 23.23	 2,450 2 1
East Asia
China	 1,215	 3,330 1 1
Vietnam	 75.35	 1,570 1 3
Africa
Tanzania	 30.5	 640 1 3
Memorandum items:
CIT population millions: 	 1,736	 excluding China: 521
% of the world population	 30.20% 9.10%
CIT	 GNP per capita PPP	 $3,348 Production - % of 7%
1996	 weighted average the world total
G- 10 countries	 GNP per capita PPP	 $24,303 Production - % of 66%
1996	 weighted average the world total
Data sources: World Bank Atlas 1998
Notes: Income groups are: 1- low income, $785 or less; 2- lower-middle income, $786-$3,115; 3 -upper-
middle income, $3,116-$9,635; and 4 - high-income, $9,636 or more.
Indebtedness groups are: 3 - severely indebted (either the present value of debt service to GNP ratio
exceeds 0.8 or the present value of debt service to exports ratio exceeds 2.2); 2 - moderately indebted
(either of the two key ratios exceed 0.6 of, but does not reach, the critical level); 1 - less indebted (all
other economies).
2 This is the population-weighted figure. The thirty countries arithmetic average is $3,660.
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5.2.2.	 The institutional factors
Major payment systems institutional framework indicators for the CIT are
shown in table 5-3 (on the next page). Columns 2 and 3 give the evaluation of the
banking and legal systems development, as assessed by The European Bank for
Restructuring and Development - EBRD (1997, 1998) 3 . Column 4 gives the assessment
of the technical infrastructure in the respective countries, based on the data on the
number of telephone mainlines and personal computers per capita, length of paved
roads and use of electricity per capita 4. Additional information on banking systems is
provided by the countries' central banks and the World Bank (1998b), and is presented
in columns 5 and 6. Despite the relatively high number of banks in many CIT, the
banking systems in CIT are highly concentrated, with two to six large (mainly state
owned) banks accounting for overwhelming portion of total assets, loans and deposits
(from 50 to 95 percent). These large non-privatised banks also hold almost all of the
'bad debts' and are, as a rule, insolvent and/or in need of financial and business
restructuring.
The banking system problems in CIT are also emphasised by interconnected
ownership and lending, with non-performing loans as a major consequence. Persistence
of the ties and practice, whereby the state-owned, loss-making enterprises are both the
shareholders and major debtors to state-owned, loss-making banks and vice versa, is
one of the major hindrances to the banking sector restructuring. Moreover, given the
weak state of capital markets and volatile foreign capital movements, the banks remain
the main source of finance and assistance in CIT which is why banking system reforms
are both important and necessary.
3 The explanation of the classifications is given in the appendix 2.
4 The data is provided by the World Bank. Explanation of the classifications is given in the appendix 2.
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Table 5-3 Institutional Framework 1997
Banking
system	 Legal system	 Technical
Country	 development	 adequacy	 Infrastructure
(1-5)	 (1-5)	 (1-6)
Two-tier
banking
system
established
Number of
banks to
lmillion
population
Population
per branch
Europe
Albania 2 2 2 1992 2.7
Belarus 1 2 4 1991 3.1
Bosnia 1 3 1971 10
Bulgaria 3 3 5 1989 6.1 2,000
Croatia 3 4 5 1971 7.1
Czech R. 3 4 5 1990 5.6 3,000
Estonia 3 4 4 1992 11
Hungary 4 4 4 1987 4
Latvia 3 3 4 1992 12 3,000
Lithuania 3 3 4 1991 3.2 18,000
Macedonia 3 2 4 1971 8.5
Moldova 2 2 4 1991 5.6
Poland 3 4 4 1989 3 15,000
Romania 3 3 4 1990 1.7 7,000
Russia 2 3 4 1991 13 45,000
Slovak R. 3 3 5 1990 5.4 5,000
Slovenia 3 3 5 1971 14.5 3,400
Ukraine 2 2 4 1991 1
Yugoslavia 3 2 4 1971 10 7,000
Central Asia
Armenia 2 3 4 1988 8.5
Azerbaijan 2 1 3 1992 16
Georgia 2 2 4 1991 9.2
Kazakhstan 2 2 4 1991 6
Kyrgyz R. 3 2 3 1991 3.7 38,000
Tajikistan 1 3 1991 4.5
Turkmenistan 1 3 1993 3.2
Uzbekistan 2 2 3 1988 2
East Asia
China 3 1985 0.01 App. 150,000
Vietnam_ 2
Africa
Tanzania 1	 . 1 1 1993 0.5 150,000
Data Sources: Columns 2 and 3 — EBRD (except for Tanzania — The Bank of Tanzania); column 4 -
World Bank, column 5 — EBRD and World Bank, columns 6 and 7 — the central banks' reports and the
World Bank.
Note: Explanation of the classifications is given in the appendix 2.
It can also be observed that some countries are more advanced in terms of the
institutional infrastructure that supports their payment systems. Thus, Poland, Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Baltic States and Slovenia form a group of 'advanced'
transitional economies. The progress also coincides with higher GNP per capita in those
countries relative to other transitional countries. The starting date of the reforms, as
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indicated by the year of establishment of a two-tier banking system, is not necessarily a
decisive factor in the progress of the reforms. The somewhat better starting position of
former Yugoslav republics 5 , which had a longer practice of commercial banking and a
market economy, was not built upon in all the cases because of the civil war in the
region. In general, 'European' transitional countries have much larger relative income
per capita, more advanced banking, legal and technical infrastructure than other
transitional countries (see appendix 2, table 9-21).
The summary of the relevant descriptive statistics for the group of 30 countries,
with regard to the institutional infrastructure, is shown in Table 5-4.
Table 5-4 The CIT group* Institutional framework 1997 - descriptive statistics
Category Mean median	 standard Minimum maximum
deviation
01 03
GNP per capita in USD at PPP 3662 2865	 2744	 640	 12110 1750 4438
Consumer price Index 160 115	 123	 104	 678 109 142
Banking system (1-5 scale) 2.46 3	 0.76	 1	 4 2 3
Legal system (1-5 scale) 2.68 3	 0.9	 1	 4 2 3
Telephones per 1000 inhabitant 162.6 161.5	 99	 13	 333 76 263
Computers (1-6 scale) 2.93 3	 1.35	 1	 6 2 3.25
Electricity (1-6 scale) 3.33 3.5	 1.55	 1	 5 3 4
Overall Technical (1-6 scale) 3.7 4	 0.95	 1	 5 3 4
Data sources: World Bank (1998a), EBRD (1997)
*Group of 30 Cif
Current loss of confidence in transitional countries (starting from mid-1998)
and, thus, the diminishing activity of foreign banks and investors in CIT banking
systems may slow down the driving forces behind the banking system improvements
and legal system changes needed to spur the payment systems' development.
Conversely, endogenously-induced improvements and changes are the best solution not
only for the efficient payment system but for restructuring the confidence of both
domestic and foreign participants in the markets. There is a case for active public
policy. The activism of the policy makers can relate either to the statutory, supervisory,
co-ordination and prudential activities in the banking and payment system or increased
operational involvement. In the countries that are identified as more advanced in the
transitional processes, the optimal policy option may be the former, that is, the
dominant role of central banks in payment systems should be gradually reduced.
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia).
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Further analysis of the institutional framework for payment systems, especially
relating to the public policy measures, is presented with other analytical categories in
the subsequent sections.
5.3. Retail Payment Systems in CIT
5.3.1.	 Cash Holdings in CIT
The analysis of the Bank of England Group payment systems in the previous
chapter showed that in the transitional countries there are higher cash preferences than
in industrial countries and that the CIT cash holdings are roughly the same as those in
developing countries. This section investigates whether the transitional economies can
be classified as "cash economies" in terms of the payment systems functioning. This is
done through the analysis of:
• Cash holdings data for the 30 transitional economies.
• The BOE group data and tests' results.
• The central banks' responses to the questions relating to the retail payment systems.
• Descriptive statistics and illustrations on the use and importance of cash in selected
CIT, for which the data is provided mainly by the central banks.
Tables 5-5 to 5-7 show summaries of descriptive statistics on cash holdings
captured by the three measures in the group of 30 CIT and the BOE group analysis
results for 1997. For analytical purposes, the transitional countries are divided into two
groups. The first group is formed from Russia, former Soviet republics (excluding
Baltic republics), China, Vietnam and Tanzania. The second is formed by other
European CIT. The test results are also shown in the appendix 2.
The cash in circulation to narrow money ratio for all CIT countries (Table 5-5),
indicates an even higher importance of cash than previously shown by the analysis of
the BOE sample of CIT (chapter 4). The CIT group as a whole has, on average, roughly
the same proportion of cash in circulation and deposits in the narrow money, i.e. the
ratio of cash to deposits is approximately 1. This is even higher than for the B OE
sample of developing countries. Further breakdowns of the results shows that the ratio
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is the highest in the non-European transitional countries. The difference between the
two CIT groups is not statistically significant (see table 9-22 in appendix 2)
Table 5-5 Cash in circulation to narrow money 1997
category
The CIT group analysis The Bank of England Group Analysis
The CIT group CIT Europe	 Other CIT Transitional Developing	 Industrial
mean
standard deviation
52%
21pp
45%
14pp
59%
27pp
39%
15.5pp
40%
14pp
22%
12.5pp
Number of countries
% of the overall population
30
100%
15
50%
15
50%
11
36%
38
31%
21
88%
The average cash in circulation to gross domestic product ratio for the group of
30 CIT is higher than in the BOE sample of eleven transitional countries, at 7.4 percent.
This is much higher than in the industrial countries, and somewhat higher than in the
developing countries (the difference is still not statistically significant). The initial
inference from the comparison of the two CIT groups — Europe and Others — is that, on
average, cash holdings as a proportion of GDP is higher in "other" transitional
countries. The tests show, however, that the difference is not statistically significant6.
Table 5-6 Cash in circulation to GDP 1997
category
The CIT group analysis The Bank of England Group Analysis
The CIT group CIT Europe	 Other CIT Transitional Developing	 Industrial
mean
standard deviation
7.4%
4.5pp
7.0%
4.2pp
7.8%
4.7pp
6.7%
4.7pp
7.1%
7PP
5.0%
2.3pp
Number of countries
% of the overall population
30
100%
15
50%
15
50%
11
36%
38
31%
21
88%
The third measure of cash holdings for the 30 CIT, defined as cash in
circulation per capita in US dollars at purchasing power rate, is in line with previous
results. All the comparison inferences, therefore, remain the same. The transitional
countries have, on average, the lowest level of dollar value of cash holdings. The level
of the cash holdings is significantly higher in European transitional economies than in
other CIT. This is also in line with the previous findings on cash holdings as captured
by that measure. Thus, the CIT with higher relative wealth (GDP) and lower inflation
(CPI) have larger dollar values of cash in circulation.
6 It should be noted, however, than when Albania is excluded from the sample of "European" countries the
difference between the groups is higher and becomes statistically significant.
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Table 5-7 Cash in circulation in USD at Durchasinaower oaritvrate 1997
category
The CIT group analysis The Bank of England Group Analysis
The CIT group CIT Europe	 Other CIT Transitional Developing	 Industrial
mean 270 351 167 287 475 1000
standard deviation 181 166 147 207 642 523
Number of countries 30 15 15 11 38 21
% of the overall population 100% 50% 50% 36% 31% 88%
In countries with more detailed payments statistics available, for example,
Czech Republic, Yugoslavia and Hungary, the cash transactions represent a significant
proportion of overall transactions recorded within the respective systems. These cash
transactions represent money/postal orders transmitted through the 'giro' system but
resulting in cash transactions (money paid in or taken out) at one or both ends of the
payment orders processing. They are indicative of a lack of available substitute retail-
payments instruments for the transfer of monetary claims.
In the Czech Republic, the value of cash receipts recorded within the system was
about 50% of the value of the annual GDP in 1995. In Hungary, the ratio was about
40% in 1994. The figure for Yugoslavia for 1991 was about 33%. The figures for 1997,
however, show a decline in relative value of the cash transactions. In Hungary, the ratio
declined to 16 percent, and in Yugoslavia to 12 percent. When compared to the total
value of large-value payments processed by the systems, the value of cash transactions
is one fifth of the total value of LVTS payments in Yugoslavia, on average for the
period 1991 to 1997.
It is also evident from the central banks' responses to the questions on cash
holdings that in every single transitional country cash transactions dominate in both
volume and the value of retail payments. In Hungary although card transactions have
shown a significant increase in volumes and values cash remains the major payment
instrument. Moreover, according to the central bank information, only one seventh of
all card transactions are 'cashless', i.e. refer to transactions other than ATM cash
withdrawals.
In addition to local currency holdings and transactions, there is the phenomenon
of currency substitution, i.e. relatively significant values and volumes of foreign
currency in circulation and in savings accounts. Anecdotal evidence for Russia and
former Soviet republics, Bulgaria, FR Yugoslavia and former Yugoslav republics is in
line with the assumption of high foreign currency significance for payment transactions.
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Although large cash holdings, especially in hard currency, are indicative of grey
and black market operations and criminal activities they primarily relate to lack of trust
and inefficiency in the financial systems. Moreover, cash - especially if denominated in
a stable foreign currency or used as a real-time medium of exchange - is the most
effective antidote to a combined influence that high inflation rates and inadequate
interest rates, payment lags and float (inefficiency) have on idle or trapped balances in
the institutions.
The central banks' information on cash payments and other payment instruments
is unambiguous. Cash is still the dominant retail payment instrument both in volume
and value in CIT. Comparison with the G-10 countries' cash holdings measures
(appendix 3-2, table 9-27) also confirms this.
In summary, the first two measures of cash holdings confirm the high
importance and use of cash in CIT. The third measure shows a relatively low value of
cash in circulation in USD, influenced by low income and wealth in the CIT.
Descriptive statistics and illustrations provided by the central banks of the
representative transitional countries, confirm the findings of high use and importance of
cash in CIT. Furthermore, cash preference is confirmed by the central banks' evaluation
of their countries retail payment systems.
5.3.2.	 Retail payments and non-cash payment instruments
Based on the information provided by CIT central banks on the payment
systems, the separation of payment flows into "corporate" and "households" streams
was one of the prominent characteristics of the CIT payment systems prior to the
reforms. This was also in line with the priority of material production over services and
investments and development over private consumption and standard of living in
national plans and politics. The distinction was not made according to the values of the
payments, although, the payment streams coincided with large-value and small-value
payments, respectively. The separation had a different but important implication for
systems functioning. The retail payment methods and services were neglected and had a
low priority in the payment systems functioning and development.
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Given the choice of priorities and the need for centralised control and execution
of payments, the provision of major payment system services was, as a rule, centralised
within a single institution (usually the central bank and its branch network). Transfer of
small value transactions, other than face-to-face cash transactions, was usually left to
the national post system. With the underdeveloped retail banking systems and
competition, little progress has been made in introducing new payment instruments and
improving retail payments efficiency. Thus, credit instruments - money (cash/postal)
orders and credit transfers — as opposed to debit instruments (such as cheques of
different credit institutions) dominated the volumes and values of transactions within
the centralised and monopolised systems. On the plus side in some countries the credit
transfers, evolved from paper-based to electronic, enabling also rather fast giro-retail
systems' functioning. The choice, costs, transparency and privacy of retail payments
remained the issues of lower priority. The statistics on retail payments was also
undeveloped and in line with the 'importance' of these payments.
In recent years, coinciding with the payment systems reforms, the introduction
and importance of non-cash instruments for retail payments began to rise. However, as
this is a gradual process, overall credit transfers 7 remain dominant in the volume and
value of the payments. Thus, in the group of the 30 CIT countries, according to the
central banks survey, this payment instrument typically accounts for 95 percent of
overall value and 70 percent of overall volume of retail payment transactions in 1997.
Another feature of 'transitional' retail payment systems is the low use of
cheques and, in reformed systems, the increased use of plastic cards (mainly debit
cards). Given the advantages of electronics and plastics over cheques in speed, risks and
costs (as discussed in the previous chapters), it is to the benefit of transitional countries
to leap-frog into a `chequeless' society. Also, the relatively small number of plastic
cards in the system and their late introduction could mean that the transitional countries
do not have to go trough the process of replacing too many of their magnetic stripe
cards with the 'chip' cards. Nevertheless, it is hard to enthuse banks to start thinking of
new payment instruments development when traditional products (but new to the
systems) are profitably expanding. This and other issues are examined separately in the
section 8.1.4.
133
The Payment Systems Reforms	 Countries in Transition
In general, in European CIT there has been more progress in the introduction
and use of cash-alternative payment instruments, in particular direct debits, ATMs and
cash-cards and, to a lesser extent debit cards. Most has been achieved in The Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The introduction and use of ATMs, debit cards and
international credit cards, seems greater in countries with a higher presence of foreign
banks.
5.4. Wholesale payment systems in CIT
5.4.1.	 Introduction
The sources of information for the analysis of CIT payment systems design are
mainly the countries' central banks. Being involved in both systems regulations and
operations, the central banks are the most knowledgeable entities in respect of the
payment systems' past and reforms. Given the poor statistical coverage of payment
transaction volumes and values in the past, and the relatively short life of new payment
systems, the information is of a rather 'qualitative nature'. However, in order to get a
more objective picture of the state and future of the payment systems, the information
has been checked from other sources, namely the EBRD, World Bank, local bankers
associations and commercial banks operating in the markets. The information gathered
from the central banks and other institutions was mainly in the form of specially
prepared reports or publications on the countries payment systems that the central banks
sent in response to the survey.
The eleven systems for which substantial meaningful information was provided
by the central banks or other institutions are analysed next in form of 22 mini case
studies 8. The analysis is presented in the two analytical sections — payment systems
developments and payment systems within the monetary policy framework.
7 Cash-related, electronic or paper based.
8 In general, these are advanced countries in terms of financial and monetary systems reforms or countries that have
started the payment system reforms as such.
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5.4.2.	 Payment system developments in eleven CIT
The payment system reforms were a necessary part of banking and monetary
system restructuring in transitional countries as they shifted towards market-oriented
economies. As the "monobanking" systems with dominant central banks were being
replaced with two-tier banking systems, and with the larger number of financial
intermediaries present, the changes in payment systems had to reflect the less-
controlled, multiparty, payment flows. However, not all of the countries had the same
institutional arrangements, level of banking system development or had followed the
same transitional and privatisation paths. The payment system reforms were also not
uniform. The differences lay in whether a particular reform was:
• part of a broader banking and monetary system restructuring programme or not,
• accompanied with adequate institutional and legal changes or not,
• incremental or 'strategic'; thorough or superficial,
• with the involvement of different stake-holders (especially banks) or top-down
imposed;
and in the choice among available technical and organisational solutions for a .system's
design9.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria adopted a strategic approach to its payment system reform. The
objective of the reform was the creation of a SIC-like RTGS system by the year 1999.
Instead of sequencing the steps of the reform, the envisaged system was both the
starting and the end point of the process. Thus payment system is being reformed in its
entirety, and the existing gross system is going to be enhanced into an RTGS system.
The system, called "Bisera" is operated and owned jointly by the central bank and the
commercial banks through "Bankservice", the system operator. In 1997 the total
volume of the payment transactions processed by the system was about 16.5 million.
There are, however, other more fundamental impediments for the efficient
payment system functioning. First, according to the central bank, the large amounts of
non-performing loans and the insolvency of some banks is reflected in the illiqudity of
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the system and in payment delays. Second, there is anecdotal evidence of high foreign
currency holdings in Bulgaria which, when coupled with high cash preference, result
in lower utilisation of banking channels. Third, non-reformed banks and high inflation
in the past are also responsible for a lack of trust in banking and payment systems.
Finally, the reform came rather late during the process of financial system restructuring,
i.e. it did not support new monetary policy nor money market development. These
issues are analysed in section 5.5.2.
China
China has started the financial system reforms in the late seventies. By 1984 a
monobanking system was replaced by the system consisting of four specialised banks
and the central bank — People's Bank of China. This change was also reflected in the
replacement of a centralised record-keeping accounting system by a payment and
settlement system. The central bank provided settlement accounts for the banks and
2200 local clearing houses and the specialised banks operated their own inter-branch
clearing for non-local payments. The system was paper based with manual operations.
Between 1985 and 1993, new regional and national banks as well as other financial
institutions were established which resulted in increased interbank transactions. The
paper-based operations resulted in large amounts of float. In response, the central bank
and four specialised banks introduced electronic interbank systems. The payment
transactions' pricing policy has relied on subsidies rather than full-cost recovery.
Since 1993, efforts have been focused on creating a modern two-tier banking
system, with a clear distinction between central banking and monetary policy on the one
hand, and commercial banking on the other. This also included efforts towards the
adoption of new accounting principles and modernisation of the payment system. Hence
the increased importance of the Chinese National Advanced Payment System — CNAPS
project, which started in 1991. It is now in a pilot stage and is expected to be
operational by the year 2000.
9 An overview of the analysis is given in Box 5-1 on page 152.
IC) For example, cash in circulation to narrow money ratio is about 0.6, and cash to GDP is approximately eight
percent.
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From the information provided by the central bank, it can be concluded that the
long time delays in implementing this, and other, payment system projects can be
attributed to the following facts:
• First, there is no clear strategy for the payment system development as the country's
financial system is in the process of transition, which, in turn, is also not clearly
defined. The incremental but substantial development of banking and monetary
systems require changes in the payment system design and operations, and the
problem is that the payment system improvements are thus always one step behind.
This is also reflected in an inadequate legal framework for payments and
insufficient risk awareness of the system participants.
• Second, the payment system infrastructure in general and technical framework in
particular are still undeveloped, and the payment system needs to be rationalised. As
these factors are tackled in a centralised fashion, with little bottom-up initiative
and/or contribution, the implementation of a programme is a substantial undertaking
for the authorities -- time-wise skills-wise and money-wise.
• Third, the payment system is supposed to serve the most populated country in the
world, surpass large distances and work for a rapidly changing and growing
economy. The implementation of a programme of such proportions certainly takes
time.
Croatia
Croatia has 'inherited' its payment system from former Yugoslavia, of which it
was part until 1992 11 . Thus, in the current payment system credit institutions accounts,
accounts of companies, juridical and natural persons, are still kept with the Agency for
Domestic Payments (former Social Accounting Service/Bureau, so-called "SDK"). The
Agency is a non-depository institution authorised for handling domestic payment
operations. The Agency operates through 22 branches, with 120 sub-branches, and has
500 employees. In 1998 it kept more than 260,000 accounts and processed about
500,000 payments a day.
II The payment system of former Yugoslavia is described in more detail in "Payment system in Yugoslavia" section.
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The payment system reform that started in 1995 was aimed at redesigning the
system so that the credit institutions' accounts are transferred to the central bank's
books, and the customers' (businesses and individuals) accounts are kept with the credit
institutions - namely banks. Therefore, in the new system, the interbank payments are
planned to be processed through an RTGS-type of clearing and settlement system, the
inter-company payments will be processed via their banks through the RTGS system.
The retail payments will be executed through the National Clearing System, a giro-type
clearing house that will utilise existing Agency's facilities. Both systems are planned to
go live by the end of first quarter 1999.
It is planned that all payment transactions between accounts kept with different
banks, except large value payments, settle at the National Clearing House (NCS). The
transactions will be processed on a multilateral net settlement basis. As for large value
payments, the transactions will be settled on a gross basis in 'real-time', provided there
are sufficient funds on the payer's bank account. The payment orders that are not fully
covered will be sent in a queue and processed on either a first-in-first-out or priority
basis once there are sufficient funds available. The LVTS transactions will be
transmitted using the SWIFT proprietary network. All direct participants will be able to
monitor executed transactions, account balances and unsettled transactions placed in the
queue.
Given the nature of the system design, there may be a few problems in its
operations. The successful functioning of the envisaged payment system may be
affected by the following:
• First, the separation of payment instructions on large-value and retail payments
transactions may not be a clear-cut one. The existence of two, obligatory,
settlement systems may create ambiguities about which payment orders can and
should be transmitted through each of the systems. Even with an adequate legal
framework, the difficulty may be in deciding upon what is a large value payment
and how often should the decision be revised. Furthermore, if, for example, the
upper limit for small-value payments is set too low it will increase the need for the
liquidity required for large value payments. If, on the other hand, the limit is proven
by practice to be too high, the banks might want to utilise the net settlement
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arrangements of NCS and increase the risks that are provided for by the RTGS
system.
• Second, related to the first remark, obligatory centralised clearing and settlement of
'small-value' payments may unnecessarily complicate the day-to-day operations
and increase reliance on the NCS's technical facilities. If the objectives of the
reform are, among other things, to make banks the main retail payment services
providers and to channel funds through the banking system, the control and
financial discipline can be catered for by supervision and surveillance of the
financial institutions (including licensing procedures). In that case, settlement of
banks' net open positions resulting from all small-value payments can then easily
be done through the large-value gross settlement system or NCS' facilities.
• Third, with regard to LVTS payments, the existence of the queuing arrangements,
with no 'guarantee facilities' may be a contradiction to so-called real-time
settlement. As indicated by the Swiss case I2, the gross system with queuing
facilities may de facto function as a net, deferred time, settlement system, as the
bulk of payments occur late in the day. The possibility to attach priority to
payments and to decide on it ex-post in the Croatian payment system contradicts
the nature of an RTGS system and has different policy implications.
However, the necessary changes may still be incorporated into the system design
on time.
Czech Republic
In Czechoslovakia, until 1989, payments for the corporate sector were operated
by the State bank of Czechoslovakia through its branch network while the retail
payments were the responsibility of the Czech State Savings Banks and the Slovak State
Savings Bank. A fully computerised 'real-time' clearing network began operations in
early 1992. The central bank established the Clearing and Settlement centre to handle
domestic currency payments between banks. After the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993
until 1995, the National Banks of the Czech Republic and Slovakia cleared and settled
payments between the states. The systems effectively functioned like EU TARGET,
12 In the literature review chapter.
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with domestic clearing centres, but with the difference of two currencies present. Since
1995, when the arrangement was cancelled, the inter-states payments function on the
conventional correspondent-banking arrangements basis.
In the Czech Republic, total volumes and values of payments processed by the
national RTGS system, owned and operated by the central bank, are 175 million
transactions, worth approximately 45,000 billion Czech Korunas. In 1995, the payment
system services were provided by just below 3,500 bank operating units. Of the total
number of accounts and transactions processed in 1995, the five largest banks
accounted for about 90 percent.
The payment system reforms seem to have been approached strategically, with
clear definition of the reform objectives and the payment systems' role in the monetary
economy. There was, however, no involvement of commercial banks and other financial
intermediaries in the reform process and all changes were introduced by the central
bank. Also, the oversight of the system is formal and regulated by law. The central bank
provides no overdraft facilities and there are queuing arrangements instead.
In spite of advanced technical solutions for the country's RTGS system there
were liquidity problems reflected in the payment system functioning. A series of
failures among small banks with a resulting liquidity crunch and collapse of the two
largest fully private banks ("Kreditni banka" and "Agrobanka" in 1996) have brought
the credibility of the Czech financial markets to its lowest point since economic reforms
begun. Furthermore, the four largest banks that account for eighty percent of all assets
of the banking system are yet to be truly privatised. The costs of borrowing are high and
the industry is in a weak financial state.
Although the clearing and settlement system has improved I3 , the interbank
market faces many difficulties that are rooted in the banking system itself. For example,
despite the improved technology that allows same-day settlement, banks often make
delays that may amount to many days (according to international banks present in the
system). Also, the system does not effectively function in real-time as many participants
are not electronically linked to the settlement system. Thus, payments have been
effectively cleared only after one to three days.
13 There were a few technical hiccups though, including the late establishment of back-up facilities (in 1997).
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Estonia
In Estonia, the majority of interbank payments are settled through the clearing
centre of Eesti Pank (the central bank). The centre is responsible for 1/3 of overall
payments 14. The centre processes both debit orders and credit orders on a multilateral
netting basis. The great majority of payment orders, which account for above 99% of
the total value of payments, are electronic. The system does not distinguish between
large-scale and retail payments. The multilateral netting falls into two phases. The first
phase ends at 15.00 hours when the information on effected and rejected payments is
sent to the participants. After that, the participants have two hours in which to provide
the required liquidity to pay for the rejected orders. The money can be obtained from
the interbank money market or through trading in the central bank's certificate of
deposits. At a certain penalty rate, the banks can also use part of their reserve
requirements. At 17.00 hours the final settlement takes place. The uncovered payments
are rejected.
Since 1996 a fee for the payment services has been charged to indirect payment
systems participants, namely the banks' subdivisions, in order to equalise the position of
credit institutions with only one settlement account and put the liquidity management of
institutions with several of the accounts in order. In 1997 the central bank decided to
design a new interbank payment system, in order to prepare the country's payment
system for LVTS payments for 'interlinking' with the EU TARGET and bringing its
SVTS payments in compliance with the EU standards.
Two projects have started — one is to develop an RTGS system by September
2000, and the other is to develop a DNS system for retail payments by September 1999.
These developments are accompanied with the already effected changes in the
accounting principles, unified account statements and the replacement of payment order
copies by electronic ones. According to the Eesti Pank, the final objectives of the
reforms are to accelerate settlements, build confidence in the banking sector and reduce
use of cash for high value transactions.
There are several conclusions that can be made about the Estonian payment
system that can also serve as lessons on payment system design.
14 Other are mainly intrabank payments and payments settled 'any other way' (according to the central bank).
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• First, there is no account of/control over all large value payments by the central
bank and the payment arrangements and rules of participation are ambiguous. This,
although not necessarily risky in its own right, complicates the payment flows and
may increase payment system risks as the autonomous flows in an immature or
poorly supervised system may reduce financial discipline or neglect social costs.
• Second, some operational measures are used as substitutes for legal or statutory
setting. Pricing policy, for example, is not the most effective measure for putting the
use of the system or number of participants in order in a 'developing' banking
system.
• Third, on the plus side, there is a parallel development of two types of settlement
systems. However, although the DNS system is supposed to be for retail payments,
there is no provision that it will be the case. What is the interest of the central bank
in introducing two different competing systems? Is it not up to commercial banks to
try and establish an alternative payment system if necessary? Also, the monetary
policy and control consequences may prove to be rather complex for the central
bank to deal with.
• Fourth, also on the plus side, the development of a DNS may be a central bank's
contribution to retail payment system efficiency, choice and cost reduction. Still, the
question is how to arrange it. It is possible to do it: a) in the way described for
Croatia - obligatory and by making a distinction between LVTS and SVTS, b) by
leaving both systems open for all payments, or c) by creating a giro institution
instead of the DNS system - as an additional offering and thus to put pressure on
banks to develop retail payment services.
Hungary
In Hungary, the development of a new Interbank Giro System - IGS, costing
about US $30 million initially, began in 1987 and took seven years to develop.
Settlement was on net basis against participants' accounts. Other clearing institutions
include the card companies and "Giro Bankcard Ltd" and the central securities
clearinghouse and depository — "Keler Ltd". Back in 1992, it was noted (Summers
1994) that the IGS was designed to be an 'all-in-one' system, handling a wide variety of
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payments, intrabank and interbank, retail and wholesale, as well as non-value messages.
It was a very ambitious task. However, the utility of (the retail arm of) the system
ultimately depends on the willingness of non-bank customers to use bank transactions
rather than cash (Scott 1993), which has been becoming the reality over the past five
years. The National Bank of Hungary has assumed the leading role in the system
development and regulation from the very beginning. The interbank clearing system,
owned jointly by the central bank and commercial banks, started operations in the late
1994. It can be defined as a deferred (next day) settlement, gross clearing, batch
processing, system. The central bank has also implemented two additional projects -
uniform account numbering and standard paper form in 1995 and interbank clearing for
direct debit and direct credit in 1997.
The IGS has direct and indirect membership. The direct participants are only the
licensed banks that satisfy the procedural and technical standards set by the central
bank. The institutions that do not meet the criteria may join the system through the
central bank, as correspondent banks. As of mid 1997, 44 credit institutions, the
National Bank, the Keler and the State Treasury were connected to the IGS. In 1996, for
example, the system processed over 40.6 million transactions worth 2.7 times the
annual GDP. Only credit transfer orders (in Hungarian Forint only) can be sent through
the system, i.e. the payments are always payer's bank initiated. Electronic transfers
account for 57 percent of the total volume and 63 percent of total value of payments.
There are no limits on the value of transactions and all transactions 15 have the same
priority. The prices are set per transaction and charged to debtor's bank, except in case
of multiple direct debit. The pricing allows the full cost-recovery and is revised
quarterly. The payments clearing cycle for the period 1992 to 1998 was from two to
four days.
In line with the requirements for risk reduction and compliance with European
Central Bank standards (connection to TARGET) are the efforts towards creation of an
RTGS system. This will also require improvements to the accounting system at the
central bank which is still inadequate for the task. These projects at the top of the
agenda since early 1998.
15 Bank to bank payments, customer payments and non-clearing (non-value messages) transactions.
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The Hungarian payment system reform and functioning provides a few good
lessons for other countries undertaking the reforms.
First, based on the information provided by the National Bank of Hungary, the
payment system project suffered long delays because of the following problems:
• The task of separating the operations of a modern central bank and all other
functions that the central bank carried out in the past, as a precondition for setting
up a new clearing system.
• Some of the assumptions about the fundamentals turned out to be false. These
regarded, for example, the availability and reliability of public telecommunication
services and centralised intrabank accounting, and the persistence of old business
practice and governance.
Second, the involvement of the central bank and its relationship with
commercial banks was both crucial for payment reforms implementation and a sensitive
issue during the reform. Commercial banks are reluctant to change both payment
arrangements and co-operate in line with the reduction of other than their private costs
(for better or worse) unless the central bank pressures them to do so. In an immature
banking system as in a transitional country, this shifts the responsibility for 'strategic
thinking', setting of the agenda, and ensuring the compliance with the rules and
deadlines on the central bank. Moreover, the different interests of some large banks may
jeopardise the success of the project, as was the case in Hungary when large banks
started exchanging payment instructions bilaterally just before the new system was to
go live.
Third, notwithstanding these private versus public cost considerations, the
involvement of the commercial banks is critical for the success of the interbank
payment system reform. Therefore, a clear balance between the central banks
initiative/leadership and commercial banks involvement needs to be found. In the
Hungarian case, the banks were less involved than they wanted to be. However, it was
the involvement of foreign banks (bigger than in any other CIT) that contributed to
better utilisation of the system, and thus was in line with the central banks policy
intentions. The involvement has also contributed to a more mature banking system and
better banking practice, the basic prerequisites for risk reduction and monetary policy
efficiency with regard to the payment systems.
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It can also be concluded that the clearing and settlement were considered for
quite some time as a merely operational matter, which had nothing to do with the
banking and monetary risks. Nonetheless, the risk awareness and control have gradually
increased and the payment system was able to function without major disruptions over
the years. In the very competitive market, with significant presence of foreign banks
and investors, the system operated satisfactorily.
Lithuania
The Bank of Lithuania carries out interbank settlements via banks'
correspondent accounts held with the Bank. It is done through the Bank's "Settlements
Centre" that started operations in 1992 and was an independent entity up to mid 1994.
The centre has about 60 employees that run the system responsible for about nine
million payments, worth 82 billion Lithuanian Litas in 1997. All banks (12 banks in
1998) participate in the system and the banks' branches (160 of them) may also take
part in it. Interbank settlements are performed twice daily — at 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. Banks
are supplied by the information on the effected payments also twice daily by E-mail.
The telecommunication network is public network, the protocol is "CC:Mail" and the
hardware consists of personal computers both at the Settlement Centre and the
participants. The membership for clearing and settlement services is open for domestic
banks, their branches and foreign banks/branches. The pricing is per transaction,
regardless of the value, and per computer system use, i.e. for each KB of information
transferred and stored.
Since late 1997, if banks do not have sufficient funds on correspondent accounts
for effecting payments at the time of the last clearing, they may use the loan of the
central bank for pledged Government securities. The central bank is also an agent of the
government in managing auction of Treasury bills. The preparations are under way for
establishing an RTGS system.
In short, the Lithuanian payment system illustrates the following issues of
interest:
• As the settlement system is based on correspondent accounts, there is the question
of the cost of reserves and complexity of multilateral arrangements.
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• Mixture of gross clearing and net settlement arrangements is not fully taken into
policy considerations. As in other countries that use the same settlement formula,
the potential ambiguities and lack of simplicity may be too much for the banking
and monetary systems to deal with.
• The system is technologically underdeveloped and has inadequate security
provisions.
• Participation of both banks and their branches, as in the Estonian case, increases the
risks and reduces control and financial discipline.
• Centralised queue management with no guarantee of settlement may be contradicted
by the possibility of overnight borrowing, as payment related borrowings may spill-
over to overnight borrowings.
Poland
In Poland the reforms started in 1990 when a telex service for large-value
payments was introduced. The reforms followed the macroeconomic adjustment
programme and were aimed at reducing the settlement cycle and facilitating monetary
policy and control. In 1991, the National Clearing House (NCH) company was
appointed. Alongside the central bank, the clearinghouse became responsible for the
payment system design and operations. The primary responsibility for the system
regulation and supervision, however, remained at the National Bank of Poland. After
two years of preparation, in 1992, the first concrete measures were initiated and the
NCH was given the task of developing two clearing systems, one for paper and one for
electronic payments, both with net settlement. The latter started operation in 1994.
In 1993, the bank accounts were consolidated at the central bank - centrally
instead of at its 49 branches as before. Thus, interbank settlement at the central bank
started. Meanwhile a need for RTGS system has been recognised and the settlement
system at the central bank is being gradually improved to function in real-time.
Therefore, the payment operations are effected through the three systems: a) "SYBIR" —
paper-based DNS clearing system, operated by the NCH 16 b) "ELIXIR" — electronic
clearing system, also operated by the NCH, and c) "SORBNET" — large-value interbank
I6 The NCH processing is DNS and the system is owned jointly by the central bank and commercial banks
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settlement system, operated by the central bank. In addition, since mid 1995, the central
bank processes and settles government bills transactions through its automated delivery-
versus-payment, book-entry, system — "SKARBNET". Electronic credit transfers are still
insignificant and account for about five percent of both value and volume of total
payments. Large-value payments are now typically cleared within one to three days.
The price of payment services is subsidised, i.e. the participants do not bear the full
costs of the services.
Initially, it seems, the objective of the reform was not clearly defined. In eight
years there has been several changes in strategies, designs, objectives and systems. This
partly reflects the conflict of interest existing between customers, banks and central
bank, as well as legal impediments. The slow start and delays were also a consequence
of lack of resources and adequate skills. As the Polish case illustrates, a quest for quick
results does not favour the execution of the reform and is usually expensive since much
work turns out to be unnecessary. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be concluded that
a clear vision and strategy can certainly minimise both the time and resources required
for a new payment system implementation and reduce the need for constant changes
and conflict among different stakeholders.
Russia
In Russia and the former Soviet Union there was only one bank until 1989. It
was the State Bank of the USSR, which was responsible for money and funds
distribution, tax collection, credit distribution as well as for keeping all the accounts and
making all settlements in the economy. When the financial system reforms started in
Russia in the late eighties, as many as 2,500 commercial banks mushroomed to fill the
gap in the banking system. It, however, did not create substantial payment and
settlement difficulties initially. As the banks had no branches and each of them operated
in just its respective region (except for the Savings Bank), where they held the accounts
at the one of the 80 regional branches of the central bank, the payment operations were
settled locally. The payments were in paper form and mostly regional and, thus,
bilateral.
Although simple, the payments took up to several weeks to clear. The banks
then discovered the potential benefits of free float that resulted from long payment
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delays and rudimentary payment system. The image of the inefficient payment system
was used as an excuse for banks to hold free money. The delays became even longer. In
response, the central bank established the system of Cash and Settlement Centres (CSC)
and made it compulsory for banks and their branches to pay through the centres. This
resulted in a shorter clearing cycle that is by law limited to five days (after that the
centres pay penalty rates for delays). The clearing was still mostly regional as poor
telecommunications and computer networks prevented both fast and truly nation-wide
electronic payments. The establishment of the paper-based payment system has been
followed by an incremental introduction of electronic payments with the ultimate aim of
creating a national centralised RTGS system.
The process, however, is burdened with many problems and considerations and,
as in China, is a substantial undertaking. Vast distances, eleven time zones, remote
scarcely populated places, poor telecommunications networks, lack of interbank
communication system and an inability of some customers to initiate payment orders in
an electronic form are the obvious ones 17 . Also, the costs of transferring data are high as
a consequence of both high demand and poor infrastructure that requires state-of-the-art
solutions. As there is a demand for improvements, not only because the central bank
pays huge penalty rates for clearing delays, there is no time to wait for improvements in
the overall telecommunications infrastructure. Thus, the central bank has started
building its own "VSAT" network, based on satellite technology. The first satellite,
owned by the central bank, was launched in late 1997 and should start operations in late
1998/8.
There are, however, certain changes that need to accompany the reform of the
system to start operating efficiently. Firstly, the legal framework is inadequate for
electronic payments, and the authenticity of electronic documents is currently hard to
prove in courts. Secondly, operating procedures need to be aligned with electronic
payments as they are designed for paper-based payments. Thirdly, the computer
infrastructure of the central bank needs to be improved. And fourthly, there is a problem
17 Even in the European part of Russia there are very few reliable terrestrial telecommunication lines and, for
example, in the places that can be reached only by plane or helicopters, a storm may result in these places being cut
off for several weeks.
18 Another satellite (planned to be launched in 1999) is needed for full coverage of the territory. The central bank has
also signed the contract to buy necessary bandwidth on IntelSat satellite and use it as back up capacity.
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of excess employees coupled with a lack of skilled staff. Moreover, the changes are
opposed within the central bank's system from both employees and some managers.
The Russian payment system reform provides certain lessons, and raises a few
questions.
• First, the Russian case is a good example of when and why a central bank can take
the leadership in payment systems development and provision. It seems that the
banks do not trust the central bank's announcements and policy consistency, i.e. the
credibility of central bank is seriously undermined. On the other hand, the central
bank does not trust the banks to be capable of implementing socially optimal
solutions. Furthermore, the bottom-up approach has failed in Russia and banks
showed hostility towards each other and no willingness to co-operate. Moreover,
there is lack of financial discipline, an immature banking system, and financial and
debt crises in the country. According to the central bank and foreign observers, the
banks have shown no risk awareness. Regardless of whether some of this is of the
central bank's own making or not, in those circumstances one may argue the case
for more formal involvement and a regulatory rather than co-operative route.
• Second, notwithstanding the above mentioned circumstances, there are the questions
of: a) the right balance of the central bank's involvement and private initiative
(especially regarding the potential retardation of market forces), b) costs, i.e. use of
public funds and deciding on priorities, and c) measure of involvement of the central
bank in retail payments system development. In general, can some of the objectives
relating to trust, discipline and risk reduction be achieved through proper regulation
and/or supervision instead of operational involvement and huge investing? These
issues are particularly sensitive when a market-based financial system is in its
infancy.
• Third, the decentralised system with different standards in its 90 clearing centres
(some gross, some net, some RTGS); regionalism and strong autonomy tendencies
of the regions; accompanied by the popular preference/inertia for centralised
services provision, have all contributed to the choice of centralised, nation-wide,
RTGS system by the policy-makers. However, in terms of costs, potential
bottlenecks, mistakes, overuse of capacity and system breakdowns, it might have
been more effective to implement a so-called 'interlinking' solution as for EU
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TARGET, whereby a particular local RTGS system could be located not on a
regional but, for example, time-zone basis. In light of the current practice, for
example, with 90 percent of payment orders being sent just before the closing time
for payments, the technical robustness of the centralised system will be put to the
test sooner rather than later.
Slovak Republic
The National Bank of Slovakia is responsible by law for payment system co-
ordination, integrity and effectiveness. The central bank is the majority shareholder in
the Slovak's National Clearing Centre (SNCC), an automated clearinghouse, which
provides settlement services for all payments 19 . The clearing is gross but the settlement
is not real-time. There are about thirty banks participating in the system and Bratislava
Stock Exchange and Authorisation Centre of Slovakia (card payments clearing
company) as indirect participants. The transactions processed by the system are either
credit transfers or debit orders (collections). There is no discrimination between large
and small payments. The system also clears cheques.
The system works on a 24-hour operating cycle and participants can send and
receive payments for 21 hours while the remaining time is reserved for necessary
processing and system maintenance. The final settlement takes at most t+3 days. The
system processes 560,000 transactions on average a day and on peak days up to one
million transactions. The average value of a payment order is about 250,000 Slovak
Kronas. Since 1993 the average annual growth rate of the payment orders volume is
about 20 percent. Approximately 110 million transactions were processed in 1997.
The payments are cleared on a gross basis, meaning that only if there are
sufficient funds available to cover payments can the orders be executed. Otherwise, the
payment orders are placed in a queue until sufficient liquidity has been achieved. The
payments are processed on FIFO principle or rejected at the end of the day depending
on funds availability. Banks are required to keep minimal balances on their settlement
19 The Centre is jointly owned by the central bank, commercial banks and the ministry of finance, with the central
banks owning 40 percent of the shares.
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accounts that are equal to required reserves balances held at the central bank20. Banks
can monitor their balances either electronically by using an interbank communication
system or by telephone. The sources of additional liquidity available to banks are the
interbank money market and sale of eligible securities to the central bank as part of the
bank's open market operations.
There are a couple of points about the Slovak payment system that may indicate
a non-optimal system design.
• First, one may wonder why there is a gap between clearing and settlement (instant
clearing if funds are available versus three-day settlement)? According to the central
bank information, and given the fact that the payment orders are checked for
available funds each time, it is not a matter of technology, even though the
technology may need to be improved. It leaves the payment system
design/procedures and legal arrangements exposed to criticism. There are certainly
risks and costs that arise from the gap and the queuing arrangements. These relate to
possible gridlock and an inability of the system participants to rely on incoming
cleared payment orders.
• Second, it seems that the system functions at its peak capacity (over 400,000
payments a day initially envisaged) and that the capacities are not used rationally.
There is the practice to stop clearing day to process high priority orders instead of
differentiating between LVTS and SVTS during the regular clearing hours.
Slovenia
Slovenia has the same payment system background as Croatia and FR
Yugoslavia. The payment operations are handled by the Payments Agency directly,
without the banks' 'intermediation'. The system functions as an end-of-day gross
settlement system. Paper-based credit transfers dominate the system and account for
about one half of the total volume of processed payments and over 90 percent of the
payments value.
20 The settlement accounts mirror banks reserve accounts. The former are held at the clearinghouse and the latter at
the central bank. Therefore, the accounts at the clearinghouse are only provisional 'technical' accounts linked to the
real settlement accounts at central bank.
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The reforms are aimed at transferring the banks' accounts at the central bank
and making banks the main payment services providers. However, not all banks will
participate as the large-value payment services providers. An RTGS settlement of
interbank payments is to start soon, after extensive preparations. Also, progress has
been made in the area of subsystems of low-value payments' clearing, transfer of
companies' accounts to banks, public finance and tax collection and changes in
payment statistics.
Coincidence or not, the Slovenian payment system reforms and system design
resemble those of Croatia and Yugoslavia. The analysis will focus on advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed systems. The main remarks about the Croatian payment
system also hold true in the Slovenian case. Some of the payment system design aspects
are analysed further in the analytical chapter on the Yugoslav payment system.
What is different, however, is the state of these economies and their financial
systems in particular. Thus, Slovenia has a more favourable macroeconomic
environment and political stability than other former Yugoslav republics. Also, Slovenia
is a small monetary economy both in terms of territory and population and its payment
system reform may be a much smoother undertaking as compared to some other
countries.
On the other hand, what may test the efficient functioning of the new system is
low private ownership both in banks and the economy as a whole and a possible
continuation of the 'good-old' relationship between the 'social' sector and non-
privatised banks. Moreover, there are restrictions on foreign banks' participation and
foreign investments, as compared to the other advanced transitional economies, which
may mean reduced pressure on financial institutions to compete and function efficiently.
However, notwithstanding the pressures on Slovenia to privatise and relax the
capital flow regulation by foreign investors and institutions, as well as the potential
risks of non-privatised banking sector, the policy makers seems to have done a good job
so far. Slovenia was able to control the influence of capital flows on domestic inflation
and liquidity, alleviate the effect of the international emerging markets crisis, and carry
on with the reforms. Nonetheless, the policy makers are faced with a choice of selecting
an adequate policy for the future in relation to Slovenia's aspirations towards joining
the EU and its competitiveness in the international capital host market.
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Box 5-1 Overview of the payment system developments in select group of CIT
Bulgaria China Croatia
•	 Strategic	 approach	 to	 the
payment	 system	 reform,
aimed at establishing RTGS
system from the outset of the
reforms. Late start though.
•	 System operated jointly by
central bank and commercial
banks,
•	 The economic instability and
banking	 and	 legal	 system
infrastructure are the major
impediments to the reform.
•	 Incremental changes aimed
at	 improving	 speed	 and
choice. Sluggish progress.
•	 Centralised	 approach
towards	 establishing	 an
RTGS system for large-value
payments and an electronic
netting	 system	 for	 retail
payments by the year 2000.
•	 Payment float and lags are
still substantial,
•	 Large-value	 payments
operated	 by	 the	 Payment
Agency on a net settlement
basis. No bank participation.
•	 Aims of the reforms are to
transfer	 the	 large-value
payments	 at central	 banks
books and establish an RTGS
system by I-Q 1999.
•	 Dominant state ownership of
the banks. No changes in the
banks' management structure
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
•	 Established (RT)GS system.
•	 Leading role of the central
bank.	 It	 also	 regulates
payment system and keeps
banks settlement accounts.
•	 No	 overdrafts	 permitted;
queuing arrangements.
•	 Obligatory	 participation	 of
all commercial banks,
•	 Delays	 and	 risks	 in	 the
payment	 system	 are	 the
banking system borne.
•	 Bilateral interbank settlement
dominante.	 Multilateral
netting	 at	 central	 bank
accounts	 for	 only	 1/3	 of
payments.
•	 No distinction between inter-
bank	 and	 retail	 payment
orders	 processed	 by	 the
central system.
•	 Aiming towards an RTGS
system for LVTS by the end
of 2000.
•	 Deferred	 gross	 settlement.
End-or-day	 settlement	 but
'good-funds'	 required	 prior
to payment orders. Queuing
facilities offered.
•	 Took long time to develop.
•	 Ambiguities regarding small
value	 and	 large	 value
payments;	 and	 liquidity
provision and risk reduction.
•	 Project to develop an RTGS
system.
Lithuania Poland Russia
•	 Designated	 time	 settlement
through	 the	 banks'
correspondent accounts with
the	 central	 bank.	 Twice
daily. No daylight overdrafts,
Queuing optimisation.
•	 Participation ambiguities.
•	 No	 on-line	 liquidity
monitoring by the banks.
•	 Use of open public network,
PCs	 and	 e-mails raise the
questions of the security,
•	 No	 clear	 strategy	 and/or
consensus among the stake-
holders	 resulted	 in	 long
delays and inefficiencies in
the new system design and
functioning.
•	 Reliance	 on	 manual
processing and use of fax and
telex.
•	 Towards the establishment of
an RTGS system, with no
queuing or guarantees.
•	 Decentralised	 system,	 long
delays and poor discipline.
Some 90 settlement systems
across	 the	 country.	 No
standardisation.
•	 Poor	 regulation	 and
supervision.
•	 No risk sensitivity at banks.
•	 Efforts	 towards	 centralised
orders	 processing	 versus
poor technical infrastructure
and vast distances.
Slovakia Slovenia Yugoslavia
•	 Single	 clearing	 centre	 —
independent legal entity; but
central	 bank is	 a majority
shareholder.
•	 Gross clearing with queuing
arrangements.	 Long
settlement.
•	 Use	 of	 capacities	 can	 be
rationalised.
•	 Aim to establish an RTGS in
order to get connected with
TARGET.
•	 The same payment system's
background as for Croatia
and Yugoslavia.
•	 Extensive work towards the
establishment of an RTGS,
including	 improvements	 in
payments standardisation and
statistics.
•	 Aim to connect to TARGET.
•	 Sound	 economic	 and
financial fundamentals.
•	 Low private ownership.
•	 The same payment system
past	 and	 plans	 towards
establishing	 an	 RTGS
systems as in Croatia and
Slovenia.
•	 Many	 postponements	 and
delays in the new payment
system
	 implementation
reflect lack of consensus and
unstable	 economic	 and
political environment.
•	 Non-reformed banking.
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5.5. Payment system and monetary policy in C1T
5.5.1.	 Introduction
The experience of transitional countries with the payment system reforms
provide illustrative examples of both positive and negative influences that payment
system and monetary policy and control have on each other. As a rule, payment system
changes were initiated to support new monetary policy and banking system platforms.
However, the payment systems and monetary policies were not always compatible or
without frictions.
The 'conflict' was a reflection of one of the following factors or their
combination:
1. Lack of payment system reform to support monetary policy reform or measures.
2. Lack of a payment system development strategy.
3. Lack of control over the payment system by the monetary authorities.
4. Lack of consistency in monetary policy measures and/or turbulent macroeconomic
environment.
5. Lack of understanding of how the payment system influences or complements
monetary policy and vice versa.
6. Lack of consensus or minimal co-operation between parties involved and/or
political will to carry out the reforms.
7. Lack of resources and/or necessary skills for payment system development and
operations.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the influence of payment system on monetary policy,
and vice versa, is either from the money supply or money demand side and it manifests
itself through:
• Demand for settlement reserves by banks and resulting systemic risk and liquidity
provision considerations.
• Positive or negative payment float.
• Speed and reliability of transfer of monetary claims.
• Choice of monetary operations instruments dependant on payment technology.
• Potential 'spill-over' of intraday credits for payments into overnight borrowings and
ability of monetary authorities to control it.
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Against this framework, the payment system reforms in the transitional
countries are analysed next. An overview of the findings is given in tables 5-8 and 5-9
in section 5.6.2.
5.5.2.	 Country case studies
Bulgaria
Bulgarian economic reforms, aimed at transition towards market-economy, were
characterised by inconsistent macroeconomic polices and delays. The industry,
especially manufacturers and exporters, were slow to adjust to the new economic reality
and the loss of 'eastern-block' markets. The privatisation of state-owned enterprises, as
well as banks, was partial, slow and was missing the political will to support it. Poor
performance of the economy and banks' lending decisions were reflected in the banks'
balance sheets, where the bad debts resulted in liquidity crisis that became insolvency
crisis and finally resulted in runs on banks in 1996. The loss of confidence in banks was
accompanied by high inflation and a substantial currency devaluation.
At the same time, the central bank was trying to accommodate the demand for
additional liquidity but, as the credits were not covered by collateral, the proportion of
unsound financial assets at the banks only increased. The non-privatised banks expected
and asked for credits from the state — the owner, and the central bank was there to
provide. The money was then poured back into loss-making state-owned enterprises but
they were unable to put it to good use but used it for life-saving 'one-off infusion(s) to
pay out the wages and produce more non-selling goods. The financial authorities had
also resorted to bailing-out distressed banks, but the interventions resulted in
perpetuation of the problems. Thus, a systemic risk became a moral hazard problem,
which became a systemic crisis.
According to the central bank, open market operations and the setting of basic
interest rates have become main monetary policy instruments since 1994. But, as the
central bank's policy was ineffective in stopping the inflation, the interest rates were
inflation led and were getting higher and higher. The high interest rates did not
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compensate nor stimulate savings, because of the high inflation and inflation
expectations, but made it harder for debtors to service the debts.
How does the payment system fit into all this? Almost all of the previously
mentioned generic factors exercised their influence on the relationship between the
monetary policy and payment system in Bulgaria from 1991 to 1997. As the
introduction of the new payment system started only after the full impact of the
financial crisis was over, there was no adequate payment system to support the
monetary policy based on interest rate setting. Without an effective payment system
there was no efficient interbank money market and fast distribution of money to reduce
pressure on the central bank as well as to enable better liquidity management and
investment opportunities. On the other hand the monetary policy and economic
environment would not have been a match even for the latest payment system
technology, as the crisis was deeply rooted in the financial system itself.
In summary, the relationship between the payment system and monetary policy
in Bulgaria from 1990 to 1997 was manifested through the following:
• First, the demand for settlement reserves was blurred by the demand for liquidity
and actual insolvency. They were blended together and there were no procedures,
or payment system for that matter, to discriminate between the two.
• Second, the actual debt-servicing difficulties and illiqudity were thus
indistinguishable from payment delays. Also, payment system inefficiencies could
easily hide behind the overall economic depression.
• Third, the payment system was inadequate to support the new monetary policy
instruments as it was not quick or reliable enough. In the given circumstances,
effective and efficient interbank lending was also impossible without a state-of-the-
art payment system.
• Fourth, the Bulgarian case vividly illustrates the place and importance of a payment
system in a monetary economy. There is no use of high precision electronic tools
(say the latest payment system technology) in mending simple mechanical
instruments (ineffective monetary policy). A good tool cannot compensate for poor
maintenance or unskilful use of the instrument or for an inadequate instrument.
Furthermore, a bad tool is a bad tool, no matter the instrument.
156
The Payment Systems Reforms	 Countries in Transition
China
A decentralised organisational structure of approximately 2200 central banks'
local clearing houses, three-level hierarchical intrabank clearing and mainly paper-
based payment instruments and processing procedures have all resulted in an extremely
large and variable payment float in the Chinese system. The net positions of bank's
branches and local clearing houses were settled only periodically — after one to five
days. Moreover, the payments were being finally settled at the central bank's books
only once a month. The central bank did not provide intraday overdraft facilities but
there is a central bank's guarantee in case of settlement failure.
The new, satellite-technology based, system that should go live by the next
millennium provides for faster electronic clearing of payments and more centralised
processing procedures. Thus, the system will no longer differentiate national from local
payments and inter-bank from intra-bank payments. Given the high level of required
reserves and the absence of a mature money market, the central bank intends to provide
intraday credit to the participants in the system. The overdrafts will be acceptable within
a given limit, but no 'spill-over' into overnight borrowing will be allowed. The central
bank will charge for the credit. Also the banks' and branches' accounts will be
consolidated into just one settlement account at the local clearinghouse for each bank.
From the monetary policy perspective, there are a few illustrative observations
for both 'old' and 'new' payment systems.
• Firstly, in the current system there is a clear conflict between efficient, market
oriented banking system functioning and long payment delays and a large float. It
could be argued that the real competition in banking and liberalisation of the
financial system are still missing and that these are the main obstacles for the
efficient banking system. However, an inefficient payment system prevents both
inter-regional banking competition and active liquidity management of profit
oriented banks. On the other hand, monetary policy has to be able to reduce and to
control the amount of float, which becomes a more serious matter in a market
oriented competitive environment. In a monobanking financial system, with
accounting instead of payment flows, the float may not matter significantly but in a
market-oriented system it is certainly an issue. The main 'technical' problem may
157
The Payment Systems Reforms	 Countries in Transition
be that the new electronic Intrabank' system is procedurally and organisationally
just the electronic version of the old 'paper-based' system.
• Secondly, the regional banking and clearing structure, as well as the decentralised
banks' accounts make banking supervision more difficult. Financial discipline and
particularly monetary policy effectiveness suffer form the segmented and
complicated organisational structure. Financial institutions cannot manage their
daily liquidity effectively as the autonomous flows from local branches may
contradict the bank's overall cash flow/reserves position. This increases the
pressure and dependence on the central bank's provision of liquidity and, thus,
payment risks. Centralised electronic payment systems and consolidated bank
accounts are likely to change that and contribute to the financial system upgrade.
• Thirdly, given the banking system structure with only four major players who have
their 'in-house' national clearing on a net basis, the central bank would not have as
much control over the payment flows as it would like to should the banks become
more independent. It has been estimated that about 2/3 of non-local payments
volume is cleared through the clearing systems of the respective banks. Therefore,
the considerations include whether the banks will become independent systems
within the system and will the central bank have the power and the skills to prevent
monopolistic tendencies and preserve financial discipline. In the case of non-
competitive oligopoly in an immature banking system, it may be difficult for the
central bank to carry out consistent and effective monetary policy and to be free of
the influence of major players (not to give in under 'systemic risk' liquidity
requirements from banks). Moreover, banks may have no incentive to speed up the
payments and reduce free float. These issues will be a considerable threat to the
central bank's authority if the loosening of the Bank's grip and more liberalised
financial arrangements in the system are not accompanied with the encouragement
of competition and effective supervision and surveillance.
• Fourthly, the central bank's provision of liquidity in the new systems, i.e. guarantee
of payments may induce a 'moral hazard' problem because of the strength of the
major banks. Thus, unless there is timely and effective supervision of banks, the
caps on intra-day borrowings and fees for credits may be inadequate measures to
prevent 'spill-over' into 'inter-day' credits.
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In conclusion, it seems that in the new Chinese payment and monetary system,
the relationship between the central bank and the commercial banks as well as the
effective supervision and surveillance are key to efficient, risk-less, payment flows.
Croatia
In former Yugoslavia, and in almost all of the newly formed states after their
independence, the payment system was a separate organisational and functional entity,
independent from the banks and the central bank. Thus, the former Social Accountancy
Service21 , and newly re-named agencies and clearinghouses that were created from its
operational units in the respective republics, had control over payment float and were
able to create 'quasi-deposits'. Although non-deposit institutions, the clearinghouses
held (giro) accounts for all enterprises and banks for payment purposes and were able to
prioritise between the payments of different parties and decide on the speed of payment
orders processing. The services provision monopoly and close ties with local
governments, for which they collected taxes, made the clearinghouses (before the
break-up of the country and the Service itself) even more detached from the central
bank and commercial banks.
Just before the break-up of former Yugoslavia, the regional clearinghouses of
some republics were caught red-handed when they started creating autonomous
monetary flows, i.e. granting liquidity and effecting payments not covered by their
customers giro account balances. It is assumed that the created revenues were
transferred to the republic's budgets for whatever purposes. The central bank at the time
was thus surpassed as a money-creating authority and was forced in some cases to sell
foreign currency reserves in exchange for the newly created money because of the
internal convertibility of the currency at the time.
In the newly formed states — including Croatia, as the both central banks and the
clearinghouses were under direct control of the respective governments, the monetary
authorities were finally put in charge of the payment and monetary systems. Thus, in
Croatia, the payment system is being reformed in line with the reform of the monetary
and banking systems, whereby the central bank holds the settlement accounts and
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controls monetary flows and commercial banks are the main payment services
providers.
However, the queuing facilities in the new RTGS system and bimodal processing
of queuing orders, as discussed in section 5.4.2, can, under certain circumstances create
gridlock and/or enhance liquidity risk. Therefore, the system may resemble a DNS
rather than an RTGS system, hence different monetary policy considerations. The issue
is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
In summary, the case of former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, illustrates
the importance of payment system and monetary policy co-ordination and of
determining the ultimate authority for both. It is also an example of payment system
potency and importance, as recognised by the policy makers in the respective former-
Yugoslav republics both now and in the past.
Czech Republic
The Czech National Bank owns and operates the only, national, LVTS
settlement system. It is also involved in retail payment systems development and
cheques clearing. In addition, the central bank took the leadership in E-money
institutional framework establishment and debate. The Czech Payment system reform is
an example of timelines and strategy and central bank's leadership and involvement,
and consequentially monetary policy co-ordination. The reform was a part of a thorough
restructuring of the economy as a whole.
However, the reforms, and overall financial system, were not problem-free.
• First, there are the questions of measuring the central bank's involvement, type of
involvement, and the scope of involvement. Apart from the immediate cost-
effectiveness implications on public finances, the central bank's involvement raises
a range of long-term policy implication issues. These include private markets
development and competition, as well as the private initiative. Also, would the
separation of supervision and operational involvement in the payment system
benefit the Czech banking system in terms of human and financial resources
allocation across the system? When is the right time to pull back from the
21 SDK for short in Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian/Macedonian.
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operational involvement and supervise, and when is the time right to limit the
central bank's involvement? An illustrative example of potentially negative
consequences of the central bank's involvement is the E-money initiative. The
provisional rules and policy guidelines, that approach the issue from the risk-to-the-
central-bank point of view, may kill the E-money schemes before they even started
in The Czech republic.
• Second, the five largest, still predominantly state owned, problem, banks account
for 90% of payments volume and value. The situation exaggerates potential
gridlock and moral hazard or systemic risk problems, i.e. there is a threat that a
crisis in the banking system can both spread fast through the payment system and
affect the payment system functioning. The banking and financial system problems
reflected, inter alia, in a shortage of liquidity, put the payment system and monetary
policy consistency at test each time there are no sufficient funds for a large-value
payment execution. Furthermore, a concentrated system (with, say, a few dominant
large banks) with an underdeveloped money market and non-restructured banking
system, allows banks with a larger market share to drain the liquidity from the
system and/or obtain the funds easier than the other banks. Thus, for example, there
may be a situation whereby insolvent but liquid banks are the pivots of a payment
system. The sooner the future of the institutions and policy actions regarding the
issues become transparent the better.
• Third, the Czech `RTGS' payment system still cannot claim the Real-Time in its
name as the payment orders are not cleared or settled in 'real-time'. A gradual on-
line connection of banks to the system is nonetheless progressing. In addition, one
may argue that the queuing and payment monitoring arrangements make the system
less RTGS than the policy makers have made provisions for. As there are different
priority levels assigned to each payment order and on-line payment monitoring by
the banks, the system can be affected by similar risks as a DNS system. Namely, a
party may rely on incoming payments and send a payment order in a queue to be
settled when the incoming payment arrives. Although the central bank has been
careful not to assume these risks itself, the banking system characteristics and
potential systemic crisis may force it to do so eventually.
161
The Payment Systems Reforms 	 Countries in Transition
Estonia
Since the 1992 monetary reform, monetary policy in Estonia has been based on
the currency board system whereby the "Estonian Kroon" is pegged to German Mark.
The domestic currency is freely convertible and the exchange rate can only be changed
by the approval of the Parliament. Therefore, the money in circulation has to be fully
backed by foreign currency reserves. The principle holds not only for the base money
but all Eesti Pank's liabilities and guarantees provided. Thus, the use of other monetary
policy instruments, including short-term interest rates, is limited. Under the
circumstances the credit institutions' liquidity management is effected through their
foreign-exchange reserves. In turn, the central bank's monetary policy is almost entirely
effected through the "forex" market. However, in order to minimise the effect of
international capital flow risks on system liquidity, the central bank introduced
additional measures to strengthen the domestic 'liquidity buffers'.
The most significant step in that direction was made in mid 1996, when reserve
requirements were allowed to be used for payment purposes. Moreover, the central
bank pays interest on excess reserves (over minimum required reserves). The other
liquidity buffer was the inter-bank money market, which, however, has had a limited
impact on the system's liquidity. The banks found it hard to rely on the highly volatile
market that is also dependent on the overall liquidity position of the market determined
by external reserve fluctuations. In late 1997, the central bank enforced a provisional
additional liquidity requirement, which was 3 percent of the reserve requirement base.
Also, the interest paid on excess reserves was increased to be equal to The German
Bundesbank's discount rate.
The introduction of the Estonian monetary policy framework has had specific
payment system implications. The potential and real influences of the payment system
on the monetary system in such circumstances are also evident.
• First, the currency board arrangements determined the choice and use of monetary
policy instruments. As the system's liquidity depended on foreign exchange reserve
balances and transactions, the banking system's liquidity management was
constrained to the forex market. Great fluctuations in overall liquidity, due to the
mobility of capital and system arrangements, also shifted the responsibility for
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liquidity management to the financial intermediaries. Under the circumstances, from
the banks' point of view, the deferred net settlement system provided an optimal
payment system solution regarding the liquidity provision and smooth functioning
of the system. Thus, the fixed foreign exchange rate and currency board catered for
low inflation and interest rates, and the DNS system contributed to the reduced need
for liquidity/reserves.
• Second, from the system point of view, the DNS system, as well as the monetary
policy measure to allow the balance of deposited funds over borrowed funds with
foreign institutions to count towards banks' reserves, made the system exposed to
both liquidity and credit risks. The settlement uncertainties and possible unwinding
are the price to pay for 'increased liquidity' provided through a DNS system, even
more so when the system is not adequately protected.
• Third, the currency board arrangement increases the probability of a run on local
currency in case of both internal and external disturbances to the system. Reliance
on external liquidity makes the system prone to the attack of speculators. Also, as
the central bank cannot manipulate interest rates effectively it cannot create a credit
crunch in order to deter the speculators. In the system dependent on the level of
foreign currency reserves in such a way, all is well while the confidence and other
macroeconomic indicators are favourable to the system. However, if the table is
turned, the impact of capital flight can be devastating for the immature banking
system, especially as the central bank has little space for manoeuvre. For example,
the loss of confidence in emerging markets as a whole in 1998 resulted in
substantial withdrawals of investors from the local market.
• Fourth, there were other payment and monetary policy arrangements that provided a
counterbalance to the threats. The central bank did not provide the intraday credit
for payments that can be potentially used for an attack on the currency. Also, the
required reserves regulations contributed towards liquidity management for
payments in the immature banking system. Furthermore, the central bank paid
interest on reserves, thus preventing reserve requirements evasion and stimulating
creation of the liquidity buffer. What was ambiguous, however, was charging a
penalty for the use of reserves for payment purposes during a period of system
reforms. Moreover, it is unclear whether the policy makers have accounted for the
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potential influence of the sale of eligible assets, namely central bank's certificate of
deposits, in case of currency attack, as there are no 'haircuts' on the securities.
Hungary
In line with the leading role of the central bank in the payment system reform,
was the formal oversight policy and risk reduction measures implemented by the central
bank. The central bank does not provide liquidity nor guarantee for payments and thus
has no risk exposure. The additional liquidity is available for pledged securities at the
central depository institution, i.e. the overdrafts are `collateralised'.
Nonetheless, for a long period since the reform started, the Hungarian payment
system arrangements did not take payment system risks and costs into account.
Firstly, although the payee banks have the information on payments pending in
the queue, they cannot assume that the payments will be settled. Thus, even though the
clearing is on a gross basis, which is supposed to eliminate the credit risk, the system is
prone to the creation of liquidity, and consequently credit, risks because of the deferred
settlement system with little additional risk provisions.
Secondly, also related to the settlement arrangements, the FIFO processing of
payment orders was clearly prone to gridlock, not less so because there was no intraday
liquidity credit facility. Furthermore, as the payment limits are set at the beginning of
the day, based on the amount of reserves, the participants had to rely on overnight
borrowing for payment purposes and had no intraday flexibility in raising additional
liquidity.
Thirdly, the cost of reserve requirements and gross settlement that the banks
incurred in the system with no efficient money market were, thus, not fully appreciated
by the central bank.
In summary, settlement delay - gridlock and a possibility of 'unwinding' can
occur in a 'gross' system if the settlement is not immediate, i.e. real-time. The
combination of deferred settlement and full cover for payment orders (gross clearing),
denies the participants the advantages of both reduced liquidity requirements of a net
clearing system and elimination of credit risk in a gross settlement system. It may be
good as a temporary measure aimed at introducing financial discipline but is certainly
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unsuitable for advanced clearing and settlement in an economy. The gap created,
coupled with the non-discrimination between transactions, complicates the liquidity
management of the participants and the functioning of the system. Also, in view of the
inadequate queuing arrangements, an ambiguous, hybrid, payment system cannot be
treated as a tailor-made solution.
Some of the mistakes, however, were made due to the lack of precedents and
consensus on the system design in the payment system theory and practice at the time
when the reforms started. Furthermore, the existing system technology can be
transformed so that the new system is not built from scratch, there are established rules
and disciplines in the system and the reform as whole can be viewed as a natural
progression and a learning process.
Lithuania
As in Estonia, the currency board was resorted to as a monetary policy anchor in
Lithuania. The Lithuanian policy makers, however, came to view the 'anchor'
arrangements as something that holds them back from pursuing more adequate, up-to-
date, monetary policy and from 'sailing' towards the EU harbour. The changes
introduced in 1997, however, have had to be gradual, because the policy has been
associated with low inflation, stable macroeconomic conditions, and confidence in the
system.
The main points about the Estonian reforms apply to the Lithuanian case too.
Thus, among other things, commercial banks were required to keep required reserves at
the bank of Lithuania22 which provided necessary liquidity management flexibility into
the system.
Nonetheless, the constraints of the currency board arrangements became evident
during the banking system crisis when the central bank was unable to help otherwise
solvent banks with the liquidity credits. Thus, according to the central bank, the crisis
spread from insolvent to illiquid but solvent banks. This, however, was due in part to
22 Estonia, for example has followed more rigid currency board arrangements, and introduced the 'liquidity buffer' at
a later stage of the reform.
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the lack of focus and separation between banking supervision and monetary policy
functions from the central bank's side.
The Lithuanian experience shows that: a) central bank's lender of last resort
function is invaluable in an immature (transitional) market in case of the systemic crisis
and b) there is a need for an additional liquidity facility other than interbank money
market. During the Lithuanian banking system crisis the money market stopped
functioning and there was a run on the banks. It is also evident that the banking system
supervision and surveillance were not up to the task and that there is a clear role for ex
ante policy measures and/or system arrangements. The payment system arrangements,
as described in section 5.4.2, only increased the risks without contributing to reducing
required liquidity for payments.
Poland
Payment system reform in Poland, part of broader monetary system reforms,
was aimed at increasing the reliability and speed of payments to support a market-
oriented monetary policy. The reforms, however, were far from frictionless and are
illustrative of the payment system and monetary policy relationship in a transitional
economy.
Firstly, as illustrated by frequent design changes and implementation delays,
there was no clear payment system development strategy and the payment system was
not up to the task of reducing payment float, uncertainties regarding timing and
execution of payments, i.e. supporting the reformed monetary policy.
Secondly, this was partly a reflection of a lack of understanding of the
relationship between the payment and monetary systems. The payment system risks and
inefficiencies only became an issue after the major payment frauds in 1991.
Thirdly, the incompatibility of monetary policy and the payment system during
the first few years of the reforms was also a consequence of a lack of adequate
resources and skills that needed to be accumulated first.
In terms of the influence that the payment system had on monetary policy, and
vice versa, the following characterises the Polish experience:
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• Before the reforms, and for some time into the reforms, there were the problems of
substantial and erratic payment float as well as the long and unreliable transfer of
monetary claims23 . According to the central bank, the transition to a two-tier
banking system transformed an internal float between the central bank's branches
into a float involving different institutions. Consequently, the technical difficulties
and the lack of competition between the newly formed state-owned banks resulted
in long payment delays. According to the IMF, the payment transactions took on
average about one to two weeks to be completed during the period 1990 to 1995.
The central bank's ability to control the float was further limited by the
decentralised organisational and accounts structure at the central bank.
• From the system/central bank's point of view, credit float exceeded the debit float,
i.e. on average the payee bank's account was debited before the payer bank's
account was credited. Therefore, the central bank held large values of funds on its
books. There were, however, both credit and debit floats present in the system. The
float was both large (about 10% of reserve money on average) and variable. The
central bank found it hard to set the size or the direction of appropriate monetary
operations because they were unable to forecast demand for bank reserves, money
and credit aggregates. Therefore, the liquidity risk was significant.
• The introduction of new payment system in 1994, resulted in a decrease of credit
float over debit float in the central bank/commercial banks relationship. The
increased liquidity, however, was not extended to the banks' customers and there
was an excess of credit float in the bank/customer relationship. The lack of
competition and, partly, inadequate regulatory framework enabled banks to benefit
from the free float.
• At the same time, the required reserves were set high at about 20 percent of the
eligible assets and banks were allowed to use them for payments. This, the
mentioned banking practice and the consequently increased speed of payments to a
few days, all resulted in excess liquidity of the banks. The banks were unable to put
the money to better use than to invest in government securities.
23 The float can be a result of payment lag but it is also a consequence of operational, i.e. accounting procedures.
They are particularly relevant in case of paper-based payments, when clearing is not real-time.
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In summary, both the payment system and monetary policy had a negative
influence on each other. The payment system arrangements, with dominant manual
procedures and the predominant use of fax and telex, prevented the central bank from
measuring the demand for settlement reserves and thus assessing the risks created by
the payment system. Also, the monetary policy could not rely on the system to transfer
the monetary claims in a fast and reliable fashion. Furthermore, the choice of monetary
policy instruments (especially indirect ones) i.e. their effectiveness was, therefore,
limited. On the other hand, it was a duty of the monetary authorities to set up the
framework and decide on what would they prefer the system to be like, especially as
they had authority over the payment system functioning. For example, the debiting and
crediting accounting practice, regulatory framework and system design were all under
the central bank's control. In addition, the central bank failed to control inflation,
which, for example, in 1996 exceeded 600 percent.
It is tempting to criticise the 'learning by mistakes' process. The costs of the
trial-and-error approach could have been mitigated by an adequate system development
strategy. However, as noted for Hungary, the countries that led the transition process
were prone to making the mistakes because of the gaps in the theory, lack of precedents
and, not least, lack of skills and resources.
Russia
The new fully centralised RTGS system will operate from 4a.m. till 8p.m.
Moscow time, in order to function in real-time in all eleven time zones. All the
participants will be able to check their accounts and make or receive payments. All the
payments will be treated as irrevocable and final. The intraday credit will be provided at
no charge but should be covered by collateral. Only the state bonds will be accepted for
the purpose. The intraday credit provision will be automatic upon pledging of the
securities, as the National Depository Centre and the settlement centre will be
connected on-line. The overall amount of daily liquidity and collateral will be set every
day in advance for the system as a whole. If a bank fails to pay back the credit at the
end of the day, the intraday credit will become a three-day credit with a penalty rate,
which is twice the bank's lending rate.
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The central bank should be given credit for the effort put into the establishment
of the new system and the strategic approach to the matter, even though the real quality
of the new system will only be tested once the system is fully operational. There are,
however, certain issues that seem likely to emerge in the day-to-day functioning of the
system and that may worry the monetary authorities.
Firstly, real-time gross settlement will put a pressure on banks for higher
reserves and/or better liquidity management, and thus may result in a high demand for
additional liquidity from the central bank, especially as the money market will take
some time to develop. Moreover, the current practice of late payment orders delivery to
the system (towards the end of the working day) is likely to continue because banks will
try to compensate for the loss of intraday incoming payments liquidity. The potential
gridlock situation may become a serious matter every time there is increased uncertainty
or macroeconomic turbulence (not an unlikely event in Russia), as any bank may fear
making the payments first 24 . Also there may be some technical difficulties in executing
the concentrated payment orders. These problems will require a) a policy aimed at
spreading out the payment orders during the day, say through pricing, b) firm and
timely supervision and surveillance, and c) probably a payment optimisation
mechanism25.
Secondly, because the overall amount of intraday liquidity available through the
pledge of collateral will be determined in advance and limited, some banks may drain
out all the liquidity for themselves. Auctions, for example, leave the possibility for
some large players to corner the market. Therefore, the immediate task is to set up a
policy or guidance for liquidity allocation. Possible criteria for the allocation range from
the bank's asset size to average payment values, but are potentially burdened with 'side-
effects', i.e. discretionary decisions or flexibility restraints.
Thirdly, as there is no charge for the intraday credit, the central bank should
consider the introduction and daily revision of 'hair-cuts' on the collateral to account
for potential fall in value of the securities. For example, the state bonds will be
significantly reduced in value in case of political and/or economic crisis, even more so
24 The system does not provide for a queuing mechanism and there is no guarantee of payment orders by the central
bank.
25 The options range, for example, from banks' internal queues or even a private DNS system to introduction of
centrally located queue.
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if the central bank wants to prevent inflation or preserve the value of the currency by
increasing the interest rates. Moreover, a bank's default is more probable in those
circumstances calling for a significant discount on the collateral in the turbulent
macroeconomic environment.
Fourthly, even though there will be stiff penalty rates charged for a spill-over of
intraday to interday borrowing, the central bank needs additional mechanisms to prevent
the possibility in case of the system crisis. Therefore, the role of supervision of financial
institutions is both significant and critical for the efficient payment system functioning.
Slovakia
The Slovak and Czech payment and banking systems share the same origins
and, thus, possess similar characteristics regarding the payment system and monetary
policy relationship. The most significant similarity is the banking system ownership and
the assets structure, i.e. the dominance of a few large state-owned banks in the system.
Therefore, as in the Czech Republic, the best share of the payment orders volume and
value is effected through these banks, which are affected by bad debt and X-inefficiency
problems. The bad debt problem genesis is similar to that of Bulgaria, only with less
severe consequences to date. According to the central bank, the share of non-performing
loans reached over 50 percent of the total banks' credits in 1995 and is still estimated to
exceed one third of the credits in 1998.
Therefore, the Slovak monetary authorities should also worry about a potential
banking system crisis spreading fast through the payment system and affecting the
system as whole as well as the liquidity and competition issues, as described for the
Czech Republic.
In addition to the bad debt problem, system concentration and related issues, a
similarly important factor was the lack of consistency in monetary policy and the
turbulent macroeconomic environment that characterised the system. Thus, monetary
policy was simultaneously pursuing two, to a large extent conflicting, goals — money
supply targeting and currency convertibility and a fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, the
proportion of autonomous money supply (beyond the central bank's control),
comprising of net foreign assets and net credits to the government, ranged from 90 to
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100 percent of the monetary base. The efforts towards sterilisation of the effect of
foreign capital inflows on the money supply were both expensive 26 and, to a large
extent, unsuccessful.
As noted for Estonia and Lithuania the influence of capital inflows and outflows
have different and serious implications on the monetary system and its relationship with
the payment system. Under the circumstances the payment system in Slovakia,
described in section 5.4.2, was open to liquidity, credit and systemic risks relating to the
institutional arrangements and legal constraints. This is partly a reflection of a lack of
understanding of the payment system/monetary policy relationship as well as lack of
skills and resources for developing technically advanced and unambiguous payment
system.
The similarities with other countries do not end there. The Hungarian payment
system was also organised on a gross clearing, batch processing, deferred settlement
basis. The remarks regarding the need for increased transparency, simplicity and
efficiency of the Hungarian system can be repeated for the Slovak system too.
Finally, as with some other Eastern European countries, Slovakia aims at
surrendering its monetary policy to the European Central Bank by becoming an EMU
member. This is, of course, coupled with the efforts towards developing a national
RTGS system.
Slovenia
Slovenia is an open and small monetary economy, prone to exogenous monetary
shocks. The ability of the Bank of Slovenia to regulate the exchange rate by sale and
purchase of foreign currency is certainly limited. With an excess supply of foreign
currency through the foreign investments, the central bank was only partly successful in
sterilising the effect of the capital inflows on inflation. Pursuit of a low inflation policy,
when successful, resulted in restrictive monetary policy and exchange rate appreciation.
Relative stability of the monetary system and not very high interest rates were only
possible because the central bank had strong indirect control over the state-owned
banks, which had a dominant market share. Also, there were restrictions on the foreign
26 The central bank had to issue and service its own bills at competitive rates.
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investments and foreign bank entrance. In light of the likely privatisation of the banking
sector, pressures for the liberalisation of capital flows and preparations for Slovenia to
join the EU, it is difficult to achieve both the desired level of interest rates and exchange
rate stability. For example, should exchange rate stability become a prime target of
monetary policy, interest rates are bound to increase.
In relation to the payment system, the monetary policy and banking system
settings in Slovenia illustrate the following issues.
• The central bank's control and involvement in the system as well as concentration
of different responsibilities in the central bank should be reviewed against:
a) the implication on the private sector initiative and development,
b) foreign investments in the banking system,
c) the preparations for joining the EU, and
d) the cost-effectiveness of the arrangements.
For example, the central banks' discretion in granting licences to foreign banks
was assessed (OECD 1997) as the most important factor in preventing foreign banks
from entering or investing in the market.
• Also, separation of supervision and monetary policy functions, i.e. the appointment
of another institution for the supervision of the system may be a viable and effective
option. This may both strengthen supervision, and help the preparations for joining
the EU. For example, the central bank would focus on the monetary policy and its
compliance with the requirements for entry into EMU, and the supervisory body
would be acting in line with the financial discipline and present and future banking
system stability, in line with the BIS requirements. Thus, the payment system would
be a) an explicit responsibility of the supervisory body and b) more integrated into
the monetary system through the potential reduction of payment risks and costs. If
the responsibility for Slovenian monetary policy is handed over to the European
Central Bank, the reward for the separation of the functions would be reaped.
• In light of the banking system concentration, ownership structure, bank/client
relations, as well as slow privatisation, there is certainly a threat of systemic risk
should the main players fail. As banks will become the main providers of the
payment services the payment system implications are evident. Political
considerations have slowed the privatisation and liberalisation processes in the
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banking sector, but as the processes may be 'externally' driven, completion of
banking system restructuring is a matter of urgency. A sound banking system, clear
of bad debts and political lending decisions, with effective ownership and
management structure, is the best guarantee of financial stability, a favourable
monetary policy environment and risk reduction in the payment system.
5.6. Payment systems in CIT - summary and conclusions
5.6.1.	 Institutional framework
There have been some achievements in the market-oriented banking and legal
systems developments in Cif. The telecommunication and computer infrastructures are
also improved. There is, however, plenty of room for improvement.
CIT still need to advance their banking and legal systems as well as the technical
infrastructure to support optimal payment system functioning in line with the public
policy requirements. The level of development of the three factors is significantly lower
than for industrial countries, and at par with the levels in developing countries. As the
latest payment system technology is increasingly becoming the only acceptable option
from the policy makers' point of view, the current institutional frameworks need to be
improved further. Development of a mature banking system practice and advanced
telecommunications certainly take time. The adequate legislation, although seemingly
easier to achieve, has also been lagging in implementation and efficiency.
5.6.2.	 Cash holdings and non-cash payment instruments
Cash holdings in transitional countries are high compared to the benchmarks
used for the analysis. Possible explanatory factors are the lack of efficient alternative
payment instruments, lack of trust in the banking systems, high inflation rates, black
market activities and tax evasion, and slow and unreliable payment systems. Therefore,
the properties of cash as a familiar, immediate, real-time settlement instrument, that
enables fast, reliable, certain, finite, non-recorded, transfers of monetary values, make
cash so attractive in CIT.
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Retail payment instruments other than cash still account for relatively small
volumes and values of transactions. Not all instruments are available to the majority of
customers. However, there has been some progress, especially in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic states.
5.6.3.	 The Payment Systems' Characteristics
The analysis has shown that the critical elements for successful of a payment
system reform are its compatibility and co-ordination with the monetary and banking
systems' restructuring. The central banks played and still play the lead-roles in the
respective systems and reforms. The reforms were all top-down initiated and
supervised.
The main characteristics of the CIT payment systems can be summarised as
follows:
• Great use and importance of cash; i.e. with regard to the retail payment systems'
characteristics and development, CIT can be characterised as "cash-economies".
• Use and importance of other payment instruments is low but increasing. The
exception has been money/postal orders, which, however, involves cash at one or
both ends of a payment transaction.
• Wholesale payment systems have been dominated by credit transfers due to the
'giro' nature of the systems, emphasis on inter-company payments, and provision of
the clearing services by a central national institution (either central bank or
clearinghouse). Paper-based credit orders are being replaced by electronic credit
orders.
• There is a definite trend towards establishing national RTGS systems. This is a
logical consequence of the central banks' engagements in the reforms. In European
CIT, especially those that plan to join the EU, the process is motivated further by
the 'convergence compliance', the preparations for the `interlinking' of the payment
systems with the TARGET.
• In general, because of the centralised payment provision function, credit based
payments - e.g. money orders and credit orders, traditionally dominated debit based
payment instruments (provided by credit institutions) - e.g. cheques and direct
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debits. In the past, this helped avoid the inefficiencies related to cheque payments
and helped the development of potentially faster giro-based payment systems. On
the other hand, this reduced further the importance of debt related financial
instruments, banks' initiative and involvement in the payment system and, thus, the
development of alternative instruments, competition and overall efficiency.
• Monetary policy considerations were the main motives for the payment system
reforms. Monetary policy and payment systems compatibility was, however, not
achieved in many cases.
• Given the `monobanking' past and monetary policy modernisation impetus and
concentration of power, skills and resources in the central banks, it came as no
surprise to find that the central banks initiated and led the payment system reforms.
The operational involvement of the central banks in payment systems is also
significant.
5.6.4. The payment system reforms
The payment systems reforms in the eleven transitional countries provide many
examples of and lessons on the reform process, potential obstacles, design choices and
the payment system/monetary policy relationship and other related issues. The
experiences are invaluable for transitional and other developing countries that have not
yet started or completed the reforms. This also refers to the analysed countries, which
can learn from their own reforms. In general, the eleven countries have made a
substantial progress in the payment systems development since the transition started but
their payment systems need to be improved further to satisfy the efficiency
requirements. Furthermore, the state and development of their banking and monetary
systems, which are still in transition, critically affect the payment system. The main
issues and findings of this part of the research are discussed further in the concluding
chapter (Chapter 8 — Conclusions and Recommendations).
175
Payment Systems Reforms	 The Y ugoslav Payment System
6. The Yugoslav payment system — exploratory and explanatory analysis
6.1.Analytical framework
6.1.1.	 Methodology and data
The following sections investigate the relative performance and characteristics
of the Yugoslav payment system. The analysis starts with an overview of the
institutional framework. The payment system is put in a broader context of banking and
monetary systems. It is followed by an analysis of cash holdings, which indicates the
payment system's development and instrument choice. Next, other payment instrument
use and their importance are examined. Finally, clearinghouse efficiency is investigated
to illustrate the characteristics of the large-value payment system and evaluate its
functioning so far.
The main period under investigation is 1993-1997, although references are also
made to the period 1990-1992. The major identified issues are: the performance of the
clearinghouse and settlement system in terms of volume, value and efficiency of
payments processing; importance of cash holdings and transactions versus various
payment instruments use; and institutional aspects of the payment system functioning.
The approach was to combine descriptive statistics and qualitative analysis. The
primary sources of data and information on Yugoslavia are The National Bank of
Yugoslavia, SDKJZOP - the clearinghouse, and Yugoslav Statistical Office.
The purpose of this part of the research is to describe the Yugoslav payment
system and investigate whether it was efficient in the past. In addition, the analysis is
aimed at identifying the main problems and suggesting possible solutions for their
resolution.
6.1.2.	 The hypotheses
The main assumptions about the system used as a basis for this part of the
research are:
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• The Yugoslav payment system was not efficient in the past and particularly in the
period 1993 to 1997. It was slow, expensive, with many risks involved and it
offered inadequate choice of payment instruments and methods.
• New payment system design, as envisaged by the policy-makers, may not be
appropriate for the economic environment and state of the economy and banking
system.
• In the long run, the monopoly of the clearinghouse should be replaced with
competition among different payment system services providers and instruments.
6.2. Institutional framework
6.2.1. Introduction
The main aspects of the institutional framework that are presented here are the
financial system characteristics, legal framework, banking system structure and
performance, monetary policy management and how does the payment system relate to
those aspects of performance of a monetary economy. The Yugoslav institutional
setting is also described in section 2.7.
The value of net payment float has an influence on the amount and distribution
of reserves available to the banking system for the purposes of making loans. In the
previous system in Yugoslavia, the clearinghouse (SDK) -- instead of the National Bank
-- had the control over the amount of float for grants to the banks (as well as to the
firms!). Although there were loopholes in the regulatory framework that enabled the
practice, the very activity of SDK undermined the monetary policy and contributed to
the hyperinflation. In effect, the institution acted as a financial intermediary, i.e. a credit
institution, and, therefore, had perverse incentives and sub-optimal efficiency from the
social best-practice perspective.
Because SDK had a monopoly on payments, the longer the delays the more float
at its disposal, and the bigger the float, the more powerful and profitable the institution
became. On the other hand, 'controlling' for the inefficiency of the payment system, the
payment system users built into the prices of goods and services the opportunity costs,
which were becoming bigger and bigger as the inflation was becoming a psychological
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phenomenon. Therefore, as payees feared that a delay resulting from the payment
system itself would help inflation to 'eat up' the receipts, the higher the inflation rate
the higher the adjusted prices, and the higher the inflation adjusted prices the higher the
inflation. It should be stated, however, that the payment system in its own right was not
the major contributor to the hyperinflation in Yugoslavia'.
One can note, therefore, that the payment system in Yugoslavia was: a)
synonymous with the clearinghouse and b) not only a channel for payment transactions
(as it was designed as non-profit institution) but also a powerful and profitable system.
As the clearinghouse built its power on its monopoly, the occasional improvements in
efficiency were the result only of constant political pressure from the users (companies)
and from potential competition (banks). On the other hand, because of the centralised
organisational structure of the payment system, the investments and improvements
benefit all the participants and the system as a whole. By the same token, however, the
organisational inefficiency and internal optimisation strategy negatively affect the
whole of the payment system.
During the past five years the banks have lobbied intensively for a total abolition
of former SDK because of both the frustrations of the past, when SDK had monopoly
over the payments, and costs charges and fees that go to the institution. Therefore,
beside the issues of efficiency and costs, the banks had a hidden agenda of taking a slice
(if not the whole) of the payment fees cake for themselves. Eventually, the debate about
the payment system became a battle about who should run it. With the loss of the
deposit base, due to the drastic decrease in savings, and the bigger importance and
potency of transactions money the stakes became higher for the banks.
The illustration of the institutional structure is given in Table 6-1. It can be seen,
when compared to the total population (appendix 3-1) that only every fifth inhabitant
has an account with financial institutions, that there are about 3,000 people per branch
and that there are about one million people per bank. Initial inference, given the
indicators for other countries (as discussed in the previous sections), show that the
system is 'over-banked' and inadequately 'branched'. This may support the argument
1 The major reasons, as discussed in section 2.7, are a) huge public expenditures, caused by the war and sanctions
(which resulted in high unemployment, number of refugees and claims on other social benefits) and b) the political
lobbying of the banks and their owners - loss making enterprises for additional funds from the central bank.
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Table 6-1 Institutional framework (1997)
Number of
institutions
Number of	 Number of
branches	 accounts
Value of	 Number of
accounts	 employees
(Dinar millions)
Categories
Central bank
Commercial banks
Post office
SDK/ZOP giro system
3
app. 1,000
1,574
189
291
app. 2million
181,543
344,176
1,779
18,815
230
2,538
32,146
3,629
1,761
1
108
1
1
TOTAL	 121	 2,767	 app. 2,500,000	 23,362
Payment Systems Reforms	 The Y ugoslav Payment System
that the banks are not ready to become the main service-providers. The banking system
will be more thoroughly analysed in the survey chapter.
Sources: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, December 1997; ZOP - The clearing and
settlement house
6.2.2. The payment system and monetary system
The payment system reform was initiated mainly to strengthen monetary
control. Although some organisational changes and technical improvements started
back in 1992, the real institutional changes came about only in January 1996, when the
former SDK (now ZOP 2) became an organisational part of the National Bank of
Yugoslavia. It was planned for the transition programme to be implemented in two
phases. During the first phase the payment operations would be conducted within the
National Bank (utilising the ZOP facilities), and in the second phase the payment
operations were to be handled by commercial banks. This was supported by the new
legislation 3 and the official policy of the central bank.
The following principles are, or are planned to be, incorporated into the
regulation of the payment system. The first major provision in the regulatory framework
and NBY policy is that of tying the ability of the users to make payments to the
liquidity of the institutions they have the accounts with. Second, there is no provision
for the central bank's guarantee of the finality of the payments. In that sense, it seems
that the model for the new payment system was the Swiss settlement system - SIC. In
2 The new name of the institution is "Clearing and Settlement House" or "Zavod za Obradu i Placanja" - ZOP in
Serbian.
3 The Official Gazette of FR Yugoslavia ("Sluzbeni List SR Jugoslavije") issues no. 53/92, 6, 16, 31/93, 32/94, and
61/95. The laws are accompanied with a range of the central bank's regulations.
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line with the principles and desire to strengthen monetary control and discipline is also
the regulation on the licence withdrawals4.
In view of the monetary system functioning so far, whereby the monetary
authorities are under constant pressure to provide additional liquidity to the system, a
consistent implementation of the intended policy will be the acid test of the reforms. In
addition to the frozen foreign exchange deposits of the households to the amount of 4.5
billion US dollars, and the somewhat higher amount of debt to international investors
and institutions, there are non-performing assets estimated to be about 50 to 60 percent
of the overall banking assets. Furthermore, even though the estimated capital to
weighted assets ratio is approximately 9 percent for the period 1993 to 1997 (as
compared to the minimum of 8 percent set by legislation) some of the largest banks are
de facto insolvent5 . In those circumstances, the question that arises is whether the banks
are ready and capable of taking over the payment services provision. Given tight
monetary policy and liquidity provision principles, underdeveloped money market and
new payment arrangements the odds against banks are high. This question, however,
will be analysed further in Chapter 7.
Monetary policy management and control is perceived as inefficient, outdated
and self-serving. This is, among other things, reflected in high inflation rates (see
appendix 3) and a continual and accelerating devaluation of national currency in the
foreign exchange black market, even during the low inflation periods. The inefficiencies
of both banking system and monetary policy have resulted in a lack of trust in the
systems and 'banking' outside the official financial institutions - currency substitution
instead of banks deposits and cash transactions being preferred to any other payment
instrument. Although there have been several attempts to restructure the financial
system, they have not been consistent and thorough enough. They have ultimately
failed.
An illustration of both money market development and the payment system's
'size' is the payment system 'turnover' to the country's annual GDP which is 6.5 times
a year, i.e. it takes 38.5 days for amounts equal to annual GDP to pass through the
payment system (on average from 1994 to 1997). This is 3 to 15 times less then in
4 The national bank's regulation introduced in December 1996, stating that a bank's license will be withdrawn if it is
illiquid for three days in a row or any three days during a single week.
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developed countries (see table 2-1). The illustration is indicative of underdeveloped
money market and overall financial transactions in the economy.
.6.2.3. Institutional framework, new payment system and monetary policy
issues -summarised
In respect of the new payment system design principles and legislation, there are
a few points to be raised. Although these principles and provisions are not controversial
in their own right, there are certain considerations that arise as a consequence. Firstly,
the freedom of choice of a payment operations provider, and the parallel existence of
the clearinghouse's (SDK/ZOP's) giro and banks' current accounts systems, leaves
businesses the option not to transfer their transaction balances to the banks to date. If
their ability to make payments is tied to the institutions' liquidity, the users will prefer
the SDK network and system of accounts, as SDK, by definition, cannot lose a licence
(i.e. it cannot become illiquid). In 1996, out of 2.6 billion Dinars of transaction money
in giro-accounts (on average a day), only 114 million Dinars (about 4 percent) was held
at the banks' accounts (Nesic 1996). The lack of trust in the soundness of banks will
discourage (and did discourage) the transformation of the payment system because the
transfer of transaction deposits from SDK to banks cannot be done by a decree as a non-
restructured banking system may not be capable of performing the task.
Secondly, if there is no central bank guarantee of finality of payment
transactions, i.e. no overdraft facilities from the central bank, could there be trust in
banks or the transfer of the payment operations to the banking system? The provisions
appear to be in line with the restoring of financial discipline, but they may hamper the
development of an efficient monetary system and money market. Although the moral
hazard is, therefore, supposed to be reduced to a minimum, there is still a constant threat
of systemic crisis that inversely influences trust and discipline. The economy with weak
firms and many insolvent banks may not be well suited for any queuing system and/or
potential gridlock problems, because:
a) There is no efficient money and interbank market to provide liquidity.
5 If the provisions were made for the "bad debts" many non-privatised banks would be classified as insolvent
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b) The system users and their banks will fear making the payments first as there may
not be planned incoming funds later in the day.
c) The payees may prefer cash or even barter as the delivery-versus-payment is not
ensured because of a possibility that a financial institution, not a payment
counterpart - payor, becomes illiquid6 , and
d) Queuing arrangements resemble a DNS system and may not discharge the risks
(unless there are additional risk provisions) that are supposed to be eliminated by a
RTGS system.
The payment system design, however, should not be confused with the banks
restructuring and the restoring of the monetary control. Provision of intra-day liquidity
by a central bank in a system which efficiently sanctions against insolvent and risky
banks wouldn't mean loosening of the monetary discipline. Furthermore, the central
bank can limit the risks of daylight overdrafts by charging fees and limiting the
overdrafts like, for example, US Fed. Finally, the rationalisation of number of the banks
and the establishment of their viability should be a part of a thorough restructuring plan
not a by-product of the liquidity control measures and payment system design. These
considerations will be taken into account when drawing final conclusions and
recommendations for the Yugoslav payment system.
6.3. Use and importance of cash
6.3.1.	 Cash Holdings
The use of cash is investigated to find how important this and other, cash
substitute, payment instruments are. It could be argued that in CIT, as opposed to
developed countries, the greater the use of cash, the less developed a payment system,
and the more limited the payment instrument choice are 7 . Initial assumptions are that
the use of cash in Yugoslavia was extensive, and that it reflects, among other things, a
6 Lack of liquidity and bad debts have resulted in so-called 'compensations' (obligatory debt netting for banks and
companies occasionally organised by the clearinghouse) or bilateral or multilateral exchange of goods and services
between the companies.
7 The differences with regard to large cash holdings in developed countries relate to the influence of crime on cash
holdings and cash holdings as a measure of public wealth (store of value function of money). See also Chapter 4.
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limited choice of other payment instruments and methods as well as an inefficient
clearing and settlement system.
The three indirect indicators of cash use for Yugoslavia are shown in Table 6-2.
Row 1 show US dollar value (at year-end exchange rates) of cash held by the public
divided by population for each year respectively. Cash held by public is defined as
notes and coins in circulation, i.e. as total currency and coin outstanding minus the
value held in the banking system and in reserve by the government. Another measure of
cash use, the ratio of currency value to GDP (which shows the importance of cash
regardless of a country's inflation and wealth) is shown in Row 2. The third indicator of
relative importance of cash in a monetary economy, the ratio of currency value to
narrow money supply (M1 in Yugoslavia), which may indicate the importance and use
of cash relative to transferable deposits used for payments, is shown in Row 3. The use
of cash as a settlement media and local currency values, according to BIS methodology,
are shown in appendix 3-3 (tables 9-30 to 9-32).
Table 6-2 Notes and coins in circulation (end of year)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
In USD, per inhabitant 23 35 58 45 66 671 55 75
As percentage of GDP 10 11 11 11.5 9.9 10 8 8
As percentage of narrow
money - M1
44 35 37 31 44 44 54 52
Data sources: The Yugoslav Statistical Office 1997, The National Bank of Yugoslavia 1997
Calculated according to Bank for International Settlements methodology
I) Year average. The year-end figure is 29 USD. The average amount of notes and coins in circulation in
1995 (monthly amounts were translated in USD at month-end exchange rates and averaged for the year)
is calculated to make the adjustments for the currency devaluation made in November 1995. Monthly
data are not available for the period prior to 1994.
The first measure shows that each person in Yugoslavia holds about $60. The
cash holdings figures for the developed countries, for example, are on average 20 times
higher and range from $440 to $2670 8 . The year 1993 witnessed a 300 million percent
monthly inflation, one of the largest in world economic history. The inflation rates for
the other years in the period were also high and the annual rates approached or
exceeded 100 percent 9. The initial inference of low cash holdings per person is in line
with the theoretical predictions of a direct relationship between cash holdings and per
8 See appendix 3-2 - Comparative tables and Chapters 4 and 5.
9 See also appendix 3-1 - Yugoslavia, the statistics
183
Payment Systems Reforms	 The Y ugoslav Payment System
capita income, and an inverse relationship between cash holdings and inflation and/or
interest rates, even more so for the years 1990 to 1993.
As expected, the second and third measures are inconsistent with the first one.
Cash holdings as percentage of GDP figures are, on average, much higher than in the
developed countries and at par with less-developed countries (see Chapters 4 and 5 and
appendix 3-2). The third indicator shows a relatively high proportion of cash in narrow
money supply for all the years. The proportion of cash in the narrow money supply,
using BIS statistical methodology and definitions, is above the figures for any G-10
country. However, comparison with other countries, with regard to the monetary
aggregate, is not straightforward because of the different definitions of the narrow
money monetary aggregates across countries. Nonetheless, it should be noted that as
compared to a developed country that uses similar definitions of the monetary
aggregates, for example Germany, the percentage of notes and coins in M1 in
Yugoslavia is on average one and half times higher.
The resulting high ratios could not be explained by the generally accepted
rationale behind the theoretical predictions for developed countries -- high cash
holdings/high income per capita nor high inflation (interest rates)/low cash holdings.
How then can one explain high currency holdings, as generally perceived by the public
and economists, in Yugoslavia? Might it be that the general perception was an illusion
(caused by the litter of worthless banknotes that filled the pockets), as indicated by the
first measure, or that the second and third measure provide better explanations? It has
been argued (Petrovic 1997) that the cash holdings are low in comparison with other
countries. The comparative analysis and illustrations shown in chapters 4 and 5 clearly
show that this is not the case and that the cash holdings indicators in Yugoslavia are
indeed high.
There are a few additional points that may help reconcile the opposing findings
of the three measures and explain the issues further:
• First, as illustrated in Chapter 4, the first measure captures the low income per capita
and standard of living (see also appendix 3-1). Also, as the cash in circulation to
GDP -- CCGDP -- may be influenced by the year-end prices statistical measurement
it should be used in combination with the cash in circulation to narrow money ratio --
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CCM1-- as the indicator of cash use. These two measures show high relative
importance of cash in Yugoslavia.
• Second, the domestic currency holdings do not capture total currency holdings as the
currency substitution is resorted to as a solution for the lost functions of national
currency of a store of value and a unit of account. The major hard currency holding
in Yugoslavia was in Deutsche Marks, mainly due to the large number of expatriates
that have been working in Germany. One indicator of the value of foreign currency
holdings in period 1991 to 1994 is the amount of foreign exchange demand deposits
in banks outstanding in 1994 and collected during the period 1992 to 1994. Two
newly formed banks Yugoskandik and Dafiment Bank, for instance, having attracted
foreign exchange deposits with high interest rates (about 10% a month), declared
bankruptcy. Estimates of outstanding liabilities that are not recovered by the
receivership procedure range from $400 million to 700 million 10 . This amount of
money can be regarded as cash holdings prior to depositing it into the banks. As most
of the deposits were for one to three months (and relate to the period June 1993 -
April 1994) the whole amount can be treated as a 'foreign currency in circulation'
during the period 1990-1994, especially in 1993 when most of the small value
transactions were in foreign currency. In addition, various domestic experts estimate
the amount of foreign currency holdings with households in the range of $700
million for the year 1997. These estimates, if correct, would raise the value of cash
holdings per person four and three times for the periods 1990-1994 and 1994-1997
respectively.
• Third, with regard to the first measure, the real purchasing power of any specific
amount of money varies across countries and is particularly distinct between the
developed and developing countries. Therefore, adjusting for the differences, by
using PPP, the amounts in Row 1 in Table 6-2 would increase twofold". A further
III As the banks have not been treated as bankrupt so far by the officials, the exact amount of foreign exchange
deposits is not published. The deposits are treated as frozen adding to the $4.5 billion foreign exchange deposits of
the households that are frozen back in 1990. However, the foreign exchange deposits prior to and after 1990 are
treated differently as the former were explicitly guaranteed by the Federation.
II The estimate steams from the World Bank Atlas (various issues 1991 to 1998). In their computation of GNP and
GDP at PPP exchange rates, the countries' nominal GDPs or GNPs are divided by the Purchasing Power Parity rate,
which is defined as the number of goods and services in the domestic market as one dollar would buy in the United
States. However, as there is no data on Yugoslav purchasing power parity in the recent reports, one should treat the
estimates only as indicators. In the very turbulent economic and political environment, the auditing and statistical
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approximation of the purchasing power of the specific amounts and, therefore, real
and relative importance of the cash holdings can be a ratio of the cash holdings as
defined in Table 6-2 to the average monthly wages denominated in US dollars. This
indicator would show much higher relative importance of the cash holdings in
Yugoslavia than in some of the developed countries for the respective years (see also
appendix 3-2).
Although it would be tentative to calculate fully adjusted amounts according to
the estimates, the points raised above show that the relative volume and importance of
cash holdings in Yugoslavia were relatively high. Additional analysis, however, will be
conducted to test the assumption further.
In conclusion, it has been confirmed that the first measure is inappropriate for
measuring the relative importance of cash holdings in 'lower' income and/or high
inflation countries due to the overwhelming effect of low standard of living and GDP on
it. Conclusions based on combined results of the second and third measure would
provide a better explanation for the relative importance of cash holdings in the
Yugoslav case. As the second measure controls for inflation, and the third measure
shows importance of cash relative to transferable deposits I2, they may be more suitable
indicators of the relative importance of cash in Yugoslavia and other CIT than the cash
in circulation, not least because of the lower per capita income in those countries. These
measures indicate the relatively high importance of cash in Yugoslavia, even without
taking 'the foreign currency in circulation' into account.
6.3.2.	 Cash holdings and transactions explained
Several important facts about the payment and monetary system during the
period may be used as explanations and/or evidence for cash preference in Yugoslavia.
First, given the payment instrument choice, it is clear that cash payments did not
have an adequate alternative, as far as the SVTS payments were concerned. For
households, the only close substitute available were cheque payments and paper based
records and practice may have suffered, especially during the hyperinflation periods. Furthermore, the data used for
calculation vary from one official publication to another.
12 Which are used for payments by other payment instruments, such as cheques, credit and debit cards etc.
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credit transfer orders. As far as the SVTS payments are concerned, the use of credit
transfers was limited to bills' payments and these were only possible at the branch that a
customer had an account with. The illustrations given in table 9-33 in appendix 3-4 can
be used as indicators of use of credit transfers for small/retail payments.
' Second, the combined effect of inflation and float would leave the clearing
system users at loss if they relied upon the official payment system channels. A one day
clearing cycle was the norm. In practice, however, there were instances of 2,3 and 7
days clearing. In the high inflation environment the float can devalue the funds sent
from 0.4 up to 40 percentage points a day for a given monthly inflation rates of 13 and
3,000,000 percent respectively (see appendix 3-1). Therefore, the one-day clearing
cycle combined with settlement uncertainty could not satisfy the customers and resulted
in a lack of trust in official money channels. Given the inflation rates for the period it is
obvious why. During the hyperinflation period many businesses and the majority of
households resorted to currency speculations and product stocking, resulting effectively
in diminishing trading activities and industrial production. This only perpetuated the
constant decrease of monetary funds transferred through banks and the system, let alone
the use of payment instruments that are based on transferable deposits.
Third, the nominal interest rates on deposits during the period were well below
the inflation rates. High inflation rates in 1992 and 1993 decreased the proportion of
transferable deposits in total deposits with the banks (see the following section). At the
same time the amount and proportion of savings, which started to diminish in 1991,
almost disappeared in 1993. This illustrates, among other things, a shattered trust in
banks and the non-existence of the credibility of the state, which guaranteed the
deposits.
6.4. Non-cash payments
6.4.1.	 Deposits with the banks
The reverse side of a high proportion of cash in narrow money is a low level of
deposits, which serve as a basis for non-cash payments. Tables 6-3 and 6-4 illustrate the
trends in banks' overall deposits. The most striking is a decrease of savings and an
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increase in the proportion of foreign exchange liabilities. The proportion of foreign
exchange deposits on the banks' balance sheets has been rising since 1992. This, of
course, was not because of the new deposits but decreasing overall deposits with the
banks13.
Table 6-3 Deposits with banks and other financial institutions
in USD million (year-end exchange rates)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total deposits
Transferable
deposits
°/0 in total deposits
922
152
17%
1257
300
24%
1453
638
44%
6250
1033
17%
3747
73
2%
5623
877
16%
5435
382
7%
5565
495
9%
5945
750
13%
Other Demand
deposits 17 47 76 54 4 34 18 49 54
% in total deposits 2% 4% 5% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1%
Restricted deposits' ) 8 38 56 49 0 33 20 39 81
% in total deposits 1% 3% 4% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1%
Time deposits up to
one year 110 113 127 845 6 240 152 269 334
% in total deposits 12% 9% 9% 14% 0% 4% 3% 5% 6%
Foreign exchange
demand deposits 288 375 263 2204 1992 2313 2533 2430 2547
% in total deposits 31% 30% 18% 35% 53% 41% 47% 44% 43%
Savings deposits 68 103 76 139 5 36 34 61 81
% in total deposits 7% 8% 5% 2% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Foreign exchange
savings deposits 279 281 218 1926 1667 2088 2296 2221 2099
% in total deposits 30% 22% 15% 31% 44% 37% 42% 40% 35%
Data source: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 1995-1997. 1) Includes
deposits for specific purposes which, under legal or specially agreed provisions, may not be withdrawn
during a specified period of time (reserve assets, deposits relating to foreign trade transactions etc.).
13 The absolute amounts of deposits expressed in dollars, in tables 2 and 3, that show increase in dollar terms of total
deposits from 1992 onwards, may well be inflated because of the unrealistic official exchange rates, especially for the
year 1992. Since 1994 the national currency has been pegged to the German mark at the exchange rate that may be
above realistic purchasing power parity or interest rate parity rates (as indicated by much lower black market rates).
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Table 6-4 Deposits -excluding 'frozen' foreign exchange deposits- with banks
and other financial institutions
1989 1990 1991 1992
USD million (year-end exchange rates)
1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
Total Dinar deposits 355 601 972 2120 88 1222 606 913 1299
Transferable
deposits
152 300 638 1033 73 877 382 495 750
% In total deposits 43% 50% 66% 49% 83% 72% 63% 54% 58%
Other Demand
deposits
17 47 76 54 4 34 18 49 54
% In total deposits 5% 8% 8% 3% 4% 3% 3% 5% 4%
Restricted deposits () 8 38 56 49 0 33 20 39 81
% In total deposits 2% 6% 6% 2% 0% 3% 3% 4% 6%
Time deposits up to
one year 110 113 127 845 6 240 152 269 334
% in total deposits 31% 19% 13% 40% 7% 20% 25% 29% 26%
Savings deposits 68 103 76 139 5 36 34 61 81
% in total deposits 19% 17% 8% 7% 6% 3% 6% 7% 6%
Data source: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 1995-1997
I) Includes deposits for specific purposes which, under legal or specially agreed provisions, may not be
withdrawn during a specified period of time (reserve assets, deposits relating to foreign trade transactions
etc.)
Decrease of deposits with the banks was caused by three factors.
First and foremost, the interest rates that were offered to depositors could not
compensate for the inflation rates, let alone produce a positive yield for the depositors.
With no bond and equity markets, an underdeveloped real-estate investment market,
and a slow and expensive payment system that hindered both conversion between
monetary and illiquid asset and financial speculations (through the banking channels),
only the fury of the hyperinflation induced withdrawals of the deposits leaving the
oligopolistic banks dry.
Second, delays in payments and debt servicing with the resulting float, have
killed the last incentive for the customers to channel, if not save, the funds with the
banks. The practice has also killed the trust in banks from which they may not recover
for many years. Huge losses, bad debts and negative NPV projects in a highly risky
economic environment, have all created the incentive for banks to delay/restrict
payments and withdrawals and, therefore, benefit from the float. The evidence for
increased savings rates in high inflation periods in developed countries may raise a
question whether banks in Yugoslavia could have benefited from inflation if they
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played a fair game by transparent rules, however unfavourable the conditions for the
depositors. By adopting a short-term, brute force, approach during the period, the 'old'
banks committed themselves to spending much of their resources and putting huge
effort into getting their customers back at this moment. The success of this, however, is
not certain at all.
Third, the non-servicing of foreign exchange deposits has brought the credibility
of both state and banks to its lowest point. The high proportion of foreign currency
denominated deposits (table 6-3) can be used as an indicator of both non-servicing of
those deposits and the low overall deposit base. Without a meaningful and committed
programme of foreign exchange deposits repayment it would be almost impossible to
restore trust in deposit taking institutions and encourage further savings - the essential
ingredient of further investments and indeed recovery of the economy as a whole.
All of the above mentioned point out the significance of cash a) in terms of
surpassing inefficient payment and banking system channels and b) for transaction and
liquidity purposes, as adequate alternative instruments were missing. This cash
preference has implications for monetary policy, i.e. measures for controlling inflation,
establishing the demand for money and velocity of money and choosing among the
right monetary instruments and measures. This will be discussed in more detail in the
concluding section.
6.4.2.	 Non-cash transactions: paper versus electronics
While cash transactions were in great use in small businesses and the household
sectors, the credit transfers in the so-called 'giro-based system' dominated in the
corporate sector and, of course, for the inter-bank payments. However, it was not a rare
instance for the payment obligation between the domestic and domestic and foreign
trading partners to settle in a foreign currency (notes), for the period 1992-1994.
Nonetheless, it is impossible to quantify the volume and value of the payments, and
these instances will be treated as an anomaly of the period 14. This part of the analysis
14 There are two explanations for these 'grey' payment operations in foreign currency. First, towards the end of 1993
domestic currency lost its functions and the businesses preferred not to trade at all if the payment or exchange was
not in hard currency or immediate, as even the end of day settlement in domestic currency would leave them at loss.
Second, because of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia (1992-1995), all the nostro correspondent accounts of
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will concentrate on the use of available payment instruments and the clearinghouse
performance in their clearing and settlement.
Credit transfers, due to the payment system design, dominated the number and
value of all transfers recorded in the system. They account for about 80% of the value
of all 'fund transfers and about 76% of total number of transactions processed by the
clearinghouse, on average a year for the period 1991-1997. The percentage of electronic
credit transfer instructions is about 16% of total number of payment instructions or 21%
of the number of credit transfer instructions. The electronic funds transfers between the
clearinghouse branches is approaching 100%. Further examples are given in the
appendix 3-4 (tables 9-30, 9-31 and 9-32).
The use of credit and other plastic cards 15 during the period 1992-1997 was
minimal because both the domestic and international issuers found inflation too high for
the instrument to be profitable. In addition, during the period of economic sanctions,
middle 1992 to late 1995, the foreign issuers withdrew the licences and guarantees for
their cards to be issued in Yugoslavia. It is estimated by The Bankers Association that
starting from 1984, when the first major credit card companies introduced their cards to
the market, until 1992 there have been about 60,000 cards in use 16, with about 6,000
points of sale (PUS). The most widespread domestic card is the Post Savings' cheque
guarantee card (in some instances with a combined function of a credit card) with
180,000 users.
In recent years, the use of various plastic cards has started to increase. However
the use and the choice are still limited. For example, domestic banks have issued
various plastic cards in amounts of approximately 10,000 units. There is also a limited
number of loyalty and retailer/store cards. Eighty percent of all credit card transactions
were made in the supermarkets and groceries for food purchases (The Bankers
Association 1997). The figure reflects both the low standard of living and the small
number and diversity of POS. Therefore, all but the immediate settlement media - i.e.
payments with domestic and hard currencies - suffered from the inflation and other
Yugoslav banks, state and companies at foreign banks were frozen. The only way to pay for the imports and conduct
trade (for the goods that were not included under the sanctioned trading activities) was from the domestic reserves,
that is in cash (or gold).
15 The credit cards functioned effectively as debit cards as no overdraft limit was available for payments both home
and abroad.
16 Mostly VISA credit cards. Other issuers were American Express, Diners and Eurocard.
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macroeconomic instabilities (which includes the war in the region and a vast number of
refugees).
Cheques. There is no published data on use of cheques during the period.
However, some estimates (ibid. 1997) show there were fifty thousand cheque payments
cleared on average each day, which is equal to 1.25 million cheque payments a month
or fifteen million a year. ZOP - the clearinghouse started publishing the number and
value of cheques processed only from January 1997. Their reports generally support the
estimates (see also appendix 3-4). The cheque payments relate to SVTS payments and
were used mostly by the household sector. The instrument was not in wider use for
business purposes, and by the institutions or authorities. The average amount of money
per cheque was generally small due to the restrictions on the maximum amount written
per cheque as well as limits on the number of cheques issued to each customer and
accepted for payments from retailers. These restrictions, however, were not coupled
with encouragement of use and availability of other payment instruments.
From early 1992 until 1995, both the banks and the retailers discouraged the use
of cheques by imposing various restrictions and limitations on the payments. This was
done to limit the huge losses that retailers, and to a lesser extent banks, suffered due to
the float. The float had a significant influence because of the increased use of cheque
payments (and therefore time for their processing) and, most of all, the hyperinflation
(see appendix 3-1).
In conclusion, credit transfers, due to the payment system design, dominated the
overall payment transactions. The potential advantages of such centralised and paper-
less funds transfer system, however, seem not to be realised during the period. Possible
explanations are:
• a relatively small number of customers being electronically linked to the
clearinghouse's clearing and settlement system,
• lack of additional `paperless' instruments such as various plastic cards and
electronic terminals (including EFTPOS and ATMs) and
• high rates of inflation, which punished the users for even slightest inefficiencies of
and/or delays in the system.
These considerations are investigated further in the subsequent section.
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6.5. Efficiency of the clearinghouse
Since the clearinghouse had a monopoly on payments, the efficiency of the
wholesale, and to a lesser extent, retail payment systems can be evaluated by analysing
the efficiency of the clearinghouse. Unfortunately, the transparency and detail of the
available data seems to be poor. The clearinghouse statistical publications tend to lack
frequent longitudinal data, omit relevant data (for example more detail on value of
payments, electronic payments and cheque processing) and use obsolete methodologies
and indicators, which date back to the 1980's. It is also hard to distinguish SVTS and
LVTS payments as the ZOP/SDK data breakdowns were made to satisfy the need to
evaluate fund transfers among the regions 17 and overall processing efficiency in terms
of number and value of funds cleared but not necessarily settled 18 . However there is
enough data for exploratory data analysis and descriptive statistics which can blaze the
trail for the further analysis, if not provide the conclusive evidence.
As illustrated in table 9-29 (appendix 3-4), the total number and structure of
payment instructions processed is relatively stable over the years. Credit transfers
dominate in the total number, as well as value, of transactions due to the characteristics
of the giro-based payment system, i.e. the monopoly of the clearinghouse and non-
existence of alternative payment instruments. The number of 'cash' transactions
processed, i.e. money/postal orders, is about 22% of the overall payments on average.
This is also consistent with the assumptions made in previous sections about the high
use of cash for payments. Telex instructions have become insignificant in number and
value since 1993.
The value of processed payments (when adjusted for inflation) and its structure
(tables 9-30, 9-31 and 9-32, appendix 3-4) varies little over the period. Credit transfers
dominated in the giro-based system because of both its relative advantage in speed of
clearing and the lack of an alternative. The value of transactions that initiated, or
resulted in, cash payment or withdrawal, respectively, is high given the nature of giro
17 The methodology in use was established when Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of six republics,
i.e. political and economic regions (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia).
18 In all fairness, during the period of disintegration of the country, economic sanctions against FR Yugoslavia and
poor liquidity and performance of financial sector and overall economy, there were other, day to day, priorities in
running the clearinghouse than improvements of analytical tools for evaluating and presenting the payment system
(in)efficiencies. Hopefully, with the improvements of the system this will change.
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system as a cashless fund transfer system. This again was due to the poor choice among
other payment instruments that would allow the use or deposit of funds once they were
transferred. Since the introduction of a direct communication link between the
clearinghouse and some customers in 1994, the value of electronic payment instructions
has been rising relative to the total value of payments. It can also be noticed that, albeit
marginally, the value of funds transferred between the ZOP/SDK branches is rising
compared to inter-branch fund settlements. Furthermore, the fund transfer and payment
instructions between the processing units/branches have become almost entirely
electronic thus making the use of telex and telephone inter-branch fund transfers
marginal. The three have contributed to a significant rise in the proportion of electronic
payment instructions.
Nonetheless, there has been a significant number of paper based payment
instructions, together with cash initiated or resulting transactions, even after 1994. This
can be explained as a consequence of the combined effect of: a) insufficient numbers of
customers being linked electronically to the clearinghouse and b) for the SVTS
payments, lack of use or existence of other payment instruments that could initiate the
electronic fund transfer (such as various plastic cards and ATM terminals).
6.5.1.	 Efficiency of the clearinghouse - summarised
Table 6-5 gives summaries of available indicators of the clearinghouse
efficiency. Paper-based payment instructions are dominant in the total number of
instructions, but these started to decrease in 1994. The decrease coincides with the
introduction of electronic message processing between the clearinghouse and its
customers. It can also be noted that the percentage of instructions processed without
delays has increased since 1994, and now approaches 100 percent of total value. A
delay is defined by the clearinghouse as a clearing cycle longer than one day, for any
particular payment. The percentage of orders sent and received without delays seems
relatively high and is, on average, 99 percent of the total number of payment orders.
The average clearing cycle is, on average for the period, in line with the one day
clearing benchmark set out by the clearinghouse. Despite the high number of paper
payment instructions, which does not necessarily mean subsequent processing
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inefficiency, the clearinghouse would seem to be doing a very good job. Also given the
length of clearing cycles in other transitional countries (chapter 4), one-day clearing is
reasonably fast.
Given the apparent efficiency, one wonders why did the customers and
competitors put pressure on the clearinghouse to invest, back in 1993, in introducing the
changes (electronic fund transfer between the units and electronic communication
network).
However, it is obvious there are major flaws in measuring efficiency in such a
way, especially in light of the payment system technology evolution in the past four
years. The major remark relates to the definition of delay, as a payment order cleared
after one working day. For large payments, and all other electronically transmitted
payments by the clearinghouse, the technically optimal clearing cycle is now about one
to two hours, including all necessary preparations and checking, in light of the
illiquidity of the system and the insolvency of many users. Therefore the one day
clearing cycle benchmark is not only outdated but gives a false sense of efficacy which
can deceive no one.
At the same time, the payment orders settlement standard is ill-defined, adding
to the confusion. It is often the case that the clearing and settlement cycle are treated as
synonymous in the clearinghouse's reports regardless of the different legal treatment of
cleared and settled funds. Even though the system is supposed to function as a gross
system, deferred one-day clearing and settlement cycles are used as a norm. This means
a) although the funds can be cleared within an hour (or sooner) the delays of several
hours in clearing the funds are not treated as such, and; b) the funds are irrevocably
settled at the end of the day thus making the system a deferred net settlement system.
The possible logical explanation of the settlement practice could be the transition
adjustments, whereby the funds are de facto settled at the moment they are cleared (as
in a gross system) but the de jure settlement occurs at the end of the day, which was
supposed to be abolished in 1996.
The practice of measuring and treating the clearing and settlement cycle in such
a way, if not changed, is a major hindrance (along with the inefficient money market)
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to establishing the proposed payment and settlement system 19 . The introduction of a
system similar to SIC 2° in Yugoslavia, with gross real-time settlement and no
guarantees from the central bank or other institution of finality of payments, requires
precise and fast, genuine real-time, clearing and settlement of funds with no exceptions.
In addition, with ever present high inflation rates (on average forty times as high as the
inflation rates in Switzerland, where the SIC operates, even excluding the hyperinflation
years) the costs and risks to payment system users of even a few hour delay are
significant.
The costs to the users, and benefits to the payment services provider, of float are
striking for the year 1993. If a one day clearing and settlement figure is accepted as
accurate (1.03 days in table 6-5), the resulting reduction in the value of funds sent in
1993 was (typically) approximately 3 to 23 percentage points after a single day, for
given monthly inflation levels of 340 percent (three percent daily inflation rate) and
262,000 percent (30 percent daily inflation rate) respectively 2/ (see also appendix 3-1).
Even after early 1994, if one assumes full day clearing of the funds, as shown in table
12, the payment system users would lose on average 0.2 percent of the value of each
payment (assuming six percent monthly inflation) just because of the effect of the
inflation during the clearing cycle and excluding the fees and opportunity costs. This is
a huge cost to pay for the payment system services. Therefore, clearing in minutes
should become a standard for all large value payments and, if there is no guarantee from
the central bank, at most one-hour settlement (for fully covered payment orders at the
moment of their sending) should be a norm too. Even if one does assume a monetary
economy with no or minimal inflation, a fast clearing and settlement system is
necessary to reduce the opportunity costs of both delays and the holding of non-optimal
portfolios.
The labour efficiency indicators at the clearinghouse are shown in table 6-6. It
can be seen that the total number of employees that handle payment operations and the
number of those who handle cash transactions are basically the same over the period
January 1993 to December 1996. The number of total transactions and cash-based
19 As discussed under the heading "Payment system in Yugoslavia".
20 Swiss Interbank Clearing system
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transactions processed per employee per day, i.e. the labour productivity varied over the
years. The employees who handle cash transactions (cash payments and withdrawals)
have been improving productivity over the period. However, it is also evident that there
is a huge potential for improving the overall efficiency of the clearinghouse. First, if
there Was a reduction in the number of cash-based transactions 22 and persons handling
those transactions (who account for about 75 percent of all people employed at payment
transactions processing at the clearinghouse) this would result in a significant reduction
in the cost of wages. Second, as cash transactions are labour intensive, and electronic
transactions are technology intensive, the reduction would result in an increase in the
total number of payment orders processed per person.
These illustrations indicate two recommendations. The Cirst is tar the overall
payment system (the clearinghouse, financial institutions and the monetary authorities)
to start to introduce or encourage the use of cash alternative, paperless, instruments. The
second is for the clearinghouse to support the banks in overtaking the control and
handling of small value payments regardless of the battle for payment system provider
dominance. Firstly, banks are more likely to introduce the alternative instruments in
their competition for customers and secondly, some of the labour force that handles
cash payments at the clearinghouse can be employed at banks. As the clearinghouse was
a not-for-profit institution and now is an organisational part of the National Bank these
changes are not only desirable but also possible.
In conclusion, the exploratory data analysis indicates that the clearinghouse, and
therefore to a large extent the overall payment system, was not efficient in the past and
there are huge potentials for improvements. It seems that the clearing and settlement
was slow, risky and costly and there was a poor choice of payment instruments and
providers. It also seems that either the proposed changes are not being introduced at the
desired pace or that they are counterproductive and as such naturally opposed by the
system users and providers. However, the evidence is still not conclusive and those and
some other issues will be investigated further in the subsequent chapter.
21 1.03" = 2.42 = 242 percent inflation (342 percent price level as compared to the previous month), hence 1/1.03 =
0.97 of initial value of 1 after a day; 1.30 ) =2,619 = 262,000 percent price level as compared to the previous month,
hence 1/1.30=0.77 of initial value of 1 after a day, i.e. twenty three percent devaluation of funds;
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Table 6-6 Labour efficiency at the clearinghouse
1993 1,833 456 1,346 31 30,100
1994 1,792 357 1,322 39 14,300
1995 1,812 388 1,357 48 17,800
1996 1,761 453 1,379 54 29,446
Number of Number of Daily average of Number of
payment orders employees that number of cash banknotes
processed per handle cash transactions per processed -daily
employee a day transactions person employed average per teller
Total number of
employees that
handle payment
operationsYear
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Table 6-5 Payment orders - processing efficiency
Year
Paper	 Cash
payment	 instructions' .
instructions -
of total
number
payment	 Electronic	 Instructions	 % of orders	 % of orders
payment	 processed
	 sent	 received
of total	 instructions2) - without delay .	processed 	 processed
number	 of total	 of total value	 without delays without delays
number
Duration of
clearing In
days
1991 75.90% 24.10% 97.00% n/a n/a 1.2
1992 75.40% 24.60% 98.00% 99.54% 98.95% 1.05_
1993 81.50% 19.50% 99.00% 96.61% 98.01% 1.03
1994 77.30% 22.70% 99.40% 97.49% 99.30% 1
1995 60.80% 23.20% 16% 99.85% 99.24% 99.99% 1
1996 62.30% 21.70% 16% 99.50% 98.12% 99.99% 1
1997 61.30% 21.70% 17% 99.88% 98.90% 99.99% 1
Data source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
(1) These transactions refer to money (postal) orders, which involve cash at one or both ends of the
transactions, but involve cashless (inter-bank) clearing and settlement.
(2) Payment orders sent electronically by the customers to the clearinghouse.
Data source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
6.6. Summary and conclusions
The findings of the analysis are the following:
• The clearinghouse was a synonym for the payment system in Yugoslavia, as it had a
monopoly on large-value payments. Credit transfers, due to the 'giro' payment
system design, dominated the number and value of all transfers recorded in the
system.
• The new payment system design is not adjusted to the inefficient interbank money
market, non-restructured banks and a lack of trust in the banking system. As the
22 For example by introducing alternative payment instruments for paying in and withdrawing money before and after
the transactions. These instruments are credit and debit cards, ATMs, electronic purses and other forms of e-money.
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design changes are way ahead of the banking practice, the postponement of the
implementation of the changes is now five years old.
• There is evidence for cash preference in Yugoslavia that is indicative of an
undeveloped payment system, inefficient banking system and ineffective monetary
policy.
• In order to reduce the cash holdings and/or encourage transactions through the
system, the banking system should offer an alternative, i.e. a range of payment
instruments, which are attractive to the users with regard to the conveniences and
costs. They have failed to do that so far.
• The retail payment system is assessed as both undeveloped and inadequate. As the
banks were not prevented from providing and developing retail payment services
they have no excuse for the state of the system.
• Paper-based payments dominated the wholesale payment system but there is some
improvement towards electronic fund transfer. The clearing was relatively slow
given the 'giro' payment system structure. There were many risks and high costs
involved that were exaggerated by the ever-present inflation. Overall, the wholesale
payment system (the clearinghouse) was assessed as inefficient.
• Competition among payment system providers, both in retail and wholesale
payment systems should result in better payment instruments choice, faster clearing,
cheaper payments and risk reduction. A way forward, of course, is not in the
abolition of the clearinghouse but its monopoly.
In terms of the hypotheses tested, the results go in favour of accepting
hypotheses one to three. Therefore, the clearinghouse and the system as whole were not
efficient, the new payment system design has some major drawbacks and the monopoly
of the clearinghouse should be abolished. The results, however, are not conclusive.
Consequently, the final acceptance or rejection of these hypotheses is postponed until
the survey chapter results are presented.
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A prologue to the survey chapter
So far, the research has identified major problems of the system and some
possible solutions for them. As the evidence is not conclusive for rejecting or accepting
the proposed hypotheses, they are looked at once again in the next section. The
preliminary conclusions and recommendations regarding Yugoslav payment system
reform are, therefore, incorporated into the following propositions:
Proposition 1: In the long run, the monopoly of the clearinghouse should be replaced
with competition among different payment system services providers, instruments, costs
and risks.
Proposition 2: The best practice and experience of both developed and Countries in
Transition should be incorporated in the payment system design.
Proposition 3: Overall banking and monetary system reform is necessary and payment
system design is only a part of it.
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7. Yugoslavia's Payment and Banking System Past, Present and Future - A
Survey
7.1.Introduction
The survey "Bankers' Opinion on Burning Issues and Future of Y ugoslav
Payment and Banking System" was conducted between late September and the first half
of December 1997. The questionnaires were sent to the senior managers of all Yugoslav
banks, National Bank of Yugoslavia - NBY, ZOP - the clearinghouse, and two bourses
("Trziste Novca" and "Montenegroberza"). The survey of the banks was conducted in
association with The Yugoslav Bankers' Association which resulted in the excellent
response rate and sincerity of respondents. The response of the managers and experts
from the NBY, ZOP, and bourses (further " the institutions") was exceptional, which
contributed to a wide coverage of the various parties involved in the functioning of the
financial system by the survey.
As the Yugoslav banks are not obliged to publish their accounts, and the
financial results are in many cases treated as 'confidential', the accounting data and
financial statements are not readily available and in investigating the Yugoslav banking
system one needs to rely on survey data, estimates and the central bank's or the bankers'
association own records or publications (which are not always publicly available or rely
on estimates themselves).
The purpose of the survey was to shed more light on the payment and banking
system issues investigated in the research. In view of the limited official data
availability, and the emphasis on the future functioning of the financial system, the
survey was chosen as an optimal research methodology. The aim of the survey was to
investigate bankers' attitudes towards the payment and banking systems reforms and
design as well as to find out what banks and the institutions plan to do, or are doing,
with regard to the payment and banking systems improvements.
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7.2. The main large Yugoslav Banks
Based on the central bank's records at the time of the survey, the seven major
players in terms of the asset size, (estimated) market share and (nominal) amount of
risk-weighted capital in the respective order were: Beogradska Banka, BB Investbanka,
Jugobankal , Beobanka, Vojvodjanska Banka, Jubanka and Montenegro Banka.
These banks are all so-called old banks (established before 1991), organised as
"shareholders associations" (as all other banks in the system), 'socially' or state owned,
major debtors to the population (with the frozen foreign exchange deposits), and non-
performing assets - due mainly to the insolvency of their major, state-owned, clients (i.e.
the corporations which were, at the same time the banks' major shareholders). Their
combined asset size was approximately 70% of the total banking assets and their
combined (nominal) capital accounted for approximately half of the total capital funds.
Given the large banks' influence, political ties and clients base, interconnected
shareholdings and interests of the banks and their clients (coupled with the influence
of/interference from the state on both), and undeveloped money and capital markets and
other financial institutions, these banks are both the focus of, and the main obstacle, to
the reforms.
It has been difficult for corporate clients to switch between banks, for banks to
restructure and/or collect debts, for creditors to initiate bankruptcy procedures, or for
policy makers to initiate and effectively carry out restructuring of the economic and
financial systems. Furthermore, because of their size and importance, as well as the
ability to exercise political and/or 'systemic-risk-threat' pressure on the monetary
authorities, the large (in many cases insolvent, if the bad debts were provided for) banks
were more likely to ensure credits for liquidity and provide timely payment services.
The large banks are both the main driving force behind the payment system
reform (competitors to ZOP - the clearinghouse) and the major focus of the financial
system reforms.
I The one with the Head-Office in Belgrade. It used to be the largest Yugoslav bank in terms of the asset size, number
of customers, branches and accounts, but was split into eight different entities. There are seven other
Jugobankas, differentiated by the head office locations, and legally treated as separate entities (banks).
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7.3. Methodology and Data Collection
The population studied by the survey were senior managers and experts of
Yugoslav banks and institutions (NBY, the clearinghouse, and the bourses), i.e. the
decision-makers and the advisors on the banks' and the institutions' policies and
activities. They were chosen as both adequate representatives and knowledgeable
entities with regard to the issues investigated.
The population was defined as senior managers of Y ugoslav financial
institutions, which participated in the payment system operations, functioning and
design from January 1993 to December 1997.
The survey population was stratified in two groups - the banks and the
institutions. The questionnaires were sent by mail to a total of 106 banks and they were
addressed, by name, for the attention of the president/chief executive of the respective
bank2. The institutions' representatives - 15 from the central bank, 15 from the
clearinghouse, and 2 from the respective bourses - were either interviewed in person or,
in some instances, sent the mail questionnaires. Therefore, the survey sample was
designed to cover the main representatives of the population. The decision not to treat
those representatives as a population was made because: a) they might have delegated
other senior managers to respond to the questions and b) there may be other influential
entities with regard to the banks'/institutions' policies and operations. The results from
the two sample clusters were analysed both individually and, to a lesser extent, as a unit.
The main method of data collection in the survey was the mail questionnaire,
accompanied by telephone and personal interviews. The choice of the method was
governed by the subject matter, the unit of enquiry and the scale of the survey. Being a
simple enquiry among an educated section of population, for the professional group of
bank managers the mail questionnaire was opted for as an appropriate and effective data
collection tool. The follow up interviews of a sample of the banks' executives was
Combined, they would account for 16% of the total banking assets which would make Jugobanka 'the
largest' bank and increase the share of the 'big' banks in the total assets to nearly 80%.
2 The mailing list was the Bankers' Association 'banks members list', which was identical to the National Bank of
Yugoslavia Banks Registry List,
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conducted to test the results of the questionnaires and give a more complete picture of
the investigated matter.
The questionnaire was designed to ensure anonymity of the respondents, thus
catering for some potentially politically-sensitive questions. In addition, a pilot study
along with wide consultations with experts was made to ensure a good response rate,
thus minimising both questionnaire and item non-response bias.
Two assumptions were made with regard to the sample. First, it was assumed
that the senior managers and experts surveyed were responsible for the decisions and
policy that have an effect on the present and future activity of the respective institutions.
Second, it was assumed that they can evaluate the payment and banking system during
the period investigated. Both assumptions, however, should not, if violated in individual
cases3 , change the essence of the results.
Ordinal and nominal scales of measurement were dominantly used for scaling
purposes. There are a certain number of questions that use a ratio scale. Open-ended
questions were also represented. See appendix 4. T-statistics was used for testing the
hypotheses.
7.4.	 Hypotheses and Propositions
The main hypotheses and propositions 4 tested by the survey are:
• The Yugoslav payment system was not efficient in the period 1993 - 1997. It was
slow, expensive, with many risks involved and it offered a poor choice of payment
instruments and methods. The null hypothesis is:
Ho I: Y ugoslav payment system was efficient in the past period with regard to the
speed, risks, costs and choice.
3 One possibility is that the managers' decisions are overthrown later if they are not in charge any longer. The other
possibility is that the current executives were only recently appointed to the posts and have spent the period in
question outside the banking system (e.g. came straight from school, form abroad etc.)
4 The survey hypotheses complement the main research hypotheses and proposals (as stated in Chapter 3).
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• The payment system should be reformed, because either it was proved to be
inefficient or it would be inadequate for the future efficient functioning of the
financial system. The type and role of payment system providers, clearing and
settlement system arrangements, and, therefore, roles of the clearinghouse, central
bank and banks all need to be revised and changed. The hypothesis will be tested as:
Ho 2: The status quo, with regard to the payment system providers, functioning and
design, is the best option and the roles of banks, central bank and clearinghouse
should not change significantly.
• Banks are ready and capable of performing the payment operations and the ZOP-
clearinghouse monopoly should be replaced with competition among different
payment system services providers, instruments, costs and risks. Banks can,
therefore, provide cheaper, faster, more versatile and reliable services than the
clearinghouse with less risks involved.
Ho 3: Banks are not ready to take over the payment services operations, i.e. ZOP
can petform them more efficiently and effectively than banks in the future.
• Yugoslav banking system as a whole is inefficient and inadequate from the best
social practice perspective. Given the number and size of the problems it needs
larger scale, organised, restructuring. Payment system reform, although important,
can achieve little or nothing on its own. The null hypothesis is composed of two sub-
hypotheses.
Ho 4: Y ugoslav banking is efficient and does not need overall planned restructuring.
Payment system reform is a sufficient part of the system restructuring.
• The involvement of foreign banks, investors and institutions in the functioning of the
Yugoslav banking system, i.e. the process of banking system liberalisation, is key for
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the recovery of the payment and banking systems. Increased entry and involvement
would result in competition, investment, better quality and more versatile services.
Ho 5: Increased entry of foreign banks and/or attracting more foreign investors (by
changes in legislation and/or granting special concessions) are not important for the
efficient functioning of efficient payment and banking systems in Y ugoslavia, i.e. they
would have a neutral or negative effect on the domestic payment and banking system.
The survey questions are concerned with payment system performance and
efficiency, payment system reform and design, bank's present and future involvement in
the processes, and the roles of the various financial institutions. There are seven groups
of questions5 . The first set of questions is general in nature and is concerned with the
characteristics of the respondents. The second set of questions investigates how
informed, involved and influential the banks were regarding the payment system
functioning and changes. The third set of questions refers to the performance of the
payment system, dominated by the clearinghouse as a major provider of the large value
payments services. The fourth group of questions is concerned with payment system
reform, its design and potential outcomes. The fifth subsection looks at what banks are
doing, or plan to do, regarding the payment operations as a part of their business
strategy and in limiting the risks and costs and enhancing the speed and choice of the
payment system services. The sixth group of questions is aimed at establishing what
bankers think is the role and importance of payment system reform in the overall
banking restructuring and what should be the roles of government and monetary
authorities in the reform. Finally, there are the questions about the role of foreign
competition and international integration regarding the payment services.
5 Which do not necessarily coincide with chronological appearance of individual questions and subsections in the
questionnaire.
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7.5. The Results of the Survey
7.5.1.	 Response to The Survey
From the 106 banks originally contacted, a total of 51 banks (48%) responded
to the survey and returned completed questionnaires. This very high response rate, for a
mail survey, is even more impressive when we take into account the number of banks
which effectively do not function - approx. 25% of all banks (registered but not
functional and/or banks from whom the banking licence has been withdrawn but have
not been officially closed yet). Given the 'census' approach the sample bias should be
minimal. This is confirmed by the adequate "geographic" and "bank type" coverage6.
Without going into speculation about how many banks really operate, it will be accepted
that the sample is representative and the response rate adequate for making reasonable
inferences for the given population. From 35 'institutional' representatives 32 (91%)
returned completed questionnaires. The results are shown in table 7-1.
Table 7-1 Res onse to the surve
institution
Banks NBY ZOP Bourses total number
of
respondents
Category No. / % No. / % No./ % No. / % No. / %
Returned completed questionnaire 51 / 48% 15 / 100% 12 / 80% 2 / 100% 80 / 58%
not able/not willing to respond 0 0 3 /20% 0 3 / 2%
no response 56 / 52% 0 0 o 56 / 40%
Number of questionnaires sent 106 15 15 2 138
6 All FR Yugoslavia regions, 'old' and 'new' banks (established before and after 1991, i.e. with or without frozen
foreign exchange savings), 'big' and 'small', and all types of ownership were proportionally represented. The
parameters were checked against NBY and The Bankers' Association records.
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7.5.2. Characteristics of the Banks
1) In terms of the "ownership structure", 47% of the banks are `dominantly'7
"socially" 8
 owned, or their shareholders are firms which are socially owned (see Figure
1). 24% are dominantly private, six percent of the banks are owned by foreigners, four
percent are state owned banks and in four percent of banks none of the types of
ownership is dominant -- so-called "mixed" ownership structure (any single type of
ownership in those banks does not exceed 40% percent of overall shareholders funds).
When compared to, for example, total banking assets concentration and market share
criteria9 , socially owned banks, about 50% of all banks, 'run' about 90% of Yugoslav
banking. Analysis of individual banks in this survey have confirmed those findings.
These survey results and the previous findings indicate that the population of Yugoslav
banks is dominated by socially owned (non-privatised) banks, which has certain
implications on the scope and way of banking system restructuring, if it is proved
necessary.
Figure 7-1 Ownership structure of the banks
clockwise
7 A dominant ownership form in a bank was defined as a certain type of ownership that exceeds 60% of shareholders
funds of the respective bank. In terms of legal status all banks are by law "shareholders associations"- S.A's, i.e.
"firms limited by shares".
8 The classification of social, state and private ownership stems from the previous, so-called, "self-management"
system, that Yugoslavia was unique for. This type of socialism was reflected in the ownership structure whereby the
employees of the 'social' companies (majority of companies) were their 'owners' but without the right to sell their
stake on market. The participation of employees in executive decisions was emphasised by a power of veto on the
management's decisions.
9 The Bankers' Association own records.
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2) The amount of the shareholders funds of the banks, is in line with some
previous findings I ° (Ekonomska Politika, 1997). 60% of the banks have permanent
capital in amount up to 60 million Yugoslav Dinars (about 10 million US dollars, at
1997 year-end exchange rate), and the amount of capital in almost three-quarters of the
banks does not exceed 100 million Dinars. The total amount of capital of about nine
percent of the 'biggest' banks equals the amount of capital that the remaining 91% of
the banks share together (see Table 7-2). The average amount of capital in the sample is
117 million Dinars, which means that, on average, a Yugoslav bank has shareholders
funds nominally worth from 65 to 167 million Dinars (95% confidence interval; t=4.55;
0.000 two tail significance). The frequency distribution is significantly positively
skewed with significantly positive kurtosis.
Table 7-2 Amount of capital
Category - million Dinars l)
percent of	 percent of
total number total number
of banks	 of banks -
cumulatively
percent of
total amount
of banking
capital
percent of
total capital
cumulatively
up to 20 23 23 3 3
from 20.01 to 40 24 47 7 10
from 40.01 to 60 13 60 5 15
from 60.01 to 80 8.5 68.5 5 20
from 80.01 to 100 4 73.5 3 23
from 100.01 to 200 13 86.5 15 38
from 200.01 to 500 6 92.5 16 54
Above 500 8.5 100 46 100
total 100 100
I) Dinar/Dollar ratio at the time was about 1 to 6
All this, and the findings on assets concentration, are in line with the previous
findings (Jeremic 1996) of the high concentration of Yugoslav banking. The findings, of
course, tell us nothing about the solvency of the banks, especially in light of the realistic
assumption of unrealistic amounts of assets and capital as shown in the accounts". This,
on the other hand, does not alter the conclusion about the concentration of Yugoslav
banking and the probable concentration of problems in small numbers of 'social' banks.
10 As there is no obligation to publish the accounts, the accounting data is not readily available.
II It is estimated in various domestic studies that the amount of 'non-performing' loans totals about 50% of banks'
total assets on aggregate, and that there are many technically insolvent banks. Given the magnitude of the problem,
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3) When asked about their banks' individual profiles the bankers assessed the
following:
a) With regard to the business success, 14% of banks were "very successful",
63% "successful", 16% "partly successful" and only 2% "unsuccessful" (See Figure 7-
2). Five percent of banks did not answer. As the successes criteria were not defined the
intention was to establish how do bankers view themselves according to their own
success criteria 12 . Successful banks make up the statistically significant majority.
However, when compared to some other 'success criteria' classifications, the number of
partly successful and unsuccessful banks together is statistically significantly smaller
than, for example: a) the number of banks which have ended the tax year 1996/97 with
net loss; b) the number of banks that didn't satisfy the particular requirements of, for
example, "capital/liability ratio", "ratio of large and the largest possible loans in total
loans", or "ratio of investment of permanent funds (capital) in tangible assets"; or c) the
number of banks that didn't satisfy a total of 4 or more requirements (out of 10), set by
the Banking Act paragraphs 26 and 27, at the end of 1996/97 tax year. It could be that
the bankers think that being able to survive in the given environment was a success.
Figure 7-2 Business Sucess
other
unsuccessful
	
q0/0
2% 14% very successful
63% successful
b) Regarding the asset size, 23% of banks in the survey view themselves as
small, 62% are medium-sized bank, 12% are big and 2% are very big banks (see
Figure 3.). This, when checked against the asset size in Dinars for the respective banks,
means that the bankers consider a small bank to be one which has total assets worth up
to 50 million Dinars (nine million dollars); medium bank up to one billion Dinars (167
and the low level of economic activity, the central bank is reluctant to put pressure on the banks to write-off their bad
debts before there is a sound restructuring programme either for a particular bank or the banking system as a whole.
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million dollars); big bank from one to seven billion Dinars (from 167 to 1100 million
dollars); and very big bank above seven billion Dinars worth of balance-sheet assets
(above 1.1 billion dollars). It seems that bankers are reluctant to classify their banks as
small. If, for example, the lower limit for a medium bank is set at 100 million Dinars
(16 million dollars) worth of assets, as many as 50% of the banks would be classified as
small. These 50% of the banks possesses 3% of total assets value of all banks. The
classification would also be supported by other characteristics of the banks.
Figure 7-3 Asset size
13%
big banks
3% very big
banks
24%
small banks
60% medium banks
For comparison purposes, total assets of all Yugoslav banks are worth 110.3
billion Dinars - 18.4 billion US dollars (source NBY, 1997), the largest 15% banks hold
80% of the assets, and the six largest banks hold 60% of all assets (see Table 7-3).
However, in light of the amount of bad debts and inflated assets side of frozen foreign
exchange savings, as well as the unrealistic foreign exchange rate (Dinar was pegged to
German Mark at 3.3 to 1 exchange rate) a scrutiny of an independent audit would halve
the amounts presented in most banks' balance sheets.
12 For review of the banking system performance, evaluated on the basis of the set of criteria set by the legislation see
Seskar and Milatovic 1997 and Jeremic 1996.
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Table 7-3 Banks' asset size, 1997
percent of	 percent of
total number total number
of banks	 of banks -
percent	 percent of
of total	 total assets -
assets	 cumulatively
category- million Dinars cumulatively
up to 25 10.3	 10.3 0.2	 0.2
from 25.01 to 50 12.3	 22.6 0.6	 0.8
from 50.01 to 75 16	 38.6 1.2	 2
from 75.01 to 100 9.4	 48 1	 3
from 100.01 to 200 16	 64 3	 6
from 200.01 to 500 11.3	 75.3 5	 11
from 500.01 to 1000 9.4	 84.7 9	 20
from 1000.01 to 4000 10.3	 95 25	 45
above 4000.01 5	 100 55	 100
total 100% 100%
memo item:
total assets in billions 110.3 Dinars	 US $18.4 GBP 11	 DEM 33.4
Data sources: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, 1997; Ekonomska Politika, 1997.
c) As far as the number of branches is concerned, 74% of banks have between
1 to 10 branches, 13% - from 11 to 25, four percent - from 26 to 50, six percent from
51 to 100 and two percent more than 100 branches (see Figure 7-4). The estimates lead
to a conclusion that one fifth of the banks (so-called 'big' banks) owns two thirds of
total number of bank branches in Yugoslavia. That leaves 80% of banks with 33% of
total number of branches. Given a negligible number of ATMs and cash-dispensers,
even less developed telephone banking, and the absence of electronic banking, the
results show significant implications of branch concentration on retail banking and
payments. The result is significant for assessing the proposed design changes regarding
the number payment services providers, competition, choice of payment instruments and
banking system restructuring.
Figure 7-4 Banks by number of branches
from 51 to 100 6% 2% above 100
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d) regarding the level of employment, 32% of banks have up to 50 employees,
18% from 51 to 100, 20% from 101 to 250, 10% from 251 to 500, 10% from 501 to
1000, and 4% over 1000 employees (see Figure 7-5). 75% of banks employs 25% of
total number of persons employed in the banks. The results imply that the 26 'largest'
banks possess about 75% of total number of banks' employees. The results are in
line with The Bankers' Associations own estimates.
Figure 7-5 Banks by number of employees
9o1 above 1000
e) Classified according to the type of banking activities and number of
customers, a total of 8% of banks are specialised and 92% are universal banks, one
half have a 'small' number of customers and the other half have a 'large' number of
customers. The largest proportion of the sample are universal banks with smaller
number of customers - 48.5%, statistically, this is not significantly different from
43.5% of universal banks with large number of customers. (see Figure 7-6)
Figure 7-6 Type of bank
specialised/small number of customers
4% 4% specialised/large no. of customers
43%
universal/large no of cust.
49%
universal/small no. of custormers
A typical Y ugoslav bank would, therefore, be "socially" owned, 'successful',
'medium sized', with about 18.3 million dollars worth of capital, possesses 10 branches,
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employs about 50 employees, it is universal and has a relatively small number of
customers. However, for some variables the modes (the largest number of banks with a
certain characteristic) are significantly different from the respective means (this measure
for all banks) — referred to as the banking system concentration.
7.5.3.	 Bankers' Involvement in The Payment System Debate
1) As many as 82.3% of the commercial bankers in the survey "have
participated, in a professional capacity, in the debate about the payment system",
some of them have participated more then once and in different forums. The percent of
the 'institutional' bankers who participated in the debate is about 95%, which is in line
with the assumptions about their expertise and involvement in the payment system
functioning. As organisers of various debates and forums the following institutions
were named: The Bankers' Association - 70% of the cases, ZOP - the clearinghouse -
35% of the cases, National Bank of Yugoslavia - in 20% instances, Yugoslav Chambers
of Commerce and Industry and four other institutions - in 25% of the cases. Those who
did not have a chance to participate expressed their wish to do so in 90% of the cases.
2) When asked "have the banks' standings and interests, regarding the
payment system functioning, been taken into account for payment system design and
legislation in the last five years", 38% of the bankers answered they have been taken
into account - of which 36%, "yes to a certain extent", and 2% "yes entirely"; while 62%
thinks they have not been taken into account satisfactorily - 54% "not enough", and 8%
"not at all". (See Figure 7-7) It could be argued that according to the bankers their
standings and interests have not been taken into account satisfactorily for payment
system design and legislation in the last five years (the difference is statistically very
significant, a=0.01). The opinion of the representatives of the institutions is that the
banks were treated fairly, i.e. they generally opted for the first two answers.
The comments range from the statements that "only the interests of 'politically
favourable' banks were taken into account", "there is a long wait for the final statutory
solutions (legislation)", that "the payment system development concept was ill-defined",
to the remark that "different banks have different interests, all of which cannot be
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incorporated in the payment system design". Nonetheless, it is significant that more
than a half of the commercial bankers were not pleased with how their interests were
incorporated in the payment system design in the past five years.
Figure 7-7 Incorporation of banks' interests in the
system design
8% 2%
7.5.4. The Payment System Efficiency
1) When asked a general question: "were you, as a banker, satisfied with
functioning of the payment system from 1993 to 1997?", 55% of the commercial
bankers answered they were satisfied in principle - 4% "entirely" and 51% "to a certain
extent"; while 45% were "not satisfied" (see Figure 7-8). The difference is not
statistically significant (not even for a=0,10), which means that the opinions are split.
Nonetheless, the system where only 2% of the banks were entirely satisfied and 45% of
banks were not satisfied with "the financial system blood vessels", cannot be regarded
as a well-functioning system.
The reasons given for the bigger or smaller dissatisfaction related to the system
design, where the clearinghouse performs the large value payments beyond the control
of banks, were as follows: unequal treatment of the customers (banks), lack of
information about inflowing and outgoing funds and balances of the banks' customers
accounts when it is needed, that the banks' customers/debtors were able to make
payments outside the banks' control, inability to monitor their daily liquidity and
perform satisfactory liquidity management. It was also stated that there were occasional
mistakes in order processing, system breakdowns and other operational problems,
outdated equipment in some ZOP branches, as well as insufficient electronic netting
between the banks and the clearinghouse.
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On the other hand, the following was stated as positive about the system:
professionalism of the staff, precision, speed and efficiency of orders processing by the
clearinghouse as well as a good co-operation with local branches of the clearinghouse.
The institutional bankers were generally satisfied with the payment system functioning
so far. Remarks from the central bank related to the period when it did not have control
over the payment float which had hampered an effective monetary management.
Figure 7-8 Satisfaction with the payment services
4% entirely
2) Payment system costs (commission and fees) were generally assessed as high
- 98% of the answers, i.e. 29% as "very high" and 69% as "high", which, of course, is
statistically very significant (at ot=0,01). Only 2% of the respondents thought that the
costs were appropriate. The respondents from the central bank and bourses made a
similar assessment, while those from the clearinghouse viewed the costs as adequate
(See Figure 7-9). The respondents from the clearinghouse also thought that the revenues
generated from the fees and commission, after deduction of the government's share, did
not cover the expenses generated by the payment system services. There was a
consensus that 0.3% commission for a non-urgent credit transfer was too high, and that
the costs are unjustly increased by including a government tax as a source of the budget
revenue. The bankers thought that "what we pay is far more than the optimal costs of
the payment system services", "there are instances of double charging (of both payer
and payee) for the same transfer", "for the quality of services the price is too high", "the
fees are uniform and non-discriminating regardless of the type (value) of payment", and
that "the various budget requirements should be transparent and their financing should
be from transparent sources, i.e. from basic forms of taxes instead from the tax on
payment transactions orders".
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Figure 7-9 Payment system costs
2% adequate
3) With regards to the versatility of payment instruments and the choice among
them in the period 1993 to 1997, 22% of bankers thought that the choice was "good"
(0% "excellent"), 39% that it was "satisfactory", 39% that it was generally poor, i.e. -
35% "limited" and 4% "inadequate" (see Figure 7-10). The respondents from NBY and
the bourses were more critical of the instruments choice, and the opinions are split
between "satisfactory" and "limited". The clearinghouse representatives assessed the
choice as being "good" and to a lesser extent as "satisfactory".
The comments were: "the problem is not only the choice of instruments but the
(in)efficiency of their clearing", "there is a high use of cash which is not good", "there is
a low proportion of cashless payments" and "the cashless payments should be
encouraged", "electronic payments are insufficient in volume and number" and "the
number and use of various plastic cards is very low". On the other hand, some thought
that "the choice is just right for the state of the economic and banking system
development", "it is good enough to cover all business transactions", "it is in line with
the current payment system design" as well as that "the choice was inadequate because
there are too many payment instruments, hence lack of transparency". Even without
statistical evaluation of the divided opinions (to avoid possible bias regarding the choice
of assessment criteria), it could be argued that 39% is a high percentage of banks that
were not satisfied with the versatility of payment instruments offered and choice among
them.
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Figure 7-10 Payment instruments choice
4% inadequate
22% good
35% limited
39%
satisfactory
4) The payment system efficiency during 1993 to 1997, regarding "the speed of
payment orders processing and use of funds transferred" was assessed as high. Ten
percent of bankers thought that with regard to speed it was "very efficient", 59%
"efficient", 29% "inefficient" and only 2% "very inefficient" (see Figure 7-11). Sixty-
nine percent of respondents who assessed the system as efficient, is statistically very
significant (at oc=0.01). It could be, therefore, concluded the system was fast in
processing the banks' payment orders which enabled fast subsequent use of funds by the
payees.
Figure 7-11 Payment orders processing speed
2% 10%
5) However, a perception about what is fast and what is slow differs from bank
to bank. Some respondents who assessed the system as very efficient stated the time of
processing of one day, some others viewed the system as inefficient although they stated
the processing time was 2 hours. When asked what was "the average time for a
payment to reach the counterpart, i.e. from the moment of payment instruction by the
payer till the payee can use (make payments) with the funds" the answers differed. For
interbank payments the average (arithmetic mean) was about 2 hours, the most
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frequent answers (mode) were 1 hour and 4 hours, and the answers ranged from "10
minutes" to "one day". For businesses the average time from the moment the order was
sent until the funds can be used is also about 2 hours, the mode was 4 hours and 1 day
(bi-modal), and the answers range from 10 minutes to one day. As for the retail
payments average speed, as well as the most frequent answer, was one day, and interval
of answers ranged from half an hour to several days.
The bi-modality of the most frequent answers regarding the speed of large value
payments, both interbank and for businesses, and intervals of the answers for all three
categories of payments deserve additional attention. There are two possible
explanations. First, this fact could mean that different payment services users were
treated differently by the payment services providers, mainly the clearinghouse. Second,
it could also mean that the respondents to the survey understood the question in
different ways. Namely, they could have confused the payment clearing process
(payment order processing) with the settlement process (legal discharge of the payment
obligation).
The control interviews, however, confirmed that the speed in question was
understood as "the time period from the moment the payer initiates the payment
instruction for funds to be transferred until the moment the payee can use the funds for
further payments or withdraw cash". This means that the respondents assessed the time
of orders processing (clearing) and/or that the funds can be used for further payments
before their final settlement (which is one of the main characteristics of a net settlement
systems) Therefore, the assumption about the different treatment of various payment
services users cannot be excluded. It also seems that the respondents in general see no
relationship between liquidity and speed of payment processing.
7.5.5.	 New Payment System Design
1) The answers to the question "which settlement system (of discharging
payment obligations) do you view as adequate for Y ugoslav banking and payment
system" were equally divided between gross and net settlement system (there is no
statistically significant difference). However, the choice among the four particular
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categories differs and goes more in favour of "gross settlement system at the central
bank and with a central bank's guarantee" with 37% of the answers. The second is "net
settlement system in a commercial banks' network" - 29%, followed by "net settlement
at some other institution or a clearinghouse" - 16% and "gross settlement without the
counterpart" - 14%. Four percent of the respondents stated they were not sure or did not
answer. (See Figure 7-12.) The answers of the 'institutional' bankers are split between
gross settlement system with or without the counterpart.
Figure 7-12 Adequate settlement system
5
4
	 4%
2
14%
The fact that more than half of the bankers opted for a gross settlement system,
where the settlement is immediate at the time of the payment order", shows that many
thought the risks of discharging a payment obligation at the end of the day (the social
costs in case of deferred net settlement system), are greater than the costs of liquidity
management and keeping non-interest-bearing balances for the payment purposes (in
case of a gross settlement system). It also interesting that a small percentage of the
bankers would like to see gross settlement without the counterpart, i.e. the system that
does not offer daily overdrafts or credits or a guarantee by the central bank. This was in
spite of the emphasised problem of illiquidity, i.e. lack of adequate liquidity generating
mechanism and underdeveloped interbank (or any other) money market, by almost all
the bankers.
One possible explanation is that those banks are self-confident, with good
liquidity management and they thought that other banks should become the same or fail
under the market pressure. It could also be that the banks in question are afraid that in
13 For each and every payment order the funds should be in its full amount on the payers bank account at central bank
at time the payment order was made.
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the Yugoslav case "daylight overdrafts" can easily become "overnight credits", that
there would be double standards for different banks, and that the banking system can
and should create an efficient money market without help from the central bank.
However, it seems that the majority of banks needs the additional facility of liquidity
provision: - either a net settlement at the end of the day or daylight credits by an
efficient institution (in this case NBY). This does not necessarily mean those banks are
not disciplined or confident enough but that they may think the financial discipline
regarding the daylight overdrafts can be achieved by, for example: adequate pricing of
the credits, collateral requirements, caps and limits of bilateral and multilateral
exposures, and NBY's supervisory role of banking licence issuance and withdrawals.
2) Forty seven percent of banks are ready to "participate in costs of
establishing a clearing and settlement system they view as adequate", 8% of banks
would not finance such a system, and 45% does not know (the answers did not depend
on the type of system chosen, as asked in the previous question). The reasons given for
the "don't know" answer were unclear and uncertain terms and condition of
participation, the individual banks' stakes etc. The clearinghouse representatives stated
that the clearinghouse is ready to finance establishment of a gross system in general, and
that the clearinghouse should be controlled and operated by the central bank.
3) As far as the new payment system design is concerned, there seems to be a
consensus of opinion regarding "the participation of commercial banks as payment
services providers". 70% of banks (statistically very significant majority) thinks that
"banks should become the main providers of all types of payment services, 14% of
banks is of the opinion that "the banks should be involved more (as providers) than they
are now" and 8% "they should be involved at a later stage". The majority of comments
on the latter two statements were that the banks should gradually (eventually) become
the main providers of the services. Only 8% of the respondents were in favour of the
status quo, i.e. that "there should be no changes in the payment system organisation"
and/or "the banks should be providers of small-value/retail payments". (See Figure 7-
13.) Overall, about 30% of the respondents expressed a concern about the readiness and
ability of the banks to perform those services successfully at the time of the survey. The
institutional representatives expressed an even bigger concern, even though they do not
221
2% small value
6% no changespayments \
8% later
14% to be more
involved
700/ the main
providers
Payment Systems Reforms	 Survey of Y ugoslav Banks
disagree with the commercial bankers' opinion in principle. There seems to be an
agreement that the banks should eventually become the main payment service providers.
The banks generally advocated that it should happen immediately, while the institutions
were more reserved.
Figure 7-13 Banks' future involvement in the payment system
4) In view of "the number and type of banks that should carry the payment
services", 74.5% of banks supported the solution whereby "all banks should be
allowed to participate in the provision of the services on the same terms" and to
have the accounts at the central bank for those purposes (statistically very significant);
21.5% were in favour of "appointing only certain banks as the clearing banks"; 2% did
not answer and 2% thought that first the number of the banks should be reduced and
then all banks should carry the payment services in its entirety. The answers of the
"institutions" are similar to those of banks. The bankers who favour the selective
approach, i.e. are for the appointment of the clearing banks (as it is the case in the UK)
are the representatives of "big" banks, who regard themselves as optimal providers that
would utilise the economies of scale and economies of scope. The majority of bankers,
however, think that in order to increase the efficiency of the system, the existing
concentration of the payment system services should be replaced with the competition
among different payment services providers.
5) The next question was "What do you think about the proposition that ZOP -
the clearinghouse acts as an agent or principal for banks, i.e. to facilitate the payment
services in the name and on account of banks?" The answers were in line with the
previous answers regarding the banks as payment services providers. Twelve percent of
the respondents approved it and assessed that "the solution should be obligatory for all
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banks", and 26% "do not approve the proposition". The majority, however, thought that
either "it is good as a temporarily measure and should be obligatory for all banks for
some time" - 33.3% or "it could be a good solution for some banks and it should be on a
voluntary basis - 29%. The answers and comments point out that the proposition should
be either a temporary measure or an additional choice for banks, which cannot
perform the payment services successfully at the moment. That, as well as one quarter
of the respondents who do not approve the proposition, means the banks want to take
over the payment services and feel ready to do it. The respondents from NBY and the
bourses have similar opinions as the bankers, and the clearinghouse representatives are
in favour of the proposition that is in line with their negative assessment of banks
readiness to become the payment services providers. A certain number of banks
expressed a concern about the proposition (put forward by the clearinghouse) that it
would lead to "double charging (increase of costs)" and/or "conflict of interests" which
could lead to inefficiencies and gridlock in the payment system functioning.
7.5.6.	 Banks as Payment System Services Providers
1) When asked explicitly "do you think the banks are ready to become the
main payment services providers" 17.6% consider that "banks are ready for efficiently
providing payment services", 19.6% "banks are not ready", 6% that some banks are
ready and some not or that the level of preparedness varies; the majority opted for the
statements which express some form of reservation about the readiness. Namely 37% of
the respondents consider that "banks haven't got enough skilled staff", 55% that "banks
lack adequate technical facilities and equipment" and 39% that "banks haven't got
enough branches or that there is no adequate network of the branches" (it was allowed
to choose more than one statement). It seems that the opinions are divided and the
majority thought that the banks lack some of the resources for efficient payment system
services provision. It also seems that the major problem is that of technology,
although a significant number of respondents consider human and branch-network
resources of the banks as potential obstacles for efficient functioning of the payment
system. It has also been noted that if the existing clearinghouse's resources are to be
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'transferred' to banks (as expected by many banks) the problems would be mitigated.
The institutional bankers generally do not consider that the banks are ready yet.
2) "if your bank plans further involvement in payment operations, which
payment system services do you plan to introduce/expand in the next 12 months?"
was the next question. Banks responded that these are "all services currently offered by
the clearinghouse", "current accounts for businesses and individuals and the accounts'
transactions statements services"; "liquidity and cash flow monitoring and advice
services for the customers"; "establishment/expansion of electronic communication
(receiving payment orders electronically) with the clients"; "establishment/expansion of
electronic communication (making payments order electronically) with the
clearinghouse"; introduction, and services related to, various plastic cards; introduction
of ATMs / cash-machines; telephone banking. Twenty percent of the banks had no plans
regarding the payment services for the next twelve months at the time. Banks, therefore,
plan, if it will be institutionally and statutory possible, to take over the large value
payment services from the clearinghouse that would enable them to manage their
liquidity and control their customers (especially the debtors) accounts more efficiently.
Besides, the banks plan to expand, update and introduce some new retail payment
services.
3) In view of the introduction of new payment services, banks had plans for
"additional investments in the next twelve months" (from the time of the survey)
mainly in the equipment, and to a large extent in the training of staff and opening of new
branches. Some banks were less vague and stated particular projects and the costs
involved, such as "the new information system", "connecting to SWIFT communication
network and upgrading the equipment", "use of the REUTERS information and
communication system and purchase of the necessary equipment", "opening of a
specific number of branches at specific locations" etc. The number of banks that do not
plan to commit any additional funds is equal to the number of banks that did not have
any plans to introduce new payment services - 20% of the banks. A certain number of
banks also count on buying or getting a part of the clearinghouse's technical, network
and human resources. The impression was that of 80% of the banks that plan additional
investments, 40 percentage points are banks with concrete investment projects and
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the other half are banks that feel they can and should invest. A possible explanation for
the lack of concrete plans in those banks could be the uncertainty about the type and
timing of introduction of new systemic solutions regarding the payment and banking
system.
4) Out of sixteen categories of "payment instruments/services that the bank
offers", Yugoslav banks do not offer only two -- so-called electronic cash and electronic
banking. Nonetheless, many of the other services are offered by a small number of
banks and to a relatively small number of customers. The results are summed in Table
7-4.
Table 7-4 Payment services offered
No. Payment system services
offers - %
of banks
rank doesn't
offer - %
plans to
offer - %
rank
1 cheques/cheque books 80 1 20 6 13
2 paper credit orders 80 1 20 6 13
3 large value cross-border payments 76 3 24 2 16
4 retail cross-border payments 63 4 37 10 10
5 statements sent to home address 63 4 37 10 10
6 electronic payment orders 59 6 41 27 3
7 standing orders and direct debits 45 7 55 14 8
8 credit/ debit cards for domestic payments 29 8 71 33 1
9 "travellers" cheques 27 9 73 24 4
10 credit/debit cards for payments abroad 23 10 77 33 1
11 other plastic cards 8 11 92 10 10
12 ATM's 6 12 94 22 5
13 ATM's with built-in payment orders feature 4 13 96 12 9
14 telephone banking 4 13 96 18 6
15 electronic cash o 15 100 16 7
16 electronic banking o 15 100 6 13
The vast number of banks offer: "cheques/cheque books"- 80%, "paper credit
orders"- 80%, "cross-border large value payments"- 76%, "cross-border retail
payments"- 63% and "statements sent to home address - 63%. It comes as a surprise that
such a number of banks offer the last mentioned two services, but it seems that those
services are limited to a relatively small number of customers. The number of banks that
can receive "electronic credit transfers orders" from its customers- 59% and "standing
orders and direct debits"- 45%, is also high but again only a small percent of customers
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felt the benefits of using them 14. The next group of services is offered by only a quarter
of (usually not the same) banks, and these are: "credit/debit cards for domestic
payments" - 29%, "Travellers cheques" - 28% and "credit/debit cards for payments
abroad"- 24%. There are 8% of banks which offer "other plastic cards (for cash
withdrawals or cheque guarantee cards)". The percentage of customers that use various
plastic cards is, however, sma11 15 . About 6% of banks has some ATMs, 4% of banks has
a small number of more advance ATMs with the payment instructions facility, and 4%
"telephone banking". The percentage of customers that use those services is alas
insignificant.
From the services that some banks do not offer the following are planned to be
introduced within next two years (expiring just before the new millennium): the largest
number of banks plans to introduce credit/debit cards for domestic payments - 33% and
credit/debit cards for payments abroad - 33%; electronic payment orders (received from
the customers) with 28% are just behind; followed by "travellers" cheques - 24% and
ATMs - 22%. A number of banks were about to introduce telephone banking - 18% and
electronic cash - not less than 16% of the banks by the year 2000. Standing orders and
direct debits appeal to 14% more banks, and statement of accounts that are sent to home
address will be provided by additional 10% of banks. "Other" plastic cards will be
offered by another 10% of banks and retail cross-border payments will be provided by
another ten percent of banks who will join 63% of banks that already provide the
service. Lagging behind with 6% of banks each, are cheques and paper credit orders
(already offered by majority of banks) and electronic banking. The last is introduction of
large value cross-border payments services - 2% of the banks, who will join the 76% of
banks.
14 The data on the number of customers that use particular services are treated as confidential or a 'trade secret' but
were estimated from the personal interviews and the Banker's Association records.
15 It is estimated by the Bankers' Association that starting from 1984, when the first major credit card companies
introduced their cards to the market, till 1992 there have been about 60,000 cards in use, with about 6,000 points of
sale. Recently, domestic banks issued various plastic cards in amount of approximately 10,000 cards. For example, in
Hungary, a country in transition with similar number of inhabitants, there are 200,000 credit/debit cards (1998).
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7.5.7.	 Payment System as a Part of Banking and Monetary Systems
1) Importance of payment services as a part of banks' business strategies
was investigated with a series of questions, the first of which was - "what new
services/activities are planned to be introduced within next two years by your bank?".
80% of banks had plans and the answers have been grouped in four groups. The
payment system services seem to dominate - about one third of the new services that
will be offered by the banks are new payment services. These are: various plastic cards
for payments both domestically and internationally, large-value payments - currently
done through the clearinghouse, and the expansion of ATMs and ATM networks.
The other group of services, about 20% of the total number, relate to trade and
safekeeping of securities, and those distil down to forming stock exchange dealers,
brokers and custodian businesses departments. The third group, about 15% of the new
services, will be 'investment' bank's activities, i.e. "advising on and supporting
privatisation programmes of the companies", "valuation, marketing, registry,
underwriting and distribution of new share issues", "(involvement in) management buy-
outs, leveraged buy-outs, mergers and acquisitions", "guarantees and other foreign trade
and syndicated loans activities".
The remaining one third of the new activities is composed of: insurance
business, expanding the activities to retail/wholesale banking, home telephone banking,
geographic expansion domestically, "factoring" activities, support of "franchising" and
"leasing" activities of the companies, and mortgage services.
It seems that payment services are an important part of banks' business strategy
for the next two years. It also seems that banks will seek other than traditional 'deposit-
taking/credit institution' activities to compensate for low savings and lack of trust of
depositors as well as high risk of investments. As many banks predict that the low level
of economic activity, lack of foreign investments and low level of savings may continue
for some time, it is probable that the struggle for control over transaction money and
non-interest revenue businesses will intensify.
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2) With regard to the quality and efficiency16 of banking services and financial
intermediation in Y ugoslav banking (as of Autumn 1997), the system has been classified
as follows: a) inefficient by 61% of respondents and efficient by 39% of respondents,
and b) that it offers a medium quality of services - 93% of respondents, and poor
quality - 8% of respondents. From the possible combinations of categories, 55% of
bankers consider the system "inefficient with a medium quality of services", 39% opted
for "efficient, medium quality", and 6% for "inefficient, poor quality". The institutions'
representatives made similar assessments. Results are given in Table 7-5.
Table 7-5 Efficiency and qualityof services provided ythe banks
efficient inefficient total
high quality of services 0 0 0
medium quality 39% 53% 92%
poor quality 0 8% 8%
total 39% 61% 100%
The representative comments were: "inefficiency is partly a consequence of the
inefficiency of the economy as whole", "50% of Yugoslav banks is non-functional",
"inefficiency and poor quality of services results from unclear ownership structure and
owners/management relationship", "the quality of service will be increased as soon as
the systemic (institutional) prerequisites are firmly established", "inefficiency and
medium quality stem from the illiquidity of banks caused by a high level of bad debts",
"banks are constrained from functioning in an efficient manner by the economic
environment and banks' shareholders", "non-existence of adequate legislation and high
risk of placements (hence high required return on investments) prevent introduction of
new services and consumer credits to the customers", "poor cash flow management of
the companies (illiquidity), lack of financial discipline, inefficient legal system are the
causes of the banking system inefficiencies".
The majority of comments, therefore, emphasise the problems of "liquidity",
"debtors", "ownership structure", "inefficiency of the legal system" and
"inefficiency of the economy". Could such a banking system provide efficient payment
16 Efficiency was defined as "right timing and speed of a banking service required".
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services (or more efficient than the clearinghouse) will be looked at in the subsequent
sections.
3) When asked about "the quality of placements and assets composition of
Y ugoslav banks as whole" at the time of survey, nobody rated it with "high level", eight
percent feels that it is at a "satisfactory level", but as many as 80% of the respondents
thinks the quality is at a "low level", and 12% at "very low level" (see Figure 7-14).
The responses of the institutions do not differ significantly. The bankers commented
that this is because: " the inability to charge the interest and get the principal amount
back from the debtors when they are due", "bad debts", "ownership structure, whereby
the owners are the debtors and because the legal system protects the debtors", "it reflects
the quality and credit worthiness of the economy i.e. the founders/shareholders of the
banks", "banks are not completely independent when making credit decisions but cannot
force debtors to repay the credits", "there is a high influence of politics on the credit
placements", "high risk of investments", "inadequate collateral requirements and
guarantees" and because of "low level of economic activity, non-servicing of frozen
foreign exchange deposits and foreign credits".
It is, therefore, no wonder that banks want to explore other avenues of business
activities and get away from traditional deposit institution role. Payment system services
seem an obvious choice.
Figure 7-14 Quality of placements and assets
structure
12%
very low
8%
satisfactory
80% low
4) Adequacy of the number of banks in relation to the needs of the businesses
and efficiency of financial intermediation has also been looked at. Two percent of the
respondents think that "there is a need for more banks in the system", 31% that "there is
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an adequate number of banks", and 59% is of the opinion that there are more banks
in the system than necessary, i.e. 31% thinks that "there is a larger number of banks
than optimal", and 28% thinks that "there are far too many banks". Eight percent of the
respondents have chosen "other", i.e. that number of banks is irrelevant or that this is
not a meaningful indicator. See Figure 7-15. Those who think that the system is
overcrowded are the statistically significant majority only at a=0.10 confidence interval.
The institutional bankers think that there are more or too many banks in relation to the
efficiency of the financial intermediation.
Figure 7-15 Adequacy of the number of banks
7% 2% need for more
irrelevant
31% more than needed
Those who were in favour of a smaller number of banks stated: "fifty percent of
banks is de facto closed but they produce costs of the labour force and implicit financial
subsidies", "for the existing level of the economic activity there are too many banks",
"because of the inadequate payment system legislation, with regard to discharging of
payment obligations and problem of debtors, companies seek or form new banks to deal
with their needs instead of paying back the debts", "there are many insolvent banks",
"the majority of the banks cannot keep up with the developments of banking industry".
Others, however, think that: "there is a sufficient number of banks but they lack
financial strength to support the needs of the economy", "market forces should deal with
the issue", "the number of banks has no influence on efficiency of financial
intermediation" and "the number of banks would be irrelevant if there was a favourable
environment for competition and customer pressure".
5a) For those who thought that there are more banks than necessary or that the
system can be rationalised the question was what would be the adequate solution in
regard to the improvement of the system?". 85% of the bankers that responded to this
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question was more than 59% of bankers who agreed with the relevant statements in the
previous question. Sixteen percent of the banks remained consistent in relation to the
answers to the previous question and opted for the statement "let the market forces deal
with the number and quality of the banks". Those 16% and 15% of the bankers who did
not answer totals 31% of respondents who think the system has adequate number of
banks or that the number is irrelevant. However the percentage is statistically
significantly different from 41% of respondents who have agreed with those statements
in the previous question17.
From the given statements or their combination 16% of bankers have chosen
"bank mergers and acquisitions facilitated/helped by the government", 28% agreed with
"sell/privatise or liquidate certain number of socially owned banks" 39% thinks that
"there should be tougher licensing procedures (more prudent requirements)", 42% is in
favour of "tougher surveillance and supervision of banks liquidity and capital
requirements (license withdrawals)", and as many as 59% of the bankers think "let the
market forces deal with the number and quality of banks" but in combination with some
of the other 'measures'. The favourite combinations were: "tougher licensing
procedure" and "tougher surveillance and supervision measures", then "sell/privatise
'social' banks" and then "let the market forces...", followed by "tougher surveillance
and supervision" and "let the market forces...". Therefore, the banks think that there
should be tougher licensing and licence withdrawal procedures and then the banks
should be left to organise according to market principals. The representatives of the
institutions agreed but placed an emphasis on the need for tougher requirements and on
the more prudent competitive environment.
This has implications for the number and type of banks that could operate as
payment services providers, hence the other considerations such as technical, human
and branch facilities.
6) The next important issue was whether there was a need for the banking
system restructuring. The bankers were asked whether an overall organised
restructuring was required. 53% answered "yes", 31% "yes, but with minimal
17 It is tentative to conclude that the real number of those who think that the system can be rationalised regarding the
number of banks, i.e. that the market forces in Yugoslavia cannot solve the problem, is bigger and, therefore,
statistically very significant.
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involvement of the government", 12% said "no" and 4% "don't know" (see Figure 7-
16). Therefore, the majority thought that the organised restructuring is required, but
a large percentage were concerned with the involvement of the state in the process. The
expressed concern and reservation about the government's involvement were explained
by: "inefficiency of the state administration", "unequal treatment of the banks",
"pushing for certain solutions of certain banks", "lack of trust in the government's
objectivity and efficiency" and "uncertainty about the future role of the government".
The replies of some of the bankers who opted for "yes, but with minimal involvement of
the government" were inconsistent with later responses to the subsequent questions. The
inconsistency, however, is in line with the lack of trust in the state.
Figure 7-16 Need for organised restructuring
4% don't know
53% yes
6a) For those who answered "yes" the question was "how do you think it should
be done?". 62% of the bankers responded. From the given statements or their
combinations (not more than three) 25% of the respondents have chosen "restructuring18
of majority of socially owned banks at the same time", 24% were in favour of
"restructuring of only certain banks one at the time"; 18% 'voted' for "by
selling/privatising (or liquidating) majority of those banks", 10% were for
"selling/privatising some of the banks without the restructuring", and 18% for
"selling/privatising some of the banks after the restructuring"; 20% would like to see
"changing of the legal framework or banking system and operations"; and the favourite
with 38% was "by attracting foreign buyers/investors with special concessions". The
most frequent combinations included "attracting foreign buyers/investors" and the
18 Restructuring was defined as: "... by depositing additional capital, shifting the banks liabilities to the state (i.e. to
its agency), asset clearing, change of the management, merging and acquiring social banks - by the state and form its
funds and/or by issuing new public debt".
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winning combination (the most votes individually or in combination) was:
restructuring of some banks, the sale/privatisation of the majority of socially
owned banks and the attraction of foreign investors (shareholders) with special
concessions.
The comments were that "the restructuring cannot be done without the
involvement of the state", "in view of the heritage of the previous system, the
government should 'clean' the banks' liabilities by accepting the frozen forex savings
and foreign credits as it own liability", "the problem of frozen forex savings cannot be
resolved without the state", "the state should be involved but only to facilitate the
transition and help change the legislation", "additional foreign capital is necessary",
"only the involvement of foreign banks and investors can put pressure on domestic
banks to transform", "there are not enough real resources, we need foreign capital".
6b) The respondents who answered "yes, but with a minimal involvement of the
government" or "no" were asked "why?". The bankers expressed their reservations
and concern because: "the state, based on the past experience, makes counter-
productive moves and is inconsistent in its policies", "the government should provide an
adequate legal framework that would enable market forces to deal with the matter",
"unequal treatment of the banks", "the result will be inefficient bank that can be
controlled by the state and certain entities", "the role of the state is to make stable social
and political environment with low inflation", "the state should only be involved in
resolving the frozen forex deposits problem" and "because it could be argued that a
certain proportion of the social assets belongs to the state it should have a say in the
restructuring.
7) The bankers were then asked "what do you think is important for establishing
a sound and efficient banking system in Yugoslavia within next three years?".
Fourteen categories, and two 'other', were offered with an ordinal scale of importance
(consisting of four degrees) next to each category. Only one degree of importance for
each category was allowed. The weights 5,3,1,0, and 0 were allocated to each choice of
"very important", "important", "unimportant", "very unimportant" and without answer,
respectively. The results are presented in Table 7-6.
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Table 7-6 lm ortant for establishina a sound and efficient bankinci system
rank Category points
scored
percent of
maximum
score
1 changes in regulatory framework to support modern market
economy
228 89%
2 tough monetary policy and low inflation 224 88%
3 tougher terms of lending and credit rating assessment 223 87%
4 attracting foreign investors and shareholders 202 79%
5 investing in staff training and skills by the banks 189 74%
6 changes in the ownership and shareholders' structure 186 73%
7 banks involvement in securities and financial market activities 181 71%
8 quality and choice of services improvement 176 69%
9 investing in new technologies and new services development 173 68%
10 improvement of the payment system (speed, choice, costs, risks) 169 66%
11 banking system restructuring by the government 164 64%
12 banks' debtors (companies) restructuring by the government 155 61%
13 specialisation of banks in particular fields of activities 98 38%
14 concentration/enlargement of the banks (trough M&As) 89 35%
The highest ranked is "changes in the regulatory framework to support
market economy". The ranking did not even include six more "other" categories added
by the respondents (which were assessed as "very important") that distil down to
"efficient legal system" or "efficient courts". The second and third most important
categories were "tough monetary policy (independent central bank) and low
inflation" and "tougher terms of lending and credit rating assessment" respectively.
Just behind is "attracting foreign investors and shareholders". High ranked are also
"staff training by the banks" and "changes of the ownership and shareholders structure".
At the very bottom with regard to the importance are "specialisation of the banks..." and
"concentration/enlargement of the banks" 19 . It should be also noted that only the last
two measures did not pass the trashold of importance set at 151 points 20 21 . The
institutions made similar assessments but ranked "changes of the ownership structure"
higher at the fourth place.
19 Interestingly it is one of the rare policy measures that the government supported or carried out so far and with some
enthusiasm too.
20 The treshold was set at the level of possible polarisation in relation to the importance of a certain category,
whereby: 26x 1 (unimportant) + 25x 5 (very important) = 151 , which is also 60% of the maximum score.
21 It should be noted that the rank list of answers is not different from those that use weights of, for example,
/4,3,2,1,0 /, /5,3,1,-1,0/ and /10,6,2,1,0/ allocated to the degrees of importance.
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7.5.8.	 Foreign Banks, Investors and Competition
Besides the answers to the previous questions which identified the involvement
of foreign banks and investors as important for the banking system, and implicitly
payment system, restructuring, the issue was explored further with two more questions.
1) When asked "what do you think about allowing foreign financial institutions
to do the banking business in Y ugoslavia on the same terms as domestic banks?" (with
a choice of combination of maximum two statements), 50% of banks agrees that "it
would increase the competition and overall quality of the services", 63% agrees
with "it would encourage foreign investments in domestic banks and the economy",
37% think that "it would be desirable only after the domestic banks are restructured"
and 27% that "the entry should be limited to joint ventures". Nobody opted for "it
would jeopardise the survival of the domestic banks" or that "current terms and
conditions regarding foreign banks should not change" (0% each). As many as 42
percent of the banks chose only one or a combination of the first two statements. The
results are shown in Figure 7-17. The institutions generally agreed with the banks.
Figure 7-17 Increased entry of foreign banks
4
15%
increased competition and quality and/or more investments
increased competition and quality / only after restructuring
more investments / limit to joint ventures
after restructuring and/or limit to joint ventures
The bankers commented that: "new technologies should be introduced in the
banks and economy with the help of foreign partners", "it will be only when foreign
banks enter the system that it will be pushed with the processes of transition,
restructuring and adaptation of Yugoslav banks to the internationally accepted banking
practice", "without the foreign capital there could be no revival of Yugoslav economy
and the banking system". However some were more reserved and stated that "the
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restructuring of banks is a prerequisite for other changes", "domestic banks would
probably not withstand the competition of foreign banks", and "during the transition
process the foreign banks would acquire 'large values' with minimal investments".
2) The last question was: "If you plan to establish or expand co-operation with
foreign banks for offering financial services domestically or internationally in the next
twelve months, what will it be in?" The largest number of banks plan some form of
business alliance with foreign banks with regard to cross-border payment services
- 77 percent. Namely 55% of banks intend to "set up new correspondent accounts" and
22% "participation/membership in some of the payment networks (e.g. TIPA, DISCUS,
MOS, ECHO, EUROURO, etc.)". 47% of banks have plans for "staff training for providing
services and/or use of relevant technologies" with a help of a foreign partner. 43% of
banks intends to form more concrete alliances with foreign banks - 20% "setting up a
joint bank/subsidiary in Yugoslavia", 14% "setting up a joint bank/subsidiary abroad",
and 14% "some other form of joint venture, merger of acquisition". The total of 24% of
banks has no plans for any form of co-operation with foreign banks until the year 1999.
As for co-operation within next five years, another 10% of banks have plans
(excluding the establishment of new corespondent accounts). The banks who had no
intention to form alliances with foreign banks expressed a 'reactive' attitude and stated
that "the economic environment is not favourable for any long term planing", "we will
accept any mutually acceptable offer for alliance from abroad if, and when, it comes"
and "it depends on the interests of our customers".
7.6. Summary and conclusions
7.6.1.	 The results of the survey
1. Overall, the survey was considered to be a success. It covered a representative sample
of the population and provided significant insights into the issues under
investigation. Furthermore, the results of the research and some of its
recommendations were used at different forums by the Yugoslav Bankers'
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Association for formal and informal propositions towards the payment system's
improvement.
2. Characteristics of the banks:
• A typical Y ugoslav bank, given the profile of the banks surveyed, is 'socially'
owned, 'successful', with 'middle' assets size (about 184 million dollars on
average), with capital ranging on average from 65 to 167 million Dinars (11 to 28
million dollars), possesses up to 10 branches, has about 50 employees, it is
'universal' with small number of customers. The mean values, however, do not
concentrate in majority of the banks - the modes are different from the means.
• One fifth of banks possess two thirds of total number of branches. 25% 'big'
banks employs 75% of all persons employed in banks. The amount of
shareholders funds at about nine percent of banks (big socially owned banks) is the
same as at 91% other banks together. Yugoslav banking is dominantly 'socially'
owned. The banking system is concentrated, hence the concentration of problems in
a small number of 'social' banks which has implications on the scope of problems
(identified by the survey) and a way in which they may be resolved.
3. Involvement of the banks:
• A great majority of the bankers surveyed had been interested and involved in the
payment system debate. This indicates the importance of the issue and the
respondents' knowledge of the matter.
• The bankers feel that their interests were not satisfactorily reflected in the
payment system design and legislation in the last five years. The institutions think
that the bankers interest have been taken into account and incorporated in the
system's design.
4. The payment system efficiency:
• With regard to the functioning of the payment system within 1993-1997, the
opinions were divided - one half of the bankers were generally satisfied and the
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other were not. There is an indication the clearinghouse discriminated between users
of the services.
• The payment system costs in 1993-1997 are almost unanimously assessed as high.
• The payment instruments choice during the period was assessed positively by
many of the bankers, but there is a significant number of banks and institutional
representatives who think the choice was limited. The remarks relate to the high
percentage of cash transactions and low proportion of 'electronic' and plastic card
payments in overall payment transactions.
• The payment system was generally assessed as efficient with regard to the speed of
payments in 1993-1997 period. The perception of what is fast and what is slow
differs from one bank to another.
• For interbank and other large value payments the average time of order processing
was about two hours, and for retail payments one day. Bi-modality of the highest
frequency of large value payments and ranges of processing time for all payments
could point to the different treatment of some banks by the clearinghouse and
discrimination between customers by the banks.
5. New payment system design:
• As for the new payment system design, the answers were equally split between
gross and net settlement systems. Bankers would like to see the most "gross
settlement system at the central bank", followed by "net settlement system in a
commercial banks' network". The institutions favour gross system in general. The
choice of a gross settlement system with so-called "real-time" clearing and
settlement, would imply that the present "two hours" processing of the payment
orders should be reduced to no more than five minutes.
• About one half of the banks would finance a settlement system they view as adequate.
The other half were not sure because of unclear terms and conditions.
• It appears that bankers agreed that banks should become the main providers of
the payment system services.
• A majority of the banks were in favour of all banks becoming the providers on
equal terms. 'The institutions' felt the same.
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• The proposal that the clearinghouse acts as the agent, or principal, for banks in
providing payment services for their customers seems somewhat controversial. The
answers and comments point out that it should be only temporarily or an optional
solution for the banks who choose to use it.
• It can be concluded that the opinions about preparedness of banks for taking over
payment system services are divided, and the majority of bankers assessed that banks
lack some of the resources required for the successful provision of the services. It
seems that non-readiness or a partial readiness of the banks is the problem of
technology and equipment, although many bankers assessed that the banking skills
and inadequate branch network add to the obstacles of a successful take-over. 'The
institutions' assessed in principle that banks were not ready yet.
6. Payment system services and business strategy:
• Banks intend to take over control over large-value payments from the
clearinghouse which would enable them to improve their liquidity management and
control payments of their customers-debtors. In addition, banks intend to expand,
update and introduce new retail payment instruments and services.
• Banks plan to commit additional funds to the equipment and technology, and, to a
lesser extent, in staff training and/or recruitment and branch expansion.
Uncertainties regarding the type and time of introduction of the new system were
given as reasons of a lack of the concrete projects in some banks.
• Yugoslav banks can offer the majority of internationally existing payment system
services, but a number of the services, especially 'electronic' and 'plastic' payments,
are provided by a small number of banks and to a limited number of customers.
Efficiency and quality of the banks' services were not investigated.
• From the services that some banks do not offer at the moment, the following are
planned to be introduced by most banks within next two years: ATM networks,
credit/debit cards for payments home and abroad, credit transfer orders received
electronically from the customers, and "travellers" cheques.
• The payment system services seem to be an important part of overall banks'
strategies. 80% of banks intend to introduce new services/activities by the year 2000.
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One third of the services will copmprise payment system services, 20% securities
trading or custody services, 15% are 'investment bank' activities. The remaining
third is composed of miscellaneous services. It seems that Yugoslav banks want to
get away from traditional deposit-taking activities.
7. Payment system as a part of banking and monetary systems:
• The banking system, which is likely to become the hub for the payment system
services, was assessed by the banks as inefficient and that it offers a medium
quality of services. The major problems identified are those of illiquidity, debtors,
ownership structure and inefficient legal system.
• Quality of placements and asset structure of all Yugoslav banks at the time of survey
were given low marks by the bankers. It is the bankers' opinion that the low level of
economic activity, non-servicing of the frozen forex savings and foreign credits, are
responsible for bad debts, the level of savings by the households and lack of foreign
investments, respectively. It seems that "it is a reflection of the quality of the
economy, i.e. banks' shareholders", "banks are not completely independent in
making credit decisions but lack power to get their placements back", and that "the
legal system protects debtors".
• The majority of respondents thought that there were more banks than needed,
which unnecessarily burdens the system. A number of banks emphasised the poor
quality of the banks' services and their overall assets and some others think that the
number of banks is irrelevant. An adequate solution for the problem in bankers
opinion is to introduce a tougher licensing procedure and surveillance of the
banks by the institutions and then to let the market forces take over.
• Bankers agree that the Yugoslav banking system as whole needs overall organised
restructuring, but many have expressed a concern about the involvement of the
state. The 'social' banks would like to get the government's help and additional
capital, but seem reluctant to let the government interfere in ownership and
management structure and business decisions. They did not say what is in it for the
state, but feel the state 'owes' them the help.
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• The reluctance and mistrust regarding the involvement of the state was justified
by: "inefficiency of the state administration", "arbitrary terms and conditions of the
assistance and involvement", "the state's interests in certain banks or particular
solutions", and "the later (continual) involvement of the state".
• The wining combination for dealing with the problems of 'socially owned' banks is:
restructuring of a few 'social' banks, sale-privatisation (or liquidation) of the
majority of 'social' banks, and attracting foreign buyers and investors with
certain concessions or more favourable terms. In light of the heritage of
communism it is considered that the frozen forex savings and foreign credits
repayments should become the responsibility (liability) of the state. The involvement
of foreign partners and investors is a key to starting a recovery of the financial system
as a whole.
• The most important factors for establishing a sound and efficient banking system by
the new millennium are "changes in legal framework to support market
economy", "efficient monetary control and low inflation" and "tougher terms of
lending and credit rating assessment" (financial discipline). Also important are
"attracting foreign investors and shareholders", "investing in and training of the
banks' staff" and "changes of the ownership and shareholders structure". The least
important according to the respondents are "specialisation of the banks" and
"concentration/enlargement of banks". Improvements of the payment system scored
two thirds of the maximum possible score on the importance scale.
8. Foreign banks and investors:
• Involvement of foreign banks, by allowing them to do the business on the same terms
and conditions as domestic banks, would increase the competition and quality of
services, and encourage foreign investments in domestic banks and the
economy. Some bankers thought that more favourable terms for the entry of foreign
banks should be introduced only after the system's restructuring. In general, the
involvement would help the introduction of new services and technology, the
restructuring and modernisation of domestic banks, and the inflow of fresh capital.
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• With regard to establishing/expanding co-operation or alliance with foreign banks
by the end of 1998, three quarters of the banks plan some form of business
alliance with foreign bank in regard to cross-border payment services. About
half of the banks intend to train their staff with a help of foreign partners, and 43% of
banks will be involved in certain joint ventures, mergers or take-overs. Only 15% of
the banks have no plans for co-operation with foreign entities whatsoever within next
five years.
7.6.2.	 The hypotheses testing results
• The system was assessed as efficient with regard to the speed, neutral or efficient
regarding the payment instruments choice, costly and (implicitly) risky within 1993-
1997 period. The results of the survey, based on the bankers responses, cannot
confirm the assumption of the system inefficiency during the period in question, i.e.
Ho - 1 cannot be rejected.
• Regardless of the previous conclusion, respondents think that the system should be
reformed. The roles of banks, the central bank and the clearinghouse should change,
so that they: a) become the providers of the services, b) have complete control over
monetary policy implementation and c) limit their scope and number of activities,
respectively. Therefore, from the survey results alone, the hypothesis Ho - 2 is
rejected. It is not conclusive whether the answers regarding the payment system
design can be used to test Ho -1, i.e. as to whether the answers reflected
dissatisfaction with the payment system or the need to establish an adequate payment
system for the future.
• Banks' willingness to take over payment system services, as well as the preparations
for it, is evident. The evidence in relation to their readiness and capability are not
convincing. There are, however, grounds for assuming that the banks will gradually
and soon become completely ready. The respondents feel that the competition among
the payment services providers, accompanied with an adequate institutional
framework, would result in a much better payment system than in the last five years.
Also, it is considered that with the help of institutions, the problems can be resolved
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sooner rather than later. The null hypothesis Ho - 3, that banks should not take over
the provision of the payment system services, is, therefore, rejected.
• The Yugoslav banking system as a whole is inefficient and inadequate from the best
social practice perspective. Given the number and size of the problems it needs
overall organised restructuring. Payment system reform, although important, can
achieve little or nothing on its own. Ho - 4 is, therefore, rejected. An unresolved
issue is the type and scope of involvement of the state.
• The involvement of foreign banks, investors and institutions in Yugoslav banking
system functioning, i.e. the process of the banking system liberalisation, is crucial for
the recovery of the banking and payment systems. Increased entry and involvement
would result in competition, investment, better quality and more versatile services.
Therefore, Ho - 5 is rejected.
Some of the hypotheses testing results are arguably biased because of the
allocation of higher weights to assumed future functioning of the system than to the
payment system efficiency, as it was assessed by the bankers. Nonetheless, the
conclusions of the survey are in line with the earlier findings with regard to the payment
system efficiency. Furthermore, the issue of the future payment and banking system, i.e.
the system design, is critically determined by normative economics.
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1. Payment Systems in CIT
8.1.1. The Main Findings
This research has identified the major payment systems' characteristics and
problems in the eleven CIT and Yugoslavia and has put forward some suggestions. The
payment system reforms in CIT illustrate the relationship between payment system and
monetary policy and control. The specific economic environment in CIT made the
relationship even more evident and transparent.
The analysis demonstrated that the critical elements of a successful payment
system reform are its compatibility and co-ordination with the monetary and banking
systems and their restructuring. A clear development strategy and an understanding of
the place and role of the payment system in a monetary economy are the decisive
factors for achieving that aim. The major obstacles are the lack of real political will to
carry out the reforms and, to a lesser extent, lack of skills and resources.
Regardless of the timeliness and thoroughness of the payment system reforms in
CIT, they were all initiated and supervised by the central banks. This has contributed to
a relatively fast payment system development in transitional countries, on the one hand,
and lack of private solutions and systems, on the other.
The retail payment systems remain an underdeveloped area. Cash is still the
dominant means of payment, and the choice and availability of other payment
instruments are limited. This is the case even in the more advanced transitional
economies, such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Possible resolution
of the problem may lie in either further involvement of the central banks or
encouragement of private initiative and competition through the legislation,
liberalisation and opening systems for the foreign financial institutions.
In summary, many differences across the transitional countries relate to:
• The levels of development of banking, legal and technical infrastructures.
• Approach to the reforms and thoroughness of the reforms.
• Payment system co-ordination with monetary policy.
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8.1.2. The Main Problems and Inefficiencies
The common problems that CIT are faced with relate to monetary
policy/payment system co-ordination, banking and legal system development,
improvement of technical infrastructure and encouragement of competition. The
inefficiencies, resulting from the poor system design and/or co-ordination of different
public policies and authorities, are reflected in a 'non-optimal' trade-off between the
payment system risks and costs. The public policy implications, thus, relate to how best
to achieve overall risk reduction, financial discipline and trust in the system, trading off
the policy objectives with long-term and secondary effects on competition, moral
hazard and private initiative.
An overview of the findings for the eleven CIT and Yugoslavia is presented in
table 8-1. These examples (the CIT experiences) can serve as references to decision-
makers, in countries undertaking similar reforms, when dealing with potential problems,
i.e. how not to repeat the same mistakes, what to do to shorten the process and reduce
its costs, and what solutions may work given the particular circumstances.
Table 8-1 Payment Systems inefficiencies in the CIT durina the reforms
Country
Clearing
and
settlement
risks
Payment
system costs
Payment
float
Slow and/or
unreliable
transfer of
monetary
funds
Limited
choice of
effective
monetary
instruments
Spill-over of
intraday
into
interday
borrowing
Bulgaria V V V
China V V V V V
Croatia V V V
Czech Rep V V
Estonia V V V
Hungary V V
Lithuania V V V V
Poland V V V V V
Russia V V V V V
Slovakia V V V V V
Slovenia V V V
Yugoslavia V V V V
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8.1.3. Payment System and Monetary Policy Relationship in CIT
The analysis of payment systems in 11 CIT and Yugoslavia, against the
monetary policy framework, illustrates the place and importance of payment systems in
monetary economy and the relationship between the monetary policy and control and
payment systems (and payment system reforms). Because of the underdeveloped money
and capital markets and institutional infrastructure, as well as the early stages of
systems' developments and/or reforms in CIT, the relationship (often hidden or implicit
in developed financial systems), was transparent in CIT.
Some of the most illustrative examples of incompatibilities between the payment
systems and monetary policies (and/or their reforms) in CIT are presented in table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Payment system and monetary policy incompatibilities in the CIT
Country
No (timely)
payment
system
reform
Lack of
payment
system
strategy
initially
Autonomous
payment
system
functioning
Ineffective
monetary
policy
Did not
understand
(or use to its
advantage)
the
relationship
No co-
operation
or political
will
Lack of
resources
and/or
skills
Bulgaria V V V V V
China V V V
Croatia V V V V
Czech Rep V V
Estonia V V V V
Hungary V V
Lithuania V V V
Poland V V V V V
Russia V V V
Slovakia V V V
Slovenia V V V
Yugoslavia V V V V V
The examples of both the payment system/monetary policy relationship in the
12 CIT, and of lessons for other countries that are undertaking the payment and/or
monetary policy reforms, are summarised in the box 8-1.
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Box 8-1 Payment system and monetary policy relationship — examples and lessons
Bulgaria China Croatia
The	 demand	 for	 settlement
reserves was	 blurred by	 the
demand for liquidity and actual
insolvency. No adequate payment
system, to discriminate between
them.	 Debt-servicing	 difficulties
and illiqudity were confused with
payment	 delays.	 The	 payment
system was inadequate to support
the new/modern monetary policy
instruments, as it was not quick or
reliable enough,
Long payment delays and large
float are at odds with efficient,
market oriented, banking system.
Inefficient	 payment	 system
prevents	 both	 inter-regional
banking competition and	 active
liquidity	 management.	 The
central bank/ commercial banks
relationship,	 as	 well	 as	 the
effective	 FIs'	 supervision	 and
surveillance, are key to efficient,
risk-less, payment flows in China,
The clearinghouse had control
over payment float and was able
to create 'quasi-deposits'. It was
able	 to	 prioritise	 between	 the
payments of different parties and
decide on the speed of payment
orders processing. This illustrates
the	 importance	 of	 payment
system and monetary policy co-
ordination;	 of determining the
ultimate authority for both; and
of competition in payment system.
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Private markets development and
competition, as well as the private
initiative may be hindered by
the central bank's involvement,
Increased	 supervision	 role	 and
reduced operational involvement
of the central bank in the payment
system may benefit the Czech
banking	 system.	 Causes	 for
delays and risks in the payment
system (and its negative impact on
monetary policy) can be found in
the banking system.
With the currency board, the
DNS system provided an optimal
payment	 system	 solution
regarding the liquidity provision
and smooth system functioning.
Fixed foreign exchange rate and
currency board catered for low
inflation and interest rates, and the
DNS system contributed to the
reduced	 need	 for	 liquidity
/reserves. Also compatible were
(no)	 intraday	 credit	 and
required reserves provisions.
Settlement delay - gridlock and a
possibility	 of	 'unwinding'	 can
occur in a 'gross' system if the
settlement is not real-time. The
combination
	 of	 deferred
settlement	 and	 full	 cover	 for
payment orders (gross clearing),
denies	 the	 participants	 the
advantages	 of	 both	 reduced
liquidity requirements	 of a	 net
clearing system and elimination of
credit risk in a gross settlement
system.
Lithuania Poland Russia
The Lithuanian experience shows
that in an immature (transitional)
market: a) central bank's lender
of	 last	 resort	 function	 is
invaluable	 in	 case	 of	 systemic
crisis and b) there is a need for an
additional liquidity facility other
than	 interbank	 money	 market,
During	 the	 Lithuanian	 banking
system crisis the money market
stopped functioning. The payment
system	 arrangements	 didn't
provide liquidity for payments.
The	 payment	 system	 with
dominant manual procedures and
use of fax and telex, prevented the
central bank from measuring the
demand for settlement reserves
and assessing the payment system
risks. The monetary policy could
not rely on the system to transfer
the monetary claims in a fast and
reliable fashion. Thus, the choice
and effectiveness of monetary
policy	 instruments	 (especially
indirect ones) was limited,
In	 Russia,	 RTGS	 will	 put	 a
pressure	 on	 banks	 for	 higher
reserves	 and/or	 better	 liquidity
management, and may result in a
high	 demand	 for	 additional
liquidity from the central bank.
Gridlock may occur every time
there is increased uncertainty or
macroeconomic turbulence. With
no charge for the intraday credit,
there should be 'hair-cuts' on the
collateral to account for potential
fall in value of the securities.
Slovakia Slovenia Yugoslavia
The Slovakian	 payment system
was open to liquidity, credit and
systemic	 risks	 relating	 to	 the
institutional arrangements and
legal	 constraints.	 Monetary
policy	 was	 simultaneously
pursuing two conflicting goals.
The	 proportion	 of autonomous
money supply was extensive and
the sterilisation of foreign capital
inflows	 effects	 on	 the	 money
supply	 was	 expensive	 and
unsuccessful,
With banks as the main providers
of the payment services, and given
the banking system characteristics,
there is a threat of systemic risk
should the main players fail. A
sound banking system, clear of
bad	 debts	 and political	 lending
decisions,	 with	 effective
ownership	 and	 management
structure, is the best guarantee of
financial	 stability,	 a	 favourable
monetary policy environment and
the payment risks reduction.
Economy with weak firms and
many insolvent banks may not be
well	 suited	 for	 any	 queuing
system and/or potential gridlock
problems,	 because	 there	 is	 no
efficient money and interbank
market to provide liquidity; the
payees may prefer cash or even
barter	 as	 the	 delivery-versus-
payment	 is	 not	 ensured	 if	 a
financial	 institution,	 not	 a
payment	 counterpart	 —	 payor,
becomes illiquid;
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8.2. The Yugoslav Payment System: Conclusions and Recommendations
8.2.1.	 Conclusions
The Yugoslav payment system reform was an attempt to bring the operations
and efficiency of the payment system as well as its legislation in line with the accepted
international practice, standards and legislation. There are, however, some ambiguities
and weaknesses regarding the proposed new system in view of the state of the banking
and monetary systems. Firstly, the ability of the users to make payments will be tied to
the liquidity of the institutions they have the accounts with. Secondly, there is no
provision of the central bank's guarantee of the finality of the payments. In line with the
principles and desire to strengthen monetary control and discipline is also the regulation
on the licence withdrawals, based on the liquidity requirements.
Given the freedom of choice of a payment operations provider and the parallel
existence of the clearinghouse's giro and banks' current accounts systems, it is no
wonder that the businesses did not transfer their transaction balances to the banks.
When their ability to make payments is tied to the institutions' liquidity, the users
normally prefer the clearinghouse's giro system, as it cannot become illiquid.
Without the central bank's guarantee of finality of payment transactions, i.e.
intraday credit facilities, it is difficult to restore the trust in banks and to transfer the
payment operations to the banking system considering the underdeveloped money
market.
Even though the moral hazard may be reduced to a minimum, system cannot
restore trust and discipline as there is a constant threat of the systemic risk. The
economy, with weak firms and many insolvent banks, is not well suited for potential
gridlock problems, because there is no efficient capital, money and interbank market to
provide liquidity, and the payees may prefer cash or even barter as the delivery-versus-
payment is not ensured because of a possibility that a financial institution, not a
payment counterpart - payor, becomes illiquid. Furthermore, there is not a single
deposit protection scheme at the moment in the system and the foreign exchange
deposits that were guaranteed by the Federation are frozen (are not being serviced),
adding to the climate of mistrust in the banks.
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The envisaged system may contribute to both the efficient monitoring of the
financial institutions and, therefore, a reduction of agency costs in the banking system.
This, however, seems more suitable for the later stages of the reform when there is an
increased sophistication of both the reformed banks and financially strong clients
capable of negotiation. The main advantages of a gross settlement system operated by a
central bank, i.e. that of reducing systemic and credit risks and finality of settlement,
could be missing from the system. Without the central bank's guarantee it would be
hard to restore trust in the shaken banking system, without trust there is no restructuring
of the banking system, without the restructuring of the banking system there is, alas, no
effective monetary policy. Without the effective monetary policy, in turn, there could
not be a favourable macroeconomic environment for the transition and restructuring of
the economy.
Notwithstanding the importance of liquidity provision arrangements in a
payment system and its reform, payment system reform cannot compensate for the
banks' restructuring and the enactment of the monetary control, although, the system
should help the achievement of the goals. Therefore, the banks"recapitalisation' and
privatisation should accompany or precede the liquidity requirements measures. It
seems too ambitious and somewhat inappropriate for the central bank to deal with the
issues of the high number of banks and financial discipline with the mentioned
measures, especially because the non-serviced FX deposits are guaranteed by the
Federation and implicitly NBY. It is, therefore, in the government's and Central Bank's
interest to help the banking system to start operating profitably and in restoring a
customer base, making viable banks able to repay the loans and deposits.
Dealing with the number and quality of the banks should be a part of a thorough
restructuring plan, not a by-product of the liquidity measures and payment system
design, especially as there is no adequate and effective legal system in place. Therefore,
the merits of separating monetary policy and the financial system supervision functions
into two separate organisational entities should be considered. The separation could be
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clear-cut as in the UK (a more permanent arrangement) or, indeed, as in some
transitional and developing countriesl.
8.2.2. Recommendations
If the aim of the financial system reform in Yugoslavia is to strengthen
monetary control and financial discipline, together with reconstruction of the banking
sector, the issues of moral hazard, private monitoring and reduction of agency costs, are
subordinate to those of systemic risk and rebuilding of the banking sector and trust in
financial intermediaries - at least in a short run. As argued, the choice of a payment
system has an influence on all of them.
The advantages of RTGS system with no queuing or guarantees over a DNS
system in the Yugoslav case would be tight control and oversight of the payment
instructions by the central bank. The disadvantages range from potentially postponed
and more expensive transactions (in light of the opportunity costs of holding more
liquid or idle funds) to unsuitability of the weak banking system to tight liquidity policy
regarding the payment operations. Moreover, with the emphasis on tight liquidity
measures and postponement of restructuring, i.e. untreated and unsanctioned
insolvency, some insolvent but big and influential banks may insure the liquidity and
attract further transaction balances, thus adding to the overall costs (of restructuring)
when, and if, they go bankrupt. A further potential disadvantage of a RTGS system in
general is a retardation of the private market from developing cheaper and more
efficient processes.
There is also the issue of the involvement of banks as the payment system
service providers, for both LVTS and SVTS, i.e. the influence on the overall
revitalisation of the banking sector. Although it may seem that the SDK giro system can
be improved much faster and with smaller investments than the banking system to
operate electronic payments, this shouldn't discourage the improvements of the banking
facilities and skills for the payment operations. As important as the issues of initial
1 There are few examples of the arrangements where the responsibilities for the banking system restructuring,
monetary policy and payment systems, lie within different agencies, ministries and central banks, and are co-
ordinated by the respective governments. The details of the arrangements are beyond the scope of the thesis.
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costs, speed and efficiency of the payment system are the implications on competition,
customer choice and competitiveness of the banking system.
As market concentration may reduce the competitive pressure on the
clearinghouse to perform as efficiently as possible, the banks should be assisted by the
government and central bank in the process of the rejuvenation in order to offer more
choice and put competitive pressure on the existing provider. It was not until the banks
put a pressure for the change of the system that SDK started improving its practice in
the first place.
Total abolition of the giro system (i.e., limiting the role of the clearinghouse to
LVTS settlement agent) is also inappropriate. The development of an efficient giro
system within a single organisation is in line with the European historical
circumstances2 and requirements of speed and efficiency. The parallel development of
both improved SDK system and banking facilities and skills is in line with the best-
practice payment system and banking reform.
In conclusion, if the Central Bank has aspirations towards controlling and
regulating the systems, it should offer something in return. The first logical concession
would seem to be the provision of 'day-light' overdraft facilities, especially as there is
no efficient money market to cater for the liquidity requirements of the system.
Moreover, even if the money market starts to improve it can only redistribute the
existing liquidity and the central bank would remain the only source of additional
liquidity as capital market and foreign investments are almost non-existent at the
moment. Otherwise, the option of establishing a parallel DNS system should be
considered by the banks. Secondly, the payment system reform cannot compensate for
the banking system restructuring and there could be no efficient monetary policy
without the sound banking system regardless of the monetary policy measures and
payment system design.
Summarised, the recommendations for the Yugoslav payment system are as
follows:
2 In Europe, it was usually the postal system with nation-wide offices that assumed the role of developing nation-
wide giro system for payments, and it was only much later that the banks started to develop a giro-system of their
own. Humphrey et al. (1996), state that the development also helped the shift from paper to electronics, as the
movements of the funds was centralised and all the improvements were an internal issue of a single organisation.
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• Recommendation 1: The monopoly of the clearinghouse should be replaced with
competition among different payment system services providers, instruments, costs
and risks. The competition among the payment services providers, accompanied with
an adequate institutional framework, would result in a much better payment system
than was the case in the nineties.
• Recommendation 2: The roles of banks, the central bank and the clearinghouse
should change, so that they: a) become the providers of the services, b) have
complete control over monetary policy implementation and c) limit their scope and
number of activities, respectively.
• Recommendation 3: The central bank should consider a way of providing intraday
liquidity or establishing a centralised queuing mechanism 3 . Alternatively, banks may
consider establishing their own 'internal' queuing mechanism or a DNS system.
• Recommendation 4: The separation of monetary policy and supervision functions,
and not necessarily into two separate institutions, would help concentrate and even
co-ordinate the efforts towards the system reform.
• Recommendation 5: Overall banking and monetary system reform is necessary and
payment system design is only a part of it. Given the number and size of the
problems the system needs overall organised restructuring. Payment system reform,
although important, can achieve little or nothing on its own. Improvements in the
legal framework for both the banking and payment system are identified as the major
prerequisites for the restructuring processes. A sensitive issue, that needs to be
balanced, is the type and scope of involvement of the state.
• Recommendation 6: Involvement of foreign banks, investors and institutions in
Yugoslav banking system functioning, i.e. a process of banking system liberalisation,
would help the recovery of the banking and payment systems. Increased entry and
involvement would result in competition, investment, better quality and more
versatile services.
3 One that would not allow banks to cancel queued payments and that provides additional payment processing
optimisation mechanism for matching interbank payments instead.
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8.3. Payment systems in developed and transitional countries - A comparison
8.3.1. Similarities
If there is an overall agreement on the fundamental objectives and values of
banking and payment systems, there should be no difference between the basic
principles that apply to developed countries and countries in transition, as far as
payment systems are concerned. Therefore, if the countries aim at efficient market
economy systems, banking competition and customer satisfaction, monetary discipline
and control, global competitiveness, integration into the world trade and payment
networks, efficient and effective payment services to the public and businesses, then the
payment system fundamentals should be the same. An efficient and effective payment
system should, therefore, facilitate smooth and fast monetary transactions between the
parties in an economy with minimal risks and costs involved. Basic groups of costs,
risks and benchmarks of efficiency are also generally the same in all market economies.
Thus, the basic standards and the approved practice and technology ought to be
accepted as the objectives, if not the norm, in transitional countries too.
In summary, the identified similarities between the two groups of countries
relate to:
1. Increased payment risks awareness of the central banks and measures to reduce
risks.
2. Trends towards establishing RTGS systems, use of latest LVTS payment
technologies and efforts towards reducing clearing cycles and float.
3. Slow but clear 'convergence' of transitional countries' monetary policies and
payment systems' arrangements with open market operations, international trade
and integration, as in developed countries.
The experience of developed countries, together with the technology and
expertise of the payment system providers, is what can help CIT when making decisions
on a payment system design. Lessons from the West make it easier for the policy
makers in CIT to adopt the best practice and techniques and not to go through all the
stages of payment system evolution.
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The problem, however, is that no single payment system in developed countries
is the same, and they are all products of different historical circumstances. Furthermore,
there is still no agreement on which clearing and settlement system offers the best
results with minimal risks and costs. There is also no agreement on what is the optimal
balance between moral hazard and systemic risk when weighing the issues of the
regulation and supervision of and, competition in, the banking and payment systems. In
addition, a country in transition faces a reform of the overall monetary and banking
systems that a payment system is only a part of.
Nonetheless, CIT can 'pick-and-mix' the best solutions and technologies
available as there are more than a few best-practice solutions available, regardless of the
type of system chosen. Thus, the approved solutions and experience of both developed
and transitional countries can be 'cherry-picked' and incorporated in a particular
payment system design to help focus the efforts and shorten the deliberation processes.
8.3.2. Differences
What is different, therefore, is the macroeconomic environment and state that a
particular economy is in, current practice and the legacy of past, that all influence the
decisions about a payment systems design and operation. As for the economic
environment, CIT are undergoing a unique transition, which is not made easier by the
state of their economies. Generally, there has been a high level of uncertainty, lower
standard of living, and a poor state of banking facilities and fundamental infrastructure.
These factors, especially when coupled with high inflation, hamper both development
of efficient payment systems and overall financial reforms.
In addition, CIT face a difficult task of choosing priorities that could be
supported with very limited resources. The choice of a payment system design is
determined not only by the economics but by the overall institutional and political
considerations. Therefore, the priority of rebuilding the monetary and banking system,
by restoring financial discipline and trust in banks, may determine the choice of a gross
settlement system at the central bank and a bigger role of the monetary authorities in a
payment system design and operation. Furthermore, development of a system to support
large value interbank transfers has a priority over a system for small value payment
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transactions which, when coupled with the insolvency of many cash-drained banks, can
delay development of new payment instruments and the enhancement of a customer's
choice in the short to medium run.
There are, therefore, many institutional considerations, the need for choosing
priorities and fitting the particular reforms into the overall restructuring, when deciding
on an appropriate payment system in a country in transition. All those issues are more in
the domain of normative than positive economics.
8.3.3. Cash preference in CIT
Phenomena also exist in Cff that differ from the observations for developed
countries. The most striking is the preference for cash, i.e. high proportion of cash,
relative to the income and money supply in CIT. There is the evidence for developed
countries4 that a level of cash holdings in an economy are: a) positively related to the
value of national income and wealth5 and the magnitude of illegal activities and b)
negatively related to the interest rates, inflation rate and a rate of violent crime 6 . The
evidence for the high cash holdings in CIT7 contradicts the generalisations for the
developed countries. A lower level of national income and wealth, high level of cash
holdings and transactions by consumers and retailers despite the higher crime levels,
and, finally, high cash holdings and low deposits and savings despite high inflation and
high interest rates in CIT are all opposite to the findings for the developed countries.
The research results and secondary analysis provide some insights into the
phenomena. Firstly, with inefficient payment systems and poor business practice of the
banks, the payments are conducted in cash and outside the banking and payment
systems. Secondly, nominal interest rates lagged far behind high inflation rates,
resulting in a decrease in already low savings. Uncertainty and economic turbulence
then led to the currency substitution (so-called `Dollarisation') and speculations, which
are seen by the public in some CIT as the answer to the lost functions of a national
currency of a store of value and a unit of account. This, however, only perpetuates
4 For example, Humphrey eta! (1996), Santamero and Seater (1996), Wood (1993).
5 See also Lipsey and Chrystal (1995)
6 In general, more cash use by the criminal element can be offset by less cash use by consumers and retailers who fear
theft (Humphrey et al. 1996).
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inflation and further increases demand for cash. Finally, if there is no adequate
alternative for cash, i.e., no cheap and efficient payment instruments that can replace
cash, there could be no offsetting effect of the cash holdings related to crime and
inconveniences of handling large amounts of cash.
In conclusion, cash as a:
• familiar - the only reliable,
• off-line - outside the inefficient banking and payment systems,
• immediate - real time,
• delivery-versus-payment - in the world of uncertainty,
medium of exchange (payment instrument), is hard to beat in CIT. And, once again,
payment system reform is important, but only one element of monetary and banking
system reforms that a transitional economy is faced with.
8.4. E-money, Electronic SVTS and CIT: a SWOT Analysis
8.4.1. Intorduction
Apart from the improvements in large-value payments, a great amount of
consideration should be given to the efficiency of small-value retail payments, as the
efficient SVTS increases customer's choice and contributes to smooth trading activity
with small transaction costs. In light of the high relative cash holdings and preference
for cash, in CIT (also discussed in section 5.3.2), there is a possibility that e-money
products could bring some efficiency gains. The gains could range from reducing high
cash holdings ratios 8 , grey market operations, currency substitution, and crime rates
related to cash holdings 9 , to increasing a percentage of payment transactions that pass
through the banking systems. These issues are presented next with a view to
encouraging electronic money in CIT debate and research.
7 In addition to the research results there are many illustrations of the phenomena. See, for example, Scott (1993),
Topinski and Struzynslci (1995), Nesic (1996).
8 In Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1996, the proportion of currency to total money supply, measured as M3 minus frozen
FX deposits, was about 30 percent. In Poland in 1994, the proportion was about 20 percent.
9 For more details on cash/crime relationship see Humphrey et al. (1996) and Wood (1993).
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8.4.2. Strengths
It is difficult to identify any particular strength of the banking systems, but there
are certain advantages that the systems might have, in introducing new technologies,
compared with banking and payment systems in more developed countries. Firstly, it is
easier for countries that have only just started building new payment systems to start
introducing new electronic payment products, both in terms of economies of scale
(utilising the fixed investments that are going to be undertaken anyway by reducing cost
per unit of service) and economies of scope (by adding additional offers with little or no
additional cost, therefore sharing costs per offer) m. Secondly, the users are hungry for
improvements which is an advantage in overcoming possible resistance due to the
habitual practice. The practice was so bad that even inventions of questionable quality
may become a necessity". This is not to say that CIT should select any new technology
unconditionally, but that there might be a fertile ground for these.
8.4.3. Weaknesses
In order to succeed, those new technologies, particularly e-money and electronic
banking, require good computing and communication infrastructure. It is costly to set
up and operate infrastructure needed for nation-wide cashless retail payments, in the
first place. Therefore, it might be difficult to dig deeper into already empty public
pockets, let alone require consumers to bear the costs of introducing the new
technologies. Those technologies require substantial numbers of households with a PC
and modem, and/or electronic devices that will use a reliable telecommunications
network. Given the fact that the computer penetration rate in those countries lags behind
the computer penetration in developed countries, it is difficult to introduce electronic
banking on a larger scale.
11/ "In other countries like the US there is such a large installed base of magnetic stripe that it will take some time ...
We are probably talking 10 years," Mr Jensen said. (Mr Ed Jensen, president and chief executive of Visa
International), Financial Times, March 26 1997
11 To illustrate customers' willingness to pay for quick access to reliable services, there is a growing demand for the
development of cellular telephone networks. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development - EBRD (1996),
state that the cellular network penetration rates have reached, for example in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, the
levels which approach those in Belgium, France and Spain. This level of demand has been achieved despite the
substantially higher charges for the services in those countries compared with the charges in the EU (ibid. 1996).
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Secondly given the poor state of existing telecommunications networks and
network penetration rates I2, the introduction of efficient, profitable and reliable e-
money and/or electronic banking schemes, may prove to be too expensive in the short to
medium term. Furthermore, from a commercial bank point of view, the incentives for
introducing new electronic instruments may be reduced by the profitability of
conventional, but new to the market, payment services — such as credit cards business.
From a business opportunity perspective, however, in each of the countries there is a
niche in the market (for both wealthy and new technology eager customers) and the
opportunities for excessive profits".
Finally, there is inadequate financial regulation and supervision and lack of
financial discipline in the systems, also resulting from the lack of resources and skills
on the part of the financial authorities (mainly central banks).
8.4.4. Opportunities
There are certain aggregate level gains that CU can reap by introducing e-
money products. Firstly, if we take the acceptance (which is not all that certain) of the
new products by customers for granted, the e-money technology can help reduce the
high cash holdings ratios in those countries. For this to be achieved, and if we assume
high and constant substitution for cash, the limit on the maximum amount that can be
held on smart-cards have to be significantly higher in the initial stages. This is because
cash is extensively used for large as well as for small, retail, payments. Secondly, the
smaller cash holdings and/or improved monitoring enabled by these schemes, can
reduce cash related crime rates and help fight crime altogether14.
Thirdly, by enabling banks to issue e-money, there could be overall positive
effects both on the level of deposits in and proportion of payments that go via the
banking systems. In order to get e-money, customers have to pay for it either by cash or
12 The number of telephone lines relative to the size of population. The World Bank Atlas data show that the rates are
between one-quarter and one-half of those in the European Union.
13 A prospect of banks issuing private money may, however, be at odds with central bank's perception of how to
establish financial discipline in an economy. This issue is discussed in section 2.4.4.
14 Anecdotal evidence sugests that crime rates in CIT are intolerably high (particularly in Russia). Cash as an
anonymous means of payment is the `conditio sine qua non' for efficient functioning of a criminal world. However,
the prospect of re-establishing a 'big brother' supervision/control, whoever is in charge of it, may be an even bigger
concern for the public in those countries than the issue of privacy in the developed countries, especially because the
democracy is in its infancy and can be easily abused.
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from an existing deposit account. The substitution can help withdraw certain proportion
of currency from circulation and encourage higher deposit holdings. A major problem,
however, is that customers don't trust domestic banks with their deposits 15 and are
sceptical about the banks' ability to handle efficient clearing and settlement, let alone
trust the banks to issue 'cash'. Until the banking system is fully reformed and new
business practice is fully established, there could be no effective and efficient payment
system that resides on the banking system and private banking arrangements.
Finally, the instant settlement feature of smart-cards can contribute to the overall
efficiency, compensating, to some extent, for underdeveloped on-line clearing systems
for debit and credit cards 16 . The e-money products and access products in conjunction
with schemes that enable immediate settlement (for instance, Mondex, Unisource and
Milicent), may, therefore, help overcome the problem of delayed clearing and
settlement. To help surpass the X-inefficient" banking clearing and settlement system,
the e-money users may use the infrastructure provided by the international payment
card organisations. This, however, should be weighed against the long-term
implications on domestic financial systems and the ability to successfully supervise
foreign and multinational financial institutions.
8.4.5. Threats
Apart from the obstacles and counter-arguments presented above, there are
several issues of particular concern to a monetary system as a whole. All the mentioned
drawbacks of e-money 18 , as far as central banks and financial regulators in developed
countries are concerned, hold true for the monetary authorities in CIT. The most
important are: monetary policy implications; seigniorage and deficit issues;
multicurrency cards; security and supervision considerations, including fraud and
control over foreign issuers; and systemic risk.
15 Because of the bad past experience. In Yugoslavia, for example, there are blocked (so called 'frozen') foreign
exchange deposits in amount of $4.5 billion, which is more than eighty percent of all private deposits in the banks.
Poland banking has a similar problem.
16 "...Russia, too, is likely to move early to chip cards because there is considerable demand for payment services but
inadequate telecommunications infrastructure to handle the sort of on-line payment authorisations used in western
Europe or north America." Mr. Jensen of Visa International said. Financial Times, March 26 1997.
17 The X-inefficiency in countries in transition is sometimes referred to as "perverse incentives".
IR As discussed under the heading "The new payment technologies".
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The risks of implementing the new payment technologies are even more evident
in CIT, as the systems in those countries are more susceptible and vulnerable to threats.
Reconstruction of monetary control and discipline, protection of domestic banks and
seigniorage are particularly sensitive issues during the transition. Furthermore,
inadequate regulatory frameworks and lack of financial discipline may add to the
negative implications that could arise from the threats.
On the other hand, excessive and/or inappropriate regulation is the major treat to
development of electronic money in CIT, and may send a wrong message about the
public policy as regards innovations and business opportunities.
Box 8-2 - SWOT Analysis of New Payment Technolo ies in Countries in Transition
Strengths Weaknesses
•	 Investment impetus in new payment systems
•	 Little 'old' cards in the system
•	 Reform momentum
•	 Customers' willingness to pay for quick access
to reliable service
•	 Poor computer & communication infrastructure
•	 Low standard of living
•	 Lack of public resources
•	 Lack of financial discipline and trust in banks
•	 Lack of incentives for commercial banks
Opportunities Threats
•	 Reduction of cash holdings
•	 Cash related crime reduction
•	 More	 transactions	 under	 banking	 system's
control
•	 Instant	 settlement	 to	 compensate	 for
underdeveloped on-line systems
•	 Unknown impact on velocity of money
•	 Loss of seigniorage
•	 Multicurency cards & supervision of foreign
vendors
•	 Money laundering, fraud & privacy issues
•	 Security and systemic risk
8.4.6. Other electronic SVTS
It should be added that more conventional electronic payment mechanisms, i.e.
those of credit and debit cards and electronic giro, can also reduce cash holdings. Debit
card payments in particular are close substitutes for cash since both are used to initiate
small-value payments 19 . Given the state of computer and telecommunication facilities
of the households, those conventional schemes might be more acceptable for the
customers in a short run. A successful operation of these schemes, however, requires
19 In European countries known for their relative emphasis on card-based payments, such as Finland, France,
Denmark and the United Kingdom, cash holdings per person are relatively low — see e.g. Humphrey et al (1996).
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improved on-line clearing and settlement by the banks, which is the objective of the
reforms in the first place. Thus, with improved banks' and overall facilities for large-
value and interbank payments, a conventional retail electronic payment can be
conducted via those new facilities with a small additional cost for the banks.
The incentive for merchants, with reduced inconvenience of holding and
handling cash and/or cheques, is taken for granted, although the process of acceptance
has its difficulties. In addition, the credit cards payments in particular can contribute to
a higher level of sales by giving more favourable terms of payments to customers.
8.4.7. Conclusions
In conclusion, the new payment instruments, e-money in particular can
contribute to cash substitution and development of more efficient payment and banking
practice CIT, and inspire competition among financial intermediaries. However, one
may note that, although the opportunities for, and advantages of, both conventional and
new electronic payment mechanisms are evident, the first and most important step is to
improve both the overall banking practice and facilities and the macroeconomic
environment. A particular macroeconomic variable that hampers development of an
efficient banking and payment system is a high rate of inflation. With high inflation
there could be no trust in banking and monetary systems or cash substitution, as cash is
used for currency substitution and grey market trade and commerce. In addition,
financial and banking system 'liberalisation' should be accompanied by improved
institutional infrastructure, especially financial supervision and surveillance.
All this may call for active, but balanced and moderate, public policy with
regard to small-value payment systems, in the short to medium term. The case for
public policy intervention with regard to the mentioned shortcomings and the system
restructuring objectives relates to: (i) deregulation, and/or privatisation, of
telecommunications industry, with a view to increasing competition and improving
payment system infrastructure; (ii) legal system improvements, needed to protect
payments counterparts; (iii) encouragement of competition and/or innovations by the
adequate e-money regulatory framework; (iv) improvement of financial supervision and
surveillance to accomplish/preserve monetary and financial system stability.
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8.5. CIT Payment Systems' Designs and Reforms - The Main Lessons and
Recommendations
It is evident that monetary and financial authorities in Countries in Transition
assumed and will continue to assume both active and significant roles in their countries
payment systems' reforms. The following lessons and propositions for policy makers in
CIT can be extracted from the evaluated payment system reforms and developments:
1. It is very important to get the reform process right from the start to avoid expensive
and unnecessary corrections because of both very limited resources and potential
opposition to the reforms. The first major step is to determine objectives and
priorities of a payment system reform and how it fits with overall banking and
monetary systems and/or reforms. A clear payment system development strategy
compatible with the present and/or envisaged monetary policy will help the policy
makers reap the reward for being involved in the payment system design. Also a
successful start of a payment system reform may initiate and/or facilitate faster
overall monetary system restructuring.
2. If the objectives of the payment system reform are to promptly strengthen monetary
policy and control and facilitate efficient large value transactions, this requires a
major involvement of the central bank in the process of establishing and operating
the system. As domestic commercial banks in CIT may not be strong, disciplined or
risk-aware enough for initiating the process, a top-down approach would seem to be
in line with a faster achievement of the objectives20 .
3. The engagement, however, must be transparent and balanced with a view to the
long-term implications on private initiative, competition, and for motivating banks'
involvement in the process. In addition, the reforms were originally initiated
because of the need to replace `monobanking' systems and centralised payment
services provision in consideration of the new market-orientation paradigm.
Therefore, the central banks' leadership and operational involvement can be
subsequently21 replaced with a system oversight and regulation. Also, involvement
20 Given the `monobanking' past of majority of transitional countries and still immature banking systems it is no
wonder that the skills and resources are still concentrated within the central banks.
21 When there is a more mature banking system in place and/or the system has run successfully for some time.
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in, and 'ownership' of, the payment system reforms by the commercial banks is
critical for the success of the reforms.
Thus, the engagement of financial authorities can fall into two stages — the
first, where the active role of the central bank is aimed at initiating and co-
ordinating the payment and monetary systems' reforms and the second, when the
central bank steps back and puts emphasis on financial stability and competition
implications of the already in place payment system, rather than operational
involvement and monetary policy tasks for a payment system. The challenge is to
find the right type, timing and measure of involvement at each of the stages. The
experience of the more advanced transitional economies can certainly help.
4. The payment system and associated banking arrangements depend on credit as a
normal part of financial operations. The extent of provision of liquidity by the
central bank depends on the money market, banking system and overall financial
system development; type of settlement system; and financial discipline (i.e. lack of
it or potential moral hazard problems). If there is an underdeveloped money and
interbank market, it is the central bank that is responsible for providing liquidity to
the system. If RTGS system is imminent in the payment systems' development, than
a central bank should offer something in return for the increased reserves required
from banks. If, on the other hand, there is no guarantee of the finality of payments,
i.e. credit facilities provided by central bank, the system may as well be designed as
a DNS system (possibly on private banks' own initiative) as it provides banks with
the needed flexibility and liquidity.
The results of a payment system reform can only be as effective as the
success of both imposing monetary discipline and banking system restructuring.
Therefore, the settlement system design comes only third in the debate about moral
hazard, and a DNS system can function effectively in a sound financial system. The
risk control in a DNS system can be then achieved through caps, collateral, penalty
rates and most importantly through regular supervision and surveillance of the
institutions. The oversight is also indispensable for achieving trust and discipline in
RTGS type of system.
5. Thus, system oversight — that includes licensing, prudential requirements and
supervision — may be an important part of the answer to the systemic risk/moral
263
Payment Systems Reforms	 Conclusions and Recommendations
hazard dilemma, i.e. it can contribute to the effective balancing of the two
considerations relating to the payment system policy. Provision of intra-day
liquidity by a central bank in a system which efficiently sanctions against insolvent
and risky banks does not necessarily threaten monetary discipline, especially if the
risks are limited by, for example charging fees and limiting the overdrafts.
Therefore, if a central bank provides 'daylight' liquidity, in response to a lack of
efficient money markets and/or market-based monetary policy instruments, the
moral hazard issue can be catered for, inter alia, by supervision. This may also
require a separation of monetary policy and control function and the regulation and
supervision function in order to focus the efforts and make rules simpler and more
potent in achieving the public policy goals whilst taking care of encouraging
competition and private initiative.
6. A choice of RTGS type of settlement system may be an optimal solution because of,
or could be driven by, some additional considerations. Firstly, there are the issues of
compatibility and interoperability between various national payment systems, as
well as potential payment systems convergence requirements. For example, in
European CIT that deal extensively with EU and/or aim to join it, in favour of
selecting a RTGS system goes the EMU TARGET system arrangements, i.e.
interlinking between the national RTGS systems. Secondly, RTGS system may
provide confidence to foreign banks, involved (or considering involvement) in a
CIT's banking and payment system, that their payments will not go astray or be
delayed. Therefore, a choice of RTGS settlement system may be a part of a public
policy strategy aimed at encouraging foreign financial institutions' involvement in
the system22.
7. Even the latest payment system technology cannot compensate for poor technical
infrastructure and inadequate or feeble legislation and its implementation. A just
and effective legal framework is a milestone of trust and certainty needed for stable
payment system functioning. Notwithstanding, regulatory flexibility is required to
prevent shocks to the system and to enable the development of new instruments and
22 For example, this may be done with a view to increasing financial system efficiency and competition; encouraging
introduction of new payment technologies and banking products; improving technical infrastructure; or for
encouraging financial discipline and promoting best banking practices.
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services, especially in a young market economy. Also, technical
(telecommunications) infrastructure needs to be improved and not only because of
the payment system requirement. However, payment system cannot be too far ahead
of the infrastructure if it is to be fully and effectively used. As the world cannot wait
for the fundamentals to be improved to start functioning, the integration of the
technology and infrastructure is needed in a short to medium term.
8. Reform of large-value, interbank, transfer system has a priority in payment system
design and operations, as it facilitates monetary policy and control and enables
liquidity management by financial intermediaries. However, apart from the
improvements in large-value payment systems in transitional countries, the
efficiency of small-value 'retail' payments also deserves some attention, as the
efficient retail payments increase customer's choice and satisfaction, price
transparency and contribute to smooth trading activity. Furthermore, fast and
efficient retail payment systems may encourage greater use of (legal) banking
channels and reduce reliance on cash and resulting risks and inefficiencies in CIT.
The advent of new electronic payment instruments and infrastructure, and
electronic money in particular, may present the policy makers in CIT with an
opportunity to improve their payment systems relatively quickly, but is also
burdened with potential threats. However, these developments cannot be ignored, as
they will affect the CIT payment and financial systems in one way or another sooner
rather than later - through (opted for) financial liberalisation, globalisation and/or
regional integration processes. The public policy activism in retail payment systems
should, however, be minimal and, ideally, constrained to improvements of technical
and legal facilities and encouragement of competition between payment services
providers.
9. Banking system restructuring in CIT is essential for risk and cost reduction and
speed, reliability and choice improvements. Only a system without significant
proportion of bad debts, unclear or ineffective ownership and/or management
structure on the one hand, with improved skills and risk control on the other, can
establish discipline and trust in the financial system. An increased capital base, risk
provisions and risk awareness, new management and shareholders' structure, better
liquidity management and market based incentives may, however, be hard to
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achieve without government/central bank's support. An additional option,
compatible with an organised system restructuring, is the encouragement of the
involvement of foreign service-providers and competition. The experience of some
transitional countries with the banking system reforms, foreign competition and
investors and integration of payment and banking systems show the opportunities
and threats of the processes.
10. Regardless of the type of settlement system and general arrangements chosen,
payment system reform involves fine tuning '23 for bringing the system design into
the policy objectives function. Thus, successful monetary policy and control, risk
reduction and efficient interbank money markets can be achieved only if: a) the
choice of clearing and settlement arrangements is accompanied with various risk
reduction measures available for different systems, b) there are adequate supervision
and surveillance, licensing procedures and clear and consistent rules regarding the
services providers, c) legal framework and technical infrastructure and the selected
system are in tune with each other, and d) the banking system practice and
efficiency are accounted and provided for in the system design.
In summary, the payment systems reforms lessons can be grouped into six
generic recommendations for policy makers in Countries in Transition:
1. monetary policy and control have priority in a system design;
2. subsequent emphasis should be on supervision and surveillance;
3. strengthen supervision of the financial systems but retain regulatory flexibility;
4. reduce operational involvement and concentrate on improving the legal, technical
and institutional infrastructure for payments;
5. financial institutions' involvement and competition should be encouraged;
6. overall banking system restructuring is the key to risk reduction and efficiency of
the payment system.
23 The term refers to precision and sophistication of the measures, rether than frequency of interventions.
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8.6. Future research
As payment system reforms and statistical coverage of payment transactions in CIT
and other non-industrial countries progress, some of the analytical results should be
revisited in order to establish if the used categories and identified differences are indeed
true and robust. Such an exercise would also help assess the reform processes and test for
the new systems' efficiencies. Particular variables for which longer time-series, more
frequent and reliable data would be required are payment system costs (providers
profit/cost efficiency), payment instruments volumes and values and clearing and
settlement times.
In terms of the general payment system research topics, the most pressing seem:
• In Europe, introduction of Euro payments and EMU wholesale and retail payments
clearing and settlement, i.e. TARGET, EBA and different retail payment systems'
costs, risks speed and reliability (optimal choice, combination of the systems etc.);
• Cross-border payments in general, i.e. risks and costs reduction in an international
context and related issues of cross-regulation, deregulation, spill-over of effects
between different national markets etc.;
• Securities settlement systems and their integration into efficient (inter)national
clearing and settlement, including the issues of alternative purposes and priorities of
use of collateral in monetary, banking and payment systems;
• Electronic money and electronic banking implications on payment systems and
monetary policy (including the future of money and money supply and distribution,
central banks and banking industry);
• Involvement of non-banking institutions in payment services provision and financial
intermediation — including the opportunities and threats for payment systems (and
banking systems) that arise form the development of the Internet, financial
`disintermediation, and potential financial stability risks (and/or need to change the
focus and instruments for financial systems' supervision and surveillance).
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9. THE APPENDICES
9.1. Appendix 1 - The Bank of England Group Analysis Tests' Statistics
Cash in Circulation in USD, at purchasing power parity rate, per capita
Table 9-1 Comparison tests results for Cash in Circulation $CCp 1997
method used	 test statistics	 significant at implications
Analysis of Variance	 F=8.28 0.00 significant differences
across the three groups
Kruskal-Wallis test	 H=19.37 0.00 significant differences
across the three groups
2-sample t-statistics 	 t =
Developing & CIT	 1.28 0.21 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial
	
-5.50 0.00 significantly different
Developing & Industrial	
-2.91 0.00 significantly different
Mann-Whitney tests	 W =
Developing & CIT	 363 0.52 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial	 85 0.00 significantly different
Developing & Industrial	 308 0.00 significantly different
Regression Analysis
	 Constant Devdummy Citdummy
Coefficients	 993 - 537 - 726
t-statistics	 8.63** -3.25** -3.60**
R2 = 0.26	 R2adj. = 0.23 F = 8.40** N=67
*significant at a.=0.05; **significant at a=0.01
Table 9-2 Tests for regression: CC	 PC = f(GDPpppPC, Velocity, Real interest
Panel A - Statistics
Ordinary Least Square Est.
Coefficients
t-statistics
Probability
Constant	 GDPpppPC	 Velocity	 Reallnter
442	 0.05	 -16	 -.00006
5.35	 8.01	 -6.02	 -2.82
0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.008
1:1 0.80
R2adj. 0.79
S.E. of Regression 255.355
F stats 48.04
F prob 0.000
N 64
DW Statistics 1.819
Panel B - Diagnostics
Test Statistics F-Statistics Probability
Breusch-Godfrey 2.0674 0.1421
Ramsey RESET 3.0019 0.0929
Jarque-Bera 1.6309 0.4424
White 1.7385 0.1440
Condition Index 5.2970
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Table 9-3 Tests results for Cash in Circulation to M1 ratio
method used test statistics	 significant at implications
Analysis of Variance F=10.57 0.00 significant differences
across the groups
Kruskal-Wallis test H=15.70 0.00 significant differences
across the groups
2-sample t-statistics t =
Developing & CIT 0.16 0.88 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 3.01 0.01 significantly different
Developing Industrial 4.50 0.00 significantly different
Mann-Whitney tests W =
Developing & CIT 431 0.69 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 271 0.00 significantly different
Developing & Industrial 320 0.00 significantly different
Regression Analysis Constant Devdummy Citdummy
Coefficients 0.219 0.178 0.169
t-statistics 7.32** 4.33** 3.20**
R2 = 0.29 R2adj. = 0.26 F = 10.57** N=67
Appendices
*significant at a=0.05; **significant at a=0.01.
Table 9-4 Tests for regression: CC/M1= f(GDPpppPC, Clearing, Legal System
Panel A - Statistics
Ordinary Least Square Est.
Coefficients
t-statistics
Probability
constant	 GDPpppPC	 CCpppPC	 Clearing	 Technical
0.37	 -0.000015	 0.00018	 0.018
	 -0.018
6.95	 -6.26	 6.30	 3.05	 -1.71
0.000
	
0.000
	
0.000
	 0.004	 0.100
1:1 0.70
R2adj. 0.69
S.E. of Regression 0.107
F stats 30.46
F prob 0.000
N 67
DW Statistics 2.209
Panel B - Diagnostics
Test Statistics F-Statistics Probability
Breusch-Godfrey 0.6677 0.4142
Ramsey RESET 0.2102 0.6471
Jarque-Bera 5.1383 0.0696
White 1.1223 0.3669
Condition Index 9.3670 -
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Cash in circulation to GDP (local currency) ratio
Table 9-5 Tests results for Cash in Circulation to GDP ratio
method used test statistics	 significant at implications
Analysis of Variance F=0.95 0.39 no significant differences
across the groups
Kruskal-Wallis test H=0.76 0.68 no significant differences
across the groups
2-sample t-statistics t =
Developing & CIT 0.65 0.52 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 0.76 0.46 not significantly different
Developing & Industrial 1.3 0.21 not significantly different
Mann-Whitney tests W =
Developing & CIT 341 0.84 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 196 0.58 not significantly different
Developing & Industrial 447 0.92 not significantly different
Regression Analysis Constant Devdummy Citdummy
Coefficients 0.05 0.023 0.013
t-statistics 4.76** 1.53 0.70
R2 = 0.04 R2adj. = 0.01 F = 1.18 N=67
*significara at a=0.05; **significant at a=0.01
Table 9-6 Regression: CC/GDP= f(GDPpppPC, Interest rates, $CCpppPC, Legal System
Panel A - Statistics
Ordinary Least Square Est.
Coefficients
t-statistics
Probability
constant	 GDPpppPC	 Interest
	 CCpppPC	 Legal
0.09	 -0.000005	 -0.0006
	 0.000086	 -0.01
7.72	 -8.53	 -2.28	 11.65	 -2.00
0.000	 0.000
	
0.027
	 0.000	 0.050
1:1 0.80
R2adj. 0.78
S.E. of Regression 0.024
F stats 41.67
F prob 0.000
N 64
DW Statistics 2.226
Panel B - Diagnostics
Test Statistics F-Statistics Probability
Breusch-Godfrey 1.1203 0.290
Ramsey RESET 2.8647 0.096
Jarque-Bera 5.6383 0.059
White 2.7841 0.095
Condition Index 8.6040 -
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CLEARING
Table 9-7 Tests results for Clearina Cycles
method used test statistics	 significant at implications
Analysis of Variance F=5.49 0.00 significant differences
Kruskal-Wallis test
2-sample t-statistics
H=20.14
t =
0.00 across the groups
Developing & CIT -0.38 0.71 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 2.25 0.04 significantly different
Developing &Industrial 4.22 0.00 significantly different
Mann-Whitney tests W =
Developing & CIT 837 0.72 not significantly different
CIT & Industrial 256 0.00 significantly different
Developing &Industrial 1239 0.00 significantly different
RIGS and clearing
Analysis of Variance F=11.28 0.00 In a country where
RTGS system exists the
Kruskal-Wallis test H=10.65 0.00 clearing cycle is shorter
RTGS system use
Analysis of Variance F=13.05 0.00 significant differences
across the groups in use
Kruskal -Wallis test H=14.47 0.00 of RTGS
Regression Analysis
country dummy Constant Devdummy Citdummy
Coefficients 1.02 3.29 2.75
t-statistics 1.28 3.26** 2.02*
R2 = 0.14 R2adj. = 0.12 F = 5•39** N=70
RTGS dummy Constant dummy
Coefficients 4.5 - 2.9
t-statistics 7.45** -3.32**
R2 =0.14 R2adj. = 0.13 F = 11.05** N=70
*significant at a=0.05; **significant at a=0.01
Table 9-8 Tests for regression: lo clearin = f(logGDPpppPC, lo CPI
Panel A - Statistics
Ordinary Least Square Est. constant loggdp logcpi
1.1.1.	 Coeffici
ents
t-statistics
3.9
4.65
-0.71
-4.89
-0.37
-2.32
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.022
IR` 0.43
R2adj. 0.41
S.E. of Regression 0.509
F stats 12.28
F prob 0.000
N 65
DW Statistics 2.173
Panel B - Diagnostics
Test Statistics F-Statistics Probability
Breusch-Godfrey 0.3564 0.550
Ramsey RESET 0.5913 0.442
Jarque-Bera 5.2882 0.071
White 1.8812 0.170
Condition Index 18.553 -
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Table 9-9 Comparison tests results for Reserve Requirement ratios
category/ method test statistics	 significant at
Analysis of Variance F=5.45 0.00
Kruskal-Wallis test H=12.20 0.00
2-sample t-statistics t =
Developing & CIT 0.02 0.98
CIT & Industrial 4.88 0.00
Developing &Industrial 3.09 0.00
Mann-Whitney tests V/ =
Developing & CIT 407 0.24
CIT & Industrial 175.5 0.00
Developing &Industrial 246 0.00
Interest on reserves
Analysis of Variance F= 0.31 0.73
Kruskal-Wallis test H=0.37 0.83
Used for payments
Analysis of Variance F=0.92 0.40
Kruskal-Wallis test H=1.34 0.51
implications
significant differences across the groups
significant differences across the groups
not significantly different
significantly different
significantly different
not significantly different
significantly different
significantly different
no significant differences across the groups in
proportion of countries that pay the interest
no significant differences across the groups
in use of reserves for payments
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RESERVE RATIOS
BANKING SYSTEM MATURITY
Table 9-10 Bankina system maturit 1) com arison test results
Category! method test statistics	 significant at implications
Differences across the
three groups
Analysis of Variance F=17.78 0.00 significant differences across the groups in
Kruskal-Wallis test H=20.5 0.00 banking systems maturity
Clearing cycle
Analysis of Variance F=10.53 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=10.54 0.00 different banking system maturity
Reserve ratios
Analysis of Variance F=7.7 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=14.65 0.00 different banking system maturity
$CC per capita (ppp)
Analysis of Variance F=9.25 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=20.7 0.00 different banking system maturity
CC/M1
Analysis of Variance F=1.82 0.17 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=4.53 0.10 with different banking system maturity
CC/GDP
Analysis of Variance F=0.83 0.44 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=3.21 0.20 with different banking system maturity
The central banks' evaluation of their countries' respective systems. The responses were classified on an ordinary
scale, where "poor" = 1, "developing" = 2, and "satisfactory" = 3.
272
Payment Systems Reforms 	 Appendices
LEGAL SYSTEM ADEQUACY
Table 9-11 Legal system adequacy l) comparison tests results
Category / method test statistics	 significant at implications
Differences across
the three groups
Analysis of Variance F=2.58 0.08 no significant differences across the groups
Kruskal-Wallis test H=4.23 0.12 in legal systems adequacy
Clearing cycle
Analysis of Variance F=1.94 0.15 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=3.71 0.16 with different legal system adequacy
$CC per capita (ppp)
Analysis of Variance F=0.78 0.46 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal -Wallis test H=2.57 0.27 with different legal system adequacy
CC/M1
Analysis of Variance F=2.19 0.12 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=3.39 0.18 with different legal system adequacy
CC/GDP
Analysis of Variance F=2.78 0.05 significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=5.86 0.04 with different legal system adequacy
I) The central banks' evaluation of their countries' respective systems. The responses were classified on an ordinary
scale, where "poor" = 1, "developing" = 2, and "satisfactory" = 3.
TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Table 9-12 Technical infrastructure l) com arison tests results
category/ method test statistics	 significant at implications
Differences across
the three groups
Analysis of Variance F=9.08 0.00 significant differences across the groups
Kruskal-Wallis test H=15 0.00 in technical infrastructure
Clearing cycle
Analysis of Variance F=6.72 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=9.58 0.00 different technical infrastructure
$CC per capita (ppp)
Analysis of Variance F=6.37 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=16.57 0.00 different technical infrastructure
CC/M1
Analysis of Variance F=5.60 0.00 significant differences across countries with
Kruskal-Wallis test H=9.76 0.00 different technical infrastructure
CC/GDP
Analysis of Variance F=0.19 0.83 no significant differences across countries
Kruskal-Wallis test H=1.22 0.54 with different technical infrastructure
The central banks' evaluation of their countries' respective systems. The responses were classified on an ordinary
scale, where "poor" = 1, "developing" = 2, and "satisfactory"=3.
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9.2. Appendix 2 — Countries in Transition's Payment Systems
Note on EBRD institutional factors measurement and classification
In their "Transition Report 1997", EBRD assess the progress in market-oriented
transition.
Banking reform progress is assessed on an ordinary scale, where: 1= little
progress beyond establishment of two-tier system; 2 = significant liberalisation of
interest rates and credit allocation; 3 = substantial progress in establishment of banks
solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation, full interest rate
liberalisation, significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of
private banks; 4 = significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS
standards, well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision,
significant term lending to private enterprises, substantial financial deepening; 5 =
standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies, full convergence
of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards, provision of full set of competitive
banking services.
Legal transition is classified on an ordinary scale as an average measure of
overall extensiveness and effectiveness of pledge, bankruptcy and company laws. Mark
1 relate to legal rules that are very limited in scope and impose substantial constraints
on the creation, registration and enforcement of security over movable assets, and may
impose significant fees on pledges. Also, adequate corporate governance or
shareholders' rights protection is not ensured. As for the effectiveness, the rules are
usually unclear and sometimes contradicting and administration and judicial support of
the laws are rudimental. At the other end, mark 5 stands for comprehensive legislation
in all areas of commercial low that resembles those in developed countries. Laws are
clear and readily ascertainable.
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Note on the Technical Infrastructure Measurement and Classification
The World Bank Atlas (1998) provides data on number of telephone mainlines, use of
electricity per capita, number of personal computers per capita and percentage of pawed roads
in a country. The first step in constructing the technical infrastructure indicator was to classify
the interval scale data into groups and then to form an ordinal scale from the grouped data. This
was done according to the statistical rules of classification and by following the World Bank's
own group categories. Then, the indicator was constructed through the "factor analysis"
statistical procedure. The data reduction exercise resulted in creation of one instead of four
potential indicators of technical infrastructure in a country. The illustration of the procedure is
presented bellow. It can be seen that the "telephone" component explain more than a half of the
total variance.
Table 9-14 Technical Infrastructure Indicator - Correlation Matrix
TELEPHONE COMPUTER ROADS ELECTICITY
Correlation	 TELEPHONE 1.000 .177 .298 .666
COMPUTER .177 1.000 .168 .269
ROADS .298 .168 1.000 .478
ELECTICITY .666 .269 .478 1.000
Sig. (1tailed)	 TELEPHONE .175 .055 .000
COMPUTER .175 .283 .176
ROADS .055 .283 .005
ELECTICITY .000 .176 .005
Table 9-15 Technical Infrastructure Indicator - Com ponent Matrix
Component 1
TELEPHONE .799
COMPUTER .452
ROADS .676
ELECTICITY .892
Table 9-16 Technical Infrastructure Indicator - Total Variance Ex lained
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared
% of
Loadings
Cumulative% of Cumulative
Total Variance % Total Variance %
1 2.095 52.369 52.369 2.095 52.369 52.369
2 .887 22.163 74.532
3 .723 18.068 92.599
4 .296 7.401 100.000
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Table 9-17 Differences between the two CIT groups — Institutional framework
Category/Method Test statistics Significant at Null hypothesis Implications
$GDP ppp Per Capita
t-statistcs 3.241 0.003 Reject Ho Significantly
Mann-Whitney 161 0.002 different
Consumer Price Index
t-statistcs 0.388 0.701 Cannot Reject Not significantly
Mann-Whitney 171 0.239 Ho different
Banking System Maturity
t-statistcs 6.103 0.000 Reject Ho Significantly
Mann-Whitney 89 0.000 different
Legal System Adequacy
t-statistcs 2.739 0.012 Reject Ho Significantly
Mann-Whitney 87 0.016 different
Technical Infrastructure
t-statistcs 2.763 0.010 Reject Ho Significantly
Mann-Whitney 171.5 0.010 different
Table 9-18 Differences between the two CIT arous — Cash holdin s
Category/Method Test statistics Significant at Null hypothesis Implications
Cash in Circulation
t-statistcs 2.891 0.008 Reject Ho Significantly
Mann-Whitney 89 0.002 different
CC to M1
t-statistcs 1.646 0.113 Cannot Reject Not significantly
Mann-Whitney 151 0.095 Ho different
CC to GDP
t-statistcs 0.483 0.633 Cannot Reject Not significantly
Mann-Whitney 131 0.536 Ho different
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9.3.	 Appendix 3: Yugoslavia and Comparative Tables
Appendix 3-1: Yugoslavia - statistical data
Table 9-19 Yugoslavia - Basic statistical data
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Population (millions) 10.53 10.41 10.45 10.48 10.52 10.55 10.57
GDP (USD millions) 28,390 25,754 18,696 13,169 13,862 14,681 15,548
GDP per capita (USD) 2,696 2,474 1,789 1,256 1,318 1,392 1,471
Exchange rate (domestic currency
vis-à-vis USD) year-end
10.66 19.73 750 1053* 1.55 4.74 5.13
Sources: The Yugoslav Statistical Office 1997, The National Bank of Yugoslavia 1997
*In billion of dinars
Table 9-20 Monthly Consumer Price Indices
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
(t-'1)=100*
1996	 1997
January 141.6 105.7 127.7 200.8 302760900 112.6 109.6 101.3
February 115.4 110.9 146.9 311.2 2288.9 101.6 104.6 100.6
March 104.8 102.1 141.2 326.9 92.6 102.2 107.5 100.9
April 102 104.8 177.2 215.2 101 108.2 103.1 100.1
May 99.1 113.2 180.5 299.8 99.9 105.1 101.8 100.2
June 99.9 108.6 202.8 473 99 105.6 103.5 99.9
July 102 106.6 162.5 537.9 98.6 106.7 106.9 100.1
August 103.1 107.8 142.4 1958.8 99.4 107.7 102.2 101.2
September 107.7 116 163.6 745.1 100.2 110.1 101.1 101.1
October 110 115.3 149.2 1943.4 101 110 101.3 100.1
November 102.6 118.8 133.3 206886 106.5 105.3 101.7 102.3
December 102.1 119.2 147.8 176362 102.3 107.6 104.7 103.6
Source: Yugoslav Statistical Office 1997
*Notes: Each previous month is used as a base. 100 means that there were no changes. The values are
approximately one month lagged due to the statistical methodology.
Table 9-21 Annual Retail price Index
Year (t4)=100*
1990 691.2
1991 221
1992 9,359
1993 108,636,349,415,883
1994 71,050,620,550
1995 174.8
1996 194.1
Source: Yugoslav Statistical Office 1997
*Notes: Each previous year is used as a base. 100 means that there were no changes. The 1994 figure is
dominantly influenced by January inflation as illustrated by the February inflation rate in table 2.
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Table 9-22 Average monthly earnings' and cash holdings
Year Average monthly	 earnings/ notes and coins
earnings In USD
	
in circulation p/c ratio
1990 130 17%
1991 124 27%
1992 62 95%
1993 24 2%
1994 106 62%
1995 123 55%
1996 124 44%
Source: Yugoslav Statistical Office 1997
I) The net receipts accruing from employment, including self-employment, pensions and social benefits. The receipts
account for 83.4 of available resources of households in 1995, sixteen percent of all receipts is consumption in kind
and remaining 0. 6 percents is capital gains (YSO, 1997)
.0
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Appendix 3-2 Comparative tables
Table 9-23 Notes and coins in circulation
1991 1992	 1993 1994 1995
USD per inhabitant
Belgium 1,331 1,239 1,164 1,229 1,391
Canada 846 627 636 637 662
France 863 828 739 807 891
Germany 1,411 1,534 1,511 1,790 2,025
Italy 1,168 1,023 921 1,032 1,082
Japan 2,789 2,739 3,243 3,736 3,873
Netherlands 1,438 1,344 1,267 1,428 1,541
Sweden 1,587 1,207 1,042 1,120 1,312
Switzerland 2,802 2,748 2,638 2,985 3,394
United Kingdom 509 446 455 504 528
United States 1,070 1,167 1,272 1,385 1,443
AS percentage of GDP
Belgium 6.2 5.9 6 5.2 5.3
Canada 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5
France 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7
Germany 6 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.9
Italy 5.4 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.5
Japan 9.4 9 9.5 9.7 10.4
Netherlands 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.3 6
Sweden 5.3 5 5.3 5 4.7
Switzerland 8 8 7.9 7.9 7.7
United Kingdom 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8
United States 4.6 4.8 5 5.2 5.2
As percentage of narrow money
Belgium 31.2 31.5 29.6 27.1 27.2
Canada 46.1 47 44 44.2 42.8
France 15.8 15.9 15.3 15.1 14
Germany 28.4 29.9 29.2 29.6 29.1
Italy 14.2 15.7 15.5 16 16.3
Japan 33.1 31.2 31.1 30.7 29.2
Netherlands 28.6 27.4 25.1 25 22.1
Sweden 11.5 10.8 10.7 10.7 10.5
Switzerland 21.6 21.6 19.7 19.7 18
United Kingdom 5.6 4.8 4.5 4.6 4.6
United States 29.5 28.5 28.5 30.7 33
Source: Bank for International Settlements 1996 (d)
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Table 9-24 Annual Paper and Electronic Transactions per Personl
Country
(Fourteen developed countries, 1993)
No. of paper based	 No. of electronic 	 Percent
transactions p/p	 transactions p/p
	 electronic
payments
Italy 23 6 20%
Japan 9 31 78
Switzerland 2 65 97
Sweden 24 68 74
Norway 58 40 41
Belgium 16 85 84
United Kingdom 57 58 50
Finland 40 81 67
Denmark 24 100 81
Canada 76 53 41
Germany 36 103 74
Netherlands 19 128 87
France 86 71 45
United States 234 59 20
Source: Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala (1996)
'Countries are ranked by the number of non-cash payments per person, lowest first. Numbers have been
rounded off.
Table 9-25 Payment flows and GDP in G10 countries
1994 data
Annual turnover
Country	 in payment
systems ($000
billion
Ratio of payment Number of days to
system turnover	 turn over annual
to annual GDP	 GDP2
Belgium 10.9 47.5 5.25
Canada 11.6 20.7 12
France 58.3 43.9 5.5
Germany 129.1 63 4
Italy 20.4 29.9 8.35
Japan 463.4 100.9 2.5
Netherlands 12.4 37.5 6.75
Sweden 6.4 32.6 7.75
Switzerland 24.5 93.9 2.75
United Kingdom 42.9 41.9 6
United States
memorandum item:
506.5 73.6 3.25
Yugoslavia' 0.1 6.5 38.5
Source: Bank for International Settlements (from Sheppard, 1996)
'Data Sources: Yugoslav Statistical Office (1997) and ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House (1997)
on average a year.
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Table 9-27 Settlement media used by deposit-taking institutions (end of year)
1990 1991 1992 1993' 1994 1995
YU Dinar millions*
1996	 1997
200 1,300 115,900 n/a 40.1 4 277.5 354
300 4,500 158,800 68,000 129 460.6 220.3 306.7
200 1,300 115,900 neg. 40.1 115.6 315.2 362.6
Required reserves held at
central bank
Free reserves held at central
bank
Transferable deposits held at
other institutions
Table 9-28 Notes and coins (end of year)
YU Dinar millions*
1990 1991 1992 1993' 1994 1995 1996 1997
2,600 7,500 474,400 7,800 1,091.2 1,480.8 3,028.5 2,374.1
100 600 16,100 2,600 17.4 35.9 71.7 37.6
2,500 6,900 458,300 5,200 1,073.8 1,444.9 2,956.8 2,336.5
Total notes and coins issued
Notes and coins held by credit
institutions
Notes and coins in circulation
outside credit institutions
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Appendix 3-3 Yugoslav payment system - settlement media
Table 9-26 Settlement media used by non-banks (end of year)
1990 1991 1992 1993' 1994 1995
YU Dinar millions*
1996	 1997
Notes and coins 2,500 6,900 458,300 5,200 1,073.8 1,444.9 2,956.8 2,336.5
Transferable deposits
of which held by
households
3,200
600
12,600
2,100
774,800
158,800
130,300
16,200
1,361.3
149.1
1,811.2
276.5
2,538.5
515.5
2,821
369.7
corporate sector 1,000 5,300 368,200 66,200 568.8 777.9 1,134.6 1,276.4
social services 700 1,700 95,800 15,900 326.8 428.5 509.5 588.1
other 900 3,500 152,000 32,000 316.6 328.3 378.9 586.8
Narrow money supply (M1) 5,700 19,500 1,233,100 135,500 2,435.1 3,256.1 5,495.3 5,157.5
Source: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 1995-1997
(1) YU Dinar million billions
*Note: Data for 1990-1992 are fully comparable. Adjustments were made to allow for the 1992
denomination (one zero deleted). Data for 1993 are in million billions of dinars and adjustments were
made to allow for 1993 denomination (six zeros deleted). From 1994 all data are in millions of new dinars
and fully comparable.
Source: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 1995-1997
(1) YU Dinar million billions
*Note: Data for 1990-1992 are fully comparable. Adjustments were made to allow for the 1992
denomination (one zero deleted). Data for 1993 are in million billions of dinars and adjustments were
made to allow for 1993 denomination (six zeros deleted). From 1994 all data are in millions of new dinars
fully comparable.
Source: National Bank of Yugoslavia, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 1995-1997
(1) YU Dinar million billions
*Note: Data for 1990-1992 are fully comparable. Adjustments were made to allow for the 1992
denomination (one zero deleted). Data for 1993 are in million billions of dinars and adjustments were
made to allow for 1993 denomination (six zeros deleted). From 1994 all data are in millions of new dinars
and fully comparable.
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Appendix 3-4 SDK/ZOP - The Clearinghouse data
Table 9-29 Volume of the payment system transactions processed by the
clearinghouse
Year
Number of
payment
Instructions
Credit transfers -
paper and
electronic
%
Cash
transactions') %
Telex
instructions %
1990 236,000,000 n/a n/a n/a
1991 213,979,778 161,019,250 75.25 51,530,028 24.1 1,430,500 0.67
1992 224,739,119 167,880,121 74.70 55,285,823 24.6 1,573,174 0.70
1993 269,686,943 216,691,663 80.34 52,662,844 19.5 332,436 0.25
1994 204,437,800 157,765,854 77.20 46,469,918 22.7 202,028 0.10
1995 232,223,000 178,451,355 76.84 53,688,535 23.2 83,110 0.04
1996 257,180,759 201,295,024 78.26 55,854,396 21.7 31,375 0.01
Appendices
Data source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
(1) These transactions refer to money (postal) orders, which involve cash at one or both ends of the
transactions, but involve cashless (inter-bank) clearing and settlement.
Table 9-30 Value of payments processed by SDK/ZOP by instruments
Year
Value of
payments -
billions of
dinars°
Credit transfers
- paper and
electronic
Cashz)
transactions
Other
transactions3)
1991 5,005 76% 20% 4%
1992 52,500 75% 20% 50/0
1993 852,000 84% 9% 7°A
1994 140 76% 19% 5%
1995 350 77% 17% 6%
1996 520 79% 16% 5%
Data source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
(1) The amounts before and after January 1994 are not comparable.
(2) These transactions refer to money (postal) orders, which involve cash at one or both ends of the
transactions, but involve cashless (inter-bank) clearing and settlement.
(3) Includes value of cheque processed.
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Table 9-31 Value of payments processed by SDK/ZOP by means of instruction
Value of	 Paper based Cash based' )
 Electronic Telex fund Telephone
Year	 payments —	 payment	 payment	 payment	 transfers's)	 fund
billions of instructions instructions instructions 	 transfers's)
dinare	 3)
1991 5,005 49% 20% 16% 6% 9%
1992 52,500 45% 20% 21% 8% 6%
1993 852,000 56% 9% 26% 2% 6%
1994 140 39% 19% 40% 1% 1%
1995 350 37% 17% 45% 1%
1996 520 35.5% 16.5% 52%
Data source.  ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
(1) The amounts before and after January 1994 are not comparable.
(2) These transactions refer to money (postal) orders, which involve cash at one or both ends of the
transactions, but involve cashless (inter-bank) clearing and settlement.
(3) Include electronic fund transfers between the units and payment orders sent electronically by the
customers to the clearinghouse. Prior to 1994 the values are identical to electronic fund transfers between
the units (shown in table 7).
(4) The instructions were in use only by the SDK units for payment orders that settle between them.
Table 9-32 Structure of payments processed by SDK/ZOP (of total value
Year
Total value
of payments
Payments
settled
within SDK
units
Payments
settled
between the
units
Electronic
fund transfer
between the
units
Telex fund
transfer
between the
units
Telephone/
Other fund
transfers
between u.
1991 100% 69% 31% 52% 18% 30%
1992 100% 65% 35% 60% 22% 18%
1993 100% 66% 34% 76% 5% 19%
1994 100% 59% 41% 95% 3% 2%
1995 100% 61% 39% 98% 2%
1996 100% 60% 40% 99.6% 0.4%
Data source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
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Table 9-33 Number of the 'cash' transactions' within the giro-system
Year
Total Cash
Transactions Clearinghouse At Post Offices
Initiated by	 Resulted in Cash
Cash Payment	 Withdrawal
1991 51,530,028 12,934,037 38,595,991 43,336,754 8,193,274
1992 55,285,823 15,093,029 40,192,794 46,218,948 9,066,875
1993 52,662,844 13,276,854 39,385,990 42,024,949 10,637,895
1994 46,469,918 17,191,937 29,277,981 37,372,003 9,097,915
1995 53,688,535 22,841,115 30,847,420 42,839,255 10,849,280
1996 55,854,396 24,341,494 31,512,902 45,492,526 10,361,870
Source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
(1) These transactions refer to money (postal) orders, which involve cash at one or both ends of the
transactions, but involve cashless (inter-bank) clearing and settlement.
Table 9-34 Structure of the 'cash' transactions processed ro of the total
number)
Total Cash Clearing-	 Post	 initiated by Clearing-	 Post	 Resulted	 At
	
Year Transactions house	 Offices	 cash	 house	 Offices	 in cash
	
clearing-	 At Post
%	 - cash	 - cash	 payments
	 - cash	 - cash	 withdrawals	 house	 Offices
	
inflows	 inflows	 outflows	 outflows
1991 100 20.00 64.10 84.10 5.20 10.70 15.90 25.10 74.90
1992 100 20.00 63.60 83.60 7.30 9.10 16.40 27.30 72.70
1993 100 17.10 62.70 79.80 7.94 12.26 20.20 25.05 74.95
1994 100 27.60 52.90 80.50 9.40 10.10 19.50 37.00 63.00
1995 100 30.30 49.50 79.80 12.30 7.90 20.20 42.60 57.40
1996 100 32.86 48.59 81.45 10.72 7.83 18.55 43.58 56.42
Source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
Table 9-35 Value and Number of cheques processed by the clearinghouse - ZOP in 1997
Number of Cheques Value of Average Postage and Postage No. of Daily
cheques processed - cheques amount per fees per payment average of
processed on average a processed - in cheque - in charged - in cheque - orders payment
day Dinars Dinars Dinars Dinars orders
13,002,740	 50,010	 2,015,425,170	 155	 1,040,220	 0.08	 3,310,154	 12,730
Source: ZOP - The Clearing and Settlement House
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9.4. Appendix 4: Yugoslav Payment and Banking Systems Survey Questionnaire
Circle a number or numbers in front of the answer chosen, and/or make a comment. All of the
information supplied by you will be kept strictly confidential with complete anonymity given to
respondents. To avoid possible ambiguities some definitions, according to Bank for International
Settlements, are given in the text or footnotes. This questionnaire should take you approximately 30
minutes or less to complete.
State the name of your bank/institution: 	
SECTION I - PAYMENT SYSTEM
1) Have you participated, so far, in a professional capacity in a forum or debate about
Yugoslav payment system?
1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW
la) If you did not, would you like to?
1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW
lb) If you did, who organised the event?
2) In your opinion, have the banks standings and interests, regarding the payment system,
been taken into account for the payment system design and legislation in the last five years?
1. YES ENTIRELY
2. YES TO A CERTAIN EXTENT
3. NOT ENOUGH
4. NOT AT ALL
Comment: 	
3) Were you, as a banker, satisfied with the payment system services that you used in period
1993-1997?
1. YES ENTIRELY
2. Y ES TO A CERTAIN EXTENT
3. NOT COMPLETELY
4. NOT AT ALL
3a) If you were satisfied state why (what would you single out as positive about it)?
3b) If you were not entirely satisfied or not satisfied at all state why?
4) How do you view payment system costs with regard to SDK-the clearinghouse services you
used in period 1993-1997?
1.VERY HIGH
2. HIGH
3. ADEQUATE
4. LOW
5. VERY LOW
Comment: 	
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5) From your institution's point of view, and from contacts with your customers, how do you
view versatility of payment instruments offer and choice among them during 1993 to 1997?
1.EXCELLENT OFFER (OR CHOICE AMONG) OF PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS
2. GOOD CHOICE
3. SATISFACTORY CHOICE
4. LIMITED CHOICE
5. INADEQUATE CHOICE
Comment: 	
6) How would you assess the payment system efficiency during 1993 to 1997, regarding the
speed of payment orders processing (from the moment order is sent by payer till it can be
used for further payments by payee)?
1. VERY FAST
2. FAST
3. ADEQUATE
4. SLOW
5. VERY SLOW
7) From your experience during the period, what was the average time (how many minutes,
hours or days) for a payment to reach the counterpart, i.e. from a payment order instruction by
the payer till the payee can use (make payments with) the funds?
a) interbank payments: 	 ; b) corprorate payments: 	
c) retail payments: 	
8) In light of payment system costs, risks and efficiency - Which settlement system (system of
transferring money, i.e. of discharging the payment obligation) do you view as adequate for
Yugoslav banking and payment system?
1. GROSS SETTLEMENT AT THE NATIONAL BANK. With gross processing and settlement, i.e.
on transaction by transaction basis, and with the intervention of settlement agent (central bank)
who provides additional liquidity or the guarantee of settlement (BIS 1997).
2. GROSS SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE COUNTERPART. Instead of the intra-day overdrafts
granted by the central bank, it employs queue management, i.e. orders are processed only if
there are funds at the payer bank's account, on, for example, the first in first out mode (BIS
1997).
3. NET SETTLEMENT IN A COMMERCIAL BANKS' NETWORK. With net processing and
settlement of the banks' net position (usually) at the end of the day (BIS 1997).
4. NET SETTLEMENT AT SOME OTHER INSTITUTION OR A CLEARINGHOUSE (e.g. ZOP )
5. OTHER (state) 	)
Comment: 	
9) Would your bank/institution participate in costs of establishing such, in your opinion
adequate, clearing and settlement system?
1. YES
2. NO
3. DON'T KNOW
287
Payment Systems Reforms
	 Appendices
10) With regard to the debate on the new payment system design, what do you thing about the
involvement of commercial banks in payment system operations?
1. THEY SHOULD BE THE MAIN PROVIDERS OF THE PAYMENT SERVICES
2. THEY SHOULD BE THE PROVIDERS OF LARGE VALUE PAYMENTS (interbank
payments and large corporate payments)
3. THEY SHOULD BE THE PROVIDERS OF SMALL VALUE PAYMENTS
4. THEY SHOULD BE INVOLVED MORE THAN THEY ARE NOW
5. THEY SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED AT THE MOMENT BUT AT A LATTER STAGE
6. THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGES OF THE ORGANISATION OF THE PAYMENT SYSTEM
7. (OTHER)	
Comment: 	
11) What should be the legal framework regarding the number and type of banks/institutions
that carry the payment system services?
1. ALL BANKS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROVISION OF THE
SERVICES ON THE SAME TERMS
2. ONLY CERTAIN, APPOINTED, BANKS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO BE PROVIDERS (CLEARING
BANKS) FOR PAYMENT CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT (FOR OTHER BANKS AND CUSTOMERS)
3. (oTHER)	
Comment: 	
12) How would you assess the proposition that ZOP - the clearinghouse acts as an agent or
principal for banks, i.e. to facilitate the payment services in name and for the account of
banks?
1.1 APPROVE IT AND THINK IT SHOULD BE OBLIGATORY FOR ALL BANKS
2. IT IS GOOD AS A TEMPORARILY MEASURE AND SHOULD BE OBLIGATORY FOR ALL
BANKS
3. IT COULD BE A GOOD SOLUTION FOR SOME BANKS AND THE MEASURE SHOULD BE
ON A VOLUNTARILY BASIS
4.1 DO NOT APPROVE THE PROPOSITION
5. OTHER	
Comment: 	
13) Do you view banks as ready for becoming the main payment system providers, in light
of the facilities, branch network and skills of staff? Chose as many answers as you think
appropriate.
1. BANKS ARE READY FOR PROVIDING THE PAYMENT SYSTEM SERVICES
2. BANKS HAVE NOT GOT ENOUGH SKILLED STUFF
3. BANKS LACK ADEQUATE TECHNICAL FACILITIES
4. THEY HAVE NOT GOT ENOUGH BRANCHES (OR THERE IS NOT AN
ADEQUATE NETWORK OF THE BRANCHES)
5. THEY ARE NOT READY
6. (OTHER) 	
Comment:
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14) If your bank/institution plans further involvement in payment operations, which payment
system services do you plan to introduce/expand in the next 12 months?
15) Have you got plans for committing additional funds (for example in equipment,
technology, staff training, opening of new branches) for payment operations provision in the
next 12 months? If yes, what do you plan to invest in?
16) Which of the bellow listed payment instruments/services your bank offers to its customers
at the moment? Choose all appropriate answers.
1. CHEQUES / CHEQUE BOOKS
2. ELECTRONIC CREDIT ORDERS (customers can give the instruction electronically)
3. PAPER CREDIT ORDERS
4. CREDIT CARDS FOR DOMESTIC PAYMENTS
5. CREDIT/ DEBIT CARDS FOR PAYMENTS ABROAD
6. ELECTRONIC CASH - ON A PLASTIC CARD WITH THE EMBODIED COMPUTER CHIP
7. DEBIT CARDS
8. OTHER CARDS (e.g. cheque guarantee cards or cash/ATM cards)
8. TRAVELERS CHEQUES IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
9. CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS FOR BUSINESS
10. RETAIL CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT SERVICES
11. CASH DISPENSER
12. AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINES THAT CAN PROCESS A PAYMENT ORDERS
13. TELEPHONE BANKING
14. ELECTRONIC HOME BANKING
15. DIRECT DEBIT PAYMENTS
16. STANDING ORDER PAYMENTS
17. FREE BANKING STATEMENTS SENT TO A HOME ADDRESS
18. (other) 	
19. (other) 	
Comment: 	
16a) State the numbers of the above listed services that you do not offer at the moment but plan
to introduce within next two years:
17) Your additional comments about the payment system design and problems:
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SECTION II- BANKING SYSTEM
1) What is the ownership structure of your bank/institution in percentage?
a) "social" ownership 	 %; b) state 	 %; c) private	 %; d) foreign
investors	 %
2) State the amount of capital of your bank: 	 (dinars or state the currency) and
capital ratio 	 (as a percentage of risk weighted assets).
3) How would you assess/rank your bank according to the certain indicators and in comparison
with other Yugoslav banks? Tick one field for each category.
a)MARKET SHARE:	 (=I up (0 5% U from 5.01 to 10 % Ulfrom 10.01 (0 20% 1:3 above 20%
WAMOUNT OF ASSETS: Ul up to lmillion dinars arorn 1.01 to 5 million 1:11 from 5.01 to 10 million
Clfrom 10.01 to 20 million Uabove 20 million
C) NUMBER OF BRANCHES: [D from 1 to 10 Ufrom 11 (0 25 Lafrom 26 to 50
Ufrom 51 do 100 Lifrom 101 to 200 D above 200
d) NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: D up to 50	 Li from 51 to 100 CII from 101 to 250
ID from 251 to 500 1:1
 from 501 to 1000 D above 1000
e) SPECIALISATION AND NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS:
Lispecialised/ small number of customers ID specialised/ large number of customers
CI universal/small number of customers ZI universal/ large number of customers.
4) What new services/activities do you plan to introduce within next two years?
5) How would you assess Y ugoslav banking system regarding the quality of services (other
than speed) and efficiency of financial intermediation in the economy at the moment?
(efficiency relates to timing and speed of banking services)
1. EFFICIENT, HIGH QUALITY OF SERVICES
2. EFFICIENT, AVERAGE QUALITY OF SERVICES
3. INEFFICIENT, AVERAGE QUALITY OF SERVICES
4. INEFFICIENT, POOR QUALITY OF SERVICES
5. (other) 	
State why?:
	
6) What do you think about the quality of placements and asset composition of Yugoslav banks
as a whole at the moment?
1. HIGH ASSET AND PLACEMENTS QUALITY
2. SATISFACTORY QUALITY
3. LOW QUALITY
4. VERY LOW QUALITY
5. (OTHER)	
Comment: 	
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7) What do you thin about the number of banks in relation to the businesses' needs and
financial intermediation efficiency?
1. THERE SHOULD BE EVEN MORE BANKS IN THE SYSTEM
2. THERE IS AN ADEQUATE NUMBER OF BANKS
3. THERE IS A LARGER NUMBER OF BANKS THAN REQUIRED
4. THERE ARE FAR TOO MANY BANKS
5. (OTHER)	
Comment: 	
7a) If you thing there are more banks than necessary or that the system could be rationalised to
become more efficient, what would be the adequate solution regarding the improvements on
quality and speed, and reduction of costs and risk of banking intermediation? Chose not
more than three solutions and/or make a comment.
1. BANK MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS FACILITATED/HELPED BY THE GOVERNMENT
2. SELL/ PRIVATISE CERTAIN NUMBER OF STATE AND SOCIALLY OWNED BANKS
3. TOUGHER LICENSING PROCEDURE (TOUGHER AND MORE PRUDENT REQUIREMENTS)
4. TOUGHER SURVEILLANCE AND SUPERVISION OF BANKS' LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS (LICENSE WITHDRAWALS)
5. LET THE MARKET FORCES DEAL WITH THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF BANKS
6. (OTHER)	
Comment: 	
8) Do you think that Yugoslav banking (especially the 'old' banks) needs overall planned
restructuring, i.e. organised transformation facilitated and financed by the state?
1. YES
2. YES, BUT WITH MINIMAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE STATE
3. NO
4. DON'T KNOW
5. (other)	
8a) If the answer to question 8. is "yes", how do you think it should be done? Chose one to
three most appropriate ways or their combination. (N.B. option 1. excludes option 2.)
1. BY RESTRUCTURING' MOST OF THE STATE/SOCIALLY OWNED BANKS AT THE SAME TIME
2. ONE BY ONE BANK RESTRUCTURING, NOT ALL BANKS INCLUDED
3. BY SELLING /PRIVATISING (OR LIQUIDATING IF NOT POSSIBLE) MAJORITY OF THE BANKS
4. BY SELLING/PRIVATISING OR LIQUIDATING SOME OF THE BANKS BEFORE THE
RESTRUCTURING
5. BY SELLING/PRIVATISING SOME BANKS AFTER THE OVERALL RESTRUCTURING
6. BY CHANGING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF BANKING SYSTEM AND OPERATIONS
7. BY ATTRACTING FOREIGN BUYERS/ INVESTORS TROUGH SPECIAL CONCESSIONS
8.(0THER) 	
Comment: 	
I For example by depositing additional capital, shifting the banks liabilities to the state (e.g. to a specially appointed agency), asset
cleaning, change of management, merging and acquiring state/social banks by the state and from its funds and/or by issuing new
public debt.
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8b) If the answer to question 8 is "yes, but with minimal involvement of the state" or "no",
why?
9) What do you think is important for establishing a sound and efficient banking system in the
country within the next three years? Please choose only one degree for each category.
(VI) very important; (I) important; (U) unimportant; (VU) very unimportant
Importance 
1. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT MARKET ECONOMY	 1. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
2. CHANGES IN THE OWNERSHIP AND SHAREHOLDERS STRUCTURE	 2. (VI) (1) (U) (VU)
3. INVESTING IN NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND NEW SERVICES DEVELOPMENT 	 3. ND (I) (U) (VU)
4. INVESTING IN BANK STAFF TRAINING AND SKILLS OD BY THE BANKS 	 4. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
5. RESTRUCTURING OF THE BANKS BY THE STATE	 S. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
6. RESTRUCTURING OF THE BANKS' DEBTORS BY THE STATE 	 6. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
7. ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INVESTORS/SHAREHOLDERS	 7. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
8. IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND CHOICE OF SERVICES 	 8. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
9. BANKS SPECIALISATION IN PARTICULAR FIELDS	 9. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
10. EXPANDING BANKS ACTIVITIES TO SECURITIES AND CUSTODY	 10. (VI) (1) (U) (VU)
11. BANKS CONCENTRATION/ENLARGEMENT (e.g. through M&A) 	 11. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
12. IMPROVING THE PAYMENT SYSTEM (i.e. its speed, cost and risk) 	 12. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
13. IMPROVING THE PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS CHOICE	 13. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
14. TIGHT MONETARY CONTROL (including liquidity and solvency surveillance)
	
14. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
15. LOW INFLATION	 15- (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
16. INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK 	 16. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
17. TOUGHER TERMS OF BOTH LENDING AND CREDIT RATING ASSESSMENT 	 17. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
18. OTHER (state what)
	 	
18. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
19. OTHER (state what) 	 	 19. (VI) (I) (U) (VU)
Comment: 	
10) What do you think about allowing foreign financial institutions to do the banking
business in Yugoslavia on the same terms as domestic bank? Chose only two answers.
1. IT WOULD INCREASE THE COMPETITION AND OVERALL QUALITY OF SERVICES
2. IT WOULD ENCOURAGE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN DOMESTIC BANKS AND
ECONOMY
3. IT WOULD JEOPARDISE THE SURVIVAL OF THE DOMESTIC BANKS
4. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ONLY AFTER THE RESTRUCTURING OF DOMESTIC BANKS
5. THE ENTRY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO JOINT VENTURES
6. CURRENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS REGARDING FOREIGN BANKS SHOULD NOT
CHANGE
7. (OTHER) 	
Comment:
	
11) If you plan to establish/expand co-operation with foreign banks for offering financial
services home or abroad in the next 12 months, what will it be in? Chose all applicable
answers.
1. ESTABLISHING NEW CORESPONDENT ACCOUNTS
2. PARTICIPATION IN SOME OF THE PAYMENT NETWORKS
for example: TIPA, DISCUS, IBOS, ECHO, EUROGIRO etc.
3. SETTING UP A JOINT BANK/ SUBSIDIARY ABROAD
4. SETTING UP A JOINT BANK/SUBSIDIARY IN YUGOSLAVIA
5. SOME OTHER KIND OF JOINT VENTURE, MERGER AND/OR ACQUISITION
6. STAFF TRAINING FOR PROVIDING SERVICES AND/OR USE OF RELEVANT
TECHNOLOGIES
7. (OTHER)	
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11a) Have you got plans for some of the modes of co-operation in the next three years? State
which and when.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ALL YOUR ASSISTANCE IN
COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE!
In return for your time and co-operation in completing this survey we would be glad to send you
a complimentary copy of the survey's key findings. If you would like a copy of this report then
please attach one of your business cards to the front of this questionnaire when returning it. The
report will be sent to you as soon as it becomes available.
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